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SRIMAN-NYAYA-SUDHA

(Pañchādhikaraṇi)

By

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Sri Gururajo Vijayate

PREFACE

The present brochure is intended to acquaint the student of Indian philosophy with the rich contribution made by *S'ri Jayatīrtha* otherwise called *Ṭikāchārya*, to the development of world thought in his *Magnus Corpus*, the *Nyāya-Sudhā* a commentary on the *Aṇuvyākhyāna* of Srīī Madhvāchārya the propounder of *Dvaita-Siddhānta*. Srī Madhvāchārya who is held in high reverence as the *Avatāra* of *Vāyu* the highest repository of wisdom and strength among the souls, flourished in the 13th century A D. and *S'rī Jayatīrtha* being the pupil of Śrī *Akshōbhyatīrtha* the direct *S'ishya* (pupil) of the *Āchārya* was removed from the latter by two generations only. The greatest equipment of *S'rī Jayatīrtha* to interpret the *Āchārya s Dvaita Siddhānta* is stated to be Śri Āchārya's unfailing grace and compassion on him as recorded in the opening verse of the *Nyāya-Sudhā :—*

न शब्दाब्धौ गाढा न च निगमचर्चासु चतुराः ।
न च न्याये प्रौढा न च विदितवेद्या अपि वयम् ॥
परं श्रीमत्पूर्णप्रमति गुरुकारुण्य सरणिं ।
प्रपन्ना मान्याः स्मः किमपि च वदंतोऽपि महताम् ॥

—*Nyāya-Sudhā*

"I am not a deep scholar in the science of language, not conversant with the problems of *Nigama* i.e. the Vedic lore, not an adept in logic and not acquainted with the knowable principles of Philosophy. But my main strength consists in the special compassion of the great PŪRṆAPRAJÑA (All-knowing) Guru and under its shelter whatever I utter has become acceptable to the great scholars.' This indeed is a great compliment to the

versatile genius of the *Āchārya* as the works of *Śrī Jayatīrtha* bristle with sparks of great learning, depth of scholarship and unsurpassed dignity and clarity of exposition in every syllable, word and sentence which in all humility are attributed in a spirit of self-surrender to the loving kindness and patronage of the great *Guru Śrī Madhvāchārya.* A perusal of the Nyāya-Sudhā for example brings, home to the reader, the author's unchallenged mastery over the unexplored realms of philosophy and the faithful representation of the opponents' views with their full strength of arguments in defence. This is surely a fair deal which measures the strength of the combatants in the arena and the claims of superiority and victory are left to be judged by the umpires In this fair and open fight, Śrī Jayatīrtha has smashed the stand of his opponents one and all and emerged victorious, establishing the superiority of the Dvaita Siddhānta of Śrī Madhvāchārya as the only correct approach and solution leading to the Gates of Truth and eternal happiness i.e. Mōksha. His *Nyāya Sudhā* has held a unique place of honour during the last seven hundred years as the unchallenged vindicater of Dvaita philosophy of Śrī Madhvacharya and even the scholars of opposite camp bow their head in reverence to him for the fair deal and dignity shown to all schools of thought and for the clinching grip of arguments advanced to overthrow his adversary.

The late Mahāmahōpādhyāya Śrī Ananta Krishṇa Śāstri published in 1961 a work of Śrī Ānandapūrṇa, called Nyāya Chandrikā, with a long introduction in Sanskrit and English in which he has laboured hard to show that Sri Ānandapūrṇa has refuted the Nyāyasudhā of Śrī Jayatīrtha, threadbare. Further, he has argued that Sri Ānandapūrṇa was a contemporary of Śrī Jayatīrtha. He also wrote an independent work called Advaita-Tatva-Sudhā (part-I) in which he has criticised the arguments of the Nyāya-Sudhā advanced to refute the Advaita of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya. This was an unwise venture of the Śāstri to have measured his strength with the greatest adept in philosophy whose word is held in high esteem as a trenchant

critic and sound philosopher of great erudition and scholarship, equally by all controvertialists and scholars in Dvaita, Advaits Visishtādvaita, during the last seven centuries of years. Śrī Ananta Krishṇa Śāstri's elaims to understand and criticise the *Nyāya Sudhā* were treated with scant attention in the scholarly world and several treatises refuting his works tooth and nail, have already appeared in the fieild. The most important among them are Śri Nyāya Sudhā – Maṇḍana of Sri 1008 Śrī Satyapramōdatīrtha Śrīpadaṅgaḷu the present celebrated pontif-scholar of Śrī Uttarādi Math, the Advaita-Tatva-Sudhā Śamikshā of the great scholar Śri Vidyānanyatīrtha Śrīpāda of Bhandarkeri (now Phalimāru) Math of Udipi, the Nyāya-Sudhā-Kaṇṭakōddhāra of Pandit Jālihāl Śrinivāsachārya who is an erudite Pandit in Śāstras. In this series may be mentioned the Nyāa-Sudhā-Parimaḷa-Prasara of the late Pandit Acharya Venkōbāchārya the Asthana-Vidvān of Śri Raghvendrasvami Math who has shown with searching analysis that the new arguments of Śrī Ananta Krishṇa Śāstri stand refuted long long ago in the *Parimaḷa* a commentary on the Nyāya-Sudhā, by the Great Saint Philosopher Śri Rāghavendratīrth Śri Pādangaḷu who flourished exactly 300 years ago today, This last work is now published in the Silver-Jubilee Pubications of the Parimaḷa Publishing House by Vidyā Vāchaspati Raja S. Gururājāchārya, Nanjangud.

I studied the works of Ananta Krisna Śāstri critically and set to myself the task of presenting the contents of the Nyāya-Sudhā in English to the English-Knowing students of Indiau Philosophy, maintaining the intricacies of Sastric arguments of the original and of evaluating the great merits of the work with an analytical and comparative study. I have mainly depended upon " The Parimala " the well-known gloss of Srl Rāghvendratīrtha on the *Sudhā* and have given copious extracts from it to elucidate my statements. After the whole work is thus studied, the criticisms of Śri Ānandapūrṇa and Ananta Kṛishṇa Śāstri will be dealt with serially. As a first step towards this undertaking, I have presented in this work the contents of the fitsr fiae

Adhikaraṇas (Pañchādhikaraṇi) which is more or less a synopsis of the entire Brahma-mīmāṁsā-Śāstra (Vedanta Sūlras) of Bādarāyaṇa.

I completed the study of the *Jijñāsādhikaraṇa* in this way as early as 1961 immediately after the work of Śri Ānadapūrṇa was published by Śri Ananta Krishna Śāstri, and at the desire of Śrī Raja Gururājacharya, sent the typescript to him for publication in that very year. Śrī Gururajacharya wanted similar works in Sanskrit and other languages and the work oi the late Vidwan A. Venkobacharya was one of them. Śrī Āchārya has now designed to publish a series of works during the Silver Jubilee Celebrations and I am glad to note that he has included my work in English in this Series.

The *Parimaḷa Publishing House* is a well-known Research and Publication Centre of Karnatak founded by the Scholar-enthusiasts the late Dr. H. K. Vedavyasacharya, M.A. Ph.D. and Vidya Vaibhava Vedanta Siromani Sripadputra Raja S. Gururajacharya under the benign care and patronage of the late Śrī Śrī 1008 Suyamindratīrtha Śri pādangaḷu the late pontiff of Śrī Rāghavendra Svāmi Math, in 1945, who inaugurated the scheme and executed several cultural works to promote the cause of Dvaita Siddhānta. It was due to His Holiness's unfailing support and encouragement that the Guru-Sārvabhaun a-Sanskrit Patha Sala (College) and the Samīrasamaya Samvarddhinī Sabhā (Annual Conference of Pandits and Students of Dvaita Vedanta) received a momentum and thrived with great success The Parimala Publishing House studied and published several rare wosks of Śrī Vijayēndratīrtha and started a cultural monthly ' Parimaḷa ' in Kannada which is a good forum to educate the public in ancient Indian Culture and Philosophy.

I am happy to recall that the Silver Jubilee Celebrations of the Parimala Publishing House coincide with the momentous 300th year of the Great Saint-Philosopher Śrī Rāghavēndra-tīrtha's entering into *Vrindāvana* alive in 1671 A,D. It is a

common belief among the Mādhva Pandits that Śrī Raghavendra-tīrtha remains alive in his works for 300 years and in Vrindavana for 700 years. Thus, the 300th year falling in 1971 gathers special significance and sacredness for the students of Dvaita Philosophy who study and consult the *tippaṇis* of Śrī Rāghavēndra Swāmigaḷu as an indispensable guide to understand the works of Śrī Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha and of Śrī Madhvāchārya. Śrī Jayatīrtha's Vādāvali, Nyāya-Sudhā and Tatva Prakāśikā are taught by the Pandits invariably with the *ṭippaṇis* of Śrī Rāghavendratīrtha viz. Prakāśa, Parimaḷa and Bhāvadīpa respectively. Śrī Vyāsatīrtha's Tātparya Chandrikā and Tarka-Tāṇḍava cannot be understood without the glosses of the *Rayaru* (i. e. Sri Raghavendratīrtha) namely *Prakāśha* and *Tarka-Tāṇḍava–Vivaraṇa*. The Ten Prakaraṇas and the Bhāshyas on the Ten Upanishads of the Āchārya are elucidated with the Commentaries (Khaṇḍārtha) of the Rāyaru only. Hence the works of Śrī Rāghavēndrasvamigaḷu are invaluable guides to the students and teachers of Dvaita Vēdānta and the indebtedness to the Saint cannot be adequately redeemed but by studying them with his blessings and propagating the Siddhānta of Śri Madhvāchārya among the people.

It is incumbent on every Mādhva to Commemorate the 300th year as a sacred event in the cultural history of Dvaita Vedānta, ceremoniously on a cultural plane and pray the Saint Philosopher and through his great offices the great Guru Śrī Madhvācharya and God Vedavyāsa to extend the lease of vigour and life of the illustrious works of Śri Rāghavēndratīrtha for all centuries to come, without abatement and bestow upon us the great boon of perennial help and guidance so that we the seekers after Truth may reach our goal of happiness without any mishap. This is the occasion when we can with nn unbroken chorus transmit our prayers with folded hands and discharge our duties in an humble way.

I feel elated to note that the publication of the present brochure on " Nyāya Sudhaā " is timed to synchronise with this

sacred occasion of Śrī Gururāja's 300th Year Celebrations, which I offer as my small 'sēvā' to the Swamigaḷu. For this happy combination, I am indebted to Vidya-Vachaspati Śrī Raja S. Gururājacharya founder-Editor of the Parimaḷa Publishing House, Nanjangud.

Lastly, I offer my hearty thanks to the Manager, Vidyāraṇya Mudrāmaṇḍir of the K. E. Board, Dharwar, for his readiness to undertake the printing of this highly technical work and for the neat and careful execution of his assignment. Inspite of the best care to correct the proofs, some minor printing mistakes have still remained which the readers are requested to rectify while reading.

R. S. Panchamukhi

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

We feel it a proud privilege to present to the scholars of Indian Philosophy the learned thesis on the *Pañchādhikaraṇr* of Nyāyasudhā, the celebrated disquisitional gloss on the *Anu-vyākhyāna* of Śrī Madhvāchārya, by Mahāmahimopādhyāya Vidyāratna Śrī Raghavēndrāchārya Swamirayāchāya (R. S.) Panchmukhi M.A. Retired Director of the Kannada Research Institute Dharwar and the Chief Editor and Vice President — Chairman of the Karnatak Historical Research Society, Dharwar. This is an analytical study and a running narrative of the contents of the Sudhā presented in a logical setting with copious explanatory cxtracts from the *Parimaḷa* of Sri Rāghavēndratī·tha and other works given to clarify difficult points in the text. Since the first five *Adhikaraṇas* form ihe foundational structure of the philosophical enquiry about Brahma for the attainment of of final emancipation and bliss, the author has rightly confined himself to their study only, in the present brouchre in the Series of his studies in Nyāyasudhā. The author intends to examine the contents of the Advaita-Tatvasudhā of the late M. M. AnantaKrishnaŚāstri which criticises the Nyāyasudhā of Sri Jayatīrtha. This he proposes to do in full details in the last volume of the Series though the *concluding* chapters in the present work touches a few points and refntes the Sastri's adverse comments in a general way.

M. M. Vidyaratna Raghavēndrācharya has rendered signal service to tke cause of Dvaita philosophy by editing the Tantradīpikā of Śrī Raghvēndratīrtha with a critical introduction in Sanskrit and Engiish, the *Prabandha-Shaṭka* (six Treatises on the *Nyāvas* of Brahmasūtras) by Śrī Vijayīndra, Śrī Sudhīndra. Sri Sumatīndra, Śrī Vadīndra (in his pre Sanyāsa period), Sri Dhīrēndra and Pandita Venkataēhārya Panchamukhi, the great grand-father of Śrī R. S. Panchamukhi. Besides these, he has written a number of works and erudite articles on Dvaita

Siddhānta which were published in the *Parimala* and the *Tatvavāda.* His *Haridāsa Sāhitya* a scholarly work on the Haridāsas of Karnātak published by the Kannada Sahitya Parishad Bangalore as early as 1953 is a standard work on the Vaishṇava Dāsas of Karnātak This is the first critical study on the Haradāsas with historical and archaeological cvidences to trace the movement of Bhakti in India and brims with philosophical discussions of first rare value. I feel happy to record here that this achievement of the Acharya was the first book on the subject to apply research methodology tothe studies inHaridasa literature in Kannada. His example was followed by Kannada scholars in their studies of the subject. See for example the Haridasas of Karnatakɐ by the late Dr. Sri. H. K. Vedavyasacharya (preface).

Śrī Vidyaratna Panchamukhi's versatile contributions to the Indological research have expanded the range and scope of the Karnātak History from the Mauryan period to the prehistoric period of the dim past of the palaeolithic and neolithic ages by his outstanding discovereis and exploration of archaeological sites for the first time in Karnātak (see e.g. his book "The Archaeology of Karnātak"). His valuable work "My contribution to Indology" provides the details of his achievements in epigraphy. archaeology, Art and Architecture, literature Sanskṛit and Kannaḍa and other fields of Antiquarian research.

Equipped with keen Historical and penetrating research acumen, Sri Panchamukhi has approached the subject of his studies with an objective and impartial outlook and his con--clusions have been highly respected in the scholarlly world in India and abroad. A perusal of this brochure will bring home to the scholars that M. M. Panchamukhi never indulges in personal praise or censure but leaves the reader to judge for himself from the large amount of evidences cited to support the conclusions drawn from their proper and judicious application. He has followed the great savants of old in his methodology which never fails to lead to a correct conclusion. Sri Madhvāchāryas' works demonstrate how the author strings

together the words of his *Guru* Śrī Vēdavyasa from the Mahā-Bharata, Purānas and Sūtras to elicit his teachings in philosophy. The same method was adopted by Sri Jayatīrtha, Shri Vyastīrtha, Sri Rāghavēndratīrtha and other great philosophers in their works This rare method of compositioa has enhanced the value of the present brochure in detecting the correct import of the Sūtras from *Sūdhā* and *Anuvyākhyāna.*

I need not add that Sri Pachamukhi's training and equipment in Śastras and in University Education were of a high order. This has stood him in good stead in his academic pursuits both as Direetor of Kannada Research Institute and now as the Chlef Editor of the Karnatak Historicai Research Society Dharwar. He is verily a versatile genius and is regarded with respect as 'the Father of Research' in North Karnatak.

Sri Raghavendrachaya's private and public life are so beautifully and harmoniously blended that even a short contact with his personality will sublimate the surrounding region with showers of secred nectar. Even in this old age of 77, his crowded engagements of Śāstra–pravachana (tuition in Śāstrās) to students on traditional lines, daily Pūja and writing of books in philosophy and Indology baffle even a youth of 25 and teach a lesson of caution to younger generations. Sueh a holy sage he is. We heartily offer our tributes of respect and homage to such divine Angels-on Earth who carry out the message of the God with rare perseverence and persistence for the good of mankind.

We are really fortunate in publishing his dissertation on the Nyāyasudhā (Five Adhikaraṇas) in the Series of Parimala publication on the occasion of the Trecentcnary Celebrations of the Great Saint Philosopher Śrī Rāghavēndratīrtha Srīpādaṅgaḷu whose loyal and loving disciple Śri Panchamukhi is. We pray the God Śri Mūla Rāma, Śrī Madhvāchārya an avatāra of Vāyu and Sri Rāghavēndrasvamiji to pour their choicest blessings of long and eventful life on M. M. Vidyāratna Rāghavendrāchārya so that he might render more useful and solid service to the cause of Dvaita Siddhānta and Religion.

We record here our sincere thanks to Sri C. N. R. Rau son of the late C. Narayan Rao, whose munificient gift of money has enabled us to meet the entire cost of this publication. Sri C. N R. Rao has donated this money to commemorate his father the late C, Narayana Rao, who was a great devotee of Sri Raghavēndrasvamiji. His unsverving devotation to Sri Rāghavēndrasvāmiji has inspired him to do such divine acts which are sure to bring him mental peace and spiritual solace

In the end, I thank the proprietor of the K. E. Board Mudraṇa Mandira, Dharwar, who has executed the printing of this work neatly and artistically.

NANJANGUD
Ananda Margasirsha
Su. 1 Saturday
1—12—1974

Vidyā-Vāchaspati, Vidyāratnam
RAJA S. GURURAJACHARYA
Proprietor and Direetor-Editor-in-Chief,
Parimala Publishing House,
Nanjangud.

" विद्याऽऽत्मनि भिदाबोधः "

निवेदनम्

श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थीय सच्छास्त्रामृतवर्षकः ।
श्रीमत्परिमलो नाम भाति प्रकटनालयः ।।

महदिदं प्रमोदस्थानं नः यदद्य निरवद्य द्वैतविद्या वैदुष्यालङ्कृतानां, विशुद्ध भगवद्भक्तिवैराग्यमण्डितानां, सदाचार-शांत्यौदार्य-सच्छीलादिगुणगणविराजितानां, प्रबुद्धविदग्ध प्रतिभाविद्योतितानां, प्रसिद्ध संस्कृताङ्गलकर्णाटक भाषाप्रबन्धप्रणयनपटूनां, वैदिक-हरिदास-वाङ्मय प्रसारणबद्धादराणां, जगदुद्धारकगुरुवरश्रीमन्मन्त्रालयमुनीन्द्रपदपङ्कजमकरन्दास्वादनमत्तमधुकराणां, सदाचारसत्सम्प्रदायादिसनातनधर्म निष्ठानां "महामहिमोपाध्यायः, विद्यारत्नं, विद्याभूषणं, पण्डितराजः, हरिदाससाहित्यरत्न" मित्याद्यन्वर्थकविरुदावलीविभूषितानां **पञ्चमुखप्राव्हानां** श्रीमतां **राघवेन्द्राचार्य** एम् ए. महोदयानां "श्रीमन्न्यायसुधा" भिधमाङ्गलभाषामयं प्रबन्धप्रवरं मुद्राप्य प्रकाशनपथं नीयत इति ।

प्रबन्धोऽयं कालीघट्ठ (Calcutta) नगरादिषु नैकेषु महापत्तनेषु समुष्य तत्रत्यसंस्कृतमहाविद्यालयेषु संस्कृतप्रधानाध्यापकपदवीं निरूढवतां "महामहोपाध्याये" त्यादि बिरुदाङ्कितानां अद्वैतविद्या प्रतिपादनपटूनां, श्रीमतामनन्तकृष्णशास्त्रि महोदयानां "अद्वैततत्त्व सुधा" नामकस्य प्रबंधस्य विमर्शनपरः, श्रीमदाचार्य-टीकाकृत्पाद-चंद्रिकाकृत्पाद परिमळाचार्य प्रमुखपूर्वाचार्य वाङ्मयविभूषणपरः, तत्रापि **श्रीमन्न्यायसुधा मण्डनपरो** विराजते ।

विदितचरमेवेदं समेषां विबुधवराणां यत्–श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्येत्याद्यमन्दबिरुदबृन्ददीप्तिदेदीप्यमानानां श्रीमद्वैदिकबैष्णव सिद्धांत

प्रतिष्ठापन धुरन्धराणां सर्वतन्त्र स्वतन्त्राणां जगद्गुरुवराणां श्रीमत्सर्वज्ञाचार्यवेदान्तसाम्राज्याधीश्वराणां जगन्मान्यानां श्रीमद्राघवेन्द्रगुरुसार्वभौमानां मठीयदिग्विजयविद्यासिंहासनाधीश्वराणां वदान्यवरेण्यानां श्रीमत्परिमलाचार्योभयवंशसुधाब्धिराकासुधाकराणां वन्दारुविबुधजनवृन्दावनानां श्रीमन्त्रालय सुक्षेत्रविलसत्सुदरबृन्दावनमन्दिराणां कीर्तिशेषाणां परमपूज्यानां **श्रीमत्सुयमीन्द्रतीर्थ श्रीचरणाना**माज्ञोपदेशेन न्यायवेदान्तादि षड्दर्शनेषु पाठप्रवचननिरतैः "विद्यारत्नं, विद्याभूषणं, विद्यालङ्कारे" त्यादिप्रशस्तिविभूषितैः श्रीमद्भिः (इदानीं स्वर्गवासिभिः) **आचार्य वेङ्कोबाचार्यैर्विरचितः**, महामहोपाध्याय श्रीमदनन्तकृष्णशास्त्रिभिर्विरचितस्य "अद्वैततत्त्वसुधा" ख्यग्रन्थस्य विमर्शनपरः "श्रीमन्न्यायसुधा परिमलप्रसरा" भिधः ग्रंथराजः गते खलु संवत्सरे श्रावण कृष्णपक्ष द्वितीयायां श्रीगुरुसार्वभौमानां महासमाराधना महोत्सव शुभप्रसङ्गे कल्याणनगरे श्रीमच्छ्रीपादराजमठाधीश्वराणां महाध्यक्ष्ये, कर्णाटकराज्यमन्त्रिवराणां सन्मान्यानां श्रीमतां बदरीनारायणमहाभागानाममृतहस्तेन अस्माभिः प्राकाशीति ।

इदानीं भारतीय तत्त्वशास्त्र – सनातनधर्म – संस्कृति प्रचार – वैदिकवाङ्मय संरक्षण – सम्पादन – प्रकाशन – प्रसारार्थमेव १९४५ तमे क्रिस्ताब्दे परमपूज्यानां श्रीमत्सुयमीन्द्रतीर्थ श्रीमच्चरणानामाज्ञानुसारेण संस्थापितस्य, अद्यापि तत्कार्यकरणबद्धादरस्य **श्रीमत्परिमल संशोधन प्रकाशन मंदिरस्य** प्रकाशनमालायाः एकोनपञ्चाशत्तम कुसुमतया, श्रीमत्सुयमीन्द्रमालायाः पञ्चविंशतितम कुसुमतया च 'अद्वैततत्त्वसुधा विमर्शनपरामिमां 'न्यायसुधा' भिधामाङ्ग्लभाषामयीं कृतिप्रवरामचिरादेव विबुधजनसन्दोहाय सश्रद्धं सोत्साहं सप्रेम समर्पयितुं मोमुदीत्यस्माकं चेतः ।

ग्रंथकारपरिचयः

अयमिदानीं यथासम्प्रदायं ग्रंथकर्तॄणां परिचायन रूप पवित्रकर्तव्ये उद्यताःस्मः ।

एतद्ग्रंथप्रणेतारः श्रीयुताः आचार्या अमी राघवेंद्राचार्याः सद्विद्यासु प्रथितयशसां पञ्चमुखीत्युपाख्यानां सदन्वये दिष्टचा लब्धजन्मानः । इमे खल्वाचार्याः धारवाड प्रान्त्ये 'कुरूविनक्रोप्पा' भिधे ग्रामे क्रिस्ताब्दे ४–५–१८९८ तमे श्रीमन्नृसिंह जयन्ती शुभदिने सौभाग्यवती श्रीमती सावित्रीदेवी पण्डित स्वामिरायाचार्ययोर्दम्पत्यो र्वरपुत्रतयाऽवातरन् । अमीषां प्राञ्च आचार्याः निजपाण्डित्यप्रतिभादिभिः तपस्यया च धवलयशोजुषः, तदानीन्तन विजयनगरचक्रवर्तिना हरिहरराजेन ग्रामाग्रहारप्रदानादिभि स्सहर्षं नितरां सम्मानिता आसन् । अमीषां पुरातना। यदा वाराणस्यामवसन् तदा तेषां गुरुकुले शताधिकाः विद्यार्थिनः चत्वार्यपि शास्त्राण्यधीयाना आसन् । पूर्वजाः एतेषां, जगन्मान्य श्रीराघवेन्द्र स्वामिनां मठीय दिग्विजय विद्यासिंहासनाधिष्ठितानां श्रीभुवनेंद्र-श्रीसुजनेंद्र प्रभृति समेषां गुरुपुङ्गवानां सानुग्रह गौरवपात्रभूताः समया श्रीगाणधाळे स्वयंव्यक्तंश्रीपञ्चमुखी प्राणदेवोपासकाः श्रीहरि गुरुभक्त प्रवराश्चावर्तन्त ।

"अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणमुपनयीत, तमध्यापयीत" इति श्रुत्यर्थ विचक्षणेन पित्रोपनीता अमी गर्भाष्टमे हायने, आशैशवं काव्य-नाटका-लङ्कारादि साहित्यं वेदान्तसच्छास्त्रं च निजपितृसन्निधावधीत्य, तदनु स्वकुलगुरुवरेभ्यः श्रीराघवेन्द्रमठाधीश्वरेभ्यः उपात्तन्यायवेदाण्तादिविद्याः विचक्षणाः श्रेष्ठपण्डितास्च समभवन् । किञ्च १९२३ तमे क्रिस्ताब्दे मुम्बयी विश्वविद्यानिलये आङ्ग्लविद्यां सम्यगभ्यस्य बि, ए. (B.A.) कलायां ब्रह्मचारी) परीक्षायां प्रथमश्रेण्यां समुत्तीर्णाः लब्धोत्कर्षाः दक्षिणाफेलो शिष्यगौरवेण सुवर्णपदकमलभन्त । अनन्तरं १९२५ तमे वत्सरे एम्. ए. (M.A.-स्नातकोत्तरायां कलोपाध्याय) परीक्षायां च श्रेष्ठस्थानमभजन् ।

तदनु १९२५ तमे क्रिस्ताब्दे भारत सर्वकारीय पुरावृत्त संशोधन संस्थायां (Epigraphic Department) प्राप्तोद्योगा अमी उत्तरकर्नाटकराज्ये अनेकेतिहास संशोधन शासनसंग्रह-परीक्षाकार्याणि विधाय लब्धप्रसृतकीर्तयोऽभवन् । १९२६ तम वत्सरमारभ्य १९३९ तम वत्सर

पर्यंतमिमे धारवाड-विजापुर-कारवार-बेलगाम् प्रभृतिषु मण्डलेषु सञ्चार्य नैकान्यद्भुतानि शोधनान्याकलय्य कर्णाटकेतिहासेषु प्रौढप्रकाशप्रसवानि अपूर्वं शासनानि इतर सामग्रीसमवायं चाविरकुर्वन् ।

श्रीयुताः धारवाडनगरे क्रि श १९३९ तमे वर्षे कांग्रेस् सर्वकारैः संस्थापितां 'कन्नडसंशोधन संस्थां राजकीयादेशानुसारेण प्रविश्य तस्या निर्देशका (Director of Kannada Rerearch) अभवन् । तत्र १९५३ तम वर्षपर्यन्तं निर्देशाधिकारस्थानमण्डिताः यावन्निवृत्ति समयं प्रागैतिहासिकानामितिहाससंबन्धिनां च संशोधनं विधाय नैकानि शासनान्याविष्कृत्य, तद्विषयमधिकृत्यानेकान् विमर्शात्मकान् ग्रन्थान् विरच्य कर्णाटक राज्यस्य विशेषतश्च निखिलभारतदेशायैव, तदितिहास प्रपंचाय चापूर्वोपायनानि व्यतरन् । ब्रूस् फूटर महोदयानन्तरं उत्तर कर्णाटक प्रागैतिहासिक संशोधनं (Pre Historic) यशस्वितया कृतवतां श्रीराघवेन्द्राचार्या एव प्राथमिका इति निवेदयितुमतीव सन्तोषः । लण्डन नगरस्थाः प्राच्याध्ययनमण्डल दिग्दर्शकाः (Director of Oriental Studies, London.), रावबहद्दूर दीक्षित मार्टिमर् वीलर्–प्रो. ज्वायिनर् (लण्डन विश्वविद्यालयीय) महोदय प्रभृतयः अमीषां संशोधन कर्म-कौशलं कार्यदक्षतां च समीक्ष्य सामोदममून् प्राशंसन् । अपि च भारतीय विख्यात संशोधक पण्डिताः राष्ट्रकवि दि. गोविन्द पै महोदयाः, महामहोपाध्याय डा. दत्तात्रेय वामन पोतदाराः, डा सरकाराः, डा. जयकराः मुम्बापुर सर्वकारीय मुख्य सचिवाः, बि. जि. खेर महोदयाः श्री रङ्गनाथ रामचन्द्र दिवाकर प्रभृतयश्च एतानाचार्यान् समुक्तकण्ठ प्रशस्य स्वीयग्रन्थेषु एतानधिकृत्य प्रालीलिखन् ।

कर्णाटकान्ध्रराज्यसीमाविवाद समये केन्द्रसर्वकारेण नियमितस्य मिश्रा आयोगस्य (Mishra Commission) बल्लारीनगरे अधिवेशितस्य सभायां विचारणायां एभिर्दत्तन सप्रामाणिक साक्ष्येण, अधिकृतवादेन च बल्लारि नगरसहितं मण्डलं कर्णाटक राज्यान्तर्भावितया उररीकृतं समपद्यत इत्यहो अमीषां वैचारिकवाद विवेचनवैदग्ध्यम् ।

श्रीयुताः पञ्चमुख्युपाव्हा आचार्याः एतावता समयेन माकिं पञ्चाशदुत्तरशताधिकान् (१५०) संशोधनात्मकान् संस्कृत कर्णाटकाङ्गलभाषामयान् ग्रन्थप्रवरानरीरचन् । इमानि संशोधन कार्याणि श्रेष्ठ ग्रन्थरचनादीनि अमीषां बहुमुखपाण्डित्य द्योतकानि प्रतिभाप्रमुख गुण-प्रकाशकानि सुव्यक्तानि प्रभवन्ति । एतत्प्रणीत ग्रन्थरत्नानि भारतीय वाङ्मयभाण्डारभूषणानि पण्डितमण्डलस्य, विमर्शकानां भारतीय जनतायाश्च गौरवादरभाजनानि सुदयितानि च वरीवर्तन्ते ।

अमीभी रचितेषु प्रबन्धेषु १. "हरिदास-साहित्यं," २, "कर्नाटकद अरसुमेनेतनगळु," ३, कर्णाटकदेशद इतिहास," ४, भारतदेशद संस्कृति परिचय" ५. आक्वर्यालाजि आफ कर्नाटक, ६. तन्त्रन्दे पिका, ७. प्रबंधषट्कं ८. "वेदापौरुषेयत्ववादः" इत्यादयः अत्युत्तमग्रन्था इति सुप्रथिता विद्योतन्ते । एतेषां संस्कृत गद्यपद्यानुबन्धप्रवराः राष्ट्रीय श्रेष्ठ मनोषिणां नितरां गौरवादरपात्राणि विराजन्ते । षट्सप्ततिवर्षदेशीया इमे किल ज्ञानवयोवृद्धा अपि तरुणा इव सोत्साहचेतसः बहूनन्तेवासिनः वेदान्तशास्त्ररत्नं अध्यापयन्तः सर्वदा ग्रन्थावलोकन – ग्रन्थसंशोधन – सम्पादन – प्रकाशन – ग्रन्थरचनादि कार्याण्यातन्वानास्सदासक्ताः स्वीय-जीवनसार्थकतामाचरन्ति । सदाचारसंपन्नाः सद्धर्मानुष्ठानवरिष्ठाः ज्ञानभक्तिवैराग्यभूषिताश्च आचार्या इमे निखिलमाध्वसमाजालङ्काराः विद्वज्जननयनानन्दकराः आदर्शपुरुषाः सज्जनानां सर्वजनादरगौरव भाजनानि निजधवलयशोजुषश्च शोभन्ते ।

तत्र भवतां श्रीमतामेतेषां पाण्डित्य-प्रतिभा-वाग्विलास-ग्रन्थसंशोधन-ग्रन्थप्रणअन-प्रभृतिषु अनितरसाधारणवैदग्ध्यं समवलोक्य प्रहृष्टान्तःकरणाः भारतीयानेक विद्या संस्थाः मठाधिपतयश्चेमान् 'विद्यारत्नं, विद्याभूषणं, पण्डितराजः, हरिदाससाहित्यरत्नं, महामहिमोपाध्यायः' इत्याद्यन्वर्थक प्रशस्तिप्रदान-मानपत्र-सुवर्णपदक-सौवर्णराङ्कवयुगलवितरण पूर्वकं सममानयन्। अत एवामी आचार्याः सर्वविद्वज्जनादरतां समवाप्य आदर्शभूता विशोभन्ते । एतादृश पण्डितप्रवरैरमीभिः विरचितं 'न्यायसुधा' भिधं ग्रन्थरत्नं विद्वज्जनकरपल्लवेषु समर्पयितुं सन्तोतुष्यामहे :

महामहोपाध्याया: तत्रभवन्तो श्रीमन्तः अनन्तकृष्णशास्त्रिमहोदयाः श्रेष्ठपाण्डित्यमण्डिता एव बाढम् । स्वस्वराद्धान्तेषु गौरवादर श्रद्धादिकं तु स्वाभाविकं, । तथापीमे शास्त्रिणः पूर्वग्रह दोषग्रस्तास्सन्तः प्रमाणाप्रमितान् स्वकपोलकल्पितान् जल्पितानल्पान् दोषाभाससन्दोहानितरमतीयाचार्यवराणां ग्रन्थोपरि मुधा समुद्धाटच तद्ग्रन्थविषये जनसामान्येष्वन्यथा प्रतिपत्त्युद्भावनमकुर्वन्नित्येतच्छ्रेष्ठविमर्शक पण्डित लक्षण विरुद्धमित्यत्र न कापि संशीतिः ।

श्रीमद्वैतसिद्धान्त प्रतिष्ठापकानां लोकपूज्यानां श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थ भगवत्पादानां तथा सर्वज्ञकल्पानां श्रीमट्टीकाकृज्जयतीर्थ पूज्यचरणानाँ श्रीमच्चन्द्रिकाचार्यप्रभृतीनां महामहिमवतां प्राच्यामाचार्याणां ग्रंथ प्रवराणामनितर साधारण जगन्मान्यतामसहमाना इमे शास्त्रिणः कथंकारं एतद्ग्रन्थविषये सामान्य जनतायामन्यथा भावमावहितुकामाः "अद्वैत तत्वसुधा" ख्यग्रंथमरीरचन् । अद्वैतसुधाप्रतिपादितः नैकोऽपि दोषाभासः माध्वग्रंथोपरि सङ्गममियादिति श्री पञ्चमुख्याचार्याः सुव्यक्तं सयुक्तिकं सप्रमाणं श्रुतिस्मृत्युदाहरणपूर्वकं अस्मिन्ग्रन्थे प्रत्यपीपदन् । पुरतश्चावशिष्टभागे विस्तरेणातन्वते च ।

अहो महत्साहसं शास्त्रिवराणाम्! हन्त! यदतीतपञ्चषशतकमारभ्याद्यावधि जगन्मान्यस्य श्रीमन्न्यायसुधाग्रंथस्य खण्डनपाडित्य मण्डितः नैकोऽपि धीरधोमानजायत किल!! ।

अद्वैतविद्याचार्या इति प्रथितयशोभिः श्रीविद्यारण्यमुनि–नृसिंहाश्रम मुनि – अप्पय्यदीक्षितेन्द्रप्रभृतिभिरपि असाधारणपांडित्य प्रभृतिभिरपि असाधारण पांडित्य प्रतिभावाग्विलासयिशारदैरापञ्चशतकं कर्तुमशक्यमद्भुतमेतादृशग्रन्थखण्डनकार्यं हन्त, अर्वाचीनैरमीभिश्शास्त्रिभिर्विरचितमिति यत्तदतीवहास्यास्पदम् । अमीषां शास्त्रिणामयं प्रयत्नः 'प्रौढप्रकाशतेजसः उष्णरश्मेस्स्पर्शकामस्य खद्योतस्य प्रयत्न' इव विद्वत्प्रपञ्चे "अबद्धं पठित्वा कुचोद्यं करोती" तिवच्च सुलघुतामेति । इत्येवमादि विषयजातं श्रीराघवेन्द्राचार्याः स्त्रीयग्रन्थे सप्रमाणं सयुक्तिकं

निरूप्य श्रीं शास्त्रिभिरुद्धारितदोषाभासखण्डनपूर्वकं श्रीमदाचार्य – टीकाकृत्पाद – व्यासराजगुरुसार्वभौमाणां ग्रन्थरत्नान्याभूषयन् । एतादृशग्रन्थ सेवामनितरामारचय्य तेषां गुरुवराणां परमानुग्रहभाजः माध्वजनतायाः, विद्वन्मण्डलस्य च गौरवपात्रभूता विशोभन्ते ।

कृतज्ञता समर्पणम्

एतादृशश्रेष्ठकृतिं आस्माकीन विद्यासंस्था प्रकाशनमालायां प्रकटयितुं सामोदमनुमतिप्रदातृभ्यः श्रीमभ्द्यः राघवेन्द्राचार्येभ्यः निरवधिकमानृण्यं निरन्तरमास्थितास्स्मः । तेभ्यः सभ्द्यस्सन्तु नमांसि भूयांसि ।

ग्रन्थममुं सुन्दराक्षरविलसितमचिरादेव संमुद्रय क्षत्तवतां धारवाड नागरिक 'कर्णाटक विद्यारण्य समिति' मुद्रणालयाधिकारिभ्यः सन्त्वास्माकीनानि भूयांस्यभिनन्दनानि । एतद्ग्रंथप्रकाशन कृते सोदारहस्तं द्रविणसञ्चयप्रदातृभ्यो वदान्येभ्यः श्रीमत्परिमलाचार्य चरणनलिनसंसेवनमत्रचित्तेभ्यः गुरुभक्तवरेभ्यः; कल्याणनागरिकाङ्गलकलाशालाध्यक्ष दिवङ्गत श्री. सि. आर्. नारायणरायमहोदयपुत्रेभ्यः श्रीमभ्द्यः सि. एन्. राघवेन्द्ररायमहोदयेभ्यः वयमत्यन्तं कृतज्ञाः स्यः । तेभ्यस्सन्तु भूयस्यः वैदिका आशिषः । श्रीगुरुसार्वभौमाः सुप्रीताः स्वीयकृपाकटाक्ष पीयूषमङ्गलतरङ्गै स्सकुटुम्बान् सि. एन् राघवेन्द्ररायमहोदयानभिषिच्य ताननुगृण्हन्तु निरन्तरमित्याशास्महे ।

अन्त्ये सामोदमिदं विज्ञाप्यते यदचिरादेव श्रीमद्राघवेन्द्रगुरु सार्वभौम विरचितां 'तत्वमञ्जरीं' मुद्राप्य प्रकाशनपथमानीयत इति शम् ॥

इति विद्वज्जनवशंवदः
विद्यावाचस्पतिः, विद्यारत्नं,
राजा. श्री. गुरुराजाचार्यः
संस्थापकः सञ्चालकश्च
श्रीपरिमल संशोधन प्रकाशन मन्दिरम्

नञ्जनगूड
आनंद सं । आश्विन शुक्ल
विजयादशमी ।
मिति :– 25–10–1974

समर्पणम्

श्रीमत्परमहंसेत्यादि बिरुदावलीभूषितेभ्य: श्रीमत्सर्वज्ञाचार्य मूलसिंहासनाधीश्वरेभ्य: दैत्यबालक प्रल्हादापरावतार श्रीमद्गुरु सार्वभौम राघवेंद्रतीर्थ श्रीपादपदपङ्कजभ्रमरायमाणेभ्य: श्रीमट्टीकाकृत्पादरचित न्यायसुधा परिमळाघ्राणतृप्तचेतोभ्य: पुण्यश्लोकचरितेभ्य: श्रीमत्सुयमींद्रतीर्थगुरुभरुभ्य: कीर्तिकायेन श्रीमन्मंत्रालये सुन्दरे वृन्दावनावसथे कृतवसतिभ्य: भक्त्मोपहारीकृतोऽयं श्रीमन्न्यायसुधा पञ्चाधिकरणा प्रबंध: आंग्लभाषायय: विनयावनतकन्धरं ग्रंथरचयित्रा पंचमुखी राघवेंद्राचार्येण तत्प्रकाशकेन राजा, श्रीगुरुराजाचार्येण च पारत्रिकभूतिकाम्यया । वृन्दावनांतर्गता: परमदयालव: श्रीस्बामिन: गुरुदक्षिणामिमां स्वीकृत्य न्यायसुधापरिमळकर्तृषु श्रीराघवेंद्रगुरुवरेण्येषु न्यायसुधारचयितृ श्रीजयतीर्थमुनिमुकुटरत्नेषु सत्सिद्धांत प्रवर्तकेषु श्रीमदनुव्याख्यानरचयितृषु मरुदंशश्रीमदानंदतीर्थभगवत्पादेषु च निरौपधाम कुटिलामचञ्चलां भक्तिं विरक्तिपरिवृढां भावगम्भीरां प्रसन्नचेतसाऽनुगृह्णन्त्विति साञ्जलिबंधं संप्रार्थयाव: ।

ग्रंथकर्ता— विद्यारत्नं म. म. पंचमुखी राघवेंद्राचार्य:

प्रकाशक:— विद्यारत्नं वि, वा. राजागुरुराजाचार्य: :

DEDICATION

(*Nyāya-Sudhā-Pañchādhikaraṇā*)

This work is dedicated to the Sacred memory of the late Svamiji Sri 108 Sri SuyamīndratīrthaSripādangaḷu of Sri Rāghavēndra-Svāmi Math with deep reverence and devotion by the author Sri Vidyaratna Mahāmahimōpādhyāya R. S. Panchamukhi M A., and the Publisher Sri Vidyaratna Vidyavachaspati Raja S Gururajacharya as a token of Pūjā to the Saint Philosopher who during the period of his *Pithādhipatya* covering 33 years from 1933 to 1966 made substantial contribution to the cause of *Madhva Siddhanta* and considerably improved the administration of Sri Raghavendra-Svami Math at Mantralaya and Nanjangud by **introducing** several benevoevent basic reforms resulting **in the present** magnificient growth of the Math **under his successor the** present Svamiji Sri 108 Sri Sujayīndratīrtha **Sripadangalu.**

CONTENTS

PART II

Sri Nyayasudha Panchadhikarani

—(an analytical Study)

INTRODUCTION

India is a land of philosophers and spiritual adepts, *The Vedas, Smritis, Purāṇas and Itihāsas* are the fountain-head of knowledge from which most of the systems of thought are derived. The Vedas are composed of *Mantra*, *Brāhmaṇa, Āraṇyaka and Upanishad* and are handed down traditionally from mouth to mouth so that the purity and authenticity of their texts are least tampered with. A mass of exegetical literature like *śikshā* (a work on Vedic accents), *Kalpa* (a work on Vedic rltuals), *Vyākaraṇa* (Vedic Grammer), *Nirukta* (Vedic Etymology), *Chhandas* (Vedic metre) and Jyōtisha (Astronomy) arose to help interpret he Vedic Texts correctly. These are called the *Vēdāṅgas* (auxiliary literature), Mere recitation of the Vedas in their *Pada, Ghana,* Jaṭā, *Pāṭhas* (recensions) was condemned as an unfruitful burden or tax to the memory and the person who mastered the Vedas with their meaning was praised as a true Vedic Scholar. The *Aṅga* literature was commended for study as an aid to the interpretation of the Vedic Texts. The enigmatic texts could not be understood in their full import and a vast literature in the form of *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* came into being in order to explain the hidden import so that the unfathomable depths of the *Vedas* could be grasped by an earnest student of philosophy and spiritual thought. Thus, the *dictum, Itihāsa–purāṇābhyām Vēdaṁ Samupabriṁhayēt* (The Vedas should be explained by *Itihāsā* and

Purāṇa works), has become a catch-word among the Vedic scholars. It may be observed that the eternal truths embodied in the Vedas are exemplified and demonstrated in the form of outward physical occurences which are recorded in the *Itihāsas* and *Purāṇas*. Hence, the latter are a veritable commentry on the abstract, *Śāstrārtha* or eternal truths. Śrī Madhvāchārya has beautifully hinted this majestic idea in his *Mahābhārata–Tātparya–Nirṇaya* :

निर्णयः सर्वशास्त्राणां सद्दष्टांतो हि भारते ।
कृतो विष्णुवशत्वं हि ब्रह्मदीनां प्रकाशितम् ॥
यतः कृष्णवशे सर्वे भीमाद्याः सम्यगीरिताः ॥

Chpt. I

In the task of extracting an all-round correct harmonious interpretation of the Vedas, several attempts were made by thinkers which, in the course of time, were crystalised into *Darśanas* or systems of philosophy. Here arose a group of dissidents that rejected the Vedas as a source of true knowledge, which came to be known as *Pāshaṇḍi* or *Nāstika Darśana*. Thus the *Chārvāka*, *Bauddha* and *Ārhata* who were the formidable seceders from the Vedas, formulated their own system of thought to interpret the mystery of creation. The *Sēśvara Sāṁkhyas*, *Mīmāṁsakas* and the *Vēdantins* were the *Āstikas* who enunciated their philosophy based on the Vedas. Thus, among the six systems of thought or the *Shaḍdarśanas*, the Vēdānta is, as the name suggests, a loyal and most accredited interpreter of the Vedic import and so its contribution to the philosophical thought of the world has been highly commendable and substantial.

The Vēdānta which offers a consistent and correct interpretation of the Vedas is embodied in the Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, which are styled as the *Brahma–mīmāṁsā Śāstra*, They come final in the thought evolution, refuting all other *śāstras* or *Darśanas* as being incomplete, defective and full of self-contradictory statements, and hold the ground as a final word on the inspired utterances of the Vedic *Ṛishis*. The

word वेदांत can be derived as वेदानां अंतः यैः तानि (ब्रह्मसूत्राणि) from which the purport of the Vedas in derived.' The *Brahmsūtras* have, in their turn, given rise to different interpretations on which separate thought patterns have been constructed. The most notable of these are the *Advaita, Viśishṭādvaita* and *Dvaita* deriving their designation from the nature of relationship between God, soul and matter, as conceived by each of them.

The controversy among these three schools of thought has given rise to a vast mass of literature which assumes a fresh interest every time a new attempt is made to revive and rejuvinate its respective system. The champions of the these Three Schools are Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya, Śrī Rāmānujāchārya and Śrī Madhvāchārya respectively, and their disciples scattered all over India have continued the wrangle by writing works of substantial worth which may be divided into (1) Exegetical or Explanatory and (2) Polemical or dialectical. The former is devoted to the faithful interpretation of the source works, intended to consolidate the thought force of the system while the latter, in a sense more important, concerns itself with the warding off of attacks of opponents aimed at demolishing the very edifice of the system. Their works are thus, the bulwarks of defence against enemy attacks. The stalwart scholars in the respective schools have spared no pains to give to the world, both kinds of works which mutually help a complete study of the system. In the three schools *Advaita, Visishṭādvaita* and *Dvai?a*, the following names stand out as most prominent and show how they contributed to the progress of thought in their respective fields :

I ADVAITA	II VISISHTADVAITA	III DVAITA
1) Shri Śaṁkarāchārya	1) Shrī Rāmānujāchārya	1) Śrī Madhvāchārya.
2) Chitsukha	2) Shrī Varavara	2) Shrī Padmanābhatīrtha
3) Ānandapūrṇa	3) Tātāchārya	3) Shri Trivikrama Paṇḍitāchārya
	4) Raṅga rāmānuja	
4) Madhusūdana Sarasvatī	5) Dēsikāchārya etc. etc.	4) Shrī Jayatīrtha
5) Brahmānanda Sarasvatī		5) Shrī Vyāsatīrtha
6) Vidyaraṇya		6) Śrī Vijayīndratīrtha
7) Appayya Dīkshita		7) Shrī Vādirāja Tīrtha
8) Raghunātha Dīkshita		8) Shrī Vidyādhīśatīrtha
9) Vāsudēvaśāstri Abhyaṁkar		9) Shri Rāghavēndra tīrtha
10) Ananta Krishṇa Śāstri		10) Shri Vēdēśatīrtha, Yādavārya and Śrīnivāsatīrtha
		11) Śrī Sumatīndra tīrtha etc., etc.

Besides these, there are a number of other well-known scholars who have, by their treatises, striven hard to justify and defend their view-points only, As such, they deserve to **be**

highly complimented for their service to enrich the philosophical thought of India. It is, however, to be noted that the Dvaita Siddhānta owes its solidarity and strength to the systematic, logical and highly convincing exposition of the tenets, by Shrī Jayatīrtha whose *S'rī Nyāyasudhā* stands out as the most faithful representation of Śrī Madhva's system of thought. It is the *Nyāyasudhā* of Śrī Jayatīrtha that has set at rest all the arguments of *Viśishṭādvaitins* and *Advaitins*, and established the superiority and authenticity of the Dvaita system. The *Nyāyasudhā* remains even to this day the most formidable weapon of defence and strength and has supplied perennial life and vigour to the solidarity of the pluralistic realism of Śrī Madhvāchārya. It commands the highest regard and appreciation from scholars of evens opposite rank for its invincible power of exposition, incontrovertible logic of arguments, versatile learning, dignity of diction and elegance and clarity of expression. The work has rightly been commended by scholars as of superior worth even to the sovereignty of the Earth. सुधा वा पठनीया वसुधा वा पालनीय। where वसुधा पालन is an अनुकल्प

Shrī Madhvāchārya has written four works on the Brāhma sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa namely, the *Sūtra-Bhāshya*, *Aṇubhāshya*,*Anuvyākhyāha* and *Nyāya Vivaraṇa*. These works form the *Sūtra Prasthāna* of Dvaita Vedanta. Shri Jayatīrtha, the most authentic exponent of the Āchārya, has composed a commentary ealled the *Tatvaprakāśa* on the Bhāshya and a gloss called the Nyāyāvivaraṇa–Pañchikā, on a portion of the text of Nyāyavivarṇa. His *Nyāyasudhā* is the most exhaustive commentary on the *Anuvyākhyāṇa*, which is a *Vādagrantha*, a polemical work of the Āchārya. Why Śri Madhvāchārya composed as many as four works separately on the Sūtras has been explained by the Āchārya himself in the following *Kārikā* of the *Anuvyākhyāna*:

स्वयंकृताऽपि तद्व्याख्या क्रियते स्पष्टतार्थतः ॥ –अ. व्या, I, 1, 1

Which is explained by Shrī Jayatīrtha in the *Nyāyasdhā* ***as*** follows :—

यद्यपि तेषां ब्रह्मसूत्राणां व्याख्या स्वयं मयैव भाष्ये कृता । तथापि पुनरत्र स्फष्टतैव अर्थः प्रयोजनं तस्मै स्पष्टतार्थंतः । भाष्येऽस्पष्टीकृतमर्थं स्पष्टीकर्तुं क्रियते । स्पष्टीकरणं चाऽनेकविधं । क्वचिदनुक्तांशस्योक्तिः । क्वाप्यतिसंक्षिप्तस्य विस्तरणं । क्वचिदति विस्तृततया बुद्धचनारूढस्य संक्षेप, । क्वापि विक्षिप्तस्यैकीकरणं । कुत्राप्युक्तस्योपपादनं । क्वचिदपव्याख्यानिरासेन दृढीकरणमित्यादि तत्रतत्र द्रष्टव्यं । ननु एकत्रैव सर्वं वक्तव्यं वक्तव्यम् । किं प्रस्थानभेदेन । मैवं । यतः संक्षेपविस्तराभ्यामुक्तं श्रोतृणां सुग्रहं सुप्रयोजनं च भवति । यथोक्तं 'संक्षेपविस्तराभ्यां हि कथयंति मनीषिणः । बहुवारस्मृतेस्तस्य फल बाहुल्यकारणा' दिति ।

"Though the Āchārya has commented upon the Sūtras in his Bhāshya, the present gloss is intended to clarify the ambiguous points: The clarification is done in many ways: in some cases, the points not mentioned earlier are given here; in some cases greatly condensed statements are expanded; in some cases, detailed expositions are condensed for easy understanding; in others, scattered statements are brought together; in some, explaining the old statements with arguments; in others, confirming the old meaning by refuting the wrong commentaries etc. This is clear in the *Anuvyākhyāna* in relevent contexts. A question is raised: why not state everything in one place? Why are the statements spread over different texts? No, it is replied; the statements, short and long are easily grasped by the listeners. The learned adopt this method, as by repeated recital, the listeners would be benefited most.

Shrī Madhva speaks about the merits of *Anuvyākhyāna*:-

ग्रंथोऽयमपि बह्वर्थो भाष्यंचात्यर्थविस्तरं ।
बहुज्ञा एव जानंति विशेषेणार्थमेतयोः ।

"This work is pregnant with depth of arguments and the Sūtrabhāshya is greatly explanatory. Only highly trained learned people can grasp their import."

The Bhāshya supplies the necessary materiale, internal as well as external, to help interpret the import of the *Sū?ras* in strict conformity with the reqirements of Bhāshya as defined in

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुकारिभिः ।
स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यंते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

The *Nyāya-Vivaraṇa* was designed, as stated by the Āchārya, to explain the *Nyāyas* or *Yuktis* (reasons or criteria of interpretation) adopted in the *Anuvyākhyāna* for an easy understanding of the *Brahmasūtras*. This is accomplished by giving the *Yuktis* of the *Pūrvapakshin* and those of the *Siddhantin* serially.

Thus, the *Nyāyas* stated here are the arguments of the questioner and the replier put forth in each *Adhikaraṇa* as made out frcm the critical study of the *Sū?ras* themselves.

The *Aṇubhāshya* is a compendium of the Āchārya's interpretations of the *Sūtras* for memorising the contents of the *Adhikaraṇa*, *Pāda* and *Adhyāya*. This is an admirable piece of composition, brief but pregnant with meaning which can be repeated within ten minutes reviewing the entire body of contents of the *Sūtra-Prasthāna*. It is highly praised by Śrī Nārāyaṇa–Paṇḍitachārya in his *Shrī-Madhva-Vijaya*;

अनंतोऽर्थः प्रकटितस्त्वयाऽणौ भाष्यसंग्रहे ।
अहो आत्मपरिज्ञप्त्यै कृष्णेनै वाननांतरे ॥

— XV, 82.

"You have displayed the fathomless meanings of *Brahma-Sūtras* in the small work *Aṇubhāshya Saṅgraha*, as Śrī Krishṇa showed in his tiny mouth, the endless universe of creation to exhibit his real nature to his mother Yaśodā." In the *Tatva-mañjarī*, Śri Rāghavēndratīrtha points out, by profuse references to the *Adhikaraṇas* and *Sūtras* how the entlre meaning of the *Anuvyākhyāna* and *Bhāshya* is couched in an admirable manner in the cryptic *Anushṭup* verses of the work. There is a tradition among the Mādhvas still alive, to repeat and recite this admirable compendium at the time of *Pūjā* every day along with *Śrī Vishṇu-sahasra-nāma*.

Thus, by a study of the afore-said four works, the tenets of the Dvaita Siddānta can be understood fully. The contents of the ten *Prakaraṇas* (दशप्रकरणानि) and the Bḥāshyas on ten Upanishads are availed of in the *Nyāya Sudhā* in proper contexts, besides the gist of the *Sūtra-Prasthāna* (the above-mentioned four works of the Āchārya) The *Bhāgavata-tātparya, Mahābhārata-Tātparya-nirṇaya, Gītā-Bhāshya* and *Gītā-Tātparya Nirṇaya, Ṛigbhāshya, Tantra Sāra Saṅgraha* etc. have also found their place in several contexts of the *Anuvyākhyāna* and naturally in the *Nyāya-Sudhā* also on the relevent portions of the Text. It will be a just compliment to the versatile character of the work to regard the *Nyāya Sudhā* as a veritable mine of philosophical doctrines, not only of Dvaita Siddhānta as gathered from the original works of the Āchārya, but also of the other *Darśanakāras*, like the Bauddha, Ārhata, Nyāya Vaiśēshika, Sāṁkhya, Yōga, *Mīmāṁsaka, Pāśuptaa, Advaita and Chārvāka* etc. whose position has been summarised and set forth faithfuily as ***Pūrvapaksha*** for being refuted and the Dvaita Siddhānta established ultimately

It may, further, be noted that the polemical works of the great Vyāsarāja, namely the *Nyāyāmṛita, Tarkatāṇḍava* and *Tātparya -chandrikā* owe their existence for the intricate discussions about वेदापौरुषेयत्व. प्रामाण्यवाद and चक्तित्वाद and simiIiar problems treated in them, to the arguments and verbal terminology adopted in the *Nyāya Sudhā*, So, the *Nyāyasudhū* may be characterised as the *Encyclopedic* source book of Dvaita philosophy with none else to excel or equal it.

The foregoing discussion briefly sets forth the outstanding features of the *Nyāya Sudhā*, which entitle it to the highest rank of *Reference Library of Dvaita Philosoyhy* next to the original works of Śrī Madhvāchārya, the Founder of the Schōol. As the Dvaita system of Philosophy is described as the final *Siddhānta* (अंते सिद्धांतु सिद्धांत:) in *Vēdānta Darśana*, all scholars turn their eyes to its exposition in the Nyāyasudhā, for undersanding its metaphysics and doctrinal edifice of

the Vēdas. So, it is imperative to the students of philosophy to know the contents of this important work for their edification, together with a brief analysis of the topics discussed there in so that they may be enabled to evaluate and appreciate the great contribution made by the *Dvaita Siddhānta* to the World's philosophic thought. We, therefore, propose to set forth an analytical summary of this great work *Abhikaraṇa wise* and acquaint the reader with the subjects treated therein, and while doing so, we will examine the criticisms of other writers against the conclusions of Śrī Jayatīrtha adumbrated in the *Nyāyasudhā* and show how they are silenced in the *Sudhā* itself and in the works of subsequent writers and commentators.

We shall now set ourselves to the task of reviewing the contents of the *Sudhā* topic-*wise* and according to the *Adhikaraṇas*.

CHAPTER–I

ANUVYĀKHYĀNA AND NYĀYASUDHĀ :

Important topics discussed :— The *Anuvyākhyāna* is the original, of which the *Nyāyasudhā* is the exhaustive commentary reviewing the whole range of philosophic thought in India. The greatness of Śrī Madhva's *Dvaita-Vāda* is vindicated in the *Anuvyākhyāna* a *Magnus Corpus* of his doctrines, on which Śrī Nārāyaṇa–Paṇḍitāchārya. rolls words of praise in his *Madhva Vijaya* a biography of Śrī Madhvāchārya. It is stated that Śrī Madhva was entreated by scholars to compose a work detailing the basic principles of interpretation (*Nyāyas*) in support of his *Siddhānta* in one place in easy and simple style as they cannot be grasped fully from his other works which are full of terse, epitomic and enigmatic phrasaeology.

अपरोऽपीष्यतेऽस्माभिर्ग्रंथेष्वेतेषु सत्स्वपि ।
सत्स्वपींद्रादिषु पुरा तारकारिरिवामरैः ॥
ग्रंथेभ्य एभ्योऽगाधेभ्यो युक्तयो नो दुरुद्धराः ।
मनोमांद्यात्ततो ग्रंथं व्यक्ततर्कततिं कुरु ॥
इत्यर्थितो व्यधान्मध्वः सोऽनु**व्याख्यां** सतां सुधाम् ।
दुर्वादिगर्वाद्रिपविं मायिध्वांतरविद्युतिम् ॥

M. V. XV, 86–88

It is further stated that Śrī Madhva dictated to his four pupils the four chapters of the work, each chapter to each pupil – simultaneously without any labour of thought or previous arrangement of the sequence of topics.

युगपद्रचयन्नेनां कदाचित्स निरंतरं ।
चतुरश्चतुरः शिष्यान् लीलयाऽलेखयत्खलु ।

ibid, IV, 89.

This is a wonderful performance which passes human comprehension. Śrī Jayatīrtha the author of the *Nyāya Sudhā* explains in all humility how wonderfully the work leads to the gate of Truth by utilising all the accepted canons of knowledge, namely *Tarka*, *Vyākarṇa* *Mīmāṁsā* etc. and on that account how his mind is loath to get away even for a moment from its study and meditation

अनुव्याख्याननलिने जञ्चरीकति मे मनः । —सुधा

The high merits of the *Nyāyasndhā* cannot be adequately extolled. No less a scholar–philosopher than Śrī Rāghavēndra-tīrtha observes in his commentary, the *Parimaḷa* that " the *Sudhā* is unfathomable in every word and sentence; still, I cannot explain it fully in this limited space of the commentary".

प्रतिवाक्यं प्रतिपदमनेकाकूतगर्भिता ।
प्रतिभाति सुधाऽथापि ग्रंथाल्पत्वाय नोच्यते ॥

—परिमळ

It is enough to point out that the work is held in high esteam by the greatest scholars and adepts in philosophy to whatever school of thought they may belong.

It is admitted by all the *Bhāshyakāras* that Śrī Vedavyāsa or Bādarāyaṇa condensed and classified the Vēdas which were innumerable and difficult to be understood by men of poor intellect, into small divisions and subdivisions (शाखोपशाखा भेदेन) and composed the Brahmasūtras for their correct interpretation. The main object of the *Brahmasūtras* is, therefore, to offer the criteria or *Yuktis* with the help of which the Vedic Texts which are in some cases apparently ambiguous and self-contradictory, may be properly understood. Śrī Madhvāchārya has beautifully given the relevency of the Braham sūtras in the opening Passage of his *Bhāshya* as follows:—

द्वापरे सर्वत्र ज्ञाने आकुलीभूते तन्निर्णयाय ब्रह्मरुद्रेंद्रादिभिरर्थतो भगवान्नारायणो व्यासत्वेनाऽबततार । अथेष्टानिष्टप्राप्तिपरिहारेच्छूनां तद्योगमविजानतां तज्ज्ञापनार्थं वेदमुत्सन्नं व्यंजयंश्चतुर्धा व्यभजनत्

चतुर्विंशतिधा एकशतधा सहस्रधा द्वादशधा चेति । तदर्थनिर्णयाय ब्रह्मसूत्राणि चकार । —ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्य

"At the end of the *Dvāpara yuga*, when right knowledge was clouded, Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa was prayed for by rhe Gods Brahmā, Rudra, Indra etc. to clarify it. He appeared as Vyāsa and divided the distorted Vedic literature into twenty four, one hundred, one thousand and twelve different groups and composed the Brahma-Sūtras to impart right knowledge to those who were anxious to know the means of warding off sorrow and getting unmixed happiness but were unable to get at the proper remedy" This introductory passage in the *Bhāshya* at once establishes the authenticity of the *Sutras* being the work of the Omniscient God Vēdavyāsa, an *Avatāra* of Nārayaṇa, done for the benefit of the aspirant *Mumukshus* (striving for Mōksha) at the request of the Gods headed by Brahmā (four-faced) Rudra, Indra, who were eager to learn the remedy to escape from the world of misery, and justifies his undertaking of writing a Commentary on such an all-desired valuable and authentic work.

This is confirmed by the statement in *Skanda Purāṇa*.

गौतमस्य ऋषेः शापाऽज्ञाने त्वज्ञानतां गते ।
संकीर्णबुद्धयो देवाः ब्रह्मरुद्रपुरः त्वराः ॥
शरण्यं शरणं जग्मुर्नारायणमनामयं ।
तैर्विज्ञापितकार्यस्तु भगवान् पुरुषोत्तमः ॥
अवतीर्णो महायोगी सत्यवत्यां पराशरात् ।
उत्सन्नान् भगवान् वेदानुज्जहार हरिः स्वयम् ॥

It should be remembered that *Brahmā* (four-faced) is unaffected by ignorance and evcn in deluge, his knowledge about the World and God is clear and transparent (प्रलयेऽपि प्रतिभातमरावरः।) He approached the God Nārāyaṇa out of pity for the grief-stricken good souls (अनुक्रोशयुक्तः) toiling in *Saṁsāra*.

It may be noted that the Vedas are the oniy means that can offer the right remedy to get bliss :

अदुः खमितरत्सर्वं जीवा एव तु दुःखिनः ।
तेषां दुःखप्रहाणाय श्रुतिरेषा प्रवर्तते ॥ —श्रुतिः

"All else than the *Muktas*, God Nārāyaṇa and Lakshmī (Also Brahmā who is विलीनप्रकृति = uninfluenced by Prakṛiti) and the inanimate Prakriti are untouched by grief. Only the souls (i.e. जीव in संसार) are grief - stricken. To remove their grief, the Śruti functions."

The Brahmasūtras called also Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras, Vēdānta-Sūtras or the Brahma - Mīmaṁsā Śāstra, are brief significant precise all- comprehensive (विश्वतोमुख) cryptic utterances (aphorisms) numbering 564 (five hundred and sixty four) conforming strictly to the definition of a sūtra :

अल्पाक्षरमसंदिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतो मुखं ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ॥

They are grouped under four chapters or *Adhāyas*, each chapter having four *Pādas*, or sections, determined by a specfic subject matter treated in them. But, the division of *Padas* into *Adhikaraṇas* or topics with a definite number of Sūtras comprising them, is not indicated in the body of the work by any symbol or device. Since each *Pāda* is comprised of a large number of *Sūtras* as shown below, they are apparently dealing with more than one topic or subject-matter and so they have to be classified into smaller groups or *Adhikaraṇas*, topic-wise. This, the *Bhashyakāras* have done according to the meaning they seek to invest them with. This has led to the difference in the number of the *Adhikaraṇas* or the Sūtras constituting them Thus, it is noticed that the total number of the *Adhikaraṇas* according to Śaṅkara is 192 with 555 Sūtras, according to Rāmānuja 156 with 545 Sūtras and according to Madhva, 222 with 564 Sūtras. It is however, inexplieable, how the total number of the *Sūtras* in the entire work could vary according to these authors who adopt in some cases quite a different reading of the text altogether. It is also noticed that some

Sūtras are clubbed together by the Bhāshyakāras and in a few cases they are split up into two or more. This device has caused apparently, the discrepancy in the number of the Sūtras mentioned above. It would be a useful study to examine, in the light of the teachings of the Sūtras, which is correct and which represents the intentions of the author, We shall deal with this point when we discuss about the contents of the *Adhikaraṇas* according to the different Bhāshyakāras to assess the correct import of the Brahmā-sūtras and of the system of Philoshphy derived from them.

The titles of the four *Adhyāyas* and the *Pādas* comprised in them are apparently assigned to them by the *Bhāshyakāras* who are unanimous in naming the four *Adhyāyas* as (i) Samanvayādhyāya समन्वयाध्याय (ii) Avirōdhādhyāya अविरोधाध्याय (iii) *Sādhanādhyāya* साधनाध्याय and (iv) *Phalādhyāya* फलाध्याय. The *Pādas* and the *Adhikarṇas*, are, however, named differently by the different *Bhashyakāras*, in accordance with the contents or the import they assign to them.

With these general remarks on the nature and authorship of the *Brahmsūtras*, we shall revert to the study of the text according to the topics discussed in the *Nyāya Sudhā* while commenting on the *Anuvyākhyāna* of Śrī Madhvāchārya. The first five Adhikaraṇas पञ्चाधिकरणी are regarded as the prelude to the first chapter, *(Adhyāya-Pādapīṭha)* and embody the contents of the *Adhyāya* in a nut-shell. The nature and characteristics of *Para Brahman* are given in the first five *Adhikaraṇas*. What then is the object of the remaining part of the *Adhyāya?* It is answered in the *Bhāshya.* "तमेव समन्वयं प्रकदयत्यानंदमयोऽभ्यासादित्यादिना समस्तेनऽध्यायेन प्रायेण। That the sntire Vedic literature treats primarily about the supremacy of Para-Brahman-Nārāyaṇa only, (तत्तुत्पमन्वयान्) is explained in full details in the remaining part of the Adhyāya. In the *Anuvyākhyāna* the Āchārya says that the homogenuity of import of the entire *Śāstra* in respect of Nārāyaṇa is treated in the whole chapter from *Ānandamayo-bhyāsāt*, in the *Kārikā* ;—

एवं शास्त्रावगम्यत्वे विभागेन समन्वयं ।
आनंदमय इत्यादिनाऽध्यायेन वदत्यजः ॥

This is explained in the *Sudhā* in justification of the continuation of the discussion in the passage :—

सत्यं न ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणे किमव्यवशिश्टं । तथापि। तत्तु समन्वबादित्युपक्रमादितात्पर्यलिंगवलात् सकलस्यापि शास्त्रस्य यो ब्रह्मणि परममुख्यया वृत्या प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकत्वलक्षणस्समन्वयोऽभिहितः तमेव समन्वयं **विभागेन प्रपञ्चेना**नंदमय इत्यादिनाऽध्यायेन वदति सूत्रकार इति न वैयर्थ्यम् । —सुधा I. 1, 6.

"True, Brahman has been explained in full in the first five Adhikaraṇas That Para-Brahman is the chief object of the entire Vedic lore as mentioned in the *Sūtra* ततूसमन्वयात्। is proved with reference to each and every important word or passage of the Vedas, in the remaining part of the chapter from आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्। The same explanation is offered in the Tatvaprakāśikā. :—

अथ ब्रह्मस्वरूपनिरूपणेऽनवशेषात् किमध्यायशेषेणे त्यतस्तत्क्त्यमाह ॥ तमेवेति । कृत्यांतराभावेऽपि तत्तुसमन्वयादि त्युक्तमेवोपक्रमाद्यन्वयात्सम्यङ्गिनरूवणं शास्त्रीयशब्दानां प्रतिवाक्यग्रहणंन प्रकटयत्यनेनाऽध्यायेन सूत्रकारः । अन्यथा प्रतिज्ञामात्रस्यासाधकत्वेनान्यदेव समन्वयादित्यपि वक्तुं शक्यत्वादिति भावः । —1, 1. 6

" If this statement is not established by copious examples from the Vedas applying the canons of textual interpretation like उपक्रमोपसंहार etc; and श्रुतिर्लिन्गं समाख्याच etc; some objector may step in and try to miscarry the whole Vedic literature as refering to some other God than Vishṇu."

This समन्वय can be discussed only when Vishṇu or Para-Brahman is established beyond doubt, to be the object of *speech* (वाच्य) in general. In the *Śrutis* 'यतो वाचो निवर्तंते अप्राप्य मनसा सह ।' and अशब्द मस्पर्शम रूपम त्ययम् Brahman is stated to bc beaond the renge of speech. This doubt is removed in the ईक्षत्यधिकरण

which intervenes between समन्वयाधिकरण and आनंदमयाधिकरण. If it (ब्रह्मन्) is beyond the scope words or is अवाच्य, how can any discussion by words be set in? The ईक्षत्यधिकरण emphatically states that Para Brahman is **not अशब्द** that is, he is *describable* by *words*.

शब्दलेशसंचाराभावे वाक्यतात्पर्यविचारस्यानवकाशात् । न हि तोयाभ्यवहारासमर्थस्य मुमूर्षोः शष्कुलीभक्षणं सचेतनः संभावयतीति ।
I, 1, 6.

If no words can function on a thing, how can the scrutiny of the import of a Vedic passage regarding it, be conducted? It will be as absurd as prescribing the eating of fried puddies to a patient on death-bed who cannot *sip* even a drop of water. So, it is just and proper to treat the first पञ्चाधिकरणी as the prelude of the first Adhyāya unlike Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja who take the first *four sūtras* only (चतुःसूत्री) as the ground-work of the Adhyāya.

"शास्त्रारंभसिध्द्यार्थे वा चतुःसूत्री मृषावादिनां पक्षे न संगच्छते । तत्पक्षे विषयप्रयोजनानुपपत्त्या शास्त्रस्यानारंभणीयत्वात्।
—श्रुतप्रकाशिका on *Shrī Bhāshya.*

The topics discussed in the Nyāya Sudhā in the पंचाधिकरणी will be stated in serial order and explained fully in the sequel. The first five *Adhikaraṇas* are :—

1. *Jijñasādhikaraṇa* १. ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ ॥
2. *Janmādhikaraṇa* २. ॐ जन्माद्यस्य यतः ॐ ॥
3. *Śāstra-yonitvādhikaraṇa* ३. ॐ शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ॐ ॥
4. *Samanvayadhikaraṇa* ४. ॐ तत्तु समन्वयात् ॐ ॥
5. *Īakshatyadhīkaraṇa* ५. ॐ ईक्षतेर्नाऽशब्दम् ॐ ॥ १
ॐ गौणश्चेन्नाऽऽत्मशब्दात् ॐ ॥ २
ॐ तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ॐ ॥ ३
ॐ हेयत्वादवचनाच्च ॐ ॥ ४
ॐ स्वाप्यात् ॐ ॥ ५
ॐ गतिसामान्यात् ॐ ॥ ६
ॐ श्रुतत्वाच्च ॐ ॥ ७

The meaning of these *Sūtras* in the first five Adhikaraṇas is given below in the words of the *Tantradīpika.* of Shrī Rāghavēndratīrtha in which the different interpretations of the Bhāshya, Anuvyākhyāna, Nyāyavivaraṇa, Tatvapradīpa, Tatva-prakaśikā. Nyāya-Sudhā and Tātparya-chandrikā are given in proper contexts,

JIJNASADHIKARANAM

Ōṁ Aithā-to Brahma-Jijñāsā Ōṁ

In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the necessity of starting an enquiry into the nature of Brahman is established as a means to the acceptance, by the learned people, of this Mīmāṁsāśāstra consisting of four Adhyāyas viz Samanvaya, Avirōdha, Sādhana and Phala Adhyāyas, for the knowledge of Brahman leading to eternal bliss i. e. *Mōksha*

Atha = after being equipped with the quality of tranquility and restraint etc, *Ataḥ* (1) through the propitiation of Brahman (= Nārāyaṇa = Vishṇu) denoted by the word 'A', (ii) as the testimony of the *Āgamas* is valid, (iii) as the propitiation of God produced by the knowledge will surely lead to the fruit of emancipation, (iv) as the bondage of Samsāra is real, (v) As the Vedas teach an accomplished object (*Siddhārtha*) and not merely *Sādhya* or a *kārya* (thing to be accomplished), *Ōṁ Brahmaṇaḥ* = of Vishṇu who is full of auspicious qualities, *Jijñāsā (Kartavyā)* = an enquiry (should be instituted). That is, an enquiry viz., study, contemplation and concentration or contemplation only of all the Vedas (Brahman also) as ordained in the Śruti; *Tad Vijijñāsasva* etc., ('enquire into it') should be conducted in order to acquire the knowledge of *Brahman.*

Here, Ōṁ *Brahma* (God Nārāyaṇa = full of auspicious qualities) explains the contents of the first Adhyāya, and also of the second, furnishing the *object*; *Atha* and *Jijñāsā*: those of the third *Adhyāya*, means to attain Brahman. and *Ataḥ* the fruit of enquiry, of the fourth Adhyāya.

II. Ōṁ Janmādyasya Yataḥ Ōṁ

In this *Adhikaraṇa* the definition of Brahman under study is offered. *Asya*, of this Universe (which is real) consisting of

chit and *Achit* which is proven by evidence (Pramita), *Janmādi*, creation etc; is given in all aspects or in a few only according as the constituents of the universe deserve, *Yatah* = by whom. That is, the cause of creation etc., of this universe is Brahman (Nārāyaṇa) only. The creation etc are eight-fold as explained in the verse

सृष्टिरक्षाहृतिज्ञाननियतिज्ञनिमावृतिः ।
बंधमोक्षौच च पुरषाद्यस्मात्स हरिरेकराट् ।
सृष्टिरक्षाहृतिज्ञाननियत्यज्ञानबंधनान् :
मोक्षं च विष्णुतस्त्वेव ज्ञात्वा मुक्तिर्नचाऽन्यथा ॥—म ता. नि. I ॥

The knowledge of these eight deeds of God Nārāyaṇa is ordained as an essential means to emancipation in the Śruti

यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायंते etc. (जन्मादि यतः समासव्यासाभ्यां यथायोग्यं भवति तज्जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्मेत्यर्थः I—तं—दी.)

III Śāstra Yōnitvādhikaraṇam
Ōṁ Śāstra-Yōnitvāt Ōṁ

In this *Naya*, a proof is offered to remove the defect of egress (अतिव्याप्ति) in the above-mentioned definition.

Of this cause of creation etc. (i. e. of Brahman), *Śāstra* the Vedas and the works conveying their imp*c*rt written by Purusha (God or human beings) (is) *yōni* = Source of knowledge the valid proof. So, it is not open to the defect of *Ativyāpti*.

IV. Samanvayādhikaraṇam
Ōṁ Tat tu Samanvayat Ōṁ

In this *Naya*, the testimony of *śāstra* in favour of God Vishṇu alone as the cause of the Universe is advanced again, to remove the possible objection of *Atīvyāpti*, to the above mentioned definition of Brahman.

Śāstra-yōni of the previous Sūtra follows here. *Saṁ* is contrued with *Śāstra* also, meaning entirety and primariness Saṁ = examined about the weakness or strength of Anvaya) mutual

relationship) known from the determinative criteria उपक्रमोपसंहारादि लिंगसंघ. From this examination, it is known that Brahman alone (तत्) is the primary object of the entire *Śāstra*.

V. Īkshattyadhikaraṇa
Ōṁ Īkshater-na-aśabdaṁ Ōṁ

In this *Adhikaraṇa*, the previous propostion that Brahman is the primary object of the entire *Śāstra* is firmly established. There are seven sūtras in this *Adhikaraṇa* which go to support the main thesis by removing the doubts raised by the ***Pūrva****pakshin*. They are :—

१) ॐ इक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ॐ
२) ॐ गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॐ
३) ॐ हेयत्वावचनाच्च ॐ
४) ॐ स्वाप्ययात् ॐ
५) ॐ गतिसामान्यात् ॐ
६) ॐ श्रुतत्वाच्च ॐ

Their contents will be discussed and summrised **in the** sequel while dealing with the respective *Adhikaraṇas.*

CHAPTER 2

॥ अथ जिज्ञासाधिकरणम् ॥

JIJÑĀSĀDHIKARAṆA

॥ ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ ॥

This *Adhikaraṇa* is the most important one in the whole work. Every word in the Sūtra, ॐ, अथ, अतः, ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा and कर्तव्या (understood) has occasioned a deep inquiry and discussion. The *Sūtra* also justifies the starting of the enquiry (आरंभणीयत्वंप्रेक्षावदुपादेयत्वं) by offering the अनुबंधचतुष्टय (four precedents of a composition) Viz. अधिकारिन्, विषय, प्रयोजन and संबंध without which the writing of a work would be a vain attempt. But this alone will not do. If the work is unauthentic or invalid (अप्रमाण) like शशविषाण (horn of a hare) or वंध्यापुत्र (son of a sterile woman), who will care to read it even though it is equipped with अनुबंधचतुष्टय? So, its validity should be proved first. This is accomplished by the Bhāshyakāra, i.e., the Āchārya, in the introductory part of the *Bhāshya* and *Anuvyākhyāna*.

ननु यदुपादेयं तदेवानन्यार्थतया व्याख्येयं । यच्च प्रमाणत्वे सति इष्टसाधनावबोधकं प्रायस्तदेवोपादेयं । अतः कथं ब्रह्मसूत्राणां व्याख्येयत्वोपयोग्युपादेयतायै प्रामाण्यादीत्याशंकां परिहर्तुं सूत्रागतिक्रममाह ॥ द्वापरे इति । –तत्वप्रकाशिका.

आप्तवाक्यतया तेन श्रुतिमूलतया तथा ।
युक्तिमूलतया चैव प्रामाण्यं त्रिविधं महत् ॥
दृष्यते ब्रह्मसूत्राणां एकधाऽन्यत्र सर्वशः ।
अतो नैतादृशं किंचित्प्रमाणतममिष्यते ॥ –अनुव्याख्यान

The *Parimaḷa* of Shrī Rāghavēndra–tīrtha has beautifully analysed the point and set forth as follows :

आरंभणीयत्वसंदेहो द्वेधा । प्रामाण्यसंदेहनिमित्तको विषयप्रयोजनाधिकारिसंबंधसंदेहनिमित्तकश्च । तत्र अंत्यस्य सूत्रेण परिहारेऽपि आद्यस्य न परिहारः । अतो भाष्यमेतत्सार्थकं । प्रामाण्येन विना विषयादिव्युत्पादनस्यैवायोगात् ।

The writing of a work is beset with two doubts : (i) doubt about its validity and (2) doubt about its having the four-fold precedents (अनुबंधचतुष्टय). The latter is removed in the *Sūtra* itself. In as much as the sūtra enunciates the existence of four-fold precedents for the *Brahma mīmāṁsā* Śāstra, it must necessarily be an authentic work.

(अतः सूत्राक्षिप्तमेवेदं शिष्याणां बुद्धिसिद्धये भाष्यकृतोक्तमिति । –सुधा. विषयादित्युत्पादनान्यथाऽनुपपत्त्यैवार्थाल्लब्धं प्रामाण्यमित्यर्थः । आर्थिकोऽप्यर्थः सूचार्थ एवेति –परिमळ.)

After, thus, establishing the validity and acceptability of the work (Brahmasūtras) in the Introduction, the Āchārya begins to explain the first *Sūtra*. In the *Nyāyasudhā*, the following topics have been discussed as an introduction (उपोद्घात) to the polemical Commentary *Anuvyākhyāna*.

(1) परापरविद्याविचारः (Parāpara–Vidyā) in which the Vedas are shown to be the *Paravidyā* as they primarily refer to *Para Brahman* only and secondarily to the other subjects, when interpreted with the aid of the logic *(Nyāyas)* of Brahmasūtras This auxiliary work इतिकर्तव्यता i. e. *Brahmasūtras* is therefore called *Paramā Vidyā* here, metaphorically or secondarily, because it aids the Para–Vidyā i. e. the Vedas in yielding the correct meaning.

It may be noted that only autentic and meaningful works deserve to be commented upon so that the commentary may be acceptable to the learned.

(याथार्थ्ये सति अर्थविवक्षापूर्वकवाक्यस्यैवोपादेयतया व्याख्यानं युक्त । –सुधा) The present work is such and so it is called the best scientific treatise (अनुत्तमं शास्त्रम्). True, there are several similar works; why

this work alone is selected for commentary by the Āchārya? It is replied that no other work is so highly equipped with the requisite merits as the Vēdānta-Sūtras which are called the best imparter of the highest knowledge about Brahman *(Paramā Vidyā)* and are known as अनूत्तमं शास्त्रम्. The Vedas are called both *Para-Vidyā* and *Apara Vidyā* viewed in different aspects— Vishṇu - aspect and world - aspect.

ऋगाद्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचकाः । ता एव परमा विद्या यदा विष्णोस्तु वाचकाः ॥

Note the observation of Shri Jaya-tīrtha :

ब्रह्ममीमांसाशास्त्रव्युत्पादितन्यायानुपकृता हि वेदादयो विष्णोर वाचकाः । तदुपकृताश्च तस्य वाचका भवंतीति । —सुधा.

Thus, primarily, the Vedas are the *Para Vidyā* and secondarily the Brahmasūtras which help the Vedas with the criteria of interpretation to yield corret meaning and so are also called Paramā Vidyā or Para Vidyā. This is equated with अनुत्तमं शास्त्रं in the *Anuvyākhyāna*.

The degree of *Mahat* in *Prāmāṇya* of the Brahmasūtras (प्रामाण्यं त्रिविधं महत्) is explained in the Sudhā thus :—

यत एवं ब्रह्मसूत्राणां प्रामाण्यं त्रिविधं दृश्यते । आप्तवाक्यत्वादि प्रमाणत्रयेण दृश्यते इति यावत् । अतस्तन्महदनुत्तमं मंतव्यम् । न हि प्रमाणमात्रं निःशंकप्रवृत्तौ उपयुज्यते । किं नाम प्रमाणतया प्रमितमेव । तच्च यावद्यावदधिकं प्रमीयते तत्तदनुसारिणीं अविशंकां क्षिप्रप्रवृत्तिं प्रसूते इत्यनुभवसिद्धम् । ततः प्रामाण्यमेव स्वकार्यातिशयवशेनातिशयवदित्युच्यते । एवं विषयप्रयोजनातिशयो द्रष्टव्यः । —सुधा.

The treble authenticity shown in the text implies the intensity of the desire to accept the work by the aspirants as the highest authority to induce un-doubted action. The *prāmāṇya* of the Sūtra is proved by the following Sylloligms.

१. विमतं आप्तवाक्यं अनुकूलेन वक्त्रा अनुकूलान् श्रोतॄन् प्रति तदीय हितसाधन बोधयोपदिष्टत्वात् ।

२. विमतं प्रमाणं आप्तवाक्यत्वान् संप्रतिपन्नवत् ।

To avoid the doubts of अप्रयोजकत्व etc, the प्रामाण्य is **established** through आप्तवाक्यं and not directly from अनुकूलवक्त्रादिमत्व etc. Here वक्त्रानुकूल्य, श्रोत्रानुकूल्य and प्रसंगानुकूल्य are explained precisely by Śrī Jayatīrtha in the Sudhā, while commenting on the kārika of *Anuvyākhyāna* :—

गुरुर्गुरूणां प्रभवः शास्त्राणां बादरायणः ।
यतस्तदुदितं शास्त्रमजादिभ्यस्तदर्थतः ॥
वक्तृश्रोतृप्रसक्तीनां यदाप्तिरनुकूलता । —अ. व्या.

The teacher, the student and the occasion must be conducive to render the composition of a work reliable and authentic. The special features of each unit are given by Sri Jayatīrtha in the following analytical definition :—

१) विवक्षितार्थतत्वज्ञानं करणपाटवं विवक्षा चेति त्रयं वक्तुरानुकूल्यं नाम ।

२) तत्वज्ञानयोग्यना वक्तृप्रीतिविषयना चेति द्वयं श्रोतुः ।

३) श्रोतृप्रयोजनोद्देशः प्रसंगस्य । (प्रसंगशब्दो भावव्युत्पन्न एव, अतः वक्तुरुपदेशादौ श्रोतुश्च श्रवणादौ प्रवृत्तिरेव प्रसंगशब्दार्थः।)

(1) Knowledge of the subject under study, dexeterity of the sense organs, and the desire to teach constitute the competence of the teacher.

(2) Capacity to grasp the truth, and being a favourite of the teacher are the requisite qualities of a listener (student).

(3) The inclination of the teacher and the student to teach and study respectively is the proper occasion.

In the present case, Śrī Vēdavyāsa an *avatāra* of Vishṇu is the teacher, four-faced Brahmā his son the teacher of the world is competent to learn and the occasion is to remove the ignorance of the Satvik souls. These three requisites constitute an *Āpta* whose characterastics are given in the Sudhā as follow ;

विवक्षितार्थतत्वज्ञानं. अविप्रलिप्सा, विवक्षा, करणपाटवं चेति इयमाप्तिः । तद्वानाप्त इत्यंगीकारात् । —सुधा.

Thus, the validity and supreme authenticity of the Sūtras are established to justify the writing of the Bhāshya on it by Śrī Madhvāchārya, to the exclusion of other works.

(2) मंगलवाद :—

The performance of *Maṅagala* (prayer for unobstructed completion of the work undertaken) is quite necessary before the work is commenced.

The objector states that Bādarāyaṇa has not inserted prayers in the beginning and so it does not deserve to be commented upon. But Śrī Jayatīrtha has pointed out that Bādarāyaṇa *has* performed *maṅgala* by using the words ॐ and अथ at the beginnig of the first *Sūtra* which convey the sense of auspiciousness (मंगल) also, like the sounds of the conch, Vīnā, Vēṇu musical instruments which impart auspicionsness to the listener though used for other purposes.

(प्रथमसूत्रे अधिकार्यादिप्रतिपादनायोपात्तावोंकाराथशब्दौ शंख वीणावेणुध्वनिवच्छ्रुतितो मांगलिकत्वान् कृत्स्नशास्त्रस्यानंतरायपरिसमाप्त्यादिकं कुर्वाते । अन्यार्थमानीयमानपूर्णकलशवत् । —सुधा p 8)

This explanation is based on the statement of the Sūtra-Bhāsya : अथशब्दो मङगलार्थोऽधिकारानंतर्यार्थश्च । ...... आनंतर्येऽधिकारस्य मंगलार्थे तथैव च । ...... सिसृक्षोः परमाद्विष्णोः प्रथमं द्वौ विनिःसृतौ । ॐकारश्चाथशब्दश्च तस्मात्प्राथमिकौ क्रमात् ॥ Sūtra Bhāshya I. I. 1

(3) ॐकारवाद :

In the *Anuvyākhyāna*, it is stated that all the Sūtras commence with तार (ॐ) and अथ as in ॐ अथाऽतो धर्मजिज्ञासा ॐ, ॐ अथातो दैवी मीमांसा ॐ, ॐ अथाऽनो दर्शपूर्णमासौ व्याख्यास्यामः ॐ । (तत्ताराथमूलत्वं सर्वशास्त्रस्य चेष्यते । —अनु.)

An objector denies this as unnecessary. The Sudhā refutes him saying that rhe *Brahmasūtras* are as sacred as the Vedas and

like the latter should begin with ॐ whenever they are recited. There is also a second ॐकार which forms part of the Sūtra अथाऽतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ।. The words ॐ and अथ being by nature more powerful, are used first in all the sūtras and in thc present case they serve the purpose of completing the work कारकतया and also suggesting (ज्ञापकतया) the auspiciousness, for beginning the commentary.

(यत्पर्यायांतरं विहायाऽनयोरेव क्रमांतरं विहायाऽऽदावेवोपादानं तेन जानीमः ज्ञापकतयाऽऽदिसूत्रस्य कारकतया समस्तशास्त्रस्य चोपयोगित्वेनै तौ सूत्रकृता विवक्षिताविति । Ibid P. 9.)

They also indicate that the enquiry is justifiable because it is equipped with the four-fold requisites of अनुबंधचतुष्टय.

The Brahmasūtras are meant to determine the import of the Vedas and as such they are each subsidiary *Brahma-Vidya*. To conserve the spirit of the Vedic lore, ॐकार should be pre-fixed and affixed to the sūtras as in the recital of the Vedic Mantras, according to the अर्थवादश्रुति; स्रवत्यनोंकृतं ब्रह्म परस्ताच्च विशीर्यते । if ॐकार is not added in the beginning, the spirit of the Vedas will flitter away and if it is not affixed at the end, it will lose its strength.

This seeondary ॐकार of अर्थवाद is understood at the beginning and end of the first sūtra—not conjoined (असंहिततया) and another ॐकार is admitted as part of the first sūtra. (अन्वयप्रतियोगिसमर्पकतया) The first ॐकार continues in all the *Sūtras* as अधिकृत to conserve the sprit of the Vedic lore. According to Tantradīpikā, only one ॐकार at the biginning serves both the purposes.

(4) Then, the अनुबंधचतुष्टय of the Brahma Mīmāṁsā Śāstra is sought to be established in the Sūtra by the words ॐ and ब्रह्मन् (विषय = object), अथ (अधिकारिन = knower) and अतः (प्रयोजन = purpose) and the mutual relationship (संबंध). First of all, it is argued that unless the four precedents are proved

to exist, the work will not be acceptable to the learned scholars. Since it is the work of Vēdayvāsa who is an *Avatāra* of Vishṇu and is *Āpta*, all these requisites are presumed to exist and need not be retold. But, since the function of this *śāstra* is to prove them by *Nyāyas*, the four-fold precedents are shown to exist there by Nyāyas.

(तस्मान्नेदं प्रयोजनाद्युपदेशमात्रं किं तु श्रौतस्य प्रयोजनादेर्न्यायेनोपपादनार्थमित्येव परिहारः । आप्तत्वं तु न्यायस्योपोब्दलकमात्रमिति भाष्यकारीयं तव्द्युत्पादनमपि नानर्थकम् ।)

If they are presumed to exist on the strength of their being आप्तवाक्य, it would be an आगम and not युक्तिशास्त्र (work based on reasoning.)

The *Parimaḷa* explains the point precisely :

तद्विजिज्ञासस्वेत्यत्र विशब्दतच्छब्दाभ्यां यस्य प्रसादादित्यादौ मुच्यते इत्यादिशब्दैः श्रुतस्येत्यर्थः । **न्यायेनेति** । पूर्वपक्षिणा वक्ष्यमाणदिशा प्रयोजनाद्यभावशंकायां **प्रयोजनस्य कर्माद्यजन्यत्वरूपन्यायेन, विषयब्रह्मणो जीवाद् भिन्नत्वन्यायेन अधिकारिणः शूद्रादिव्यावर्तकत्वोपपादकाध्ययनादिमत्वरूपन्यायेनो**पपादनार्थमित्यर्थः। **तव्द्युत्पादनमपीति** । प्रादुर्भूत इत्यादिना कृतमिति भावः ॥)

The doubter poses an objection : There is no object विषय of enquiry at all. It cannot be अनात्मा or insentient being or *Jaḍa*. For, it is known by perception and inferences etc. A thing that is already known by other sources of knowledge cannot be the object of enquiry again. Without *Vishaya*, an Adhikārin cannot be maintained. Without these two, the aim प्रयोजन and mutual relationship are out of question. Other alternatives of the *Vishaya* Viz, (i) *Dharma*, *Adharma*, *Dēvatā*, Kāla, etc. are warded off as they are known by other *śāstras*, namely *Karma-Mīmāṁsā*, *Dēvī-Mimāṁsā*, *Jyōtisśāstra* etc. (ii) Body, Sense organs, or their composition into a collection. Self-Conscious

soul—आत्मा an agent and experiencer-all these are known by perception or cognised in self-cognition अहंप्रत्यय respectively. (iii) One that is not cognised like this is inconceivable, (iv) Other man's Ātmā परात्मा. He (परात्मा) is inferred by प्राणादिलिंग (minor premises like vital airs etc).

(हिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारानुकूल चेष्टादिलिंगैरित्यर्थः । चेष्टादिलिंगेन सात्मत्वे परदेहस्य साधिते **इत्युपाधिखण्डनो**क्तेः । प्राणवाय्वादि मत्वलिंगेनेतिवाऽर्थः । परिमळ, P. 24)

and Āgama is not necessary. (v) God or Paramātmā or Īśvara. He does not exist at all. Even if he does, he is none else than the individual soul or जीवात्मा who, as stated above, is self-valid or is known by inference or as being the repository of mental cognition

(जीवस्य चाऽहमिति स्वप्रकाशतया स्वप्रकाशज्ञानाश्रयतया मानस प्रत्यक्षवेद्यतया वा सिद्धत्वेन न जिज्ञासाविषयत्वमित्युक्तम् । –सुधा, p. 12)

The objections of the Pūrva pakshin are analysed thus in the Parimaḷa :

सौत्रब्रह्मादि पदार्थोक्तिपरस्योतत्ववाचीत्यादेर्व्याक्यं निर्विषयत्वं तावव्द्यक्तीकुर्वन् ऐंद्रियकानैंद्रियकरूपेण वा श्रेयोऽहेतु तद्धेतुरूपेण वा द्विविधानात्मनां स्वात्म-परात्म-परमात्मनां च विषयत्वं क्रमेण निराह ॥ अनात्मनेत्यादिना प्रयोजनं चेश्वरजिज्ञासायाः इत्यतः प्राक्तनग्रंथेन ॥

Further, there is no evidence to prove the existence of Īśvara: ईश्वरविषया जिज्ञासा भविष्यतीतिचेन्न । तस्यैवाभावात् । प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and आगम – पौरुषंय and अपौरुषेय.

He is not amenable to perception, nor is there a *linga* to surmise his existence. A word has no separate status as a means to right knowledge (प्रमाण) and what of the special words the Vedas ?

शब्दस्यैव प्रामाण्यं दुर्घटं अर्थसंस्पर्शशून्यत्वात् । वाक्यार्थप्रत्यायन प्रकारानिरूपणाच्च । कुतस्तद्विशेषस्य वेदस्य । ?

This enquiry ls fruitless (has no प्रयोजन): neither heaven nor *Mōksha*, is obtained. The bondage of this world is caused by *Avidyā* and so it is unreal. It can be removed by destroying its cause *(Avidyā)*, by knowledge *(Vidyā)*. If the bondage is real, it cannot be removed at all just as Ātmā who is real cannot be destroyed.

अथ परमार्थ एवाऽयं बंधस्तर्हि न ज्ञानेन निवर्तेत । न च सत्यस्यानादेरात्मस्वरूपमात्रानुबंधिनो बंधस्य केनापि निवृत्तिर्युक्ता ।

—सुधा P. 13

Thus, there is no *Vishaya* here. In such a case, an enquiry or meditation cannot stand its ground.

तदेवं विषयाद्यनुबंधविधुरत्वान्न जिज्ञासा कर्तव्या । तद्विधयोऽपि न प्रमाणं । शास्त्रं चेदमनारंभणीयमिति प्राप्ते सूत्रयामास भगवानाचार्यः। ॐ अथाऽतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ ॥ –सुधा P. 13

Since these is no four-fold antecedent namely, *Vishaya* etc. the injunctions of the Veda to meditate upon Vishṇu are therefore not trustworthy. In this पूर्वपक्ष, अथ has not been taken into account as its implications are fully explained in the *Sūtra-Bhāshya*.

अत्रानुव्याख्याने सौत्राऽथपदव्याख्यानस्याक्रुतत्वात् त व्द्यावर्त्यप्रपंच नमक्रुत्वा संक्षिप्योपसंहरति : –परिमळ, P. 25

All these objections are answered fully in the Sūtra ॐ अथाऽतो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ ॥

The reply is:— Certainly Īśvara is the object of enquiry as shown by the word Brahman in the *Sūtra*. The Vedas represented by the word ॐ in the Sūtra are the evidence. Since the enquiry helps the Vedas convey their contents correctly (the Vedas & through them Īśvara) the enquiry जिज्ञासा is said to relate to Īśvara indirectly.

ननु वेदानामीश्वरप्रतिपत्तिजनकत्वाद् भवनु तद्विषयत्वं। शास्त्रं तु तेषामीश्वरप्रतिपादनानुसरणोपायन्यायविषयं कथमीश्वरपरमुच्यते ।

मैवम् । वेदानामीश्वरमवबोधयता **मितिकर्तव्यता** हि मीमांसा । तेनोपकारकत्वाद् भवति तद्विषया । तद् द्वारा शास्त्रमपि । –सुधा, P. 16

ॐकार is प्रणव which means the same as व्याहृति (ॐ भूर्भुवः स्वरोम्) conveys the meaning of गायत्री (ॐ तत्सवितुर्वरेण्यं भर्गो देवस्य धीमहि । धियो यो नः प्रचोदयात् ।) which is an exposition of (gloss on) Purusha-sūkta (सहस्रशीर्षा पुरुषः etc.) with three *Vargas*. The *Purusha-Sūkta* is the epitome of the three Vedas ऋक्, यजुस्, साम. Thus, ॐकार represents through व्याहृति, गायत्री and पुरुषसूक्त the entire Vedic Literature which is cited as an evidence to prove the existence of Iś vara.

Though Īśvara is self-valid (स्वप्रकाश). He is conceieved wrongly by various thinkcrs in various ways. The misconceptions have to be removed by understanding the Vedic Texts properly with the help of sound logic which is supplied by the Brahmasūtras.

वेदप्रामाण्यमेवानंगीकुर्वाणाः केचिदीश्वर एव नास्तीति प्रतिपन्नाः। अपरे तु तदंगीक्रुत्यापि तद्वाचिनां पदानां जीवादिविषयतां व्याकुर्वंतस्तदभावमास्थिताः । अन्ये तु पुनरस्तीश्वरः किंतु परमार्थतो निर्गुण एवेति संगिरंते । एके तु सगुणोऽपि न जगतः कारणमपि तूदासीन एवेत्यातिष्ठंते । केचित्कारणत्वेऽपि उपादानमित्युपयंति , निमित्तमात्रत्वेऽपि कतिपयगुणं गुणेभ्यो भिन्नमन्ये मन्यंते । इतरे तु भिन्नाभिन्नमुपगतवंतः। के चिद्विग्रहवंतमित्येवमाद्यासु विप्रतिपत्तिषु सतीषु तत्वज्ञान कारणादपि वेदात्तदनुत्पत्तौ तदपनोदनद्वारेण वेदेतिकर्तव्यतारूपा जिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति।

—सुधा, P, 16

A question is raised here. If the Vedas convey the knowledge of Īśvara, where is the necessity of जिज्ञासा or enquiry. As stated above, the जिज्ञासा removes all wrong notions about Iśvara which have resulted from fallacious thinking due to the wrong understanding of the meaning or import (तात्पर्य) of the Vedas. This Iśvara is introduced in the *Sūtra* by the words

ॐ and ब्रह्मन् which mean गुणपूर्ण विष्णु = Vishnu full of auspicious qualities (ब्रह्मशब्दश्च विष्णवेव), Brahman cannot be जीय as the latter is अल्पगुण which is diametrically opposed to सर्वगुणत्व of Vishṇu.

The word अतः in the Sūtra supplies as stated above the purpose (प्रयोजन) of enquiry. This answers the objection of futility of enquiry.

ब्रह्मजिज्ञायाः निष्प्रयोजनत्वं शंकितमपाकर्तुं अतः शब्दं व्याचष्टे। ज्ञानीति । –सुधा, P. 17.

The main purpose is the final bliss or emancipation from the bondage of *Saṁsāra*, through knowledge. But this is got only through the grace (प्रसाद) of God Nārāyaṇa or Vishṇu

यद्यपि न जिज्ञासायाः स्वर्गादिरूपोऽभ्युदयः प्रयोजनं संभवति। । तथापि मोक्षो भविष्यति । तस्याऽनन्यसाध्यत्वात् । मोक्षसाधनं हि साक्षाद् भगवानेव । बंधको भवपाशेन भ पाशाच्च मोचकः इत्यादि वचनात् । मोचकश्चेश्वर प्रसादस्तद्भक्त्येकसाध्यः । –सुधा, P. 17.

It is true that from the text proper of the Sūtra, the sense of Īśvara–Prasāda or grace connot be derived. But, since the Vedas like

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः । (वरणं तु प्रसाद उच्यते)

are emphatic in describing *Mōksha* as the gift of God's grace, it must be admitted that *Prasāda* is the immediate cause of final bliss by अन्यथा अनुपपत्ति.

यद्यपि न सूत्राक्षरेभ्यो भगवत्प्रसादो लभ्यते । तथापि अनुपपत्त्या अंगीकरणीय इति युक्तं व्याख्यानं । वक्ष्यति चैतत्सूत्रकारः । ततोह्यस्य बंधविपर्ययाविति । –*Ibid*, P. 19.

(5) The Adhyāsa-Bhāshya of Śri S'ainkara, examined and refuted.

The Advaitin rebuts and states that Avidyā or Ajñāna is destroyed by *Jñāna* and there is no need of an intermediary Īśvara or his *Prasāda*. This, however, is untenable. For, the

bondage is caused not merely by *Ajñāna*, but by the will of God primarily. The inanimate *Ajñāna* cannot be credited with agency which presupposes knowledge.

न च जडस्य स्वतः किंचित्करत्वं युक्तं । द्रव्यं कर्मचेत्यादिवाक्यविरुद्धं च । अतः परमेश्वर एव सत्वादिगुणमय्या विद्याविरोधित्वेनाविद्यया स्वाधीनया प्रकृत्याऽचित्याद्भुतया स्वशक्त्या च जीवस्य स्वप्रकाशमपि स्वरूपचैतन्यमाच्छादयतीति युक्तम् । . . . तदेवं बंधस्येश्वराधीनत्वा स एव मोचकोऽगीकार्योऽपरस्यास्वातंत्र्यात् । प्रसन्न एवासौ स्वकीयां मायां व्यावर्तयतीति तत्प्रसादार्थं सर्वोऽप्ययं साधनसंदर्भ इत्युक्तं ।

—Sudhā, P 19.

Here, the author enters into a long discussion to silence the views of the Advaitins headed by *Vivaraṇakāra* who tries to explain the destruction of the beginningless (अनादि) bondage (बंध) = अज्ञान) by ज्ञान only without the need of Īśvara–Prasāda. A question is raised: How can a beginningless bondage be removed?

अनादेः प्रकृतिबंधस्य कथं निवृत्तिरिति चेत् । अत्रऽऽह कश्चित् ॥

Here the *Vivarṇakāra* answers his opponent who takes his stand on the dictum of सामान्य विशेषव्याप्ति :– अनादिर्न निवर्तते इति सामान्यव्याप्तिः । ज्ञानेन अज्ञाननिवृत्तिरिति विशेषव्याप्तिः । अतः सैव बलवती ।

Just as the scope of a general rule 'मा हिंस्यात्सर्वा भूतानि' (No living being should be killed) is restricted by the śruti अग्निषोमीयं पशुमालभेत 'one may kill an animal in Agni-shṭoma sacrifice', similarly, the rule of non-destruction of a beginningless object is broken by the specific example viz. beginningless *Ajñāna* (Ignorance) is removed by *Jñāna* or knowledge. Thus, the general rule is contradicted by the special circumstance. According to this view, the ज्ञान and अज्ञान need not be Mithyā (false). This, the Vivarṇakāra has denounced as faulty and concluded that अज्ञान and its effect बंध are Mithyā (*false*) and

they vanish on the rise of Brahma-jñāna just as the error of "shell-silver" etc. is removed by the Bādha Jñāna (corrective knowledge) "This is not silver" or "This is shell only". This is refuted by Śrī Jayatīrtha who on the authority of the Śruti and Smṛiti 'विश्वमायानिवृत्तिः, मायामेतां तरंति ते।... तरंत्यविद्याम् etc., establishes that the real बंध (अज्ञान) though beginningless can be and is destroyed by the grace of Īśvara.

अत्रोच्यते । . . . प्रमितत्वादेव विनाशस्य । अनादेः कीदृशो विनाश इति चेत् । स्वरूपध्वंस एव । . . . ननु अविद्याचेन्निवर्तेत । तर्हि एकमुक्तौ सर्वमुक्तिः स्यात् । न स्यात् । प्रतिजीवमविद्याभेदांगीकारात् । . . . मैवं । न स्मरति भवानुक्तार्थस्य । प्रसन्नः परमेश्वर एव बंधविध्वंसं करोतीत्युक्तम् । –सुधा. P. 20-21.

The destruction here means स्वरूपध्वंस that is its very nature is dismantled as an earthen pot is dashed to pieces by a cudgel. It can not, however, be objected that if Avidyā is completely removed, all the Jīvas should have to become free (Mukta) simultaneously. For, ignorance is not one whole, but is severally different and so, the objection of simultaneous liberation of all the souls can not stand its ground. This however is not a sound reply.– Jīvas or, an in animate (Jaḍa) knowledge can not be credited with any agency. The God alone confers Mukti upon devotees through His grace.

Thus, as stated above, it is established that Parameśvara conceals the natural bliss of the जीव's by his mysterious inscrutable powers and removes the curtain at his will. For, God is the principal concealer and अविद्या or ignorance is only secondary. Even though the latter is removed, the soul cannot enjoy the full bliss until God disperses His curtain.

वस्तुतस्तु . . . . परमेश्वरशक्तिरेव जीवस्वरूपावरणं मुख्यं । अविद्या तु निमित्तमात्रं । ततोऽविद्यायां निवृत्तायामपि नाऽशेषानंदाभिव्यक्तिः । यावदीश्वर एव स्वकीयां बंधकशक्तिं न ततो व्यावर्तयति ।

—सुधा, P. 21.

The Advaitin is not able to explain satisfactorily the *Bandha* (worldly bondage) and its removal or destruction. For, according to him, Para-Brahman is the only real entity and all else is unreal. The *Bandha* that is experienced by the soul must obviously be false. This is made out in the *Adhyāsa- Bhāshya* of Sri Śaṅkarāchārya.

CHAPTER 3

ADHYĀSA - BHĀSHYA:— REFUTED

Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya has prefaced his *Sūtra Bhāshya* with a dissertation on the falsity (unreality) of bondage (बंधमिथ्यात्व) which is known as अध्यासभाष्य. This, as pointed out by Śrī Jayatīrtha, is irrelevent and contrary to the characteristics (लक्षण) of Bhāshya :

सूत्रार्थो वर्ण्यते यत्र वाक्यैः सूत्रानुकारिभिः ।
स्वपदानि च वर्ण्यंते भाष्यं भाष्यविदो विदुः ॥

The *Adhyāsa- Bhāshya* which is outside the scope of a Bhāshya should be treated as irrelevant.

बंधमिथ्यात्वस्य असूत्रितत्वात् । असूत्रितार्थवर्णनेन भाष्यलक्षणाभावेनाऽभाष्यत्वप्रसंगात् । —*Sudhā*, P. 21.

The exponents of the Advaita Bhāshya put up a defence for *Adhyāsa Bhāshya* on three grounds :—

1) प्रयोजनोपपादकत्व (justifying the purpose of enquiry)
2) विषयोपपादकत्व (explaining the object of enquiry) and
3) सकलतंत्रोपोद्घातरूपत्व (as an introduction to the whole *Śāstra*.

The Sūtras convey two senses: (1) श्रौत (Direct) and (2) आर्थिक (Indirect). The direct sense is (साधनचतुष्टयसंपन्नस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानाय विचारः कर्तव्यः । इति सूत्रवाक्यस्य श्रौतोऽर्थः संपद्यते ।" "an enquiry should be conducted for the knowledge of Brahman by an Adhikārin who is equipped with four-fold qualifications." But Brahman is (नित्यशुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव) devoid of all attributes. The Jīva *who is identical with Brahman* is known to experience pleasure and pain and to do acts good or bad. It is Brahman who is the object of enquiry and not Jīva who is self-

evident. This experience of the जीव i. e. प्रत्यक्ष is contradicted by the Śruti नेहनानास्ति किंचन (प्रत्यक्षे पुतिकूष्माण्डायिते) which discards all agency to Brahman. Since the *Śruti* is more powerful than *Pratyaksha*, the attributes of कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व experienced by the soul should obviously be considered as unreal.

तदेवमहं कर्ता भोक्ता सुखी दुःखीत्यादि प्रत्यक्षे श्रुत्यादि विरोधेन पुतिकूष्माण्डीकृते बंधमिथ्यात्वव्युत्पादनमुपपन्नतरं इत्यत आह मिथ्यात्वं यदि इति । —*Śudhā*, P. 26.

The purport of the first Śutra is stated to be as follows :

श्रुत्यर्थाभ्यां साधनचतुष्टयसंपन्नस्य मोक्षसाधनब्रह्मज्ञानाय वेदांत वाक्य विचारः कर्तव्यः इति सूत्रवाक्यस्य तात्पर्येण प्रतिपाद्योऽवगतः । एवं च शास्त्रे प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्त्यंगतयाऽर्थतः सूत्रितस्य प्रयोजनादेरुपपादकं बंधमिथ्यात्वमिति तदपि सूत्रार्थ एव" । —सुधा, P. 22

Here, Brahma–Jñāna (knowledge of Brahman through enquiry) is designed to remove the Ignorance (अज्ञान or अविद्या) which is the cause of bondage. (i. e. the कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरूपानर्थः). If this Ignorance and its effect Bondage are real, they cannot be destroyed since the real something cannot be sublated. Thus, the demonstration of the unreality is quite necessary to justify the purpose of enquiry (प्रयोजन) and the object of enquiry (विषय)

" तदेवं विध्यपेक्षितेष्वधिकारिविषयप्रयोजनानुबंधेषु सूत्राक्षिप्त प्रयोजनविषययोरुपपादकं बंधामिथ्यात्वं प्रतिपादयद्युष्मदस्मत्प्रत्ययगोचरयोरित्यादिभाष्यं सूत्रार्थसंगतमेव" । —सुधा P. 22

Since the Adhyāsa Bhāshya supports the श्रौतार्थ of the Sūtra, the treatment of *Bandha-Mithyātva* in the Bhāshya is *relevent*. Further, the sense of the *Brahma Mīmāmisā Śā*stra i. e. the Brahmasūtras, is to teach the identity between परब्रह्म and जीव. But they are known to possess mutually contradictory qualities. i. e. one (परब्रह्म) is all consciousness (चैतन्यैकरस) whiie the other (जीव) is conditioned by agency and experiencing of pleasure

and pain. So, the conditioning attributes of कर्तृत्व भोक्तृत्व etc. must necesssariiy be unreal. Thus, the Adhyāsa-bhāshya serves also as an introduction to the whole of *Brahma-Mīmaṁsā-Śāstra.* (सकल तंत्रोपोद्घात)

This explanation of the Advaitin is carefully scrutinised and it is pointed out that the three reasons given in defence of the Adhyāsa-Bhāshya are quite fallacious and ineffective.

तदेतदादिभाष्यस्य संगतित्रयमत्यसंगतं । तथाहि । *Śudhā*, P. 22. (१) प्रयोजनोपपादकत्व,, २) विषयोपषादकत्व and ३) सकल नंत्रोपोद्घातरूपत्व ।)

इत्युक्तेर्बंधमिथ्यात्वं नैव मुक्तिरपेक्षते ।
मिथ्यात्वमपि बंधस्य न प्रत्यक्षविरोधतः ॥ —अ. व्याः

This कारिका has been explained by Śrī Jayatīrtha in various ways to show that the Adhyāsa-Bhāshya of Śri Śankara is irrelevent *and illogical :—*

I (I) मुक्तिः बंधमिथ्यात्वं नैवापेक्षते। Emancipation or release does not anticipate the unreality of *Bandha.* If it does, then the *Adhyāsabhāshya* would serve the purpose of explaining *Mukti* (प्रयोजनोपपादक) But, it does not require the world (Bondage) to be unreal. Just as in *Arthāpatti,* जीवन्देवदत्तो गृहे न वर्तते "If Deva. datta who is alive is not found in the house, he must, of course, have gone out, is the correct inference by *Arthāpatti.* Without this supposition, the sense would not be complete. In the present case, however, without the unreality of *Bandha, Mukti can* be explained, only if *Bandha* is real and not otherwise

एवशब्देन अन्यथैवोपपन्नतां सूचयति । —सुधा P. 22

The king being pleased at the sight of the prisoner, releases him from the (real) fetters, Similarly the God cuts asunder the bondage of *Saṁsāra* after casting the gracious look on him (जीव).

यथा दृष्टचा प्रसन्नः सन् राजा बंधापनोदकृत् ।
एवं दृष्टः स भगवान् कुर्याद्बंधविभेदनम् ॥ —अ. व्या.

The Śruti दृष्टैव तं मुच्यते। supports this interpretation. The Advaitin quotes two instances where real and unreal things are removed by *Darśana* or knowledge respectively. In the case of the prisioner, the बंध is real, But the same *Bandha* in dream is unreal, and is removed on waking i. e. ज्ञान. Both the alternatives of 'real' and 'unreal' are possible and the latter case cannot be excluded. And there is no need of God's grace here. But since the specific śruti तरति शोकमात्मविन् coupled with the statement ज्ञानिना मोक्षदश्च सः । implies the intervention of God's grace, the general śruti दृष्टवैव तं मुच्यते । should be interpreted by *Lakshaṇā*

दर्शनजन्यादेवेश्वरप्रसादान्न पुनः कर्मादिहेतुकादित्यन्ययोगव्यवच्छेदपरत्वोपपत्तेश्च । —P. 23

by God's grace through *Darśana* knowledge only and not by कर्म etc. The emphasis in दृष्टैव may also denote अयोगव्यवच्छेद i. e. excluding non-seeing i. e. by seeing only. The other alternative of unreality is thus excluded as the *real* case is fully reasonable and justifiable.

2. अस्तु वा ज्ञानाद्बंधनिवृत्तिः । तथाऽपि बंधमिथ्यात्वं नैव मुक्तिरपेक्षते । —*Sudhā* P. 33

Even if it is agreed, as the Advaitin says, that knowledgc (without the intervention of Īśvara-Prasāda) alone removes Ignorance (and its effect Bondage), the unreality of *Bandha* is absolutely uncalled for. The cause-and-effect rule does not and cannot accommodate the sense of unreality (between the two) as the cause precedes the effect immediately without allowing any interval for मिथ्यात्व or unreality, as, for example, in the destruction of all sins by the sight of Rāma-Sētu

सेतुदर्शनादिना पापादिनिवृत्तिः सुप्रसिद्धा । मध्ये अदृष्टकल्पनायां तु न प्रमाणमस्ति । —सुधा, P. 24

3. The arguement that knowledge (ज्ञान) by itself removes the *Ajñāna* (Ignorance) is fallacious. If the beginningless

अज्ञान is destroyed, why not the beginningless *Ātmā* who is the respository of *Ajñāna* be destroyed?

अनादेश्चाज्ञानस्य निवृत्तौ आत्मनोऽपि निवृत्तिः किं न स्यात् । मिथ्याभूतमज्ञानमनाद्यपि निवर्तते न च सत्य आत्मा इति चेत् । क्वेद-मुपलब्धं भवता यत्सत्यं न निवर्तते इति । —*Ibid* P. 23

So, mutual opposition (निवर्त्यनिवर्तकभाव) is necessary for one to be destroyed and not the falsity of *Bandha* which is not derived from the text by any stretch of the meaning.

Even if it is admitted that Ignorance is removed by Jñāna (knowledge) as supposed by the opponent, it would be proper to describe the bondage as either Ajñāna or its effect only and not its unreality. For, according to the Advaitin there are only three entities–Brāhman, Ajñāna (Ignorance) and its effect (तत्कार्य) The unreality of Ajñāna itself is far from possible to conceive. Just as a piece of jaggery placed at the tip of the elbow cannot by any means be reached by the tongue to taste it, so also the unreality of *Ajñāna* is far beyond the reach of argument i. e. the falsity is a myth. So, *Ajñāna* is real.

अस्तु वा ज्ञानमज्ञानस्यैव निवर्तकमिति व्याप्तिः तथापि बंध मिथ्यात्वं नैव मुक्तिरपेक्षते । किंतु बंधस्याज्ञानतत्कार्ययोरन्यतरत्वमेवेति तदेव वर्णनीयम् । अध्यासवर्णनस्य का संगतिः । अज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वं तु कपोणिगुडायितम् । निराकरिश्यमाणत्वात् । –सुधा, P. 23

कपोणिगुडायितं is explained in the Parimala as follows:—

कपोणिर्नाम बाहुमध्यसंधिः । ..... मध्यसंधिबाह्यप्रदेशांतभागे विद्यमानस्य गुडस्य रसनेंद्रियस्पर्शो यथा न शक्यते तथा अज्ञानमिथ्या-त्वसंबंधोऽपि न शक्यते इत्यर्थः । –परिमळ, P. 41

That अज्ञान is not unreal is proved in the sequel in the kārikā.

"अज्ञानस्य च मिथ्यात्वेऽज्ञानादिति कल्पने । अनवस्थितिस्तथा च स्यादन्योन्याश्रयताऽथवा ।" –अनुव्याख्यान.

5. It is said that *Bandha* is destroyed in Mukti. If it is unreal, how can an unreal thing be destroyed? It must, therefore, be real.

अपिच बंधविध्वंसलक्षणत्वाद्बंधमिथ्यात्वं नैव मुक्तिरपेक्षते । किन्नाम सत्यत्वमेव । न हि मिथ्याभूतस्य शशविषाणादेर्ध्वंसोऽस्ति । —*Ibib*, P. 24

The horn of a hare cannot be predicated with any action like destruction etc.

6. The statement that the knowledge of Brahman removes the *Bandha* (Bondage) of जीव does not require that *Bandha* should be unreal.

अपि च एवमुक्तिः ब्रह्मज्ञानं जीवगतं बंधं निवर्तयतीति सौत्री प्रयोजनोक्तिः बंधमिथ्यात्वं नाऽपेक्षते ।

If the *Bandha* and ज्ञान exist in the same place i. e. जीव then, the *Bandha* might perhaps be unreal. The unreal 'silver' in इदं रजतं is not and cannot be removed by घटज्ञान.

न हि शुक्तिकायामारोपितं रजतं घटज्ञानान्निवर्तते । —*Ibid*, P. 24

Even in the former case, where the knowledge and the thing removed reside in the same place as in गरुडध्यान = meditation on eagle and the विष (poison), सेतुदर्शन sight of Rama's bridge and पाप (sin) respectively are not unreal. Granting that the thing removed is unreal, the remover should exist in the same place. How can ब्रह्मज्ञान remove the *Bandha* which exists in जीव? The Advaitin might shift the argument and say that जीव is identical with ब्रह्मन् and so ब्रह्मज्ञान and *Bandha* would in a sense be existing together.

ब्रह्मज्ञानं नाम त्वं पदार्थस्य जीवस्य तत्पदार्थेन ब्रह्मणैक्यानुभव इति तु स्वगोष्ठीनिष्ठं प्रलापमात्रम् । निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात् । –सुधा, P, 24.

But, this can not be maintained; for, the identity of Brahman with जीव is refuted and discarded in the Kārikā

सत्यत्वात्तेन दुःखादेः प्रत्यक्षेण विरोधतः ।
न ब्रह्मतां वदेद्वेदो जीवस्य हि कथंचन ॥ –अनुव्या.

7. All right, lel us concede that the *Bandha* is unreal and that it is removed by ब्रह्मज्ञान as presumed by the Advaitin. Then immediately after *Brahma Sākshātkāra*, the जीव should get rid of the *Bandha* i.e. the body etc. This, however, does not happen. The Advaitin admits the state of जीवन्मुक्ति

परप्रसादहेतोस्तु विलंबो नाम युज्यते ।
पुमिच्छाधीनता नोचेद्विलंबः किं कृतो भवेत् ॥

—अनु. III–उपासनापाद.

The release (मुक्ति) is delayed as it depends upon the will of God. This leads to the contrary conclusion viz. Bandha is not unreal and the removal of *Bandha* is not effected by ज्ञान alone or (without ईश्वरप्रसाद God's grace)

Thus, it is proved that the प्रयोजन does not presuppose the falsity or unreality of बंध.

Similarly, the विषय (object of enquiry) does not require the *Bandha* to be unreal. This (falsity) could perhaps be compatible if the identity between ब्रह्मन् and जीव is proved, as in that case the कर्तृत्व-भोक्तृत्व experienced by the जीव should have to be unreal. Otherwise, the जीव who is not संदिग्ध (under doubt) cannot be an object of enquiry. But Brahman who is संदिग्ध becomes the object of enquiry and the identity between ब्रह्मन् (सर्वज्ञ) and जीव (अल्पज्ञ) is a myth.

एवमुक्तिः सौत्री ब्रह्मणो विषयत्वोक्तिः बंधमिथ्यात्वं नैवाऽपेक्षते । यदि हि सूत्रे जीवात्मनो विषयतयोक्तिः स्यात्तदा सा तस्य संदिग्धतासिद्धये कर्तृत्वादि बंधमिथ्यात्वं कथं चिदपेक्षेताऽपि । ब्रह्मैवात्र विषयतयोच्यते । न हि अन्यस्य संदिग्धतयाऽन्यस्य विचारविषयतोपपद्यते । अतिप्रसंगात् । आत्मैव ब्रह्मेत्येतां तु दुराशामपाकरिष्यामः । —सुधा, P. 24

III. The same कारिका इत्युक्तेबंधमिथ्यात्वं etc; is interpreted to show that the unreality of the *Bandha* does not fit in with the import of the *Brahma-Mīmāṁsā-Śāstra*.

सकलतंत्रार्थोपोद्घातः प्रयोजनं युष्मदस्मदित्यादि ग्रंथस्येत्येतदनेनापाकरोति । —सुधा. P. 25.

The import of the entire *Brahmamīmāṁsā-Śāstra* as made out from the criteria of समन्वय viz उपक्रमोपसंहार etc. is quite contrary to the identity of जीव with ब्रह्मन् (Brahman) which is wrongly conceived by superficial tests.

To say thus (एवं) that Brahman according to तत्तुसमन्वयात् the efficient cause of the world of spirit and matter, is the object of the Vedas, does not presume the world to be unreal. So, the *Adhyāsa Bhāshya* cannot form a relevent introduction to the entire work of the *Brahmasūtras*. On the other hand, the unreality of the identity between *Jīva* and *Īśvara* should be the corollary of the teaching of the Vedas that Īśvara is the efficient cause of the world. The identity is refuted by the Āchārya in several contexts in *Janmādhikaraṇa* and *Īkshatyadhikaraṇa* :

निर्गुणत्वं च तेनैव निषिद्धं प्रभुणा स्वयं ।
कथं नित्यगुणस्यास्य स्यादैक्यं गुणहानतः ॥

—जन्माधिकरण

तस्माच्छास्त्रेण जिज्ञास्यमस्मदीयं गुणार्णवं ।
वासुदेवाख्यमद्वंद्वं परं ब्रह्माखिलोत्तमम् ॥

—ईक्षत्यधिकरणं

Thus, the अध्यासभाश्य dealing with the unreality of *Bandha* is uncalled for. It is also against all evidences

(अयुक्तमपि प्रत्यक्षादि विरुद्धार्थ प्रतिपादकत्वात् ।)
मिथ्यात्वमपि बंधस्य न प्रत्यक्षविरोधतः ।
मिथ्यात्वं यदि दुःखादेस्तद्वाक्यस्याग्रतो भवेत् ॥
मिथ्यायाः साधकत्वं च न सिद्धं प्रतिवादिनः । —अनु.

The Arthāpatti—(बंधमिथ्यात्वं विना प्रयोजनाद्यनुपपद्यमानत्वं ।) given in the *Adhyāsabhāshya* is vitiated by अन्वर्थैवोपपत्तिः i. e. by

the only reasonable alternative of बंध सत्यत्व by *Pratyaksha* (perception). Here, the Advaitin observes that *Pratyaksha* is unreliable as it is contradicted (प्रत्यक्षे श्रुत्वादि बिरोधेन पूतिकूष्माण्डीकृते) by the more powerful *Āgama* नेहनानास्ति किंचन 'Nothing is real except Brahman : No, the *S'rnti* should be interpreted with the textual criteria of उपक्रमोपसंहार and श्रुतिलिंग समाख्या च etc. and the superficial meaning of *Identity* should be discarded.

Granted that the Śruti teaches the *Advaita* between Jīva and Īśa as stated by the Advaitin, it leads to absurdity. The Advaitin puts forward his Thesis that Brahman alone is real and all else is unreal. In that case, the Dvaitin rebuts, the Śruti being other than Brahman woald be false. How can a false thing which is non-existent have the capacity to denote any object which is existent.

तदेवं सर्वं मिथ्यात्वपरत्वे श्रुतेरेव मिथ्यात्वप्रसंगेन असाधकत्वापत्तौ दुःखादिबंधमिथ्यात्वासिद्धया न प्रत्यक्षमतत्वावेदकम् ।

—सुधा, P. 27

So, the प्रत्यक्ष is not contradicted by the Śruti at all, and the unreality of *Bandha* is disproved. The *Pratyaksha* which is निर्दोष percieves the worldly bondage as *real* (सत्) and it is more powerful than *S'ruti which is not properly* understood. Further, mere *Adhyāsa* : super-imposition of a thing on another, does not prove the falsity and non-existence of the thing superimposed. If this is accepted, it would follow that *Ātman* which is superimposed on mind (i. e. mind is mistaken for Ātman) would be false.

न चाऽऽरोपितत्वमात्रेण मिथ्यात्वं । आत्मनोऽप्यंतःकरणादिष्वारोपितत्वेन मिथ्यात्व प्रसंगात् । अंगीकृतश्च अंतःकरणादिषु परेणाऽऽत्माध्यासः । ..... तदेवं सर्वंमिथ्यात्वपरत्वे श्रुतेरेव मिथ्यात्वप्रसंगेना साधकत्वापत्तौ दुःखादि बंधमिथ्यात्वासिध्या न प्रत्यक्षमतत्वावेदकमिति।

—सुधा, P. 27.

The Advaitin projects a query:— The Dvaitin should have proved the lack of requisites or the existence of some detracting

conditions of the दोष's to posit the non-production of sense by *S'ruti* and not the falsity of the *S'ruti* itself. Here, in the Śruti text नेह नानास्ति किंचन etc, there does not exist any such condition as e. g. defective word (पददोष), non-understanding of the cantact between word and its sense, (संगत्यग्रहण) non-remembering of the contact (तद्विस्मरण) and the lack of expectancy etc. (आकांक्षादिविरह) or mis construction of the passage (विपरीतप्रतिपादन). To this, the Dvaitin replies; No, it is preposterous to seek the lack of sense-yielding requisites, when the very Śruti itself is non-existent, just as it is absurd to prove the grammatical or syntactical defects in the socalled speech of the son of a sterile woman

एवं च वदता भवता कस्मिंश्चन विप्रतिपन्नेऽर्थे वंध्यासुतवचनं प्रमाणयंतं प्रतिवादिनं प्रति न पददोषादिकमेवोपपाद्य साधकत्वं दूषयिष्यते । स्वरूपस्यैवाभावेनासाधकत्वे सिद्धं किं तत्र चरमभाविन्या पददोषादिचिंतया । —*Sudhā*, P. 28.

If it is sought to prove that the Śruti, being more powerful, overrides the *Pratyaksha*, then it is replied "We shall prove that *Pratyaksha* is more powerful. (ब्रह्मत्वमपि जीवस्य प्रत्यक्षस्याविशेषतः ॥ इत्यादावुपजीव्यत्वेन प्रावल्यं । —परिमळ.)
The Advaitin quotes instances like dream, reflection, writing by linear symbols etc., where non-existing or false things are known to convey existing senses, But, these instances are carefully examined and it is pointed out that only things that exist are proved to yield senses. The dream, the written line, the reflection etc. are all of them real.

यतोऽत्र यत्साधकं न तन्मिथ्या यच्च मिथ्या न तत्साधकं । तथाहि स्वप्नस्य तावद्ज्ञानरूपस्य सत्यतां वक्ष्यति । रेखापि वर्णं पदमिवार्थं संकेतिता तं स्मारयति इति न किंचिदत्र मिथ्याऽस्ति । अत एव रेखामुपलभ्य वर्णानुच्चारयंति । प्रतिबिंबस्य तु सत्यता परेणाऽप्यंगीकृता । विच्छेदस्यापि सत्यतामुपपादयिष्याम्. । स्फटिकलौहित्यमप्येतेनैव व्यख्यातं ।

—सुधा, P. 29.

The Advaitin's, three grades of existence (sattā) : refuted

Thus, the Śruti, being false, according to the Advaitin, cannot prove anything at all. The Advaitin shifts his ground and retorts that even the existing something does not prove any thing as held by the *Dvaitin*. But this is self-contradiction. For, the Advaitin cites the evidence of *Sākshi-Pratyaksha* which is *Sat*-to prove Ignorance or अज्ञान and to say the contrary now would amount to self conttradiction. The Advaitin is thus compelled to admit, on his own confession, the capacity to prove a thing in things that exist and the Śruti नेह नानास्ति किंचन etc. should be considered as (सत्) (real) and not मिथ्या-असत् (unreal). Here, he diverts to posit that the Pramāṇas are relatively real (व्यावहारिकसत्) and not absolutely (पारमार्थिकसत्), thus imparting to them the status of सत् as required. He introduces three kinds of सत् (1) Absolute Reality (पारमार्थिकसत्) this is मुख्यसत्=परब्रह्मन् (2) The अमुख्यसत् is of two kinds (i) मायोपाधिक and (ii) अविद्योपाधिक produced by Māyā like Earth, Sky etc. and by Avidyā like शुक्तिरजतादि. The former subsists till the rise of ब्रह्मज्ञान while the latter continues till the corrective knowledge (बाधज्ञान) नेदं रजतं 'this is not silver' The former is called व्यावहारिकसत् and the latter प्रातिभासिक or प्रातीतिक सत् which endures only till the error subsists.

तदेवं सत्त्रैविध्यादंबरादिकं विश्वं सदपि पारमार्थिकत्वाभावान्मिथ्या इति युज्यते । *Ibid*, P. 35.

The world is called unreal (मिथ्या) because it is not absolutely real (पारमार्थिकसत्).

This position of three fold reality of the Advaitin is untenable. This is only an ingenuous way of evading thc objections raised by the Dvaitin. Further, with the non-existing (मिथ्या) *Pramāṇas*, the Advaitins cannot hold a place in scholastie disputation as an arguer (कथक) and to save his face as an honoured disputant, he invests the *Pramāṇas*, with a kind of सत्व i. e. व्यावहारिकसत्व. He is asked to prove the three-fold classification of *Sat* which he fails to do.

सत्त्रैविध्यं च मानेन सिद्ध्येत्केनेति पृच्छ्यते ।
तस्याप्युक्त प्रकारेण नैव सिद्धिः कथंचन ॥ —अनुव्या.

The evidences (प्रमाण's) he will say, are neither सत् सदसत् nor असत् but सदसद्विलक्षण or अनिर्वचनीय indescribable. सद्विलक्षण is असत् or non existent, and the असन् cannot, it is proved, predicate anything, असद्विलक्षण means सत् and that would lead to the admission of two सत्'s one Brahman and the other the Pramāṇas, सदसत् is self-contradictory. सदसद्विलक्षण is inconceivable and cannot be admitted. Further, there are no Śruti texts to prove the अनिर्वचनीयत्व of the world nor any inference can be adduced to establish it. The major premises प्रतिज्ञा in विवादपदं सदसद्विलक्षणं ज्ञानबाध्यत्वात् is vitiated by several defects such as अर्थांतरता सिध्दसाधनता, अप्रसिध्द विशेषणता, वाध, व्यभिचार etc.

वैलक्षण्यं सतश्चापि स्वयं सद्भेदवादिनः ।
असतश्चापि विश्वस्य तेनानिष्टं कथं भवेत् ॥ —अ. व्या.

This couplet has been explained by Śrī Jayatīrtha in tbe Nyāya Sudhā in twelve different ways pointing out the incompatability and invalidity of सदसद्विलक्षणत्व or अनिर्वचनीयत्व of the world in each case. (1) सदसच्छद्बौ (i) भावाभाववाचकौ किंवा (ii) विद्यमान अविद्यमानवाचकौ. One भाव is different from the other भाव which are real according to me. So, there will be the defect of (अर्थांतरता उद्देश्यासिद्धिं विना साध्यपर्यवसानं ।) तेन अनिष्टं कथं भवेत् (2) प्रत्येकं भावाभाववैलक्षण्यं. I admit different भाव's and अभावs So my position is not affected.

(3) भावत्वानधिकरणत्वे सति अभावत्वानधिकरणत्वं ।

The same argument as above. There are different भावत्वs and different अभावत्वs in different भाव's and अभाव's respectively.

(4) प्रत्येकं भावाभावत्वानधिकरणत्वं ।

The same argument of सिद्धसाधनता and अर्थांतरता

(5) एकस्य वस्तुनः भावत्वानधिकरणत्वं अभावत्वानधिकरणत्वं ।

The same argument of स्वयं सदेव. सिद्धसाधनता etc.

(6) भावाभिमतें भावत्वानधिकरणत्वं, अभावभिमतें अभावत्वानधि-करणत्वं ।

There are different भावत्व's and different अभावत्व's admitted by me. So, it cannot affect my position.

(7) भावाभावाभिमतयोः सर्वथा भावाभावत्वे न स्तः ।

This is also admitted by me, तेन साधितेन भेदवादिनो मम अनिष्टं कथं भवेत् ।

(8) भावाभावामितयोरभावत्वानधिकारणत्वे वादिप्रतिवादिसंमते, भावा भावत्वानधिकरणत्वमपि अधिकं साध्यते ।

That means, in अभाव, both भावत्वानधिकरणत्व and अभावत्वानधिकरणत्व and in भाव, अभावत्वानधिकरण and भावत्वानधिकरणत्व are intended. Even then, my position is not affected as I admit differences in भावत्व and अभावत्व.

(9) In the second alternative viz. विद्यमानाविद्यमान वाचकत्व पक्षे. The reply is as in the above cases. See *Nyāyāmrita* under मिथ्यात्व-निरुक्ति भंग as cited in the Parimala.)

(10) to (12) The same queries and replies as above.

There are only two entities सत् and असत् So सदसद्विलक्षण is inconceivable. The श्रुति नेहनानास्ति किंचन and the तर्क (हेतु) viz., बाध्यत्व in विवादपर अनिर्वाच्यं बाध्यत्वात् । are not competent to prove the unreality of the *Bandha*, as they are wrongly employed by the Advaitin.

After refuting the *Pratijñā* in the above अनुमान, the *Hētu* or the reason ज्ञानबाध्यत्व (minor premises) is shown to be defective. The दृष्टांत example cited in the अनुमान is devoid of साध्य and साधन (साध्यवैकल्य and साधनवैकल्य). So, the *anumāna* is vitiated and

cannot prove the Sādhya. i. e. अनिर्वचनीयत्व of the world. Thus there is no *Pramāṇa* to prove the अनिर्वचनीयत्व.

The *Hetu* ज्ञानबाध्यत्व has incidentally introduced the discussion about the meaning of the term बाध which is variously explained by different writers :

1) ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं 2) प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिक निषेधप्रतियोगित्वं Finally अन्यथाविज्ञातस्य सम्यग्विज्ञानमेव बाधः । correct knowledge of a thing which was wrongly understood (i. e, *Bādha* or corective knowledge) is established. The meaning assigned to the term by the Advaitin is wrong. So, the *Bādhyatva* which the Advaitin assigns to the world is wrong,

ज्ञानबाध्यत्वमपि ते न सिद्धं प्रतिवादिनः ।
विज्ञातस्यान्यथा सम्यग्विज्ञानं ह्येव तन्मतम् । –अनु्व्या.

ज्ञानबाध्यत्व is not sublation of the world by the knowledge of God; ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्व nor ज्ञाननाश्यत्व i. e. destruction of the world by the knowledge of God. The हेतु is अप्रयोजक i. e. it does not prove the साध्य i. e. अनिर्वचनीयत्व. On the other hand. even the real thing can be destroyed by the knowledge, The second alternative प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ etc. is based by the Advaitin on the Upanisadic text नेहनानास्ति किंचन according to his interpretation which is wrong.

श्रुत्यर्थनिर्णयोत्तरकालमेवैतत् । स एव तु उपपत्ति विरोधादशक्य इत्युच्यमानत्वात् । –सुधा. (मिथ्यात्वं यदि दुःखादेस्तद्वास्याग्रतो भवेदि त्यादिना उपपत्तिविरोधादशक्य इत्युच्यमानत्वात् । –परिमळ.)

In order to establish the definition of बाध given by Śri Madhvāchārya as correct, Śri Jayatīrtha has launched upon a long and very minute examination of the views of the Prābhākara, Sāṅkhyas, Bauddhas, Naiyāyikas, Rāmānujāchārya and the Māyāvādins in what is known as *Panchākhyati – Vāda* (पञ्चाख्यातिवाद) and proved them all as defective. The author has

finally upheld the definition of Śri Madhva viz. अन्यथा विज्ञातस्य सम्यविज्ञानमेव बाधः This is illustrated by the stok example of इदं रजतं (this is अन्यथा विज्ञान) and नेदं रजतं (this is सम्यग्विज्ञान).

अत्र अन्यथाविज्ञानमेव भ्रांतिः । तत्प्रसंजितान्यथाकारलोडनं सम्यग्विज्ञानयेव बाधः । इत्यवधारयता मानांतराणि निरस्तानि वेदितव्यानि । हि शब्देन तत्र प्रमाण प्रसिद्धि सूचयति । —सुधा, P. 41.

The emphasis of एव (alone) in सम्यग्विज्ञान (corrective knowledge) indicates that the other views contrary to this are defective and not acceptable. They are stated and refuted one by one in the next Chapter 'पञ्चाख्यातिवाद' with the arguments of Śri Jayatīrtha briefly summarised from the Nyāyasudhā.

CHAPTER 4

THEORY OF EPISTEMOLOGY

पञ्चाख्यातिवादः

The Position of the five Schools of Thlnkers is summarised by the Prābhākars briefly in the following paragraphs.

This discussion of the theory of knowledge and illusion is the most important contribution made by Shrī Jayatīrtha to the study of *Indian Epistemology*, The following views are analysed:– अन्यथाख्यातिर्नाम :—

1) 'अन्यथापरिणते वस्तुनि ख्यातिः । उत
2) अन्यवस्तुनोऽन्यात्मनाऽवभासः ।
8) असंबद्ध विशेषण विशिष्टप्रतीतिः । वा ।
4) अन्यथाऽऽकारं ज्ञानं वा ।
5) अन्याकारोल्लेखि अन्यालंबनं ज्ञानं वा ।

तत्र आद्यं परिणामपक्षं तावदपाकर्तुं अनुवदति । इह खलु केचिदित्यादिना ' । —परिमळ.

(1) The Prābhākaras who do not admit illusion and consider all knowledge as true, criticise the following five theories and finally establish their own, in the following manner:—

1) अन्यथापरिणते वस्तुनि ख्यातिः अन्यथाख्यातिः ।

The knowledge of a thing transformed into some thing else:—

(शुक्तयादिके रजताद्यात्मना परिणते या ख्यातिः प्रतीतिः सेत्यर्थः ।
—परिमळ.

Śukti or shell is changed into silver or "Rajata". The knowledge of the silver is "Vibhrama" or *illusion.* But, this is untenable since all changes or transformations like pot (घट) out of earth

(मृद्), cloth (पट) out of threads (तंतु) etc; will have to be considered as अन्यथाख्याति or illusion. If it is added that defects in sense-organs will bring about Illusion, then it is replied. "How can a defect in the *karaṇas* (sense organs) cause the effect in the shell in front?

(करणमिंद्रियादिकरणदोषो वा दुष्टेंद्रियसंबंधो वा दुष्टेंद्रियसंप्रयोग जन्यं विज्ञानं वा —परिमळ.)

It is not the defect in the sense organs, for, it cannot operate on the object 'shell' in front. If it does, then all the objects contacted by the eye will have to be transformed into 'silver' and under-stood as such, by the neighbours or other lookers on. If it is averred that the contact of the defective organ, with the shell will result in the production of the *silver*, then, it is asked whether the shell would disappear altogether or not? In either case, the illusion cannot be explained. Nor is the knowledge produced by the defective sense-organs responsible for the birth of the silver. For, we do not have the cognition accordingly i. e. the silver is produced at the beginning and destroyed at the end or at the time of *Bādha*

किं च उत्पन्नंचेद्रजतं विनष्टं तदा तथैव प्रतीतिःस्यात् ।
न पुनर्नेदं रजतं इति बाधबुद्धिः ।

For the reason stated above, it cannot be held that the view of cause and effect is acceptable in this theory. Thus, the illusion and corrective knowledge बाध cannot be explained according to this view of cause and effect.

तदेवं भ्रांतिबाधयोरनुपपत्तेः न परिणामपक्षो युक्तः ।

—सुधा, 42

2) वस्तुनो वस्त्वंतरात्मनाऽवभासोऽन्यथाख्यातिः ।

The knowledge of a thing appearing (अवभास) as *something else* is अन्यथाख्याति or illusion.

The character of being different from the original should be either existent or non-existent. In either case, the position

is untenable. If it exists, it is against the proposition and cannot be an illusion. If it does not, the non-existent something will have to be taken as an object of knowledge which is against the opponent's position. (असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत) But this will lead to the Buddhist view of असत्ख्याति not acceptable to the Pūrvapakshin or to Siddhāntin. Hence, this view also is wrong.

3) असंबद्ध (असत्संबद्ध) विशेषण विशिष्टप्रतीतिरन्यथाख्यातिः ।
असंबद्धस्य अविद्यमानसंबंधवतो विशेषणस्य विशिष्टप्रतीतिः संबंधप्रतीतिरित्यर्थः ।

An error is the knowledge of an object with its adjective (विशिष्टप्रतीति) in contact with something non-existent.

How can the contact with non-existent something happen at ail? If it does, it will lead to the असत्ख्यातिवाद (nihilism) of the Buddhists.

उपपत्तौ वा किमसत्ख्यातिवादिभिरपराद्धम् ।

Ibid, P. 42.

4) अन्यथाऽऽकारं ज्ञानमन्यथाख्यातिः ।
समीचीनज्ञानस्यापि आंतर – बाह्यत्वादिनाऽर्थविलक्षणाकार विभ्रमत्वापत्तेः ।

Ibid, P. 42

A knowledge having two aspects-external and internal different from the object which is external only, cannot necessarily be called अन्यथाख्याति or illusion. For, even a right knowledge possesess this character.

5) अन्याकारोल्लेखिज्ञानमन्यालंबनं अन्यथाख्यातिः ।

A knowledge having one aspect but with an object different from it is called *Illusion*.

This is also defective, as it is self-contradietory. It would mean that a knowledge can refer to one thing and can hsve an *object* different from the former. How can this happen? If this is admitted, it would lead to the adsurdity of the presumption that a knowledge will have the properties of all other things and

the knower of a pot or घट will have to be regarded as omniscient सर्वज्ञ.

This definition of अन्यथाख्याति is analysed and shown to be incorrect

अन्याकारमुल्लिखतो ज्ञानस्य अन्यालंबनत्वं 1) किमन्यस्य सत्व मात्रेण, 2) पुरोदेशे सद्भावमात्रेण वा 3) कारणत्वेन निमित्तेन वा 4) विषयतया कारणत्वेन निमित्तेन वा

These alternatives are refuted in the Sudhā as follows:
(1) न तावत्सद्भावमात्रेण आलंबनं. mere existence (सद्साव) of a thing does not render it the character of आलंबन (object). Existence in front is also warded off. The third is absurd and the fourth leads to the defect of the self dependence (आत्माश्रय) as विषय ls none else than आलंबन. The past and future objects would not be cognised if it is held that the object must be present at the time of cognition,

The exact nature of आलंबन or विषय is examined:—

(1) किं चेदं विषयत्वं :–

i) येन यस्य अतिशयः उत्पद्यते स तस्य विषयः । or

ii) यद्विज्ञानं यदाकारं तत्तदालंबनं । or

iii) यत्सन्निकृष्टकरणेन यद्ज्ञानं जन्यते तत्तद्विषयम् ।

All these are shown to be inadequate.

Thus, according to these thinkers, illusion cannot be defined properly. Further, says the Prābhākara, they cannot explain also *how* the error is produced न चाऽन्यथाख्याति जनने कारणं पश्यामः । The cause of error cannot be a sense-organ. (चक्षुरादिकं). For, it is known to produce correct knowledge (तस्य समीचीन ज्ञानकारण तावधारणात्), nor a defective sense organ, for the defects are known to obstruct the production and not to give rise to contrary results.

दोषा हि कारणानामौत्सर्गिककार्यजननसामर्थ्यं निघ्नंति ।
न तु विपरीत कार्यजननसामर्थ्यमादधति । —सुधा

Further, if one knowledge is held to be an error or illusion, all cognitions, being knowledge, will have to be damned as untrustworthy.

किं च प्रदर्शिताकार व्यभिचारे प्रत्ययस्य सर्वत्र व्यभिचारशंका दुर्वारा स्यात् । —सुधा

Moreover, where does the mistaken 'silver' in इदं रजतं 'this is silver' come from? It is not present in front, nor does it come from outside. If it is taken to be internal (cognition) then it will amout to the विज्ञानवाद (Idealism) of the Buddhists.

तथा च जितं साकारविज्ञानवादिभिर्बौद्धैः । —सुधा

After thus denouncing the views of other disputants on the theory of epistemology, the *Prābhākaras* set forth their own position as follows:—

ननु तर्हि इदं रजतं इति प्रत्ययस्य का गतिः । उच्यते । रजतमिदमिति द्वे ज्ञाने 1) स्मृत्यनुभवरूपे । .... 2) क्वचिद् ग्रहणे एव मिथोऽगृहीतभेदे : ..., 3) क्वचित्पुनः स्मरणे एव अगृहीतविवेके । .... तत एव सर्वस्योपपत्तौ किं विपर्ययकल्पनया । —सुधा, P. 43-44.

(i) The notion "this is silver" is composed of two knowledges viz. (1) Memory स्मृति and (2) Perception अनुभव their distinction not being noticed. Due to defective circumstance, the property of shell शुक्तित्व and thatness तत्तांश of silver रजत in the *Smṛiti* (silver must have been perceived previously for its memory to rise now) are sublated. The two different cognitions are rolled into one thought and like the knowledge of real silver are expressed in juxta position as "This is silver"

तथा च रजतस्मृतेः पुरोवृत्ति ग्रहणस्य च मिथः स्वरूपतो विषयतश्च भेदाग्रहणात्सन्निहितरजतज्ञानसारूप्येणेदं रजतमिति भिन्ने अपि ग्रहण स्मरणे अभेदव्यवहारं सामनाधिकरण्य व्यपदेशं च प्रवर्तयतः ।

—सुधा, P. 44

What is the evidence to suppose the error as constituting two undifferentiated cognitions? All other explanations are shown to be faulty and this is the only course left for our adoption.

कुत इतिचेन्न । अन्यथानुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात् । –सुधा. एवं कल्पना भावे । अनुपपत्तेः । परिणामपक्षे भ्रांतिबाधानुपपत्तेः अन्यात्मना भानपक्षे च असतो न भानात् । साकारवादात् संविद्विरोधात् । हेत्वभावा दित्याद्यनुपपत्तेरुक्तत्वादित्यर्थः । परिशेषवरूपप्रमाणाच्च ग्रहण-स्मरण रूपं इदं रजतमितिज्ञानमित्याह । –परिमळ, P. 58.

(ii) Two Perceptions:— 'This' and 'Silver' combined into one without noticing the distinction as in "the conch is yellow" पीतः शंखः due to the defect of bile, the quality yellowness without substratum and mere substance of conch without its quality whiteness are cognised and the substance and property or quality each anticipating the other are combined into one knowledge without noticing the distinction and are expressed likewise as पीतः शंखः । (ग्रहणे एव मिथोऽगृहीत विदेके)

(iii) Two memories of 'this' and 'silver' not noticing their difference

क्वचित्पुनः स्मरणे एवागृहीत विवेके) । यथा स घटस्तत्राऽऽसीदिति ।
This non-cognising of the difference is common to both of us i. e. the admitter of error and the non-admitter

किंच विपर्ययमंगीकुर्वाणेनाऽपि विवेकाग्रहो ग्राह्य एव । न हि विवेकग्रहे विपर्ययावकाशोऽस्ति ।

There is no evidence to prove the error (illusion).

न चाऽन्यथाख्यातौ किमपि प्रमाणमस्ति । —*Ibid*, P. 44

Hence, all knowledge is true.
The Prābhākaras prove their view-point by the following sylloly-gms—

1) विगीतप्रत्ययो यथार्थः प्रत्ययत्वान् संप्रतिपन्नवत् ।
This knowledge under dispute (illusion) is *correct*, being knowledge, like the knowledge of "this is a pot" अयं घटः

2) विवादाध्यासितं रजतज्ञानं रजतविषयं रजतज्ञानत्वात् । सम्मतवत् ।
The knowledge of "Rajata" under dispute, has "rajata" for its object, because it is "*rajata-jñāna*" a as घटज्ञान has घट for its object.

3) ज्ञानत्वं यथार्थमात्रवृत्ति ज्ञानमात्रवृत्तित्वात् प्रमात्ववत् ।
The property of knowledge exists in correct knowledge only, for it resides in knowledge only like the property of right knowledge which subsists in right knowledge.

4) शुक्तिका न रजतत्वेन अवभासते । तद्रूपेण असत्वात् । यद्यद्रूपेण असत् तत्तद्रूपेण नाऽवभासते । यथा मेरुः सर्षपत्वेन ।
A shell is not cognised as "silver" for it does not exist as "Silver" just as Mēru mount is not cognised as *Sarshapa* (सर्षप)

5) इदं रजततादात्म्यं न प्रत्येतुं शक्यं असत्वात् कूर्मरोमवत् ।
This identity of shell with silver cannot bs conceived, for it never exists, like the hair of tortoise.
Hence, our conclusion that all knowledge is correct has to be conceded to.

तस्मादख्यातिपक्ष एव श्रेयानिति । —*Ibib*, P. 46

This position of the *Prābhākaras* is examined fully and it is established that the error or illusion must be admitted and all knowledge cannot be regarded as *true*. The refutation of the five theories of error mentioned above is fully endorsed by the *Āchārya*, According to the Dvaitin, the illusion is defined as अन्यदन्यात्मना विषयीकुर्वज्ज्ञानं अन्यथाख्यातिरित्यंगीकारात् ।
It is stated so in the *Vishṇu Tatva-Nirṇaya*:—
असतः सत्वप्रतीतिः सतः असत्वप्रतीतिरित्यन्यथाप्रतीतेरेव भ्रांतित्वात् ।

1. The silver in shell is असत् (non-existent) and a non-existent something can certainly become the object of knowledge. We are going to prove in the sequel, that an *Asat* can be cognised.

असद्विलक्षणज्ञप्त्यै ज्ञानव्यमसदेव हि । —अनुव्याख्यान.

2. The second objection of usual experience i. e. perception (अनुभवविरोधः) on the ground of silver *(rajata)* being impo-

ssible of contact (for, *rajata* is non-existent), is not tenable. For, the knowledge of *rajata* is generated through the contact of the eyes with shell, due to some defective circumstances.

रजतावभासस्य शुक्तिकासन्निकृष्टकरण जन्यत्वेन तद्विषयत्वोपपत्तेः । न चातिप्रसंगः । दोषजन्यत्व तदभावादिना व्यवस्थोपपत्तेः ।

The contacted shell is not cognised as shell and the defects produce quite contrary results.

3. It is not necessary that the silver रजतं in इदंरजतं should in all cases be existent, as in the case of cognition of real silver इदंरजतं. An *asat* can be cognised. Silver and the identity of *rajata* with shell रजततादात्म्यं are, we hold, the objects of cognition in इदं रजतं The cause of this defective or vicious knowledge (illusion) is the *(sense organ)* itself.

न चान्यथाख्याति जनने कारणाभावः । इंद्रियादेरेव तत्कारणत्वात् ।–सुधा

That is, the eye, under the influence of grave defects, is the cause. The defects or auxiliary causes सहकारिकारण have the capacity to distort the normal course of action and produce quite an opposite result.

अंगीकृतं तर्हि सहकारिणां स्वारसिकशक्ति प्रतिबंधेन विपरीतशक्त्याधायकत्वं । ... किंच काचादयोऽपि विपरीतज्ञानजनने सहकारिण एव अंगीक्रियंते । .... दोषत्वं त्विष्टकार्यविघातितामात्रेणोच्यते ।

सुधा, P. 47

In some cases, the inherent capacity to produce is undermined

केचित् वस्त्वंतरशक्तिमेव प्रतिबध्नंति ।

and in others they obstruct the normal capacity and impart quite the opposite power to produce contrary results as poison under certain conditions loses its killing capacity and becomes a promoter of health.

Then, it is asked how can *rajata* or its identity with this इदं which are non-existent, become the object of illusion? The object should be present for being contacted with the eye etc.

जनकस्यैव साक्षात्कारिप्रत्ययविषयत्वं दृष्टं । न च रजतस्येदंतादात्म्यस्य वाऽसतो जनकत्वमस्ति । तत्कथं विषयत्वमिति ।

—*Ibid* P. 43

No, it is replied. The knowledge of Īśvara which is *Nitya* (अजन्य) is not produced by the object. In 'recognition' (प्रत्यभिज्ञा) the object (तत्ता) is not contacted. Further, in examples like गुरूणां टीका "This is a commentary of old teachers" and कुरूणां क्षेत्रं "This is the sacred place (or land) of the Kurus", the non-existent *Gurus* and *Kurus* are posed as objects in the respective knowledges. It may be observed that the acceptance of असत् being the object of knowledge does not verge on the nihilism of the Buddhists.

(ननु तर्हि असता रजतादिना सन्निकर्षायोगात् कथमिंद्रियेण तज्ज्ञान जन्मेति चेन्न । शुक्तिकासन्निकृष्टं दुष्टमिंद्रियं तामेव अत्यंतासद्रजतात्मनाऽवगाहमानं ज्ञानं जनयतीत्यंगीकारात् । अत एव न असत्ख्याति प्रसंगः । यावत्खलु विगीते प्रत्यये भासते तस्य सर्वस्य असत्त्वे असत्ख्यातिः स्यात् । न चैवमित्युक्तं । *Ibid*, P. 48)

If the entire body of the objects posed in a knowledge is non-existent, then it would be exposed to the charge of असत्ख्याति of the Buddhists. But, here शुक्ति as इदं is posed as object in इदं रजतं and शुक्ति is सत्. Thus, the three objections of the Prābhākaras against the theory of अन्यथाख्याति are silenced.

(एवमसतो न भानात् संविद्विरोधात् हेत्वभावाच्चेत्यन्यथाख्यातौ पूर्वपक्षिणोक्तं बाधकत्रयं परिहृतं । –परिमळ, P. 63)

The objection that all knowledges irrespective of their special features (real and unreal cases) will be liable to suspicion of untrueness, if some instances are regarded as illusory, because the object is non-existent, is very stoutly set at rest by the explanation of the function of self-valid *Sākshin* which has the mysterious power of judging what is true and what is untrue.

(यच्चोक्तं विषयव्यभिचारे ज्ञानस्य सर्वत्राऽनाश्वास इति। तदौत्सर्गिकं ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यं अपवादाद्विपर्यय इति वदता आचार्येणैव परिहरिष्यते।) —सुधा. P. 48.

The invalidity अप्रामाण्य of a knowledge is detected by the *Sākshin* (or self-organ of consciousness) only, in a curious manner after परीक्षा (scrutiny) by inference (युक्त्यनुसंधानं)

(साक्षी खलु चैतन्यरूपः नियतयाथार्थ्यः कदाचिदपि संशयानास्कंदितोऽतःकरणवृत्तीनां याथार्थ्यं स्वयमेव गृह्णाति। परीक्षासहकृतस्तु अयाथार्थ्यं इति बादरायणीयं मतं। अत एव अनाश्वासनिरसनोपायो न ज्ञानेषु कश्चिद्विशेषोऽस्तीति निरस्तम्। —सुधा, P. 48)

This is proved in the sequel by the *Āchārya* in the स्वतः प्रामाण्यवाद in the present Adhikaraṇa:

प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवागमस्य हि।
अनवस्थाऽन्यथा हि स्यादप्रामाण्यं तथाऽन्यतः॥

in the प्रकृत्यधिकरण :—

तत्प्रामाण्यं यथा साक्षी स्थापयत्येवमेव हि।
सर्वकालेष्वपि स्थैर्याद्व्यभिचारमपोह्य च॥ —I, III. 6

and in the Bhakti-pāda of the 3rd Adhyāya.

उत्सर्गतोऽपि यत्प्राप्तमपवादविवर्जितम्।
व्यभिचार्यपवादेन मानमेव भविष्यति॥ —III, —भक्तिपाद

The opponent argues as follows in explaining the verbal usage as the basis of further verbal transactions. If in one transaction (eg. नदीतीरे पंचफलानि संति) there is disparity between verbal expression and the sense, all transactions would have to be untrustworthy. Further, how can, in the absence of these transactions (व्यवहार), mutual contact between the words in a sentence be understood without which no action (प्रवृत्ति) is possible? It is, thus, clear that, as admitted in the transactions mentioned above (व्यवहार), a non-existing something can be made the object

of knowledge, in illusion (इदंरजतं) also. That does not preclude the possiblity of the knowledge being real with its contents non-existing.

(अन्यथा परस्यापि कथं विषयव्यभिचारे व्यवहृतेर्व्यवहारांतरे समाश्वासः स्यात्। तदभावे च कथं व्यवहारदर्शनेन अन्वितार्थे व्युत्पत्तिः। क्वचिद्विवेकाग्रहे च कथमन्यत्र विशिष्टप्रत्यये विश्वासो भवेत्। तदभावे च कथं निःशंका प्रवृत्तिः। —सुधा, P. 48

There is no evidence to posit that the illusion is made up of two cognitions स्मृति and अनुभव etc. The syllolygms अनुमान's cited above by the Prābhākaras are open to *Vyabhichāra. Aprasiddha Viśēshanatva*, *Bādha*, *Sādhya-Vaikalya*, *Satpratipakshatā* Hence, it is concluded that इदंरजतं is one composite knowledge and the objections such as साकारवाद, असदभान. संविद्विरोध and होत्वभाव have been dispelled in the foregoing discussions.

या चेयं प्रक्रिया रजतमिदमित्यादिनोक्ता सा ज्ञानद्वित्वे रजत ज्ञानस्य च स्मृतित्वे प्रमाणाभावादनुपपन्ना। विशिष्टज्ञानबाधकानां परिहृतत्वात्। अनुमानानां च दूष्यत्वात्। —सुधा, P. 48.

According to the *Vijñānavādins*, the cognition takes the form of the object and there is no object separate from cognition. This is answered by stating that आकार (aspect) and विषय (object) are different and the objcct has a separate existence; the silver (रजत) which is अत्यंत असत् in इदंरजतं can be cognised, the knowledge can have an object (आकार) different from the actual contacted विषय (object), due to distorting defects and the cause and producer of this error is the sense-organ or *Pratyaksha* vitiated by abnormal conditions. The Pūrva-pakshin's ingenuous explanation of the error इदंरजतं as composed of two knowledges their distinction not being cognised, is not acceptable. For, the case of error is quite similar to the genuine case of इदंरजतं 'this is silver'. and like the latter, it should be regarded as one composite knowledge विशिष्टप्रत्यय=विशिष्टज्ञान only. Otherwise, it would not have produced the desire and action to fetch the

silver as in the case of real silver (इदंरजतं) which is produced by अनुभव (sense contact with the object). But, how can a non-existent something be an object of knowledge? We have shown above that an असत् *can be cognised* under the influence of vitiating defects. It may be noted that the cognition of असत् is admitted by other schools of thought also.

तस्मादसदेव विभ्रमालंबनं । न चासतोऽवभासानुपपत्तिः । विवेकाग्रहवादस्य निरस्तत्वात् । अन्यथाख्यातिवादिभिरसत एव तादाम्यस्य संसर्गस्य वा प्रतिभासाभ्युपगमान् । विज्ञानख्यातिवादभिरपि असत्यायाः बाह्यतायाः प्रतीत्यंगीकारात् । —सुधा, P. 55.

In the present case (illusion) also अनुभव is the evidence.

(अन्यथाख्यातौ किं प्रमाणमिति चेत् । अनुभव एवेतिब्रूमः । तथाहि । पुरोवर्तिनि रजते रजतमिदमिति विशिष्टबिषयकमेव विज्ञानं स्वप्रकाशतथा वा मानस प्रत्यक्षतया वा साक्षिणा वा अवभासते । तथा इदमपीति कुतोऽस्य न विशिष्ट बिषयैक ज्ञानत्वम् । न हि ततोऽस्य मात्रयाऽपि विशेषं पश्यामः । दर्शने वाऽस्मात्प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । केवलमेकं तादृग्विषयसद्भावाद्यथार्थं । तदभावादपरमयथार्थं । —सुधा, P. 49.)

The only diffence between the two knowledges is that in the true knowledge the object 'silver' exists, while in the other, it does not.

Prābhākaras try to explain प्रवृत्ति (desire to fetch the silver) not by composite knowledge but by the mistaken identification of two different cognitions. This is discussed at length in the Sudhā (PP. 50-52) and after considering the differnt alternatives put forward by the *Pūrva pakshin*, it is concluded that not only by अनुभव i e. प्रत्यक्ष but by the *anumāna* (inference) and *Arthāpatti* also, विपर्यय or error must be admitted by all The *Anumānas* are

1) विमतो व्यवहारः व्यवहर्तव्यज्ञानपुरःसरः व्यवहारत्वात् । घटव्यवहारवत् ।
2) विवादपदं ज्ञानं पुरोवर्तिविषयं तद्विषय व्यवहारजनकत्वात् । संमतवत् ।

3) पुरोवर्ती वा रजतज्ञानगोचरः रजतानुपायत्वे सति तदर्थिप्रवृत्ति विषयत्वात् । सम्यग्रजतवत् ।
4) विवादपदं रजतज्ञानं इदं ज्ञानान्नभिद्यते प्रकाशमानात्ततोऽप्रकाशमानभेदत्वे सति प्रकाशमानत्वात् । संप्रतिपन्नरजत ज्ञानवत् ।

The Arthāpatti:—

किं च विपर्ययाभावे नेदं रजतमितिज्ञानस्य बाधकत्वमनुपपद्यमानं तं गमयति ।

Since नेदं रजतं 'this is not silver', is the corrective knowledge, 'this is silver' must necessarily be a wrong or incorrect knowledge (error). Thus, the knowledge इदंरजतं produced on seeing the शुक्ति in front must be अयथार्थ only. The *anumāna* विमतं अयथार्थ बाध्यत्वात् । व्यवहारवत् and the general acceptance of error by all people prove the existence of भ्रांति (illusion) as a separate cognition

अत एव भ्रांतित्व प्रसिध्याऽपि विपर्यासिसिद्धिः ।

The Prābhākara seems to think that an admission of error or illusion in our experiences would lead to the distrust of the Vedas as an absolute valid authority. For, if one knowledge is invalid, what guarantee is there to hold that the knowledge of the Vedas (being knowledge as such) is trustworthy? That also is liable to suspicion.

(विपर्ययाभ्युपगमे कथं वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्धिः । वेदजनितप्रत्ययेऽपि विपर्ययशंकाप्रसरात् । सर्वस्यापि विज्ञानस्य याथार्थ्ये तु नेयं शंका अवकाशमासादयति । इति । मैवं । तथासति विवेकाग्रहस्यापि अनंगीकार्यत्वापातात् तथाहि . , . . *Ibid*, P. 53.)

This is a wrong argument. In that case, your (Prabhākara explanation of the experience on the ground of विवेकाग्रह will have to be abandoned. The apprehension of invalidity of the Vedas can be removed by the argument of the Vedas being

अपौरुषेय. There is, thus, no need to deny the existence of विपर्यय (error) which is accepted by all people.

(अपौरुषेयत्वादिना सा निरसिष्यते । इति चेत् । किं तर्हि सकल लोकावसित विपर्यास निरासेन । तच्छंकाया अपि तत एव निराकर्तुं शक्यत्वात् । *Ibid*, P. 53.)

So, tne position of the Prābhākaras cannot be justificd by any argument.

The views of the Rāmānuja school are similar to those of the Prābhākaras on this subject. They argue that by the combi nation of the three elemental principles of Tējas (fire), *ap* (water) and *anna* (earth), the *Bhūtas* or द्रव्य's *Prithvī*, *Ap*, and *Tējas* were created. So, everything is composed of the three elements or five elements according to the sūtra त्रयात्मकत्वात्तु भूयस्त्वात् and Puranic Statements (cited). And this is supported by the *Mīmānisā* rule सोमा वे पूतिकाग्रहणम्, व्रीह्यभावे च नीबारग्रहणम् which presumes the existence of the *Sōma* property in *Pūtikā* grass and the *Vrīhi* property in *Nīvāra*. So, everything exists in every other thing. In इदंरजतं the shell possesses the property of *silver* and so, there is no element of untruth, in the knowledge 'this is silver'. If the property of silver is plentiful, then the object is called 'silver' and otherwise not. Then, why is it called error or illusion? They say that when one perceives a smaller quantity i. e. of silver instead of the major portion of the shell in the sheli, due to some distorting factors, or दोष's it is called *error*. That is why he stretches his hand to fetch the silver there. But when the defect is removed, he will have the correct knowlcdge. (बाधज्ञान).

(अपि च वस्तुनो वस्त्वंतरसादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षत एव प्रतीयते । न च तद्द्रव्यावयवयोगादन्यत्सादृश्यं नामास्ति । अतः शुक्तिकादिषु रजतादेः सद्भावाद्यथार्थं एव अयं रजतप्रत्ययः । निर्देशव्यवस्था अर्थक्रिया व्यवस्था च भूयस्त्वादुपपद्यते । दोषवशादिंद्रियं भूयांसमप्यंशं परित्यज्याल्पीयां संमंशं प्रकाशयतीति रजतार्थिनस्तत्रप्रवृत्तिरिति युज्यते । —*Sudhā* P. 52

This argument is shown to be fallacious. The *S'ruti* and sūtra texts enjoin the mixture of elements in the products and not of products in other products. 'Śukti' (shell) and 'rajata' are them selves products. How can they abide in other products *rajata* in *S'ukti* and *S'ukti* in *rajata?* That is un-imaginable. Since, according to them everything is composed of every other thing- it follows that the knower of a thing should be the knower of all, other things i. e. be omniscient which is absurd. Further, they say that by similarity between शुक्ति (shell) and रजत (silver) the former is understood as *rajata*. If similarity or सादृश्य is the guiding factor in the selections, it would be a disastrous proposition.

किं च मातृमातंगमदिराद्यति सादृश्यं भार्यादिस्वप्यस्तीति तदुपभोगे प्रत्यवायः स्यात् । —*Sudhā*, (P. 52)

(भार्यायां मातृसादृश्यं पितृगुरुप्रभृतिषु मातंगशब्दित चण्डालसादृश्यं : धृतक्षीरादौ मदिराशब्दितमद्यसादृश्यमस्तीत्यर्थः । —परिमळ P. 67)

Similarity exists between wife and mother; parents, preceptor. and hunter and low caste person; ghee, milk and toddy etc. On that ground, if the latter are enjoyed it would be a heinous sin, so विपर्यय or illusion must be admitted.

The old school of Tārkikas (प्राचीनतार्किकाः) think that the silver that is cognised in "This is silver" is existent while the contact of indentity रजततादात्म्यं between शुक्ति and रजत only is असत् or non-existent. It is always advisable to remove or lose as less as possible if by so doing a case can be justified, according to the maxim of the Nyāyavids.

एकदेशापवादेन कल्प्यमाने च बाधके ।
न सर्वबाधनं युक्तमिति न्यायविदः स्थिताः ॥

So, only the identity of silver with the shell (रजततादात्म्य) is असत् If रजत (silver) is असत् (non-existent), how could it be cognised?

किंच रजतस्यात्यंतासत्वे प्रतिभासो नोपपद्यते । स्थिते चैवं सत्वे बाधसमये पुरोऽदर्शनाद्देशांतरे सत्वमास्थीयते । दोषदूषितं चक्षु

शुक्तिकाशकलमासन्नसन्निकृष्टमपि विप्रकृष्टरजतात्मना तदा दर्शयतीति को दोषः इति । —*Ibid*, P. 54)

But, the silver is not found in front of us, So, it must be supposed to exist in some other place like the shop or treasury etc. It is the effect of the defect in the eye etc. that the distant silver is seen as existing quite close to us. This explanation, however, is not reasonable. If the silver is सत् why should it be perecived as असत् in the corrective knowledge?

सत्वे सति रजतस्य असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभादित्यनुभव विरोधात्

—*Ibib*, 64

Further, it is not at all imperative to suppose this silver as सत्. It must be either for the facility of the contact of the eye (इंद्रियसन्निकर्षार्थं वा) or for the production of an impression on the mind after perception (संस्कारसिद्धार्थं वा). In the former alternative, its existence in a shop will be of no avail for the local contact here. In the latter, the impression would point to the previous experience of that 'silver' and not of the silver in front of us. (अत्र प्रतीतस्यैवाऽन्यत्र सत्ता कुतः कल्प्या) It deserves to be noted that for the rise of cognition of 'silver' on seeing the shell, it is enough that an impression of some silver previously experienced, is left on the mind, and not of the silver existing in the shop or in the market. It amounts to this. The knowledge of some silver is produced on seeing the thing (shell) in front, from the impression of a previous experience, though the silver is not 'existing' either here or anywhere else. This is the work of the defective circumstance such as dazzle of the object (चाकचक्य) in front and the similarity (सादृश्य) between the shell and the silver etc. Śrī Jayatīrtha cites an instance of the error where the object is not existing anywhere at the time of cognition.

किं च घटांतरं विनष्टोत्पत्स्यमानधटांतरतया यदा प्रत्येति तदा कथम् । न हि विनष्टोत्पत्स्यमानधटयोरन्यत्र सत्ताऽस्ति । कालांतरेऽस्तीति चेत्सत्यम् । न तस्याः भ्रांतौ उपयोगं साक्षात्पश्यामः । संस्कारादिना

हि तदुपयोगः । स च रजतांतरानुभवमात्रेण भविष्यतीति व्यर्था तस्यैवान्यत्र सत्वकल्पना ।

—*Ibid*, P. 54

This point has been nicely explained in the *Parimala*. "I keep a pot in my house and ask my friend to take it. He says that he would take it the next day. In the meanwhile, that pot is destroyed and in its place, another pot is kept. The next day, my friend goes to fetch it. He thinks that it is the same pot which was referred to by me. This is a wrong notion or error. In this mistake, no previous experience of the pot could officiate. The pot that is mistaken is non-existent (असत्)

गेहे धटो मया निहितः । तं त्वं गृहाणेति चैत्रेणोक्तो मैत्रः श्वो ग्रहीतास्मीति अवदत् । तन्मध्ये स घटो नष्टो अन्यस्तु तत्स्थाने केनचिन्निहितः । मैत्रश्च परेद्युस्तत्र गत्वा तमेव धटं चैत्रेणोक्तघटत्वेन भ्राम्यति चेत्तदा कथम् । इत्यर्थः ।

—*Parimala*, P. 68

It must be noted that the object of illusion आरोप्य is not असत् in all cases of error. In गृह्यमाणारोप (error is perception), only the contact of तादात्म्य between आरोप्य and अधिष्ठान is non-existent. For example, the two trees चूत (mango) and पनस seen side by side from a distance are confounded as, "this is one mango tree only", mango-ness being superimposed on the *Panasa*. This is purely a case of perception (गृह्यमाणारोप). Here the *Adhishṭhāna* and *Ārōpya* are close to each other. Only their mistaken identity is non-existent. But when the *Ārōpya* is not present (as in स्मर्यमाणारोप), in that case both the *Ārōpya* and the identity are non-existent.

तर्त्किं सर्वत्र आरोप्यमत्यंतासदेव । उच्यते । यत्राऽऽरोप्यमधिष्ठानसन्निहितं तत्र तत्तादात्म्यमात्रमसत् । यत्र दूरस्थयोश्चूतपनसयोरेक एवाऽयं चूत इति बाधोत्तरकालमपि स्वरूपद्वयानुवृत्तेः । यत्र पुनरसन्निहितमारोप्यं तत्र तत् तत्तादात्म्यं च उभयमप्यसत् । उक्तन्यायेनेति तदेवं नैवंविधान्यथाख्यातिवादोऽप्युपपन्नः ।

Ibid, P. 54

Parimaḷa clears the ambiguity in the following words:—

द्रष्ट्रपेक्षया दूरस्थयोरेकदेशे सतो श्चूतपनसयोः दूरस्थत्वदोषेण पनसे चूततादात्म्यमारोप्यते एक एवाऽयं चूत इति । चूत इति इति-शब्दस्य यत्राऽऽरोप्यमित्यादि पूर्ववाक्येनान्वयः । कुत एवं तत्रापि स्मर्य-माणारोपस्थले इवाऽऽरोप्यस्य स्वरूपमप्यसत् स्यात्कि तादात्म्यमात्रासत्वो पगमेनेत्यत आह । बाधेति । नाऽयं चूत एव किंतु चूतपनसाविति बाधोत्तरकालमित्यर्थः । उक्तन्यायेनेति । असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभादित्य नुभव विरोधादित्यादिनोक्तन्यायेनेत्यर्थः । एवंविधेति । तादात्म्यमात्रं गृह्यमाणारोपे स्मर्यमाणारोपे च सर्वत्रासदित्येवं रूपान्यथाख्यातिवादः प्राचीननैयायिकोक्त इत्यर्थः ।

Some thinkers among the Buddhists (बौद्धैकदेशिनो बिज्ञानात्मतत्व वादिनः) posit that the silver that is cognised in "illusion" exists (सदेव) but it is internal in the form of cognition only. For, it cannot be असत् since it becomes the object of knowledge. It is not found in front, as that would nullify the illusion and the corrective knowledge. Nor is it the one in the shop; There is no evidence to say so. Further, how can it be cognised here? So, the only alternative is that it must be internal only.

न तावदसदेव रजतं, प्रतीत्यनुपपत्तेः । नापि पुरत एव सत् भ्रांत्यनुपपत्तेः । बाधविरोधाच्च । न च देशांतरे सत् । प्रमाणाभावात् । अतः परिशेषान् ज्ञानाकार एवावतिष्ठते ।

This is established, they say, by the evidence of परिशेष, अर्थापत्ति and साधनानुमान. इदं ज्ञानरूपं इंद्रियसंप्रयोगे असति अपरोक्षत्वात् ज्ञानवत् ।

The notion of externalness renders it the character of illusion or भ्रम. The negation of externalness is the corrective knowledge. This is a fallacious argument. If असत् is not cognisable, how can the externalness which is also असत् be cognised? That असत् is cognisable is proved by the corrective knowledge

असदेव रजतं प्रत्यभात् in which the non-existent silver is the object. The *Anumāna* cited above is fallacious since the knowledge is cognised by the contact of internai organ साक्षिन्.

स्वरूपेंद्रियसंप्रयोगाभिव्यक्त साक्षिरूपापरोक्षज्ञानविषयत्वस्य ज्ञानेऽपि स्वीकारादिति भावः : —परिमळ, P. 69.

If everything were to exist internally only, then in the mis-conception (error) of *Gnnjā* seeds as fire, fire like 'silver' should have to be internal and would in no time burn away the body

किंच गुंजापुंजादौ दहनादि समारोपे तस्यांतः सत्वे देहदाहादि प्रसंगः । अन्यथांतरेऽपि तदसदित्यत्यंतासदेवापन्नमिति नाऽऽत्मख्यातिपक्षोऽपि उपपत्तिमान् ।

So, this view of the *Vijñāna-Vādins* is absurd.

Still others among the Buddhists, advocate nihilism and explain the 'silver' as totally non-existent. These are called असत्ख्यातिवादिन्s.

(अन्ये पुनरिदं रजतमिति प्रतीतिरसदालंबनैवेत्यास्थिताः । तथाहि । ....

—*Ibid*, P. 54)

The silver in इदं रजनं is not सत् as the corrective knowledge calls it असत्, not सदसत्, (existing and non-existing) which is self-contradictory. It must therefore be असत् only. If सदसत् is explained on different grounds of time and place, (देशकालप्रकार व्यवस्थया सदसत्वांगीकारे) it would be like घट (तथाचेयं भ्रांतिः । घटादि-धीस्तु प्रमेति न स्यात्) which is सत् and असत् viewed in different aspects and not an *illusion* or, the knowledge of घट which is प्रमा (correct) would have to be भ्रांतिः illusion. Further, the corrective knowledge which cognises असत् only could as well be an illusion if असत्ख्याति of the Buddhists is admitted, So, it follows that the silver in "This is silver" must be totally non-existent. Since the theory of the Prābhākaras viz. "non-cognition of difference" (विवेकाग्रह) has been refuted, the cognition of असत् has to be admitted. The *Naiyāyikas* who advocate

the अन्यथाख्यातिवाद (silver being existent in the shop) accept the cognition of असत् (तादात्म्य or contact between रजतत्व and शुक्ति) and the Buddhists, *Vijñānavādins* – presume the knowledge of externalness which is असत्. If the silver is सत् it cannot be a misconception or *Bhrama* Thus, the alternative explanations of the Prābhākaras and Naiyāyikas namely विवेकाग्रह and अन्यथाख्याति (तादात्म्य and संसर्ग only being cognised) respectively are defective as demonstrated in the previous discussion. So, it must be conceded by परिशेष that the silver in 'this is silver' is totally non-existent.

This view shows a right approach to the subject. But, it is not free from defects. There are two objects in the cognition 'this is silver' viz. 'this' and 'silver'. Of these 'this' stands for shell, which is existent सत् before and after the illusion. So, the totally 'non-existent something' cannot be supposed to be an object here, as इदं (this) a part of it points to an existent some thing i. e. a piece of shell as an object of the knowledge 'इदं रजतं', for it is pointed out by fingure that the object exists in front. Otherwise, the posing of the fingure would be meaningless.

"अत्रेदं विवेचनीयं । केयमसत्ख्यातिरिति । यदि सदेव शुक्तिका शकलं सकलदेशकालासद्रजतात्मनाऽवगाहमानं ज्ञानमिति तदा अनुज्ञया वर्तामहे । यथोक्तं । तस्माद्यदन्यथासंतमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते । तन्निरालंबनं ज्ञानं असदालंवनं च तत् । इति । यदि पुनरिदं रजतं इत्यवभासे चकासद सदेवाखिलमिति । तदसन् । इदंकारास्पदस्य शुक्तिकाशकलस्य प्रागूर्ध्वं सत्वावगमात् । यदि च न तदिदंकारास्पदं तदा न भ्रांतिवाधयो रंगुल्यग्रेण निर्दिशेन्नोपदद्यान्न परित्यजेत् । —सुधा, P. 54

Further, what is the *cause* of this असत्ख्याति of the Buddhists? It cannot be faulty sense–organ (diseased or soiled eye). For, without contact, it cannot produce knowledge and it cannot contact an असत्. If it contacts the object इदं (this i. e. the shell) its knowledge is inevitable.

(एवं चेदं रूप्यमिति ज्ञानं शुक्ति विषयकमप्यासीदिति असन्मात्र विपयकमित्युक्तिभंग इति भाद: ॥ —परिमळ, P. 69.)

इदंकारास्पदाभिन्नस्य शुक्तिशकलस्य इंद्रियसन्निकृष्टत्वेनेयं शुक्तिरिति ज्ञानस्याऽप्यवर्जनीयत्वेन इदं रजतमिति भ्रमाऽनुपपत्तिरिति भाव: । —सुधा टिप्पणी श्रीनिवासतीर्थीय.)

And *Bhrama* or error cannot arise If it is argued that संवृति or अविद्या is responsible for the knowledge of 'silver' रजतं etc. concealing the other part shell, then to a blind man or in the absence of *S'ukti*, the eognition of रजतं 'silver' might have to arise which is against experience. Thus, the असत्ख्यातिवाद of the Buddhists *connot bc acceptcd.* But, we concede that the silver in 'this is silver' is wholly non-existent whereas the *S'ukti* or shell exists and is cognised by the term इदं 'this'.

तस्मान्नैवं विधासत्ख्यातिपक्षोऽपि साधीयान् । —सुधा,

The *Māyā-vādins* explain the position thus:— They say that the 'rajata' that is cognised here is neither सत् for a सत् cannot be contradicted or eradicated by the *Bādha Jñāna,* nor सदसत् which is self-contradictory in a thing, nor असत् for an *asat* cannot be cognised, whereas the s!lver here is cognised. So, it must be सदसद्विलक्षण or अनिर्वचनीय. The following अनुमान's are cited in support of this conclusion:—

1) शुक्तिरजतादिकं अनिर्वाच्यं दोषप्रयुक्तभानत्वात् । भ्रांति सिद्धतादात्म्यवत् ।

The silver is indescribable in the knowledge, "This is silver" इदं रजतं, as it is produced under defective circumstance, like the notion of identity in the error.

2) विवादपदं अनिर्वचनीयं भ्रमविषयत्वात् । यन्नैवं तन्नैवं यथा आत्मा ।

The object under dispute, is inexpressible as it is the object of भ्रम or error, like आत्मा by व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति

3) विमतं अनिर्वचनीयं बाध्यत्वात् व्यतिरेकेण आत्मवत् ।

The disputed thing is अनिर्वचनीय as it is dispelled unlike आत्मा in व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति. यदनीर्वचनीयं न तद् बाध्यं न Ātmā is not indescribable अनिर्वचनीय and so it is not destroyable बाध्य

4) सदसत्वे एकधर्मिनिष्ठात्यंताभावप्रतियोगिनी धर्मत्वात् रूपरसवत् ।

Existence and non-existence cannot reside in one substratum as they are conflicting propertles like form and taste.

The *Anumāna's* and the Arthāpatti या तिबायान्यथानुपपत्ति are shown to be faulty being exposed to the fallacies of अप्रसिद्धविशेषणता, सिद्धसाधनता, असिद्धि, व्यभिचार and बाध or कालात्ययापदिष्ट etc. and so they cannot prove the अनिर्बचनीयत्व of the रजत or silver in the error इदंरजतं

(. . . . बाध्यत्व विकल्पदूषणानि च उक्तवक्ष्यमाणान्यनुसंधेयानीति नाऽनुमानाच्छुक्तिरजतादेरनिर्वाच्यता सिद्धिः। ख्यातिबाधान्यथाऽनुपपत्तिश्च अनेनैव निराकृता वेदितव्या - *Sudhā*, P. 56. 'असच्चेन्न ख्यायेत सच्चेन्नबाध्येत ख्यायते च शुक्ति रूप्यं बाध्यते च तेन तदुभयाव्यथानुपपत्तिश्च शुक्तिरूप्यादेः सदसद्विलक्षणत्वे मानमिति निररतमित्यर्थः । अनेनेति । असतोऽपि ख्यातेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । सतोऽपि ब्रह्मणो विज्ञानस्यान्यथा सम्यगित्युक्त बाध्यत्वसत्वेन व्यभिचारः कश्चायंबाधः इत्यादि वक्ष्यमाणदिशा ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्व रूपबाधस्य शुक्तिरूप्यादावभावात् त्रैकालिक निषेधप्रतियोगित्वेऽसत्वापत्त्याऽसद्विलक्षणत्वपक्षे बाध्यते च इति विपर्यय पर्यवसानायोगात् इत्याद्युक्तवक्ष्यमाणबाध्यत्वादि दूषणगणेनेत्यर्थः ।

—परिमळ, P. 71

Shrī Jayatīrtha adduces a number of counter arguments (Sudhā p.p. 56-57) to demonstrate the absurdity of the view of अनिवंचनीयख्याति of the Advaitin. For example,

(1) If रजत is अनिर्वचनीय why is it conceived as सत् in the beginning (प्रतीतिसमये) and as असत् at the time of *Bādha.* It should have been understood properly as अनिर्वचनीय only.

(2) Is the 'Rajata' cognised here, eternal नित्य or non-eternal (अनित्य.) In the former alternative, it must be cognised at all times. In the latter, what is its cause then? If it is अविद्या (Ignorance), we say it cannot be accommodated in Advaita-Vāda. (तस्यास्त्वन्मतेऽनुपपत्तेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । —*Sudha*, निर्विशेषे स्वयंभाते किमज्ञानावृतं भवेत् इत्यादिनेति भावः । —परिमळ, P. 72)

(3) *Avidyā* rests in Ātmā and 'silver' which is its transformation, should be self-evident always, like Ātmā, As Ātmā is all pervading, it should be cognised by all.

(4) Is this 'silver' cognised as a result of the contact of the sense-organ with it, like घट or by the impression संस्कार of the past experience like the past घट or by the self-organ साक्षी like pleasure and pain etc. None of these alternatives are possible. The silver is born at the time of its cognition and not after contact. There is no *Samskāra* as this *Rajata* is not pereceived before, *Sākshin* does not cognise *Rajata* which is non-existent. If it grasps along with the shell शुक्ति which exists, we say that according to the Advaitin, the shell is व्यवहारिकसत् and the *Sākshī* does not recognise it at all. The silver is born at the moment of cognition प्रातिभासिक and no sense-organs can operate on it

(रजतं तु प्रातिभासिकं नेंद्रयब्यवधानमपेक्षते । —सुधा, P. 57)

(5) If साक्षिन् cognises both the *Adhikaraṇa* i. e. शुक्ति and *Rajata* रजतं = silver then like the *Akhyāti* of the Prābhākaras, the knowledge would be true and no error or illusion would bc possibie.

(अख्यातिमतानुमतिप्रसंगेन प्रवृत्त्याद्यनुपपत्तिः । —सुधा. P. 57)

Thus, it is concluded that अनिर्बचनीय cannot stand the scrutiny as exhibited by the Āchārya in different contexrs.

(अनिर्वचनीयनिराकरणं च तत्र तत्र आचार्यः स्वयमेव करिष्यतीत्यलं पल्लवेन । तस्मात्साधूक्तं विज्ञातस्यान्यथा सम्यग्विज्ञानं ह्येव तन्मतमिति ।— *Sudha*, P. 57) 'पृथगुपदेशान्' 'संध्ये सृष्टिराहहि' इत्यादौ तत्र तत्रेत्यर्थः । —परिमळ, P. 72.

CHAPTER 5

REFUTATION OF ANIRVACHANĪYA

The Advaitin restates his position and points out that since असत् cannot be cognised, the silver which is made the object of knowledge in इदं रजतं is अनिर्वचनीय or सदसद्विलक्षण and not असत् He states शुतिरूप्यं असन्न प्रतीतत्वात् This syllolygm is fallacious. For शुक्तिरूप्य he admits, is सदसद्विलक्ष i.e. णसद्विलक्षण and असद्विलक्षण The term, असद्विलक्षण demands the cognition of its प्रतियोगिन् असत् Otherwise, the term सदसद्विलक्षण cannot be understood. For, the knowledge of difference वैलक्षण्यज्ञान depends upon the knowledge of its anticedent or प्रतियोगिन्

(वैलक्षण्यज्ञानंप्रति प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्य कारणत्वात् । –सुधा. P. 57.)

The followlng sylloiegms prove that अलत् can be cognised:—

I) विप्रतिपन्नः असत्प्रतीतिमान असद्विलक्षण मितिप्रतीतिमत्वात् । यो यद्विलक्षणं प्रत्येति स तत्प्रतीतिमान् । यथा घटविलक्षणः पट इति प्रतीतिमान् देवदत्तः घटप्रतीतिमान् ।

The person under discussion has the knowledge of असत् for he understands a thing as different from असत् etc.

2) विमतः असत्प्रतीतिमान् तत्संबंधिधर्मनिषेधकत्वात् । यो यत्संबंधितया किंचिन्निषधति स तत्प्रतीतिमान् यथा घटस्य नास्ति शौक्ल्यमिति निषेधकः घटप्रतीतिमानिति ।

A person in dispute has the knowledge of असत् for he negatives the properties relating to it; just as a man who negatives whiteness with reference to घट must be aware of घट

Further, does the sentence "there is a horn on human head" convey any sense or not? This is a wrong knowledge and is removed by the corrective knowledge "there is no horn" etc

If the object is सत् it cannot be eorrected by the *Bādha Jñāna.* If, however, it is असन् then असत् is admittedly known in this very case. There can be no knowledge without an objeet.

(न हि विषयानुपरक्तः घटादिवदसावनुभूयते । *Sudha*, P. 58)

The sylloligm also proves this:—

विमतानि पदानि स्वार्थान्वयप्रतिपत्ति जनकानि आकांक्षा सन्निधिमत्पदत्वात् गामानयेत्यादिपदवत् ।

The words in question नरशिरप्ति विषाणमस्ति etc. produce the knowledge of their relationship with the object since they are uttered in close proximity and bear mutual expectancy.

तस्य अनाप्तत्वेन तदुक्तवाक्ये बोधकत्वसत्वेपि योग्यताविरहादिति भावः । (परिमळ)

Since there is no concordance योग्यता and since it is uttered by अनाप्त it is unreliable. All the same, it is cognised

(अतः असतः प्रतीत्युपपत्तेः प्रतीतत्वात् न असच्छुक्तिरजतादिक मित्ययुक्त) —*Ibid*, P. 58.

All right. Let असत् be an object of knowledge in general तीत). But it cannot be *perceived* (प्रत्यक्ष), whereas the silver is perceived as सत्, So, the silver in 'this is silver' cannot be असत् The Siddhāntin says that असत् *can be* an object of percception (प्रत्यक्ष).

असद्विलक्षज्ञप्त्यै ज्ञातव्यमसदेव हि ।
तस्मादसत्प्रतीतिश्च कथं तेन निवार्यते ॥
अन्यथात्वमसत्तस्माद्भ्रांतावेव प्रतीयते ।
सत्यस्यासत एवं हि स्वीकार्यैव प्रतीतता ॥
तस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वे स्यादेवह्यनवस्थितिः ॥

—अनुव्याख्यान

The *Anyathā khyātivād in* admits that, though शुक्ति (i. e. *Adhishṭhāna;* substratum of illusion) and रजत (आरोप्य) are both by them selves सत् (real), they are in their contacted form, unreal. This

identity between "this" and the "silver" is non-existent. When the eye catches the shell i. e. when the sheli is perecived, this non existent identity is also perceived.

इदंरजतयोस्तादात्म्यानवभासे प्रवृत्याद्यसंभवश्च । तत्र यदन्यथात्वं शुक्तिकेदमंशस्य रजतत्वसंसर्गः रजतस्येदंतासंसर्गः तत्तावदसदेव । प्रतीयतेचाऽपरोक्षतया सत्वेन च । अपरोक्षावभासस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात् । सत्वेनाप्रतीतौ प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेश्च । न हि प्राग्बाधात्सत्यरजतेदंता संसर्गो मात्रयाऽपि विलक्षणोऽनुभूयते । तथाचासदपरोक्षतया सत्वेनचनावभासते इति व्याप्तेरन्यथात्वे भग्नत्वान्नानेन हेतुनाऽसत्वाभावोऽनुमातुं शक्यते इति । (सुधा P. 58)

Otherwise, without cognising it as सत् (existing), how can a person desire to fetch the silver? For, in form and expression, there is absolutely no difference between "this is silver" इदं रजतं where silver actually exists and the error इदंरजतं wkere it does not exist.

If the silver is अनिर्वचनीय, it will lead to the inevitable vicious circle of *ad infinitum* regress अनवस्था The expression स्यादेवह्यनवस्थितिः has been explained in threc different ways: the first two as referring to the contact betwend इदंता and रजतत्व and the contact of identity between शुक्ति and रजत

In both the cases, there is no escape from the defect of अनवस्था. They are neither व्यावहारिक nor प्रातिभासिक सत् The residue is अनिर्वचनीय

तस्मादपरिहार्यैवेयमनवस्था । (*Ibid* 60.)

The objector reiterates that the रजत is प्रातिभासिकसत् as there are three kinds of सत् (as explained already).

किनाम ब्रह्मणीव पारमार्थिकमंबरादेरिव मायोपाधिकं व्यावहारिकं शुक्तिरजतादावप्यविद्योपाधिकं प्रातिभासिकं सत्वमस्त्येव । इति । तद सत् । सत्त्रैविध्यस्य दूषितत्वात् । (*Ibid*, P. 70)

The third interpretation of तस्यानिर्वचनीयत्वे is that if the सत्व of

रजत is प्रातीतिक the effort to fetch the silver cannot be explained. अनवस्थितिः = अव्यस्थितिः प्रवृत्तेरिति ज्ञेयं ! *Ibid*, 70.

Thus, the Advaitin's contention that the world is secondary सत् व्यावहारिक सत् and the silver in इदंरजतं is प्रातीतिक or प्रातिभासिकसत् suffers from lack of evidence and proof and so cannot be accepted. The discussion about the falsity of bondage बंधमिथ्यात्व in the अध्यासभाष्य of Śrī Sankara, is thus impertinent and redundant.

एवं बंधस्य अध्यस्तत्ववर्णनं प्रकृतानुपयुक्तं अयुक्तंचेत्यभिधाय यत्परेण मिथ्याज्ञान निमित्त इति बंधस्य मिथ्याभूताज्ञानोपादानकत्वमुक्तं तदप्यनुपपन्नमित्याशयवान् परमते अज्ञानासंभवं तावदाह निर्विशेषे इत्यादिना ।

Ignorance (अज्ञान), incompatible in Advaita-Vāda

Further, the view of the Advaitin that the *Bandha* or संसार is unreal, being produced from ignorance अज्ञानोपादानक is declared to be quite unsound and faulty since in the अद्वैतवाद the position of Ignorance or अज्ञान itself is very shaky and cannot be proved. *Ajñāna* (Ignorance) as a positive entity or substance (भावरूपअज्ञान) is disproved in the प्रकृत्यधिकरण The examples quoted by the opponent to prove the Ignorance as a positive entity, can be referred to the work of negation of knowledge (ज्ञानाभावरूपं अज्ञानं) The Advaitin is asked: where does Ignorance rest in? Is it in जीव? जड or ब्रह्मन्. जड (matter) and ब्रह्मन् are out of question. We have shown in the प्रकृत्याधिकरण (below) that Jīva is not its shelter. जड it cannot be. It is the *product* कार्य, of अज्ञान. How can it be its receptacle आश्रय?

It must therefore be ब्रह्मन् only. Does this ignorance bind down or condition ब्रह्मन् जीव or जड? In the first case, ignorance would envelope *Brahman* who is its shelter. What is the *object* of this Ignorance? A cover आवरण should have an object to be covered and a receptable आश्रय to stand upon. If the ignorance were to cover Brahman, does it do the whole or part? or some thing else? Brahman is part-less (property-less) परेण ब्रह्मणः निर्विशेषत्वांगीकारात् ।

Brahman is self luminary स्वयंप्रकाश and cannot be covered. Though Brahman hos no positive properties, it can be related in negative terms like अद्वितीयत्व which as property are unreal, according to the statement of the Advaitins:—

(अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात्प्रथगिव अवभासंते इति –P. 60.)

But, for the property to be unreal, *Ajñāna* must be proved to exist, in the first instance. Without *Ajñāna* the falsity of the property cannot be posed. Thus, the argument suffers from the defect of mutual dependence of अन्योन्याश्रय.

निर्विशेष स्वयंभाते किमज्ञानाबृतं भवेत् ।
मिथ्या विशेषोऽज्ञानसिद्धिमेवह्यपेक्षते ॥ —अनुव्याख्यान

This p ecludes the possibility of the third alternative as every thing else than Brahman is Mithyā or false. On the same ground, जीव too cannot be covered by ignorance. Similarly जड also is precluded. For जड is produced (कार्य) from ignorance. How can it rest in *Kārya* which comes into being later? Māyā-Vādin himself has denied that जड is the *receptacle* of अज्ञान.

जडस्य अप्रकाशस्वरूपत्वादेव स्वपरग्रहणासंभवे किमावरण कल्पन येति परो मन्यते । यथाह । प्रमाणवैकल्यादेव तदग्रहण सिद्धेरति ।

Sudha, P. 61

Further, जड is अप्रकाशस्वरूप non shining What use is it to cover this already dark substance? Thus, Ignorance or अज्ञान cannot be proved in the system of *Advaita Vēdānta* and the Śāstra (system) without the four precedents which anticipate अज्ञान namely अनुबंधचतुष्टय is unacceptable:—

न चाऽऽवरणमज्ञानमसत्ये तेन चेष्यते ।
अप्रकाशस्वरूपत्वाज्जडेऽज्ञानं न मन्यते ॥
अज्ञानाभावतः शास्त्रं सर्वं व्यर्थीभविष्यति ॥

Granted that the *Bandha* is the effect of *Ajñāna*. If this is real, how can a real thing be removed by ज्ञान *(Jñāna)*? If this is not

removed, the *Bandha* would be constant and *irradicable*. What purpose then, would the study of the *Śāstras* serve?

The Advaitin replies that to avoid this defect, he has stated that अज्ञान is false मिथ्या and the *Adhyāsabhāshya* of Srī Sankarāchārya is purposeful. True, but his stand is untenable.

नन्वत एव अज्ञानस्यापि मिथ्यात्वमुक्तं मिथ्याज्ञान निमित्त इति । सत्य मुक्तं दुरुक्तं तत् । (P. 61.)

If अज्ञान is मिथ्या, it is as usual superimposed on आत्मा Is this superimposition natural or incidental? If natural, it cannot be removed and the study of the *Sāstras* would be futile.

'मायावादिनः हि शास्त्रस्य विषयप्रयोजनवत्ता सिद्धिचर्थं आत्मनि मिथ्याभूताज्ञानोपादानको बंधाध्यासो वर्णितः । अज्ञानानुपपत्तौ च तदुपादानकस्य आत्मनि बंधाध्यासस्याऽप्यनुपपत्तेस्तदधीना विषयप्रयोजन वत्ता च शास्त्रस्य न स्यादिति । —सुधा, P. 61.

In the latter case, its cause should be found out. It is either the आत्मस्वरूप or अज्ञान itself. Ātmā is all consciousness and changeless and the causation which admits of change cannot be attributed to it. So, it should be अज्ञान only. If this अज्ञान is real सत्य, बंध (Bondage) its effect also would be real and the real cannot be removed according to the Advaitin. If it is unreal, the query would lead to अनवस्था endless chain of suppositions. To escape this flaw, he admits that Ignorance is its own cause, and so no charge of अनवस्था can be levelled. Here again, अन्योन्याश्रय is inevitable or आत्माश्रय if the same *Ajñāna* plays the part of cause and effect. (कारण and कार्य) If to avoid this charge, the flash प्रतिभास of अज्ञान is taken as superimposed on Ātmā, then the series of flashes प्रतिभासपरंपरा will have to be admitted which lands no where.

The Advaitin is flared up at the attack and plucks up his strength to revive his position. He is required to admit the necessity of अज्ञान to establish his system of philosophy. This

अज्ञान as a positive (भावरूप) *entity*, he proposes to prove by the evidences of *Pratyaksha*, *Anumāna*, *Āgama* and *Arthāpatti*

(अवश्यंतावदज्ञानं अनादिभावरूपं विज्ञानविलाप्यं अभ्युपगंतव्यं । प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमार्थापत्ति सिद्धत्वात् । *Ibid*, P. 62.)

His evidences are (i) अहमज्ञः (I am ignorant), मामहमन्यं च नजानामि । (I do not know myself or other person)

These experiences are positive perceptions अपरोक्षावभास like अहंसुखी 'I am happy'. Hence this '*not knowing*' is positive भावरूपअज्ञान and not negative ज्ञानाभावरूप-अज्ञान For, ज्ञानाभाव is cognised by अनुपलब्धि a separate Pramāṇa according to th *Prābhākaras*

(अभावस्य षष्ठप्रमाणगम्यत्वात्– सुधा प्राभाकररीत्या प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धिरूप षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरे . . . –परिमळ).

Even if it is conceded that *Abhāva* (negation) is the object of Perception only, and not अनुपलब्धि the above experiences अहमज्ञः मामहमन्यंच न जानामि cannot be deemed to be negative. i. e ज्ञानाभावरूप.

(प्रत्यक्षाभाववादिनोऽपिनाऽऽत्मनि ज्ञानाभावावगमः संभवति ।

—*Sudhā*, P. 62.

For, the knowledge of ज्ञानाभाव depends upon the knowledge of its antecedent प्रतियोगिन् and receptacle आश्रय. If ज्ञान and ज्ञानाभावाश्रय i. e. Ātmā are known, how can it be negatived ? If both are not known, how can ज्ञानाभाव be known without the knowledge of प्रतियोगिन् and धर्मी or आश्रय? In either case, the above experiences cannot be considered as referring to ज्ञानाभाव The Bhāṭṭas hold that knowledge (ज्ञान) is beyond the ken of senses (अतींद्रिय) and should be inferred from the effect of ज्ञातता produced by the contact of the senses with the object

(भाट्टरीत्या ज्ञातता लक्षण फलरूपकार्याख्य लिंगाभावानुमेयऽपि इत्यर्थः । *Ibid. Parimala*, P. 75.)

ज्ञानाभाव also should be inferred

(भट्टमते ज्ञानस्यातींद्रियत्वेन तदभावस्याप्यतींद्रियत्वाम्

—परिमळ P. 75,

Even according to this view of the Bhāṭṭas, the same difficulty of non. conceiving of ज्ञानाभाव arises.

(षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरे फललिंगाभावानुमेयेऽपि ज्ञानाभावे आत्मादाववगते अनवगते आत्मनि ज्ञानाभावप्रतिपत्त्ययोगात् । *Ibid*, P. 62.)

But this argument does not hold water in the case of positive neiscience भावरूपाज्ञान. In the experience, "I do not understand the meaning of your statement त्वदुक्तमर्थं संख्यां वा शास्त्रार्थं वा न जानामि or your calculation (संख्या = arithmetic) or the exposition of philosophy (शास्त्रार्थ,) one directly comprehends the said ignorance भावरूपाज्ञान and proceeds to understand them i e. संख्या or शास्त्रार्थ. The knowledge of प्रतियोगिन् and आश्रय is not expected here as in the case of ज्ञानाभाव and the incompatability of अज्ञान cannot be advanced as before. It is true that even if it is positive Ignorance, the knowledge of antecedent and recaptacle is essential, but this does not conflict with the existence of positive Ignorance For, the *Sākshin* which is self-valid helps to prove neiscience अज्ञान and does not contradict it

भावरूपाज्ञान प्रत्यक्षवादे तु सत्यप्याश्रय प्रतियोगिज्ञाने ज्ञानाभावस्येव भावांतरस्यापि नाऽनुपपत्तिर्नियंतुं (आपादयितुमितियावत् – परिमळ) शक्यते । न चाश्रयप्रतियोगि ज्ञानभूतमपि साक्षिचैतन्यं भावांतरस्या ज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम् । —सुधा, P. 62.

Here an objection is raised. How can साक्षिन् which is knowledge reconcile with Ignorance which is quite opposed to it ? This requires proof. True, says the Advaitin, the *Sākshin* comprehends every thing known or unknown as such. A proof is required in the case of a thing known. Sākshin is obviously its proof. In the latter case also, the *Sākshin* conceives the unknown thing as such in general or in particulars. So, *Sākshin* does not conflict

with ignorance or अज्ञान. So, in the examples cited above, the intuitive perception (साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष) directly comprehends the positive Ignorance. (अन्यस्तु सामान्याकारेण बिशेषाकारेण बा अज्ञान व्यावर्तकतया सदा साक्षैदव भास्यते इत्युपपत्तिर्सहितमज्ञान प्रत्यक्षं भावरूपमेत्र आत्मन्यज्ञानं गमयतीति सिद्धम् । —*Sudhā*, P. 62.) Further evidence is sought in the experience of a person after sound sleep, I did not know anything (during sleep)

(एतावंतं कालं सुखमहमस्त्वाप्स्वं । —नाहं किंचिदवेदिषम् ।)

which points to positive ignorance and not absence of knowledge. For, the latter, we have already stated, requires the knowledge of antecedent etc. which is lacking. This experience after sleep can not be attributed to inference after sleep. For inference, inferendum or हेतु-लिंग is necessary which is wanting. The absence of contributory cause and the absence of its knowledge are mutually inter dependent and so it cannot be considered as the हेतु So it must be the positive ignorance only In this way *Ajñāna* can be proved by *Pratyaksha*. The following *Anumāna* proves neiscience as a positive entity :—

II. (1) विवादगोचरापन्नं प्रमाणज्ञानं स्वप्रागभाव व्यतिरिक्त स्वविषयावरणस्वनिवर्त्यं स्वदेश गतत्रस्त्वंतरपूर्वकं अप्रकाशितार्थ प्रकाशकत्वात् अंधकारे प्रथमोत्पन्नप्रदीप प्रभावदिति ।

Thus, the knowledge is produced after the Ignorance residing in the same place is removed. Thus is proved positive neiscience (Ignorance). The Ignorance cannot be considered as want of Jñāna ज्ञानाभाव for, it is not known by the evidence of *Abhāva* as is proved by the syllolygim:—

(2) अज्ञानं न ज्ञानाभाव: अभावमानागम्यत्वात् । संप्रतिपन्नवत् । (अभावमानयोरगम्यत्वादित्यर्थ: । उपलब्ध्यभावागम्यत्वात् प्रमाणागम्यत्वादिति हेतुद्वयं बोध्यम् । —परिमळ, 76.)

If it is grasped by Abhāva and other Pramāṇas, it can perhaps be taken as ज्ञानाभाव. But this is not so.

(3) विगीतं देवदत्तनिष्ठं प्रमाणज्ञानं । देवदत्तनिष्ठप्रमाप्रागभावातिरिक्तानादेर्निवर्तकं । प्रमाणज्ञानत्वात् । यज्ञदत्तनिष्ठप्रमाणज्ञानवत् ।

In all these inferences, positive Ignorance is sought to be proved.

III. There are *S'ruti* texts to prove the positive Ignorance. तम: आसोत्। मायांतु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् etc., are the verbal testimony (आगम) to prove the *Ignorance*. The usage 'I do not grasp the meaning assigned to it by you' also points to the positive Ignorance only and not to the lack of knowledge (ज्ञानाभाव). In the latter case., *Abhāva* or negation anticipates the knowledge of its antecedent (प्रतियोगिन्) and its determinant (अवच्छेदक) i.e. sense (अर्थ = object). If it is known, its absence cannot be predicated. If it is not known, how can its kowledge be expressed ?

(अस्य व्यवहारस्य ज्ञानाभावपरत्वे प्रतियोगिभूतज्ञानावच्छेदकार्थस्य ज्ञानद्वारा ज्ञातत्वाज्ञातत्वाभ्यां तथा व्यवहारायोगात् । भावरूपाज्ञान पक्षे प्रागुक्तदिशोपपत्तिरितिभाव: । —परिमळ, P. 76.)

This व्यवहार or usage is taken to refer to neiscience अज्ञान only. The Dvaitin adds that the verbal usage त्वदुक्तमर्थं प्रमाणतो न जानामि। 'I do not understand your import correctly or through lack of knowledge derived from evidence, involves lack of knowledge ज्ञानाभाव and not the positive Ignorance or neiscience. This expression can be understood in two ways:—

(1) प्रमाणजन्यार्थगोचर ज्ञानाभावेन तादृशज्ञानाभाव विषयत्वेन वा (2) सामान्यस्य ज्ञातत्वेऽपि तद्विशेषज्ञानाभावविषयकत्वेन वा न जानामीति व्यवहारो युक्त इत्याशंक्य निराह । न च प्रमाणत इति ॥

In both the alternatives, the statement (व्यवहार) refers to want of knowledge (ज्ञानाभाव) only. If it is intended to convey that I have no evidence other than this (एतदतिरिक्तप्रमाज्ञानं मम त्वदुक्तेऽर्थे नास्ति) then, it is self-contradiction. For, you have an authentic knowledge about this and in the same breath you say that you do not have correct knowledge about it. In the second alternative, the lack of knowledge about its particulars — whether known or

unknown—would refer to अज्ञान only and not ज्ञानाभाव. A small objection is raised against the Advaitin. You say that neiscience or अज्ञान is grasped by *Sākshin*, and when everything is known by *Sakshin* how can it be negatived as न जानामि (I do not understand)? To this he replies : The Sākshin which is knowledge itself can grasp everything including the positive Ajñāna (Ignorance). So, knowledge and Ignorance can rest in one plaae without conflict. But want of knowledge got from external instruments (प्रमाणजन्यज्ञान) cannot rest with knowledge i. e., Sākshin. Hence, the statements त्वदुक्तेऽर्थे प्रमाणज्ञानं मम नास्ति etc,, imply positive Ignorance only.

The Advaitin advances another argument to prove his thesis of positive Ignorance. The *Adhyāsa - bhāshya* which explains the production of illusion by super-imposition of object and its knowledge on some other objects and knowledge (अध्यासस्य अर्थज्ञानात्मकस्य मिथ्याभूतस्य) states that the material cause of the illusion should necessarily be a false thing (मिथ्याभूतमेव किंचिदुपादानमन्वेषणीयम्।). If this cause is real, its effect the illusion (अध्यास) also would be real.

(सत्योपादानकत्वे कार्यस्य कारणस्वभावतया अध्यासस्यापि सत्यत्व प्रसंगात् । *Sudhā*, P. 63.)

The material cause of illusion should of course be beginningless अनादि. Thus, *Adhyāsa* anticipates its material cause as the beginningless something unreal. viz., अज्ञान

(मिथ्याध्यास एव तथाविधाज्ञानोपादानकारणमंतरेणानुपपद्यमानः तत्कल्पयति । *Ibid*, P. 63.)

The statement that *Bandha* or *Saṁsāra* is removed by knowledge presupposes the unreal positive Ignorance as the cause of the unreal *Bandha*. The positive Ignorance is thus proved by *Arthāpatti*. This Ignorance bides in Ātman only and not in *Anātman* (inanimate thing) as already stated.

To this, Shri Madhvāchārya whirls a formidable attack upon the Advaitin and cuts asunder the very edifice of his thesis in his reply:

अज्ञानस्य च मिथ्यात्वमज्ञानादिति कल्पने ।
अनवस्थितिस्तथा च स्यादन्योन्याश्रयता तथा ॥
स्वभावाज्ञानवादस्य निर्दोषत्वान्न तद्भवेत् ।
अविद्या दुर्घटत्वं चे त्स्यादात्माऽपि हि तादृशः ॥
अतोऽधिकारिविषयफलयोगादि वर्जितम् ।
अनंतदोषदुष्टं च हेयं मायामतं शुभैः ॥

Advaitin's theory of positive ignorance (भावरुपाज्ञान) is refuted. Śrī Jayatīrtha surveys his adversary's position and states emphatically that the evidences cited by him can best be applied to refer to negative Ignorance (ज्ञानाभाव) only: (1) The perception अहमज्ञः, मां अन्यं च न जानामि (I am ignorant, I do not know myself and other person) grasps negative Ignorance (ज्ञानाभाव) in as much as perception receives both positive and negative knowledges.

(उन्मीलितनेत्रस्य झटित्यभावबुद्धेरुत्पत्तेरितिभावः । ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वेन तदभावस्य तथात्वौचित्यादिति वाऽभिप्रायः । —परिमळ 77.)

Further, on opening the eyes, one sees in front a void only which is अभाव (negation). A separate instrument of knowledge called अनुपलब्धि need not be invented to explain the negation of a thing. The objection that the *Pratiyōgin* (antecedent) and अनुयोगिन् receptacle = आश्रय of ज्ञानाभाव, if known, (अभावज्ञानं प्रति प्रतियोग्याश्रयज्ञानस्यावश्यकत्वात् ।)

would render the position of ज्ञानाभाव inexplicable, would lead to the non-cognition of ज्ञानाभाव at all. Then, without its knowledge how can it be set aside?

तथासति ज्ञानाभावस्य तव सर्वथाऽप्यप्रतीतिप्रसंगात् । ततश्च तन्निरास प्रयासानुपपत्तिः । —Sudhā. P. 63.

If it is replied that ज्ञानाभाव is acceptable because it is grasped by साक्षिन् and it *can be* discarded in preference to positive Ignorance (अज्ञान), then the present experience 'मामन्यंच' न जागामि (I do not know myself etc.) can as well refer to negative Ignorance by

Sākshin itself. The argument of experience in sound sleep can be explained in favour of ज्ञानाभाव by inference only, such as

सुप्तिकाल: ज्ञानाभाववान् नाऽहं किंचिदवेदिषमित्यनुभववत्वात् ।

The पक्ष (major premises) can be known by another अनुभान "the waking state is preceded by the sleeping state" etc. जाग्रदवस्था अव स्थांतरपूर्विका and the fallacy of पक्षाप्रसिध्दि or पक्षाप्रतीति cannot be advanced against the Anumānā. The inference of ज्ञानाभाव (not अज्ञान,) cannot be set aside for want of minor premises हेतु = लिंग) The special mental state अवस्थाविशेष or sleep would determine the lack of knowledge. In the *Anumāna* cited by the Advaitin विवरणकार, विबादगोचरतापन्नं प्रमाणज्ञानं etc, the reason (हेतु) अप्रकाशितार्थ प्रकाशकत्वं which exists in the *Paksha* = प्रमाणज्ञानं does not abide in the example (द्रष्टांत) in that sense but exists in बिपक्ष. Thus the *anumāna* is vitiated by असिद्धि. व्यभिजार and साधनवैकल्य

ज्ञापकाप्यायकत्वरूपत्वेऽसिद्धि: । ज्ञापकत्वरूपत्वे चक्षुरादौ व्यभिचार: । ज्ञानत्वरूपत्वे साधनवैकल्यं दृष्टांतस्येति भाव: । —परिमळ, P. 77)

The homonymousness (शब्दसाम्य) of the word अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्वं will not serve both *Paksha* and *Drishṭānta*. In that case the word गौ: is comon both to the speech and to the cow and on this similarity, it would be absurd if one were to surmise 'hornyness' to the speech

शब्दसाम्यमात्रेण अनुमाने तु गोत्वेन वागादीनामपि शृंगित्वादि प्रसंग: ।
—सुधा, P. 63.

The अप्रकाशितार्थप्रकाशकत्व cannot be equated with तमोविरोधित्व where तमस् is either darkness or Ignorance. This is aiso open to असिद्धि and साधनवैकल्य etc. अज्ञानं न ज्ञानाभाव: अभावभावागम्यत्वात्

Here the हेतु is असिद्ध i. e. does not rest in the Praksha: To remove the *Asiddhi*: the Advaitin puts forth the (अनुमान):, अज्ञानं न मानगम्यं, मानानिवर्त्यत्वात्, If it is not मानगम्य (known by the *Pramāṇas*), then why endeavour to cite evidences to prove the ignorance ? The third *syllolygm*

विगीतं देवदत्तनिष्ठप्रमाणज्ञानं देवदत्तनिष्ठप्रमाप्रागभावातिरिक्ताना-देर्निवर्तकं प्रमाणज्ञानत्वात् । is vitiated by आभाससाम्य and admits of wrong conclusion as e. g.

घटोऽयं एतद्घटप्रागभावातिरिक्तानादेर्निवर्तक: घटत्वात् घटांतरवत् ।

'त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि' (I do not understand what you say) can refer to lack of knowledge ज्ञानाभाव and not necessarily to positive *Ignorance* (अज्ञान). The objection of incompatability of प्रतियेगिज्ञान and आश्रयज्ञान should be properly explained by the Advocate of Ajñāna also as otherwise the refutation of ज्ञानाभाव would be impossible. If there is no ज्ञानाभाव, how can it be expressed at all.

तत्रोक्तानुपपत्तिस्त्वयापि समाधेया । अन्यथात्वन्मतेऽपि ज्ञानाभाव व्यवहारासिद्धिप्रसंगास् । इति भाव. । —परिमळ, P. 77.

The statement of the Advaitin that the illusion (अध्यास) cannot be explained without accepting अज्ञान which is unreal as its material cause (उपादानकारण), is wrong since mind (अंत:करण) is the marerial cause of (wrong) knowledge and not मिथ्याज्ञान or अज्ञान

(अध्यासकार्यानुपपत्तिस्तु नास्त्येव । ज्ञानस्यांत:करणोपादानतोपपत्ते: ।
—Sudha, P. 64. The wrong knowledge or illusion does not require its object to be सत् (extent). The knowledge as such may be existent, but it becomes an error if its object is non-existent. The existent knowledge need not necessarily grasp an existent object only as eg., *Sākshin* which is सत् (existent) grasps non-existent things like the horn of a hare (शशविषाण) etc.

स्वरूपसतोऽपि विषयासत्वेनायथार्त्वोपपत्ते: । न हि स्वरूपसतो विषय सत्तयाऽपि भाव्यमिति नियामकमस्ति । साक्षिचैतन्ये व्यभिचारात् ।
—hudhā, P. 64.

Thus, all the arguments of the Advaitin advanced to prove positive Ignorance (भावरूपाज्ञान) are shown to refer to negative Ignorance (ज्ञानाभाव) only. So, he cannot prove positive Igno-

rance and explain the unreality of *Bandha* as presumed in the *Adhyāsa- Bhāshya-* of Śri Sankarāchārya. The study of the Śāstras would, thus, be purposeless

अज्ञानाभावत: शास्त्रं सर्वं व्यर्थीभवित्यति । —अनु.

Positive Ignorance in Dvaita Siddhanta.

The Dvaitin observes that the Dvaita Siddhānta is not opposed to the acceptance of positive Ignorance (भावरूपाज्ञान)

किं च न वयं भावरूपाज्ञानस्य परिपंथिन: । किं नाम परपक्षे तन्न संभवतीति ब्रूम: ।

and the charges leading to the futility of the *Śāstras* cannot be levelled against the Dvaitin.

स्वभावाज्ञानवादस्य निर्दोषत्वान्न तद्भवेत् ।
अविद्या दुर्घटत्वं चे त्स्यादात्माऽपि हि तादृश: ॥
अतोऽधिकारि विषयफलयोगादि वर्जितम् ।
अनंतदोषदुष्टं च हेयं मायामतं शुभै: ॥ —अनु.

(ननु अंगीकृतं चेदज्ञानं तर्हि भवतोऽप्युक्तानुपपत्त्या शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यमापन्न मित्यत आह । स्वभावेति । —सुधा, P. 64.)

In the *Dvaita Siddhānta*, जीव who is different from Brahman (Paramātmā) is the repository and the object of ignorance. He is knowledge itself by nature. Though he is self-evident, he is covered by ignorance due to the inscrutable will of God. Jīva is thus ignorant of his own qualities and of the powers of God who is also *Svaprakāśa* (self-evident). So, the Jīva has to remove the ignorance by the study of the *Śāstras* (through the grace of God). The ignorance which is real *can be removed* (dispelled) by the will of God. Thus, the Āchārya declares that the positive unit of *Ajñāna* in Jīva justifies the utility of *Śāstras*. Śri Jayatīrtha has explained the couplet 'स्वभावाज्ञानवादस्य .... etc. in five different ways :—

एतदुक्तं भवति । नाऽस्मन्मते अज्ञानांगीकारे दोषोऽस्ति । येन शास्त्रस्य विषयप्रयोजनशून्यता स्यात् । जीवाश्रितं जीवावरणं च अज्ञान

मित्यंगीकारात् । तस्य च स्वत एव ब्रह्मणो भिन्नत्वात् । ज्ञानस्य भावत्वाच्च । तस्य स्वप्रकाशस्यापि परमेश्वरेच्छया परमेश्वरे स्वधर्मेषु चाज्ञानं संभवत्येव । यद्यपि धर्मा: स्वप्रकाशचैतन्यान्नभिद्यंते । तथापि सविशेषत्वांगीकारात् अज्ञानविषयतोपपत्ति: । अज्ञानमपि सत्यमेव । नाऽज्ञान कल्पितं । तथाविधस्यापि निवृत्तिं बक्ष्याम: । —सुधा, P. 64.

(1) स्वश्चासौ भावश्चेति । स्वभावो जीव: तदाश्रितं तदावरणं चाऽज्ञानमिति वाद: । स्वभावाज्ञानवाद: । तस्य निर्दोषत्वात् जडब्रह्माज्ञानवादोक्तदोषाभावान्न तच्छास्त्रवैयर्थ्यमस्मन्मते भवेत् ।

Svabhāva is Jīva. Ignorance abides in Jīva and covers him. In this view, there is no flaw as in जडाज्ञानवाद (which is impossible) and ब्रह्माज्ञानवाद (which is absurd)

(2) स्वयमेव भवति अस्तीति स्वभावो । नाऽज्ञानकल्पित इति यावत् । तदज्ञानवादस्य उक्तेतरेतराश्रयदोषविकलत्वात् न तद्भवेत् ।

जीव is real and not imaginary (अज्ञानकल्पित). If he had been Mithyā (unreal), then there was room for इतरेतराश्रयत्वं. जीव is real and the reading of the *Śāstras* is not futile.

(3) स्व: स्वतंत्रो भाव: परमात्मा । स्वस्य भावो धर्म: पारतंत्र्यादिर्वा स्वभावस्तद्विषयमज्ञानं जीवस्येतिवाद: स्वभावाज्ञानवाद: । तस्य स्वप्रकाशे स्वविषयाज्ञानासंभव दोषविधुरत्वान्नतद्भवेत् ।

God (Paramātmā) is Independent (स्वतंत्र) and Jīva is dependent (परतंत्र) on God. In the theory of Ignorance in Jīva who is dependent, the defect of futility of Śāstra cannot be posed.

(4) स्वभावभूतमेव अज्ञानं न मिथ्येति वादस्य अनवस्थादिदोषरहितत्वान्न तद्भवेत् । सुधा, P. 64.

The Ignorance is the natural property of Jīva and not imaginary, in which case, there would be no अन्योन्याश्रय or अनवस्था and similar flaws.

(5) स्वभावेन स्वतंत्रेण परमेश्वरेण अज्ञानं जीवस्येति वादस्य स्वप्रकाशस्वरूपाभिन्नधर्मविलयमपि अज्ञानं जीवे न युक्तमिति दोषहीनत्वान्न तद्भवेत् ।

The Ignorance is real and there is no incompatability in thinking that जीव is ignorant of his self-luminous properties due to the inscrutable powers of Independent God; for, जीव is covered by Ajñana due to the will of God.

(स्वभावाज्ञान वादस्य निर्दोषत्वान्न तद्भवेत्).

Since the positive unit of Ignorance (भावरूपं अज्ञानं) cannot be accommodated in the *Advaitin's Siddhānta* (परमते अविद्याऽनुपपत्ते रित्यर्थः । —सुधा, P. 64.)

it cannot have the four-fold requisites of अनुबंध चतुष्टय of a *śāstra* and so it deserves to be discarded by persons desiring knowledge and favour of God.

अतोऽधिकारि विषयफलयोगादिवर्जितं । अनंतदोषदुष्टं च हेयं मायामतं शुभैः ।। —अनुव्या.

The Advaitin's classification of the Vedas to suit his Advaita-vada is wrong.

The Advaitin renews his attempts to justify the अध्यासभाष्य. He says that the Veda consists of *Mantra*, Brāhmaṇa and Upanishads. The first two are intent on enjoining action (कर्म) to please the Gods and get wordly blessings from them. Hence, they are called कर्मकाण्ड and देवताकाण्ड meant for the use of the ignorant aspirants. Obviously, they teach dualism and are therefore false in their import. But the Upanishads otherwise called the *Brahma-Kānda* (ब्रह्मकाण्ड) are devoted wholly to the teaching of *Advaita* and the *Brahmasūtras* which provide the criteria of textual interpretations of the Vedāntas (Upanishads) have similarly the Advaita or the identity of Jīva and Brahman as their sole subject of treatment. They are designed to teach Brahman to the evolved souls (Vidvat).

The *Vedāntas* may be classified under different heads according to the different topics treated in them. Some texts deal with the identity of Jīva and Brahman directly as e. g. तत् त्वमसि । 'That Thou art! Others treat about Brahman (*Tat*) first, for the sake of identity as 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्'. 'At the beginning of creation there was, *Sat* only (Existence or Being alone)'. The texts like यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणि bear upon the nature of जीव (त्वं) for establishing his identity with Brahman (*Tat*). The portions teaching about the creation of the world and the meditation upon *Prāṇa* etc., are of secondary importance and have a bearing upon the teaching of Advaita only indirectly. Thus, the entire *Vēdānta* and its *Itikartavyatā* (subsidiary guide) i. e. the *Brahmasūtras* are an incontrovertible stock of evidence to prove the *Advaita* only. So, the treatment of the unreality of Bondage (बंधमिथ्यात्व) is not irrelevent in this context.

जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वं शारीरकमीमांसाशास्त्रविषयं प्रतिपद्यमानेन वेदस्यापि तद्विषयत्वं प्रतिपत्तव्यम् । तदितिकर्तव्यतारूपत्वामीमांसाशास्त्रस्य । करणेति कर्तव्यतयोरेकविषयतानियमात् । न च वेदो जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वं वक्ति । सर्वस्यापि मन्त्रब्राह्मणोपनिषद्रूपस्य वेदस्य भेदावलंबनत्वावभासनात् । ननु कथं वेदो न जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वपरः । मन्त्रब्राह्मणयोरतत्वावेदकयोरविद्वद्विषययोर्द्वैतावलंबनत्वेऽपि उपनिषद्मामद्वैतनिष्ठत्वात् । तत्र हि तत्वमसीत्यदिवाक्यं साक्षाज्जीवस्य ब्रह्मतां प्रतिपादयति । सदेव सौम्येत्यादीनि वाक्यानि तत्पदार्थस्वरूपनिरूपणपराणि तत्रैव समन्वितानि । अथ योवेदेदं जिघ्राणीत्यादीनि त्वं पदार्थपराण्यपि तत्रैव समन्वयं प्रतिपद्यंते । सृष्टयादिकथनं च ब्रह्मणो निष्प्रपंचता प्रतिपादनायानुवादतयोपयुज्यते । प्राणाद्युपासनानि चांतःकरणस्य पराग्वृत्ति निरोधद्वारेण अद्वैतप्रतिपत्तावेवोपयुक्तानि । तदेवं वेदांतानां जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वं विषय इति तदुपकरणीभूता मीमांसाऽपि तद्विषयैवेति युक्तम् ।। सुधा, P. 65.

Shrī Jayatīrtha cuts at the very root of this subject-wise classification of the Vedic literature and asserts that no part of

the Vedic literature teaches the identity between *Jīva* and *Brahman*. (अत्रोच्यते । आस्तां तावदियं समन्वयप्रक्रिया । तत्वमसीत्यादि वेद एव तावदेकताविषयो न भवति । —सुधा.)

सत्यत्वात्तन दुःखादेः प्रत्यक्षेण विरोधतः ।
न ब्रह्मतां वदेद्वेदो जीवस्य हि कथंचन ।। —अनुव्या.

The Vedas (तत्वमसि etc.,) do not teach the identity of जीव with Brahman by primary connotation (मुख्यया वृत्या) or by लक्षणा removing the incongruous properties दुःखित्व and निर्दुःखत्व. For, the attributes दुःखित्व and निर्दुःखत्व are opposed to each other in actual experience and cannot remain in one place. In the latter case (i. e. लक्षणा), the incongruity should either be ignored, or regarded as momentary or unreal. Ignorance cannot change the actual fact. The expression "तत्वमसि" in which the present tense असि denotes the continuity, does not admit of momentariness. The experience of grief which is contrary to निर्दुःखत्व cannot be denied and is real. Hence, the *S'ruti* cannot convey the identity between Jīva and Para-Brahman.

The Advaitin exclaims how can Śruti which is posterior to or comes after Pratyaksha

(परत्वादिति ।। पश्चात्तनत्वादित्यर्थः । प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्यनंतरमेव जीवब्रह्माद्वैतादिवाक्यस्य प्रवृत्तेरिति भावः : —परिमळ, P. 77.)

and is Apaurushēya i. e. unaffected by human defects, be overridden by *Pratyaksha* which is prone to error. The Vedas are more powerful and the teaching of identity in तत्वमसि etc. cannot be set aside by the *Pratyaksha* or mundance experience

(ननु कथमेतत् । प्रत्यक्षविरोधेन श्रुतेः प्रतीतार्थप्रच्याबनं । क्वाऽप्येवमदर्शनात् । प्रत्युत परत्वान्निर्दोषत्वाच्च बलवत्या श्रुत्या विरूद्धं पूर्वं दोषशंकाकलङ्कितं अहं दुःखीत्यादिप्रत्यक्षमेवाऽप्रमाणं भवितुं युक्तमित्यन आह ।। यजमानेति ।।)

To this, the *Siddhantin* replies 'No' the Śruti should be interpreted in 'conformity with the basic प्रत्यक्ष as in the case of

यजमानः प्रस्तरः = 'the sacrificer is a handful of *Kuśa* grass.' The superficial meaning of identity between यजमान (Sacrificer) and प्रस्तर (handful of grass) should be abandoned and a consistent sense should be assigned to it by लक्षणा (मुख्यार्थबाधे तद्योगे रूढितोऽथ प्रयोजनात् . . . . लक्षणा ।). Otherwise, mere *Pratyaksha* of Rāma and Kṛishna as imperfect human beings might despoil the very nature of God-hood described in the Vedas.

(न यजमानः प्रस्तर इत्यादि वाक्यस्य प्रत्यक्षविरोधमात्रेण प्रतीतार्थपरित्यागः । तथात्वे परमेश्वरावतारनिर्दोषतावाक्यस्यापि प्रत्यक्षविरोधेनार्थपरित्याग प्रसंगात् । किं नामोपजीव्य प्रत्यक्षविरोधात्। उपजीव्योपजीवकयोरूपजीव्यं बलवदिति हि न्यायः । —सुधा, P. 66.)

The following अनुमानs prove the proposition that the basic प्रत्यक्ष is more powerful than the dubious *S'ruits* and the superficial meaning should be abandoned :—

(1) जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वं न मीमांसाशास्त्रस्य विषयः तदुपकर्तव्य वेदाविषयत्वात् । यद्यदुपकर्तव्यप्रमाणस्याविषयः न तत्तदितिकर्तव्यता विषयः । यथा संप्रतिपन्नं ।।

(2) तत्वमस्यादि वाक्यं न प्रतीतार्थं प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धत्वात् । यजमानः प्रसार इति वाक्यवदिति ।

(1) The identity is not the subject-matter of the Brahma-Mīmāṁsā-śāstra, for it is not treated in the Vedas which are aided by it. The Vedas तत्वमसि etc. do not convey the out-ward sense of identity; for it is quite opposed to experience (प्रत्यक्षं).

In the first place, the Advaitin's classification of the Vēdnāta texts तत्वमसि, योऽहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽहं and परेऽव्यये सर्वे एकीभवंति etc. as जीवानुवाद, ब्रह्म नुबाद and ऐक्यविधान in general, conveying the superficial sense of identity is illogical and arbitrary. They should be interpreted according to the established criteria of Mīmāṁsā viz. उपजीव्योपजीवकयोरुपजीव्यं बलवत् । 'the feeder is

more powerful than the fed.' In 'त्वं तत् असि' the जीव is refered to by त्वं, and is identified with ब्रह्मन् represented by तत्. This is contrary to experience प्रत्यक्ष. For, Jīva is known by प्रत्यक्ष as अल्पज्ञ (Ignorant). This is contradicated by तत् standing for ब्रह्मन् who is सर्वज्ञ (Omniscient) according to the श्रुति, यःसर्वज्ञः etc. In the second example, Brahman is introduced by यः असौ and is identified with सोऽहं=जीव. Brahman is known by Śruti only 'यः सर्वज्ञः' etc. It is thus clear that the basic evidence is more powerful than the later superificial argument :—

एवं जीवमनूद्य ब्रह्मत्वं प्रतिपादयंतीनां तत्वमसीत्यादीनां श्रुतीनां उपजीव्यप्रत्यक्ष विरोधादतत्परत्वमुक्तं। अधुना याः ब्रह्मानुवादेन तस्य जीवैक्यं विदधति तासां तद्योऽहं सोऽसौ योऽसौ सोऽहंमित्यादीनामुपजीव्य श्रुतिविरोधादतत्परत्वमाह ॥ सर्वज्ञादीति ॥ —सुधा, P. 66.

सर्वज्ञादिगुणं जीवाद्भिन्नं ज्ञापयति श्रुतिः।
ईशं तामुपजीव्यैव वर्तते त्वैक्यवादिनी।
उपजीव्य विरोधेन नाऽस्यास्तन्मानता भवेत् ॥ —अनु.

Īśvara is refered to first and then the identity of जीव with him is set forth. Without knowing the subject of the discussion. i. e. Īśvara, how can any statement be made about him. So, Īśvara is known by the Śruti only as सर्वज्ञ. This is in conflict with the proposed identity of जीव who is अल्पज्ञ.

(ईश्वरमनूद्य तस्य जीवाभेदं प्रतिपादयंत्या श्रुत्या सर्वथा तावदीश्वरसिद्धिरपेक्षिता। अप्रतीतस्यानुवादायोगात्। न चेश्वरसिद्धिः श्रुतिं विना संभवति। ततो 'यः सर्वज्ञः' इत्यादि श्रुतिरेवास्या उपजीव्येतिवाच्यं। सा चासर्वज्ञाज्जीवादीश्वरस्य भेदमेव प्रतिपादयतीति तद्विरुद्धा तद्योऽहमित्याद्या श्रुतिर्नाद्वैतवादिनीति। —सुधा, P. 66.)

Here again, the Advaitin demurs and poses an instance that an उपजीव्यप्रत्यक्ष is contradicted by the testimony of word. The प्रत्यक्ष (perception) इदं रजतं. is vitiated by the word नेदं रजतं.

Similarly the experience of दुःखित्व etc. is contradicted by the Śruti नेह नानास्ति किंचन conveying निर्दुःखत्व, निर्धर्मत्व. etc. No: says the *Siddhāntin* emphatically. The general rule of उपजीव्योपजीवकन्याय should be respected and the exception should be explained on other grounds. The Identity Texts are सावकाश (admit of alternate interpretation) and are weak

Further, the so-called Identity texts (अद्वैतश्रुतयः) are contradicted by the Difference Texts (भेदश्रुतिः). The correct Import of the Śruti should be obtained by the dictum of सावकाशनिरवकाशयोः निरवकाशं बलवत्। The श्रुति which admits of alternate interpretations is सावकाश whereas the one which refers to one definite sense only is निरवकाश. Of these, the निरवकाशश्रुति is more powerful and would determine the import of the text.

The Śruti द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया etc. directly opposes the identity texts which are सावकाश i. e. admit of other alternate Interpretations. The भेदश्रुति is निरवकाश i. e. does not yield any other meaning than भेद only. Judged by this *Mīmāṁsā-Nyāya*, it becomes clear that the difference between ईश्वर and जीव is uncontradicted by the identity sense which should be understood without prejudice to the sense of difference. The apparent identity can be understood keeping in tact, the sense of difference which is supported by accredited usages :—

स्वातंत्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि।
सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः ॥
अवकाशोज्झिता भेदश्रुतिर्नातिबला कथं ॥ —अनु.

The identity is used in verbal expressions to convey the difference in the following five contexts :

(1) स्वातंत्र्य (Independence) (2) विशिष्टत्व (greatness or superiority) (3) स्थानैक्य (oneness on account of identical residence) (4) मत्यैक्य (oneness on account of unity of thought) and lastly (5) सादृश्य (similarity).

These are the *Nimittas* (causes or occasions) for the expression of identity in difference in verbal transactions. The point is made clear with appropriate examples by Śrī Padmanābha-tīrtha in his commentary on Anuvyākhyāna called *Samyāyaratnāvalī* as pointed out by Shrī Rāghavēndra-Tīrtha in his *Parimaḷa*. (P. 78).

(1) वशीकृतग्रामं पुरुषमधिकृत्य **अयं ग्रामोऽयमेव** इति स्वातंत्र्ये अभेदव्यवहारः ।

(2) विद्याविशिष्टं ब्राह्मणमधिकृत्य अयमेव ब्राह्मणोऽस्मिन् ग्रामे इति वैशिष्ट्ये (अभेदव्यवहारः) ।

(3) सायंगोष्ठे एकीभूताः गाव इति स्थानैक्ये (अभेद व्यवहारः) ।

(4) पूर्वं परस्परविरुद्धाः ब्राह्मणाः इदानीमेकीभूताः इति मत्यैक्ये (अभेदव्यवहारः) ।

(5) अग्निर्माणवक इति सादृश्ये चाभेदव्यवहारः। इति द्रष्टव्याः इत्यर्थः ।

In the Upanishadic Texts, these principles are illustrated as shown by the Āchārya while commenting on the Sūtra

'तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्'
तथाऽपितु चिदानंदपूर्वास्तत्सदृशा गुणाः ।
सारः स्वरूपमस्यापि मुक्तावप्यवशिष्यते ॥

(1) तत्वमसीत्यादिवाक्यं सादृश्यनिमित्तकम् ।

(*'Thou art like Him.'*) That is, similarity guides the expression of identity here)

(2 and 3) सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेत्यादिकं स्वातंत्र्य–वैशिट्य निमित्तकम् ।

'All this is indeed Brahman'. Here, the identity indicates **that** Brahman is independent of, and Supreme in, the whole world).

(4 and 5) परेऽव्यये सर्वं एकीभवन्ति ।

All become one in that unperishing Great Soul (परे). **Here** identity is due to oneness of their thinking and residence.

But what is the वृत्ति (principle of semantics) which conveys) these senses in the above mentioned expressions? The *Parimala* observes :—

सादृश्यस्थले गौणी । स्थानैक्यस्थले लक्षणा । मत्यैक्यस्थले लक्षितलक्षणा इत्येवंरूपवृत्तिचितेत्यर्थः ।

Parimaḷa, P. 78. Thus गौणी वृत्ति, लक्षणा and लक्षित लक्षणा are the conveyances adopted in the above usages. The sum total of the above discussion is set forth in the Sudhā as follows :—

एवदुक्तं भवति । साबकाश निरवकाशयोः निरवकाशं बलवत् । सावकाशा चाद्वैतश्रुतिः । विनाऽपि साक्षादद्वैतं स्वातंत्र्यादिना निमित्ते-नाऽमुख्यार्थतयाऽपि घटमानत्वात् । भेदश्रुतिस्तु निरवकाशा । जीवेश भेदमंतरेण अर्थांतराप्रतीतेः । अतो निरबकाशतया बलवत्या भेदश्रुत्या सावकाशतया दुर्बलायाः अद्वैतश्रुतेः बाधो युक्तः । —Sudhā, P. 67.

The identity texts are shown above **as** capable of **alternate** interpretations and so are दुर्बल = weak, where as **the** Difference texts yield no other sense than difference between God and soul and are therefore प्रबल or more powerful. —The weaker text is suppressed by the powerful, that means, the Vedas being अपौरुषेय and स्वतः प्रमाण, the less powerful texts should be made to yield a sense in harmony with that of the more powerful *S'ruti* on the principles of semantics shown above.

The Advaitin doggedly sticks to his thesis and endeavours to show that *Bhēda S'ruti* (Difference Texts) is सावकाश = conveys alternate meanings.

(ननु भेदश्रुतिरपि सावकाशा मिथ्याभेदपरत्वादिति चेत् । कोऽयं मिथ्याभेदो नाम । किमसन् । उत अनिर्वचनीयः । नाऽद्यः अनंगीका-रात् । द्वितीये दोषमाह । अज्ञानेति ॥)

अज्ञानासंभवादेव मिथ्याभेदो निराकृतः ।
अतो यथार्थबंधस्य विना विष्णुप्रसादतः ॥
अनिवृत्तेस्तदर्थं हि जिज्ञासाऽत्र विधीयते ॥ —अनु.

The Difference Texts convey the *false* भेद and are सावकाश *Sāvakāśa*. What is the falsity in Difference? Is it non-existence (असत्) or *indescribability* (अनिर्वचनीय)? असत् is not admitted by the Advaitin himself. The latter i. e. अनिर्वचनीयत्व, cannot be proved. It has been pointed out already that अज्ञान or Ignorance on which falsity (मिथ्यात्व) is based cannot be maintained by the Advaitin.

(अज्ञानातिरिक्तमनिर्वचनीयं अज्ञानकार्यमिति हि परसंमतं । न चाऽज्ञानं तन्मते संभवतीत्युक्तं । ततो मिथ्याभेदाऽसंभवान्न तदर्थत्वं भेदश्रुतेरिति । —Sudhā, P. 67.

A minor objection is raised here, The भेदश्रुति repeats what is already known (अनुवादिनी) only to be refuted by the अद्वैतश्रुति not known before from any other source (अपूर्व). This is silenced (न च मानांतरोपेयं ब्रह्म तद्भवति क्वचित् । —पृथगधिकरण—अनुव्याख्यान) by stating that *Bhēda* is not known before, as it involves the knowledge of अनुयोगिन् and प्रतियोगिन् and the *Pratiyōgin* = Īśwara cannot be cognised by either प्रत्यक्ष or अनुमान. Further, if Bhēda is authentic (i. e. known by Pramāṇas), then अभेद or identity is automatically contradicted as false, or अप्रामाणिक

(according to the maxim ' परस्पर विरुद्धयोरन्यतरनिषेधे अन्यतरविधिनांतरीयकत्वात्). एतेन अपूर्वताविरहात् दुर्बला भेदश्रुतिरिति निरस्तम् । —Sudhā, P. 67.

Thus, the Adhyāsa-Bhāshya of Śrī Saṅkarāchārya is refuted to establish firmly that the *Bandha* is real and it can be removed by the grace of God. अत: in the sūtra was previously interpreted to mean that release from the *Bandha* can be obtained through the *Prasāda* of Vishṇu. (जिज्ञासोत्थज्ञानजात्तत्प्रसादादेव मुच्यते।) Now; the *Bandha* is stated to be real – not मिथ्या (unreal) as adumbrated in the *Adhyāsa bhāshya*.

अतो यथार्थबंधस्य विना विष्णुप्रसादत: ।
अनिवृत्तेस्तदर्थं हि जिज्ञासाऽत्र विधीयते ।।
यथा दृष्टया प्रसन्नः सन् राजा बंधापनोदकृत् ।
एवं दृष्टःस भगवान् कुर्याद्बंधविभेदनम् ॥

—अनु.

The Advaitin renews his position with a new argument. *Mōksha* (release) is stated to be conferred by the God through his grace. But *Mōksha* is the removal of *Bandha* only and not the acquisition of bliss; for the latter is momentary and will endure only for a limited period as the heaven etc. The *Bandha* is not real and is removable by knowledge of Brahman only. If it is real, how can it be dispersed by knowledge? The real bondage of shackles is not removed by knowledge. So, it must be false and to remove the false thing, nobody's favour or grace is needed. It will automatically vanish when the knowledge arises as in the case of the illusion इदं रजतं (this is silver) which disappears when the knowledge of *Śukti* is got. Where is, then, the scope for the favour or Prasāda of God in this simple transaction? This objection is removed by the use of the word अत: in the Sūtra. The *Bandha* though beginningless (अनादि) unlike the bondage of shackles which is सादि, is removed by the inscrutable powers of the God (Iśa) only. Thus, अत: provides two reasons for enquiry viz. (1) प्रसादादेव मोक्ष: इत्यर्थकतया. (2) तथा बंधसत्यत्वार्थकतया च द्वेधा ज्ञानी प्रियतमोऽतो मे इत्युक्तेर्बंधमित्यादिना च व्याख्यायेत्यर्थ: ।

—परिमळ, P. 80.

Now, अत: is interpreted to furnish reasons for the establishment of विषय or object of enquiry. A doubt had been raised that the enquiry is devoid of an object. This is removed in two ways: Brahman and Jīva are identical. Jīva is known (in अहं-प्रत्यय) and so is Brahman also. A thing which is already known cannot be made the object of knowledge again. This is removed

The evidences to prove Brahman are wrongly understood and they must be properly and correctly put forth.

विषयसमर्थनं हि द्वेधा भवति। (1) स्वप्रकाशप्रत्यगर्थाभिन्नत्वाद् ब्रह्मणो न विषयत्वमिति **प्रमेये** आरोपितान्यथाकारशंकानिरासेन, तथा (2) **ब्रह्मप्रमाणे** आरोपितान्यथाकारशंकानिरासेन चेति।

The removal of the misinterpretation of the *Pramāṇa* is three fold :—

(1) शब्दस्यैव अर्थसंस्पर्शशून्यत्वान्न प्रामाण्यं कुतस्तद्विशेष वेदस्येति शंकानिरासेन (2) वाक्यार्थ बोधोपायाभावान्न वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमिति शंकानिरासेन, (3) प्रामाण्येऽपि न सिद्धार्थे प्रामाण्यमिति कुतस्तेन विषयसिद्धिरिति शंकानिरासेन चेति।

(1) By removing the doubt about the authenticity of the Vedas, as the word in general is not an instrument of correct knowledge.

(2) The Vedas are in the form of sentence (वाक्य). Their meaning cannot be known as the sense of he words comprising them cannot be understood by any means (वाक्यार्थबोधोपायाभावात्।)

(3) The Vedas may be *Pramāṇas* (sources of correct knowledge) about *Kārya* and not of the accomplished object (सिद्धार्थ) i. e. Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa

Thus, the four doubts about the object of enquiry are removed in the following *Kārikas* by the Āchārya :—

(1) ओतत्ववाची ह्योंकारो वक्त्यसौ तद्गुणोतताम्।

The disttnction between जीव and Īśvara is obvious as Brahman is full of auspicious qualities while the Jīva is अल्पगुण.

एवं चतुर्षु विषयसमर्थनप्रकारेष्वाद्यः ओतत्ववाचीत्योंकार इत्यादिना ॐकारब्रह्मशब्दयोर्जीवभेदकगुणपूर्तिवाचकत्व व्याख्यानपरेण दर्शितः।

(2) **द्वितीयस्तु** प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं स्वतएवाऽऽगमस्य हि। इत्यत्र अतःशब्दस्य वेदादिशब्दप्रामाण्यार्थपरत्वव्याख्यानेन

(3) **तृतीयस्तु** शक्तिश्चैवान्विते स्वार्थे इत्यत्र शब्दस्य अन्वितार्थ शक्तत्वादित्येवंरूपार्थपरत्व व्याख्यानांतरेण प्रदर्शयिष्यते। **चतुर्थस्तु** वेदादेः सिद्धार्थे ब्रह्मणि प्रामाण्यादित्येवंरूपार्थपरत्वव्याख्यानरूपेण कार्यताचेत्यादिना प्रदर्शयिष्यते इति विषयसमर्थनपरतयेत्युक्तं ॥

—परिमळ, P. 80.

(2) That the word (शब्द) of the Vedas etc., is authentic is shown in प्रत्यक्षवच्चप्रामाण्यं।

(3) The word conveys a sense in relation to the contiguous word in the sentence (अन्वितार्थशक्तत्व) and

(4) The Vedas convey the sense of an accomplished object, not merely कार्य 'that which is to be accomlishcd' .... i. e. कर्म of the *Mīmāṁsakas*. Thus, the *Sudhā* introduces the कार्यतावाद with the statement :

एवं मीमांसाप्रयोजनसमर्थनार्थत्वेन अतः शब्दं द्वेधा व्याख्याय विषयसमर्थनपरतयाऽपि व्याख्याति। **कार्यते**त्यादिना।

—सुधा, P, 67

CHAPTER 6

THE VEDAS AND THE कार्यतावाद

Now, Shrī Madhvāchārya adds a very learned discussion on the import of the Vedas to prove that Para Brahman (Vishṇu-Nārāyaṇa-Hari) is the principal subject of treatment in the Vedas and not the *Karma* or *Kārya* of the *Mīmāṁsakas* or the Nirguṇa Brahman of the Māyāvādins.

The Pseudo-followers of Jaimini aver that Kārya (i. e. कर्म) is the teaching of the Vedas and not Brahman who is an accomplished object.

(विध्यर्थवादमंत्रात्मकसमस्तोऽप्याम्नाय: कार्यनिष्ठ एव। न वस्तुतत्वनिष्ठ: । स च अथाऽतो धर्मजिज्ञासेत्यादिना मीमांसित: । तत्कथं ब्रह्ममीमांसारंभसंभव: । —सुधा, P. 67.)

They propound their theory of कार्य by investigating and analysing the basic object of the use of words or language and how it is learnt by the unlettered *child through* the verbal transaction and demonstration by the elderly persons in his home.

(यत्प्रतिपादनेन वाक्यपर्यवसानं यत्प्रतिपादनाय च पदार्थांतरोपादानं तथाभूतश्च कार्यात्मैव । न हि गौरश्व: पुरुषो हस्तीति वा देवदत्त: पचतीति वा पर्यवसितमनुभूयते । किं तु देवदत्त गामानयेत्यादि कार्यनिष्ठमेव । अत: कार्यमेव सर्वत्र वाक्यार्थ: । ... अनेनैव न्यायेन आम्नायोऽप्यशेष: कार्यताबोधे पर्यवसित: । ... वृद्धव्यवहारश्च कार्य प्रतिपत्तिनिबंधन इति कार्यप्रतिपादकतैव युक्ता । —सुधा.)

Further, the language is intended to impel a person to action or deter hlm from it and that actuating force is *Kāryatā*

यद्यपि बोधकत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यं । तथापि वाक्यप्रयोगस्य परार्थत्वात् परप्रवृत्तिनिवृत्त्यौपयिक एवार्थो वाक्यबोध्योंगीकार्य: । कार्यमेव तथा विधम् । ... —सुधा, P. 68.)

the sentence becomes complete with the *Vidhi* or कार्य. Otherwise, a mere string of words cow, horse, man, elephant, etc. does not convey any sense. As stated above, even the daily transaction of a child learning the language from the elders supports this point. How the child concludes that the word conveys the impelling force to *action* is proved in the following sylloligms

(1) वृद्धस्य स्वतंत्रा प्रवृत्ति: बुद्धिपूर्विका स्वतंत्रप्रवृत्तित्वात् । मदीय स्वतंत्रप्रवृत्तिवत् ।

(2) वृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूता बुद्धि:, यद्विषयैव बुद्धि: मम प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूता तद्विषयैव, प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतबुद्धित्वात् । मदीय प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतबुद्धिवत् ।

Then, by mental analysis, the child surmises that there must be some object denoted by the word which sets him to action. What is that object? It is not mere action, its fulfilment, but it is the sense of beneficialness (कार्यता). The child sucks its mother's breast only on the impulse of its serving him his good. Thus, it is clear

चैत्रस्य प्रवृत्ति: कार्यबोधपूर्विका बुद्धिपूर्वं वृत्तित्वात् । मदीयप्रवृत्तिवन् ।

How, then, is this sense of कार्यता known in the sentence? Though the sentence in general is designed to eonvey the कार्यता (intension), it is the लिङ, लोट्, तव्य terminations which provide the impelling force directly, and not the word or the verbal meaning.

(एतेन शब्दस्तद्व्यापारो वा प्रवर्तक इति निरस्तम् । बालेन स्वप्रवृत्तौ तयो: कारणतथाऽनवधृतत्वात् । —सुधा, P. 68.

लिङादयश्च प्रवृत्तिहेतुभूतार्थाभिधायका: कार्यमेवाभिदधति । —P. 68.

The likes and dislikes (रागद्वेषौ) are no doubt the impelling forces in a man, but they are implicit and function without being taught by the word. It is true that the word as conveyer of sense

is an instrument of correct knowledge. But its aim is to put a man to action or stop him from action; so, *Kārya* is the purport of the sentence.

(अतः कार्यमेव सर्वत्र वाक्यार्थः । वेदे तु यागादिधात्वर्थजन्यापूर्वरूप कार्यमित्येतावान् भेदः ।' इति भावः । —परिमळ, P. 80.

Thus, the *Mīmāṁsakas* conclude that the Vedas purport to teach कार्य only and so they cannot be adduced to prove the existence of Īśvara who is सिद्ध. The enquiry into the nature of Brahman is thus unauthenticated.

Reply :— All this is meaningless. We accept the arguments of the *Mīmāṁsakas* that for a sentence to give complete senst, *Kārya:ā* has to be admitted and this *Kāryatā* amounts to the performence of *Karma* Vedic or unVedic. But if the sense could become complete in respect of an accomplished object, why noe accept it as Kārya. This is a special सिद्ध meaning इष्टसाधन. So, *Siddha* means both इष्ट and इष्टसाधन.

सा चेद्वाक्यार्थपर्यवसानोपयोगिनी कार्यता सिद्ध विशेषस्य स्यात्तदा- तस्यापि वाक्यार्थत्वे कीदृशो दोषः स्यादित्याशयवान् कार्यतां तावन्निर्धार- यति ।' कार्यताचेति ॥

कार्यता च न काचित्स्यादिष्ट साधनतां विना ।
कार्यं न हि क्रियाव्याप्यं निषिद्धस्य समत्वतः ॥
न भविष्यत्क्रिया कार्यं स्रक्ष्यतीश इति ह्यपि :
कार्यं स्यान्नैव चाकर्तु मशक्यं कार्यमिष्यते ॥
साम्यादेव निषिद्धस्य तदिष्टं साधनं तथा ।
कार्यं साधनमिष्टस्य भगवानिष्टदेवता ।
मुख्येष्टं वा सुमनसां प्रेयस्तदिति च श्रुतिः ॥ —अनु.

In the sentence गामानम (Bring the cow), गवानयन ('Bringing of the cow') i. e. कार्यता completes the sense. Hence, it is calculated to fulfil my desire. (इष्टसाधन) The Mīmaṁsaka says that

This must be the meaning of Kāryatā as all other alternatives are rejected. The word कार्य is derived from (1) कृ + ण्यत् प्रत्यय in which ण्यत् is कृत्यप्रत्यय which conveys the sense of कर्म (object) = That which becomes the coveted object of action

(कर्तु रीप्सिततमं कर्म – पाणिनिः), यत्कर्तुः क्रियया आप्तुमिष्टतमं– तथा च क्रियया विशेषेणाऽऽप्यं कार्यं तद्भावः कार्यता । —सुधा, P. 69.

This does not suit here since even the killing of Brahman which is prohibited by the Śāstra would have to be deemed as कार्य, For, the notion of कार्यता is the impelling force to action. (2) Future action also would be *Kārya*. A mat which Dēvadatta would make tomorrow, would be described as *Kārya*. Similarly the future creations of the world are *Kārya*. But in the present case, Kārya is denoted by the लिट्, लोट्, लेट्, and तव्य प्रत्यय in which the sense of future is warded off. (3) A thing done for others is cailed कार्य. The कार्यता in this case is not the incentive for one's present action. (4) What is done compulsorily is *Kārya* which is unavoidabe. Even the learned persons under the influence of excessive lust or anger are impelled to commit adultery and Brāhmaṇa- killing. These and similar actions are not *Kāryas* in the present context.

निषिद्धस्य परनारीगमनादेरपि अकर्तुमशक्यत्वादिसाम्यादेव भवति हि कस्यचिदतिकामाद्याक्रांतचेतसो न परांगनागमनेन ब्राह्मणस्य वा हननेन बिना स्थातुं शक्नोमीति बुद्धिः । न च तत्कार्यमेव । तस्यैव श्रुतशास्त्रस्यापि कार्यता बुद्धिप्रसंगात् । आस्तिककामुको हि अकार्यमे- वेदमकृत्वा स्थातुं नोत्सहे इति मन्यते । —Sudhā, P. 69.

Since the above definitions of कार्यता are defective and misleading, the Āchārya gives a correct sense of the term in तदिष्ट साधनं तथा । It is इष्ट and इष्टसाधन. Since in the concluding sentence. इष्ट and इष्टसाधन are stated to be *Kārya*, in the opening clause also, इष्टतां should be understood.

(अत्रेष्टग्रहणादुपक्रमेऽपि तद्ग्राह्यम् । —Sudha. इष्टसाधनतां विनेत्यत्र इष्टतां विनेत्यपि ग्राह्यमित्यर्थ: । —परिमळ.)

Some commentators interpret च in कार्यता च न काचित् as furnishing additional meaning 'इष्टतां विना'.

(कार्यता इष्टसाधनता इत्येका व्याख्या । इष्टतेत्यपरा । तथा च इष्टसाधनतां इतिवत् इष्टतां विनेत्यपि समुच्चयार्थ इत्यर्थ इत्येके ।
—परिमळ.)

तस्मादिष्टं इष्टसाधनत्वं वा कार्यमित्युपसंहरति । –तदिति

कार्यता is none else than इष्टत्व and इष्टसाधनत्व

Shrī Jayatīrtha discusses the implications of the term कार्यता by examining the views of other writers and concludes that the *Kārya* is of two kinds. (1) इष्ट (what is desired) and इष्टसाधन (means to get desired object). For ordinary persons (लौकिकानां) Bhagavān is a means to *Ishṭa* (happiness) whereas for the persons of unblemished mind (godly or divine), he is the desired object (इष्ट).

It must be noted that Ishṭatva (इष्टत्व) and Ishṭa- sādhanatva (इष्टसाधनत्व) are only the mental conditions of the Adhikarins (aspirants) and do not effect any change or addition of property (अतिशय) in the object. So, the same object (i.e. God) is both इष्ट and इष्टसाधन according to the capacity of the Adhikārins. The Śruti 'तदेतत् प्रेय: पुत्रात्प्रेय: वित्तात्प्रेय: अन्यस्माच्च सर्वस्यादंतरंतरं यदयमात्मा' definitely points out that Bhagavān is प्रेय: = प्रियतम, to the evolved souls, and for others, he is a means to eternal happiness. (cf. यंतेष्टो नो रमापति: ! — तत्वोद्योत.)

Thus, it is established that God is इष्ट as well as इष्टसाधन and the entire Vedic lore is an incontrovertible evidence to prove his existence and the enquiry (जिज्ञासा) into this authentic Īśvara is justifiable.

(तथा च परमेश्वरस्येष्टसाधनत्वात्समस्तस्यापि वेदाधिकारिणोऽस्ति तस्मिन्नाकांक्षा जिज्ञासा, अस्ति च संनिधि: सर्वगतत्वात् योग्यता च बाधकप्रमाणाभावात् । यत एवं तस्मात्स एव सर्ववेदार्थो भवितुं युक्त: ।

—Sudha, P. 70.

The other definitions of *Kāryatā* are found to be defective :-

(1) कृतिसाध्यं प्रधानं यत्तत्कार्यमभिधीयते ।

Here कृतिसाध्यत्वे सति प्रधानत्वं is कार्यत्वं ।

Are these कृतिसाध्यत्व and प्रधानत्व independent definitions of कार्यता or one combined? In the former alternative, कार्य = कृतिसाध्य is explained as क्रियाव्याप्य i.e. object of action and this will include even the proscribed or prohibited actions such as killing of Brahmana, drinking of liquor or adultery (कार्यं न हि क्रियाव्याप्यं निषिद्धस्य समत्वत: । —अनुव्याख्यान.) In the second case, प्रधानत्व means the aim of efforts (प्रयत्नोद्देश्यत्व), chief or secondary (मुख्य or अमुख्य). The first is what is desired and the second, the means to accomplishment of the desired object.

(आद्यंत्विष्टमेव । द्वितीयंत्विष्टसाधनत्वमेवेत्यंगीकृतमेव । —सुधा.)

If both the parts combined make up the definition (कृतिसाध्यत्व विशिष्ट प्रधानत्वं) the part कृतिसाध्यत्व is redundant. But the incompatability of the two (क्रियाव्याप्यत्व and प्रधानत्व) abiding in one place is removed in the Tarkatāṇḍava in the section कृतिसाध्यत्वविशिष्टेष्टसाधनत्वस्य विधित्वभंग । But in the *Karmanirṇaya* and the commentary on *Vishṇu Tatvanirṇaya*, the propriety of कृतिसाध्यत्व is explained whereas here it is stated to be redundant. This descrepancy is harmonised in the *Tarkatāṇḍava*.

(2) कार्यता is defined by some as

फलसाधनता नाम या सा नैव हि कार्यता ।
कार्यता कृतिसाध्यत्वं फलसाधनता पुन: ।
कारणत्वं फलोत्पादे ते भिद्येते परस्परम् ॥

The means to the accomplishment of the object (fruit = फल) is not Kāryata. It is only the cause whereas the *Kāryatā* is what is accomplished by action. Both being different, cannot be combined together. This definition also *is not correct*. For कृतिसाध्यत्व is shown to cover even prohibited actions.

(कृतिसाध्यत्वस्य निषिद्धेऽपि समत्वादिति कथनेन । —परिमळ.)

Thus, it is concluded that कार्यता is इष्टसाधनता. A doubt is raised: Moon's orbit (चंद्रमण्डल) is, no doubt, means to the object of desire but it cannot be got

(ननु सत्यपि चंद्रमण्डलादौ इष्टसाधनत्वे न कार्यता बुद्धिरितिचेत् ।)

what then is the idea of *Kāryatā*? If it is the same as the idea of इष्टसाधनत्व, then the orbit of Moon is इष्टसाधन. If it is different from it, then what is it? Define it. So, कार्यता is इष्टसाधनता only. To the query that the knowledge of *Kāryatā* and not इष्टसाधनता, is the impelling force to action, it is replied that in that case, the *past Kāryatā* would havc to, but does not, serve to impel a person to *action now,*

(केयं कार्यता बुद्धिः । इष्टसाधनता बुद्धिः तदतिरिक्ता वा । आद्ये कथं सा नास्ति । द्वितीयो न । अनिरूपणात् । ननु कार्यज्ञानं प्रवर्तकं नेष्टसाधनता ज्ञानमिति चेन्न । असिद्धेः । अतीतादौ प्रवृत्तिप्रसंग इति चेन्न । तस्येदानीमिष्टसाधनत्वाभावात् । अन्यथा अतीतकार्येऽप्ययं प्रसंगस्तुल्यः । —सुधा.)

The Prābhākara puts forth the definition of Kāryatā as consisting of three elements: कृतिसाध्यत्वं, कृत्युद्देश्यत्वं and इष्टसाधनत्वं. In these, कृतिसाध्यत्व is the adjective of कृत्युद्देश्यत्व and its knowledge necessarily leads to the knowledge of इष्टसाधनत्व.

> किंतु स्वयं क्लेशरूपं कर्म यत्कार्यतां व्रजेत् ।
> फलसाधनता तत्र कारणं तेन कार्यता ।।

This कारिका of Prābhākara is explained in the Sudhā as follows:—

किंच कृतिसाध्यत्वं कृत्युद्देश्यत्वं इष्टसाधनत्वं चेत्येकार्थसमवायिनः त्रयो धर्माः । तत्र कृतिसाध्यताबच्छिन्नं कृत्युद्देश्यत्वं कार्यत्वं तदधिगमस्त्विष्टसाधनतावगमनिबंधन इति परसंमतं । यथाऽऽह किंतु स्वयं क्लेशरूपं ।।

We have stated above that इष्टसाधनताज्ञान will not be an incentive to action as it would lead to the absurdity of the past इष्टसाधनताज्ञान resulting in the present action. Similarly the *Kāryatā-Jñāna* of lhe past would have to bring about the present action. This is against experience.

It is to be observed that इष्टसाधनत्व combined with कृतिसाध्यत्व would lead to कार्यता and not by itself and the aim to be reached is कृत्युद्देश्यत्व.

(न तत्रेष्टसाधनतामात्रं गमकं किंतु कृतिसाध्यतावच्छिन्नं । गम्यं तु कृत्युद्देश्यत्वमात्रमिति चेत् । तथाऽपि भूताद्यतिप्रसंगानिवारणात् :

This cannot, however, ward off the past materials (भूतादिकं) which are capable of being achieved (कृतिसाध्य). But, it is stated that the past materials do not produce the present action and so the adjective कृतिसाध्यत्व is necessary in the definition. No, it is as good as इष्टसाधनत्व which would otherwise be redundant. कृत्युद्देश्यत्व is गम्य and इष्टसाधनत्व and कृतिसाध्यत्व are गमक and so they must be different. Otherwise, it would be against experience. For, usually people argue that because it is इष्टसाधन, it is कार्य (लौकिका हि इदं मे कार्यमित्युक्त्वा कुत इति पृष्टा इष्टसाधनत्वादिति हेतुमाचक्षते । इति चेन्न । द्विविधं खलु कार्यं । इष्टं इष्टसाधनं च । तत्रेष्टसाधनत्वादिति विवक्षितं कार्यव्याख्यानं लौकिकानां । किंच प्रथममिष्टसाधनताज्ञानं ततश्चेच्छा । ततः प्रयत्नः ततः परिस्पंदः इत्यात्मन्यैकैकार्थ विषयाः धर्माः जायंते । न तु अर्थे कश्चिदतिशयोऽनुभूयते । योऽभिमतसाधनतयाऽनुभूयते । इति । –सुधा)

So, इष्टसाधन and कृत्युद्देश्य need not be different, for कार्य which is

कृत्युद्देश्य is both इष्ट and इष्टसाधन. For the लौकिक's who seek happiness, the aim of action (कार्य) becomes a means to it (इष्टसाधन) in the following order :— First comes the knowledge of *Ishṭasādhanatva,* then Desire (इच्छा), then effort and finally action, No change or addition is made to the principal object of the action,

Thus, it is established that the *Kārya* which renders the sense of the sentence complete, is either इष्ट or इष्टसाधन. So, the object of the *Brahma-Mīmāṁsāśāstra* is Bhagavān. i. e. Brahman since इष्टसाधन of the लौकिक's is इष्ट of the gods

(सुमनसां पुरुषार्थांतराभिलाषाऽकलुषितमनसामित्यर्थः । –सुधा.)

To them, Bhagavān is the unconditioned sole object of devotion.

प्राण बुद्धि मनः स्वात्मदेहापत्यधनादयः ।
यत्संपर्कात्प्रिया आसन् ततः कोऽन्वपरः प्रियः ॥
इत्यादिवाक्यैराकांक्षा संनिधिर्योग्यता यतः ।
तस्मिन्नेव समस्तस्येतीष्टे व्युत्पत्तिरिष्यते ॥

Expectancy, concordance and proximity are the three preliminaries required to make the sentence complete in sense. Since Paramātmā is इष्ट and इष्टसाधन; all grades of Vedādhikārins find in Him the three conditions fulfilled. So, God Vishṇu only is the principal object of the Vedas.

(तथा च परमेश्वरस्येष्टसाधनत्वात्समस्तस्यापि वेदाधिकारिणः अस्ति तस्मि न्नाकांक्षा जिज्ञासा अस्ति च संनिधिः सर्वगतत्वात् योग्यता च बाधकप्रमाणाभावात् । यत एवं तस्मात् स एब सर्ववेदार्थो भवितुं युक्तः । —सुधा, P. 70.)

The *Mīmāṁsakas* raise a small objection against the cont clusion of the Siddhāntin that Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa is the purport of the Vedas, for he is इष्ट and इष्टसाधन. They say that Bhagavān is *Siddha* (accomplished object) while the aim of verbal expressions is कार्य only.

(ननु तथाऽपि नेश्वरे वेदस्य प्रामाण्यं संभवति । केवलसिद्धार्थे व्युत्पत्त्यभावात् । कार्ये एव लोके व्युत्पत्तिदर्शनात् । लोकावगतसामर्थ्यः शब्दो वेदेऽपि वोधकः । इति न्यायात् ।)

as is evidenced by the worldly transactions. The sense of the words in a sentence is made out with reference to कार्य (कार्यान्वितत्वेन व्युत्पत्त्यंगीकारे). ईश्वर becomes subordinate to the predicate i. e. action and cannot therefore be the principal object of the Vedas (कार्यतान्वितत्वेन व्युत्पत्त्यंगीकारे च ईश्वरस्याप्राधान्य प्रसंगेन स एवेत्यवधारणानुपपत्तेः । —सुधा, P. 71)

Further, the sense of a sentence as made out from the transaction of the elders is undoubtedly कार्य (action). It is true that इष्ट and इष्टसाधन are *Kārya* as explained above, but this has to be given up in the light of the elders' tuition to the child, which supports the *Kārya* sense of a sentence. Without the sense of *Kārya,* no action can be explained. कार्य is कृतिसाध्य (to be accomplished by action) and Īśvara is not an object to be accomplished.

To this, the Siddhāntin replies that the child does not learn the language by the elder's transactions of 'give and take', since as stated above, he knows the object of his desire (इष्ट) **directly,** in such expressions as "Your brother eats puddies", "She is your mother" "He is your father" etc. By the process of elimination, repeating the same sentence with the change of words each time, the boy learns the meaning of the words changed alternately. There is no injunction (विधिः कार्य) "do this and not that" etc. Similarly the expressions like देवदत्त, पुत्रस्ते जातः । 'O Dēvadatta, a son is born to you,' produce an impression of satisfaction on the face of Dēvadatta. The boy observing this change of expression surmises that the birth of a son is a good news. Similarly, if the expressien on the face is that of grief, as in his own case, he thinks, that something bad has happened. Some thinkers hold that the

primary meaning of a sentence is Kārya in the first instance and the sense of accomplished object comes next.

(यदुक्तं यावती सिद्धार्थपरादपि वाक्याद्व्युत्पत्तिः सा सर्वा प्रथमभाविकार्यव्युत्पत्त्यनंतर भावित्वात् कार्यव्युत्पत्तिरेवेति। तन्निरासायोक्तं। बालोऽपीति ।।)

अत्यपूपांस्तव भ्रातेत्यादावावापतोऽपि च ।
उद्वापाद्वर्तमानत्वादाकांक्षादि बलादपि ।।
बालो व्युत्पत्तिमप्येति नाऽऽनयेत्यादि वाक्यतः ।।

This is not so, for, the boy learns the languages. as stated above, directly without the process of 'give and take' transactions. This holds good in the past and future cases also. The boy transposes thc present experience to the past and future dealings also. It is true that in some exceptional cases, the boy first learns the action and then comes to know the accomplished object by the instruction of the elders as e. g. इह प्रभिन्नकमलोदरे मधूनि मधुकरः पिबति । 'A bee drinks the nectar in the interior of the open- petalled lotus'. Here, the boy does not know the meaning of the word मधुकर though he understands other words and terminations in the sentence. Similarly he learns the meaning of *Pika* as cucoo (कोकिल). Further, he learns the meaning of गौ (cow) after knowing the concommittance of a body with the contact of dew lap etc. (सास्नादि) being called as गौः (cow). So, *Siddha–Vyutpatti* (knowledge of an accomplished object) is produced at a later stage and not at the outset, This is supported by the *Kārikā* :

शक्तिग्रहं व्याकरणोपमान कोशाप्तवाक्याद्व्यवहारतश्च ।
वाक्यस्य शेषाद्विवृतेर्वदंति सान्निध्यतः सिद्धपदस्य वृद्धाः ।।

in which; other methods than व्यवहार ('give and take' etc.) are narrated for the first learning of thē language by the unlettered boy. But, it is supposed by the Pūrvapakshin that the other methods are also posterior to the *Kārya* method. No, says the *Siddhāntin*, a boy can learn the language directly without the

sense of कार्य as explained above (तथापि व्युत्पादिता (व्युत्पत्तिः) बालस्याप्युक्त विधया संभवत्येव ।) Further, how can the *Siddhavyutpatti* be derived from or depend upon *Kārya-Vyutpatti* ?

(किं च अस्याः व्युत्पत्तेरनंतरभावित्वेऽपि कार्यव्युत्पत्त्यधीनत्वं कुतः । कमलादिपदाना मुक्तरीत्या योग्यान्वितस्वार्थे एव व्युत्पत्त्युपपत्तेरिति । —Sudhā, P. 71:)

In the example, the meaning of Kamala (lotus) is got from suitable mutual contact (योग्यान्वित स्वार्थ) and not from *Kārya.* Thus, it is proved that *Siddha–Vyutpatti* is not impossibie and to postutate that the child learns the language by the process of 'give and take' transaction only, is to miss the working of child's psychology.

आनीयमानदृष्टचैव व्युत्पत्तेः संभवे सति ।
एष्यदानयनायाऽयं कुत एव प्रतीक्षते ।।

The child cannot be expected to undergo the elaborate tire-some procedure of observation, retention of the knowledge of a series of actions by elimination etc., and then decide the meaning of words in a sentence. There is economy of thought to think that the boy sees the transaction and understands the meaning without the intervention of कार्यव्युत्पत्ति.

(तत्र देवदत्तो गामानयति तव भ्राता अपूपानत्ति इति पदानां आनीयमानाद्यमानगवादिदर्शनेनैवोक्तरीत्या व्युत्पत्तिर्लघीयसी । वर्तमानत्वेन कालांतरभाव्यर्थप्रतीक्षाऽभावात् । तावत्पर्यंतं शब्दानुसंधानप्रयासाभावाच्च । —सुधा, P. 71.).

But, how to understand the meaning in a future tense ?

व्युत्पन्नो वर्तमाने तु क्रियाशब्दे भविष्यति ।
पुनर्दृष्टचैव शब्दश्रुत्पश्चाद्व्युत्पत्तिमेष्यति ।। —अनु.

The boy understands the sense of the sentence देवदत्तः गामानयति in the present tense and then in the case of गामानय (Bring the cow, meaning future action) he knows the meaning of the

injunction (लिङ्) in आनय by observation of the action as stated by the *Prābhākara*

(अयमर्थः । वर्तमानायां क्रियायां तदन्वितेषु चार्थेषु गामानयतीत्यादिपदानां संबंधं प्रथमतोऽवगच्छति । भविष्यत्क्रियायां तु पश्चात् आनयेत्यादिपदानां संबंधं जानाति त्वदुक्तरीत्यैवेति ब्रूमः । न तु सर्वथा तत्र व्युत्यभावं । अतो न काचिदनुपपत्तिः । —सुधा, P. 72.)

The Siddhantin's view of कार्यता

Then, *Siddhāntin* says that he does not rule out *Kārya Vyutpatti*, but he rejects the theory that the *Kārya Vyutpatti* is primary or first in all cases and the Siddha-vyutpatti is later and derived from the former. Further, in the case of *Kārya Vyutpatti*, it is impossible to know the future actions, since कार्य is limited to the present tense only whereas a thing which satisfies thc three requisites of व्युत्पत्ति (शब्दार्थ संबंध ज्ञान) namely, आकांक्षा, योग्यता and सन्निधि is directly grasped in the past and future times as in the present case.

(यस्माद्वर्तमानादिक्रमेण कालत्रयसंबंध्येव वस्तु आकांक्षासन्निध योग्यतायुक्तं च भवति । आकांक्षाद्युपेते एव च व्युत्पत्तिः । नह्यजिज्ञासितेऽर्थे प्रवृत्तिसहस्रदर्शनेऽपि व्युत्पद्यंते । —सुधा, P. 72.).

The Siddhāntin holds that the knowledge of future actions etc, is subsequent to the primary knowledge of the present action; for, he says that a thing which comes into being in future, आकांक्षा (desire to know) and प्रतीक्षा (Expectation) cannot be predicated now.

दृष्टया ज्ञानपदार्थस्य स्यादाकांक्षा भविष्यति ।
व्युत्पत्तिः प्रथमा तस्माद्वर्तमानेऽगते ततः ॥ –अनु.

So, there is nothing iucompatible in this argument. The objection that the function of words is to enjoin a person to and deter him from action and the *Śāstra* should serve this purpose (प्रवृत्ति निवृत्यौपयिकार्थत्व) and since Īśvara is *Siddha*, ān accom-

plished object, He is not capable of being enjoined or deterred, is also not sound. For, action (प्रवृत्ति) is not the principal object of the Vedas. Man wants happiness and removal of unhappiness or sorrow and not thc trammels of action which involve great hardships.

(पुरुषश्रेष्टावाप्तिमनिष्टनिवृत्तिं चापेक्षते । न प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती । क्लेशरूपत्वात् ।

इष्टमाकांक्षते सर्वो न प्रवृत्तिमपेक्षते ।
अपरोक्षं परोक्षं वा ज्ञानमिष्टस्य साधनं ॥

To attain this unmixed happiness, action is not the immediate cause: it is only the knowledge primarily of the thing desired and not the action (ज्ञानमेवेष्टावाप्तिसाधनं न प्रवृत्यादिकं !). We do not reject कर्म at all. It will be required for the production of knowledge.

क्वाऽपि चेष्टा तदर्था स्यात् अस्ति हि रसवित्तये ।
वाक्यार्थज्ञानमात्रेण क्वचिदिष्टं भवेदपि ॥ –अनु.

It is well-known that one eats and masticates food (प्रवृत्ति) to enjoy its taste (अत्तिश्चर्वणादिरूपा क्रिया रससाक्षात्काराय भवति). But the direct perception (अपरोक्ष) is known to bring about satisfaction and not indirect knowledge (परोक्ष) arising out of sense organs etc. How then is knowledge in general said to be the means to the acquisition of the desired object? In some cases, it is conceded that the indirect knowledge leads to desired result as for example the words पुत्रस्ते जातः. पिता ते राजा वर्तते इत्यादौ. 'a son is born to you', 'your father is the king'. The indirect knowledge produced by the words is known to bring satisfaction. The word मात्र in वाक्यार्थ ज्ञानमात्रेण does not exclude अनुमिति which is also परोक्षज्ञान. But in the present context of Brahma-jñāna from the Vedas (i. e. शब्द), अनुमिति is not relevent and so is countenanced in the discussion.

(यद्यपि अभिमतार्थानुमितिज्ञानमपीष्टसाधनं । तथापि प्रकृतानुपयो-

गात्तन्नोक्तम् । —सुधा, P. 73. वेदादिशब्दजन्यस्य साक्षात्काररूपस्य वा ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य वेह प्रकृतत्वात्तदनुपयोगादित्यर्थः । —परिमळ).

A question is posed here, The Mīmāṁsaka has described the Vedas as purporting to teach *Kārya* only. How can this be reconcild with the सिद्धव्युत्पत्ति of the Siddhāntin? Shri Jayatīrtha explains the position thus: There are two categories of *Mumukshus*: for some, Bhagavān is इष्ट and for others, इष्टसाधन. The first is by nature सात्विक and is intent on knowing the Creator God, To him, the benign Śruti explains the nature of God as a primary meaning of the Vedas. The person thus tutored desires to know and perceive the God, for which the Śruti prescribes certain spiritual exercises. The upāsanā (= exercises) can be effective only when the mental defects are extinguished by the performance of *Sat Karmas*. So, Śruti gives specific injunctions about *Karma*. Thus, *Karma* (*upāsanā*) and ज्ञान given in the Vedas are appropriate and meaningful in leading the person to happiness.

The person in the second category who regards भगवान् as इष्टसाधन is taught by the Śruti to perform कर्म and obtain ज्ञान of God as their principal object. Bhagavān is here इष्टसाधन subservient to the aim i.e. Mōksha, but is not अप्रधान as the performance of *Jyō:ishtoma* is for स्वर्ग i. e. heaven.

(1) यो हि सात्विक प्रकृतिः लोकप्रवादात् कार्यत्वादिलिंगानुसंधानाद्वा स्वतनुभवनादेः कर्तारं सामान्यतो जानन् स्नेह-माहात्म्यज्ञानाभ्यां तद्विशेष ज्ञानार्थमुत्कण्ठितमानसस्तत्संस्कारवशाच्चान्यदगणयन् वर्तते । तं प्रत्याप्तो बंधुरिवायं समस्तो वेदस्तत्स्वरूपं स्वप्रधानमेव प्रतिपादयति । ततो वाक्यार्थ ज्ञानादवाप्तपरमानंदस्तत्साक्षात्कारं कामयते । तं प्रति तदुपासना विधीयते । सा च प्रक्षीणांतःकरणमलस्यैव संभवतीति तदर्थ कर्मविधयः ।

(2) अथवा, यः सांसारिकविविधदुखं जिहासुः परमानंदं च प्रेप्सुस्तत्साधनं जिज्ञासते । तं प्रति परमेश्वर एव प्रसन्नः परमेष्ट

साधनतयोपदिश्यते । ततः कथमसौ प्रसीदतीत्यपेक्षायां तत्साक्षात्कारः तदंगतया कर्माणीत्युभयथा स्वप्रधान एव परमेश्वरः वेदार्थ इति । न च प्रयोजनशेषतया ईश्वरस्य अप्राधान्यं । प्रतिपत्तावपरार्थत्वात् । प्रतिपत्तेरेव प्रमाणफलत्वात् : —सुधा, P. 73.

Thus, Brahman is primarily tbe import of the Vedas and not secondary to Karma. The enquiry into the nature of Brahman is therefore reasonable and proper.

(एवमकार्यशेषतया स्वप्रधाने ब्रह्मणि वेदस्य प्रामाण्यसंभवात् युक्ता ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेत्युक्तम् । —सुध, P. 73.)

The Siddhāntin, as a compromise, concede to the view of the Pūrvapakshin (पूर्वपक्षिन्) that the Veda teaches Kārya. But in the Śrutis like सत्यं ज्ञानमनंतं ब्रह्मा आत्मानमुपासीत । describing the object of meditation viz. ब्रह्मन् and आत्मन्, ब्रह्मन् = आत्मन्, is an accomplished objest (सिद्ध) only. Hence in such cases, the Śruti can be said to deal with *Siddha-vastu* only. This shows that knowledge of an accomplished objeet *Siddha* from the Vedas cannot be rejected even by the Pūrvapakshin.

न च स्रुक् स्रुववन्ह्यादावतात्पर्यं श्रुतेर्भवेत् ।
यत्किंचित्करणस्यापि यज्ञतैवान्यथा भवेत् ॥ —अनु०.

In the Śruti teaching the performance of Karma (कार्यपरवाक्य) like यूपे पशुं बध्नाति । (He ties the animal to the sacrificial pillar, Yūpa) the meaning of *Yūpa* whieh is a सिद्धवस्तु (not कार्य) and is different from the pillar of usual worldly occurrence (अलौकिकत्वात्) has to be known. The Śruti describes the *Yūpa* as खादिरो यूपो भवति । यूपं तक्षति । यूपमष्टाश्रीकरोति. 'Yūpa is made of *Khadira* wood,' he cuts the wood into *Yūpa* and makes it octagonal = eight-edged! The object of कार्य in the *Vidhi-Vākyas* describing its characteristics, is an accomplished thing. Similarly the objects ladle, the oblation and fire in sacrifices which are described in the Veda are सिद्धवस्तु. These सिद्धवस्तु's cannot bu be said to be the import of the Vedas. Similarly, Brahman full

of all qualities and actions who is the object of the Upāsanā-Vākyas must be regarded as the meaning of the Vedas. In the upāsanā, the object cannot be false. In that case, it cannot yield any fruit at all as stated in the Sūtra ' न प्रतीके न हि सः ·

In the *Śruti*, आत्मेत्येवोपासीत, the use of the word इति does not render आत्मा the object of meditation as false as in the case of व्याकरणसूत्र, नवेति विभाषा where इति in the शब्दशास्त्र gives the contrary meaning as referring to its sense—not the word.

(इति शब्दो हि वैपरीत्ये वर्तते । नवेतिविभाषेति यथा शब्दप्रकरणे नवेति शब्दयोः विभाषा संज्ञायां वैपरीत्यवाचिना इति शब्देन तात्पर्यपरौ व्यवस्थाप्यते । तथेहाप्यर्थप्रकरणे श्रुतेनेतिशब्देन आत्मनः स्वरूपेणोपासना संबंधं निवार्य स्मृतिमात्रेण संबंधो ज्ञाप्यते । तत्कथमात्मसिद्धिर्वेदादितिचेन्नं । अत्र इति शब्दस्य प्रकारवाचित्वात् । —सुधा.)

This argument does not hold good here. The word इति has several meanings — इति हेतु प्रकरणप्रकारादि समाप्तिषु । —अमर. Here it means an aspect (प्रकार) and not प्रकरण (context) as शब्दप्रकरण and अर्थप्रकरण. The Śruti states that one should meditate upon Brahman as आत्मा. Here आत्मत्व is only an aspect (प्रकार).

तस्मादुपासनार्थं च स्वार्थे तात्पर्यवद्भवेत् ।
इति शब्दोन्नयेऽग्नावित्यप्युन्नीते स्मृतिर्भवेत् ॥
इति शब्दव्यपेतानि अपि संति वचांस्यलम् ।
आत्मानमेवेत्यादीनि योगेऽग्नावपि तत्समम् ॥ — अनु.

If the use of the word इति reverses the meaning as stated by the Pūrvapakshin, then in the passages अग्नौ जुहोति (where the word इति may be understood) the very object अग्नि would be false and the offering of oblation becomes impossible.

(अग्नौ जुहोतीत्यादावपि वैपरीत्यार्थे इति शब्दे योजिते अग्नेरपि स्वरूपेण होमान्वयो न स्यात् । किंतु स्मृतिमात्रेणेति । —सुधा, P, 73.

Here, the Pūrvapakshin says that इति is not found in अग्नौ जुहोति। So, अग्नि cannot be tāken as false. In that case, in the meditation passages like

आत्मानमुपासीत । ॐ इत्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत । आत्मानमेव लोकमुपासीत । where the word इति is not found, which are found in plenty, the object of meditation—आत्मा, उद्गीथ, अक्षर etc. cannot likewise be false. So, the argument of the opponent 'that the word इति used in proximity with आत्मा etc. renders the object unreal is quite contrary to usage and experience and so cannot be accepted.

One school of Advaitins argues as follows :—
There are two divisions in the Vēdas: one is कार्यनिष्ठ and the other ब्रह्मनिष्ठ.

(सत्यं कर्मनिष्ठो वेदस्तथापि न सर्वः । वेदांतास्तु परिनिष्ठितस्वरूपे ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणं. । अथातोधर्मजिज्ञासेति कार्यनिष्ठवेदभागे विचारितेऽपि वस्तुतत्वनिष्ठवेदांतविचाराय शारीरकमीमांसारंभः संभवतीति ।
—Sudhā, P. 74,)

This is not correct. This will introduce division of interest in the otherwise composite whole text of the Vedas,

एकवाक्यत्वयोगे तु वेदस्यापि ह्यशेषतः ।
वाक्यभेदो न युक्तःस्याद्योगश्च स्यान्महाफले ॥ — अनु.

The entire body of the Vedas has been explained above as referring to one object namely ब्रह्मज्ञान. कर्म described in the कर्मकाण्ड leading to *Brahma-Jñāna* only; with reference to the different grades of अधिकारिन्s. Hence, it is unsound and contrary to the import of the context to introduce the division as कार्यनिष्ठ and वस्तुतत्वनिष्ठ in the Vedas. Some writers pose a different view. According to them, कर्म is the principal teaching of the Vedas which leads to the knowledge of आत्मन् as different from देह (body) etc. There is no Īśvara at all. Others again state that the treatment of आत्मा in the Vedas which primarily teach कर्म,

is designed to bring to memory the gods who are subsidiary to Karma.

कर्मांगभूतदेवतानुस्मरणार्थमात्मप्रकरणमस्तु । —Sudhā, P. 74.

and the mention of fruit is to only praise कर्म (फलश्रुत्यादिकमर्थवादोऽस्तु ।. They observe :—

आत्मा ज्ञातव्य इत्येतन्मोक्षार्थं न तु चोदितम् ।
कर्मप्रवृत्ति हेतुत्वमात्मज्ञानस्य लक्ष्यते ।
विज्ञाते चाम्य पारार्थ्ये याऽपि नाम फलश्रुतिः ।
सार्ऽर्थवादो भवेदेव न स्वर्गादेः फलांतरम् ॥ —अनु,

It is replied that the Vedas have the highest fruit for the knowledge of ब्रह्मन् (आत्मा) and not for Karma which brings heaven of impermanent nature. The relationship of *Aṅga* and Aṅgi between Karma and the Ātmajñana can be explained as in the case of the sacrifices called प्रयाज etc., with the दर्शपूर्णमास having short-lived स्वर्ग (heaven) as its fruit.

The पूर्वपक्षिन् states that there is no word इति in the कर्म injunctions अग्नौ जुहोति etc whereas in the उपासनावाक्य it is found. Hence the object of the उपासना is false. So, on the analogy of the उपासनावाक्य, इति can be understood even in the *Karma-Kāṇḍa* and the charge of falsity of *Agni* cannot be cscaped. Further, in Karma-kāṇḍa, इति is specifically mentioned in the hymn

यज्ञा यज्ञा वो गिरा गिरा च दक्षसे ।
प्रप्रवयमृतं जातवेदसं प्रियं मित्रं च शंसिषम् ।

Here in place of गिरा गिरा, इरा इरा should be inserted and the hymn should be recited accordingly.

(न गिरा गिरेतिब्रूयात् । ऐरं कृत्वोद्गायेत् । इति वाक्यं पठ्यते । तथैव नवमाद्यपादांतेऽभिधानात् । —परिमळ)

Thus in the chapter (प्रकरण) on *Jyōtishṭōma*, the word इति is found near आहवनीय and अग्नि. So, they will have to be regarded as false. The passages describing Brahman in the context

of meditation should refer to meditation only and not to the nature of Brahman also. A sentence should convey one meaning only. If it is invested with more than one senses, it will be liable to the defect of गौरवदोष. So *Brahman* is not real in the meditation. In that case, says the *Siddhāntin*, the sacrifical texts speaking about यूप and आहवनीय should be regarded as referring to their import पशुबध and not to the *Yūpa* and *Āhavanīya* which on the above analogy should have io be treated as false and non-existing.

कल्पनागौरवं चेत्स्यात्पृथक्तात्पर्यकल्पने ।
कल्पनागौरवादेव पदार्थाः न स्युरेव हि ॥

So कल्पनागौरव cannot deny the existence of things which are proved otherwise to be anthentic. It cannot be argued that यूप, आहवनीय etc. are unproved by evidence. The meaning of the sentences यूपं तक्ष्णाति etc. is clear and conveys only a real object. Similarly also the passages of Brahman also convey Brahman who is known by evidence. Thus, both the imports viz., of the word and of the sentence can be conveyed by a passage and the sentence सत्यं ज्ञानमनंतं ब्रह्म denotes both Brahman and उपासना (meditation).

प्रमाणावगतत्वं चे त्तात्पर्याणां तथैव हि ।
नस्मात्पदार्थे वाक्यार्थे तात्पर्यममुभयत्र च ॥

The objector finds it difficult to accommodate two meanings in a sentencc like सत्यं ज्ञानमनंतं ब्रह्म. When सत्यत्व is predicated (विधानं) of Brahman, ज्ञानत्वं and अनंतत्व would be अनुवाद or *vice-versa*. Both cannot be admitted simultaneously. This difficulty is solved by the *Siddhāntin* by construing the sentence as conveying two separate senses. In the sentence गवा सोमं क्रीणाति which is an अनुवादवाक्य, अरुणया गवा is added (विधान), Further, उपाद्रेयत्व is predicated. The त्रिकद्वयविरोध is the defect of a sentence. To avoid this, पार्ष्णिकान्वय of the words in relationship of विशेषण and विशेष्य is admitted. (अरुणया एकहायन्या पिंगाक्ष्या गवा सोमं क्रीणाति।)

पृथगेव च वाक्यत्वं पृथगन्वयतो भवेत् ।
अवांतरत्वाद्वाक्यानां वाक्यभेदो न दूषणम् ॥

The division of meanings in a sentence will be a defect if the meanings are independent. If one is subordinate to the other, it is no defect at all (एकवाक्यत्वे संभवति स्वतंत्रवाक्यभेदकल्पनैव दोषो न त्ववांतर वाक्यभेदः ।). This is admitted by the पूर्वपक्षिन् also.

अंगीकृतत्वादपि तैः पदानां तु पृथक् पृथक् ।
क्रियापदेनान्वयस्य वाक्यभेदो हि दूषणम् ॥ –अनुव्या,

The Mīmāṁsakas have accepted महावाक्यभेद as a defect and not the difference of meaning in subsidiary sentences (महावाक्यभेद एव दोषो नावांतरवाक्यभेद इति ॥)

The passages like सत्यं ज्ञानमनंतं ब्रह्म do not convey their direct meaning derived from the words in it. ब्रह्मन् is predicated with आनंदत्व and अनंतत्व. This is contradictory to the status of Brahman who is none else than Jīva according to the Advaitin. (ब्रह्म च प्रत्यक्षादिसिद्धो जीवः । न च तस्यैतद्रूपत्वं प्रत्यक्षादिकं सहते । तेन तद्विपरीतोल्लेखनात् ॥ —Sudhā, P. 75.

To this it is replied :

प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधे तु गौणार्थस्यापि संभवान् ।
अतात्पर्यं पदार्थेऽपि न कल्प्यमविरोधतः ॥

The sentence सत्यं ज्ञानं erc. speaks of ब्रह्मन् who is different from जीव who is दुःखी, अल्पज्ञ etc. In तत्वमसि, the apparent meaning is contradictory to experience. It should be understood by सादृश्य as in अग्निर्माणवकः। that is, त्वं तत्सदृशोऽसि. There is absolutely no objection in admitting both अभिधावृत्ति and लक्षणावृत्ति in interpreting the Vedic words

अतो ज्ञानफलान्येव कर्माणि ज्ञानमेव हि ।
मुख्यप्रसाददं विष्णोर्जिज्ञासायाश्च तद्भवेत् ॥
कर्तव्या तेन जिज्ञासा श्रुतिप्रामाण्ययोगतः ॥ –अनु,

If जीव is stated to be *like* ब्रह्मन्, this also is contrary to experienc, for, the blissfulness and knowledge of Brahman is not experienced by the Jīva. But, it is replied that these qualities of the जीव are concealed by अविद्या or Ignorance and on its removal through ज्ञान and भक्ति and the grace of God, he will attain his natural attributes of Joy and knowledge according to his capacity, through जिज्ञासा.

Thus, the श्रुति is proved to be the sole evidence to prove the existence of Brahman. So, *Brahma–Jijñāsā* should be conducted for the reasons stated above. (सिद्धार्थपरत्वरूपं तृतीयमतः शब्दव्याख्यानं । —परिमळ.)

To this conclusion of the Siddhāntin, Pūrvapakshin (Buddhist) poses an objection. A word in general is not authentic (i, e. is not a means to right knowledge); what of special words, the Vedas? The words when uttered, do not necessārily yield correct knowledge. What is the object of *śabda*, if it is a Pramāṇa ? It (object) must be either sensuous or supersensuous. The Direct or sensuous is known by *perception* while the latter is conceived by *Anumāna* (Inference). What is the contact between word and its sense ? Is it तादात्म्य (identity), संयोग (conjunction) or समवाय (inseparableness)? If first, the mouth uttering the word *Fire* (अग्नि etc.) would have to be burnt. संयोग which is a quality (गुण), cannot abide in *śabda* which is also गुण. शब्द is the विशेष गुण of Ākāśa; and it cannot remain in other objects by समवाय.

शब्द (word) cannot be relied upon as an authority since it is known to mislead a person in cases like नदी तीरे पंचफलानि संति uttered by a cheat. To remove these and similar objections, the Āchārya establishes the authenticity and self-validity of the testimony of word and of the Vedas, in the Kārikā :—

प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवागमस्य हि ।
अनवस्थाऽन्यथा हि स्यादप्रामाण्यं ततोऽन्यतः ॥ —अनु.

CHAPTER 9

AUTHENTICITY AND THE VALIDITY OF THE VEDAS.

Shri Jayatīrtha explains this Kārikā in eight different ways, meeting the objections of the Pūrvapaksin in each case with stronger and unblemished arguments and clarifying the Siddhanta view with great precision and perspecuity. This discussion supplies the explanation of the word अतः in the Sūtra. This is the fourth explanation of 'अतः' the first three being : (1) Vouchsafing मोक्ष or liberation from the bondage of *Samisāra* through the knowledge and favour of God ; (2) The bondage, though real, can be cut asunder by God's grace (प्रसाद); (3) The Vedas treat primarily about the Siddha-Brahman. Now, the *Prāmāṇya* of the Vedas is established by showing that they are means to right knowledge and are स्वतः प्रमाण, in the *Kārikā*. 'प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं'

(अतः शब्दस्य.प्रयोजनसमर्थनाय कृत ज्ञानप्रसादद्वारा मोक्षफल-कत्वोक्ति तपरत्व-बंधसत्यत्वपरत्वरूपव्याख्यानाच्च वेदानां यथार्थज्ञान ज ा कत्वरूपं यत्प्रामाण्यं तदर्थकत्वरूपव्याख्यानांतरद्योतक इत्यर्थः ।)

—परिमळ P. 85

(1) The word (शब्द) is प्रमाण like perception (प्रत्यक्ष) and inference (अनुमान) and like them produces knowledge defferent from doubt and illusion or error. This is proved by the syllolygm.

शब्दः प्रमाणं संशयविपर्ययाजनकत्वे सति ज्ञानजनकत्वात् । प्रत्यक्षादिवत् । इति

The प्रामाण्य here means याथार्थ्य (यथावस्थितज्ञेयविषयीकारित्व) = Veracity or authenticity and is thus different from the major premises प्रामाण्य (i.e. साध्य) in the above अनुमान. So, there is no blemish of साध्याविशिष्टता, Śabda is a means to right knowledge.

(2) Here, a word uttered by the cheat or an honest person may not by itself be trustworthy. But when it is cognised and its contact with the sense is remembered, it is bound to produce correct knowledge like the sense-organs contacted with their respective objects in perception and the minor premises (हेतु) which is in intimate relation with their major premises (i.e. व्याप्ति) in अनुमान or inference, is known to exist in the पक्ष (पक्षधर्मता).

(तर्हि वयमपिब्रूमः न शब्दमात्रं प्रमाणं । किंतु श्रुतोऽनुस्मृत संबंधश्च । —Sudhā P. 76.) Thus, it cannot be argued that such a word is unauthentic, (श्रुतमनुस्मृतसंबंधं च शब्दं पक्षीकृत्य तादृशशब्दः न अप्रमाणं । प्रमाऽव्यमिचारित्वात् ।)

(3) The word has a separate field (scope) for its operation which is different from that of अनुमान.

परोक्षोऽपि स तादृशः कश्चिद्विषयो योनानुमानस्य विषय इति वक्ष्यामः —सुधा, P. 76. 'न विलक्षणत्व नये-नहि धर्मादि सिद्धिःस्यात्-इत्युत्तरवाक्ये । आसमंताद् गमयति धर्मधर्मी परं पदं । यच्चाप्यतींद्रियं त्वन्यत् । इत्युपासनापादे चेतिभावः । —परिमळः.

It may be noted that शब्द and अनुमान being परोक्षविषय cannot be grouped into *one category*. Just as, if an object is grasped both by the eye. (चक्षुः) and ear (श्रोत्रं) the eye and ear are not considered as one, for there are independent objects for both, similarly अनुमान and आगम have separate objects for their functioning and so they must be treated as two separate instruments of knowledge. And the argument that *Śabda* is अनुमान only, can be turned round and applied to prove that अनुमान is शब्द only, both being परोक्षविषय. The particle च in the Kārikā denotes that like अनुमान, शब्द is a (separate) प्रमाण.

(4) The argument शब्दः न प्रमाणं अविज्ञानात्मकवात्, is vitiated by असिद्धि for, the knowledge of the word is quite essential like लिंगपरामर्श in *Anumāna*. It is not mere word, that is प्रमाण as अनुमान unaided by the knowledge of its contact with the साध्य i.e.

व्याप्तिज्ञान and of its existence in *paksha* (i e. पक्षधर्मता) । cannot be a Pramāṇa.

(5) The knowledge of the word means the knowledge of the contact of the word with its sense. This contact is explained by some (*Tārkikas*) as पारमेश्वर संकेत (convention or will of the God) by Jaimini and others as the natural power of the word to express a thing

(स्वाभाविकः प्रत्याय्य-प्रत्यायकभावः तदुक्तं जैमिनिना । औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन संबंध इति । वक्ष्यतिचाचार्यः । नित्ययोगोऽपि शब्दानामर्थैर्नैव निषिद्ध्यते । —आनुमानिकपादे (परिमळः).

The पारमेश्वर संकेत is अस्माच्छब्दादयमर्थो बोद्धव्य इति । परमेश्वरेच्छारूपः । = "this word should convey this meaning".

The Āchārya calls this contact as an eternal conjunction of the word with its sense which cannot be denied. In that case, it is argued, even the unlettered person who does not know this relationship will have to know the meaning of the words which is against experience. *No*, it is replied. The contact, though existing, should be understood. Then only the word conveys its meaning

(एवं शब्दस्यापि सत्यप्यर्थेन स्वाभाविके संबंधे विदितसंबंधस्यैव बोधकत्वं नान्यथेति नियमात् ।)

शक्तिवाद —Sense-yielding capacity of a word

Has the word a capacity to convey all the senses or a respective word, a respective sense?

(स्वाभाविकोऽपि संबंधः किं सर्वेषां शब्दानां सर्वैरर्थैरुत कस्य चिच्छब्दस्य केन चिदर्थेन । नाऽऽद्यः । शब्दार्थव्यवस्थाऽनुपपत्ति प्रसंगात् । न द्वितीयः ऋष्यार्यम्लेंछानामपि नियमाभावप्रसंगात् । तथा हि……*Sudhā, P. 77*.)

Since it is found that the same word such as *Yava, Trivṛit*, is interpreted differently by the *Ṛishi, Āryas* and *Mleñchas*, there cannot be an eternal contact between the word and its sense. So, we have to modify the statement. There is, in addition to the natural power (स्वाभाविकी शक्तिः) a conventional capacity

(संकेत) also, so that in some cases the former (स्वाभाविक संबंध) yields a particular sense and in others the latter (संकेत) a different meaning (सांकेतिकत्वे तु अनियमो युज्यते । पुरुषेच्छाधीनत्वात् ।) Or in regard to both the meanings, the natural contact alone works. The usage determines the one in special circumstances, (अथवा उभयत्र स्वाभाविकी शक्तिरस्तु । व्युत्पत्तिवशाव्द्यवहारनियमसंभवात् (—P. 78), just as the eye under normal conditions grasps the shell as *shell*, but under the vitiating influences, the shell as a piece of silver.

(7) The only difference between प्रत्यक्ष and आगम in conveying the sense is that the former is guided by the legitimate contacts of संयोग — etc. whiie the latter in addition to that (a contact with the ear), is accompained by the संकेत or convention either of God or of human being.

(इयांस्तुविशेषः । शब्दः संकेतादपि प्रमापको नैवं चक्षुरादि । तेन संवादविसंवादोपपत्तिरिति ।) ।

(8) It is further argued that if human convention (संकेत) is more powerful and determines the usage, then, why admit the natural contact? The transactions of the elders वृद्धव्यवहार are also based on this संकेत only.

(तद्वरमस्तु संकेत एव । कृतमत्र स्वाभाविकेनापि संबंधेन । तन्मात्रादेव प्रयोगप्रतिपत्तिव्यवहाराणामुपपत्तेः । सुधा, P. 78.)

It may, however, be observed that without natural contact, how can a human convention be deemed to exist and how can a thing be pointed out by finger and expressed by word

(नन्वयं संकेत एव केषांचिच्छब्दानामसति स्वाभाविकार्थसंबंधे न शक्यः कर्तुं । निर्दिश्य हि अर्थं ब्रूयादयमस्माद्बोद्धव्य इति । तस्मात्संकेतकरणमेव स्वाभाविक संबंधं प्रतिपादयति शब्दानां ।) *Ibid*, P. 78

Here, it is stated that the highly evolved souls like the *Ṛishis* and Gods who know the will of God, directly assign a meaning to the word without having to point out the object, which implies the existence of natural contact.

(सर्गादौ जातान् महर्षिप्रभृतीन् प्रति प्रत्यक्षेण दृष्टार्थे संकेतःसुकर एव । तत्र शब्देन निर्देशानपेक्षणादिति भावः । —परिमळः P. 87.

If, then, there is no natural contact, how can a particular word be stated to be pure and the others impure by the grammarians? According to one's whims (संकेत), all the words would be pure or impure? The reply is, the Grammarians are guided by the God's convention and to preserve it the Grammers were written by them. And to preserve it accrues merit. Then, how to account for the difference in the usage of *Ṛishi*, *Ārya*. *Mlēñchhas*? Further, God's convention is indicated by the usage only. Then, usage alone would do, why accept the convention of the God. Even वृद्धव्यवहार = usage of the elders implies the existence of earlier conventions. Thus, there is no end to this chain of conventions in either case. This discussion is concluded by the verdict that in addition to the subsidiary causes like human convention and वृद्धव्यवहार, it is to be admitted that there exists a capacity which cannot be grasped by the senses.

(किं स्वरूप सहकारि व्यतिरिक्तातींद्रियशक्तिः क्वापि नांगीक्रियते । उत शब्दे एव । आद्ये वक्ष्यामः । द्वितीये अधुनातनास्तावत् न संकेतयितारः इति तवाऽपि संमतं । न च लोकोत्तरे संकेतयितरि प्रमाणमस्ति । तथा च स्वभाव एवायं शब्दानामिति गम्यते । —*Sudhā*, P. 79.

This composite group of causes can explain the variety of cases mentioned above. Thus, it is proved that a word has a natural contact with the sense and so it can convey a correct sense.

(तदेवं शब्दस्यार्थसंबंधसंभवान्नाऽप्रामाण्यं । – *Sudhā*, P. 79.)

This subject is discussed at length in the Sudhā pp. 76–79, to which the readers' attention is drawn. See also the Tarkatāṇḍva where the view of संकेत is refuted.

(प्रपंचितमेतत्संकेतपक्षखंडनं तर्कतांडवे द्वितीयपरिच्छेदे —परिमळ)

(8) The objection that the word utterd by a cheat is untrust-worthy and how can the Vedas — a group of words —

be trusted? Just as the sense organs like eye etc. (प्रत्यक्षवत्) are capable of producing correct and incorrect knowledges according as they are not or are affected by defects, similarly the word under normal and abnormal conditions yields different meanings (संवाद or विसंवाद)

To avoid the charges advanced above, some thinkers (*Vaiśeshikas*) consider the Vedas as अनुमान whereas others distinguish between the unhuman (अपौरुषेय) and human speeches (पौरुषेय): the former as आगम and the latter as अनुवान These two views are not acceptable since the word like *Pratyaksha* and *Anumāna* is a self-evident means of right knowledge.

तदुभयमप्यतएवायुक्तं । किंतु प्रत्यक्षवदनुमानवच्च शब्दस्यापि प्रामाण्यं स्वतःस्त्वेनैव रूपेण न तु अनुमानत्वेन । अत एव श्रुतेः प्रकृतत्वेपि सर्वशब्दपरिग्रहाय आगमस्येत्युक्तं । P. 79.

Thus, The Siddhāntin has established the authenticity of Śabda as प्रमाण by establishing the natural contact between it and the sense with its distinctive character to distinguish between the words of an honest person and a cheat and its separateness from inference (अनुमान),

(ननु तथापि शब्दस्यार्थेन स्वाभाविकसंबंधे अनाप्तवाक्याद्विशेषे च सत्यप्यनुमानाद्बहिर्भावेपि । —परिमळः P. 88.)

From this, it is deduced that the Vedas – a special type of words are likewise a *Pramāṇa*. But this is objected to by the *Pūrvapakshin*, who does not accept the Vedas as *Pramāṇa*. He advances a number of arguments to condemn its validity, of which the following few may be mentioned here :—

The Vedas tell false-hoods and contain self-contradictions and repetitions. This is not correct. The अनृतत्व, व्याघात and पुनरुक्ति do not affect the reliability of the Vedas, since these flaws are considered as arising through the faulty interpretations of the Vedas. The Vedas are one complete unwritten literature and there can be no half-truths in them. They must be either

wholly true or wholly untrue, Since it is admitted that they are unwritten (अपौरुषेय) and not sullied by human defects, they should naturally be deemed as not unreliable (not अप्रमाण). But how to prove their validity (प्रामाण्य). This has to be proved

(ननु अस्तु एवं वेदस्य अप्रामाण्यपरिहारः। प्रामाण्यं तु कुतः। न हि अप्रामाण्य प्रतिक्षेपएव प्रामाण्यं। घटादावभावात्। इति। ज्ञानकारणस्य सतः अप्रामाण्ये निरस्ते स्वत एवेति ब्रूमः। तदिदमुक्तमागमस्येति। —सुधा, P. 80.)

स्वतः प्रामाण्य of the Vedas

The self validity of the Vedas becomes obvious when the doubts about validity are removed. This is done in the couplet.

प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवागमस्य हि।
अनवस्थाऽन्यथा हि स्यादप्रामाण्यं तथाऽन्यतः॥ —अनुव्या.

To those who admit the self-validity of प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान and do not concede the same to the testimony of *word* or *Śabda*, t is proved by citing प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान as examples (दृष्टांत) Those who do not accept the self-validity of the *Pramāṇas* in general and likewise doubt the same in regard to आगम (word) are taught to revise their opinion and accept the आगम along with प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान as self-valid. This topic assumes great importance in the study of epistemology of Indian Philosophy and should be examined critically with minute analysis of the problems involved in it. The प्रामाण्यस्वतस्त्व has been discussed and studied in detail in the प्रमाणपद्धति, विष्णुतत्वनिर्णय, तर्कताण्डव and other polemical treatises on Dvaita Vēdānta. Here, we give only a brief account of the problem from the *Sudhā* in the following paragraphs. The discussion is started in the Sudhā with the question,

ननु किमिदं प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वं? । उच्यते । प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः तज्जनितं विज्ञानं च प्रमाणं । तत्र ज्ञानस्य यायार्थ्य

लक्षणं प्रामाण्यं तस्य ज्ञानजनक (सामग्री) मात्राधीन जन्मत्वं स्वतस्त्वं। करणानां च ज्ञानजननशक्त्यैव तद्याथार्थ्य जनकत्वं स्वतस्त्वं। तथा ज्ञान गतयाथार्थ्यस्य ज्ञानग्राहकमात्रग्राह्यत्वं स्वतस्त्वं । करणानां तु ज्ञप्तौ स्वतस्त्वं नांगीक्रियते तत्स्वरूपस्य यथायथं प्रत्यक्षादिवेद्यत्वात् । यथार्थ ज्ञानजनकत्वस्य अनुमानवेद्यत्वात् । अथवा तेषामपि ज्ञानजनकत्वं येन गृह्यते तत एव यथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वस्य तदीयस्य ग्राह्यत्वं स्वतस्त्वमिति । —सुधा P. 40.

What is the self-validity of the Pramāṇa? To know this, we must define what *Pramāṇa* is and what self-validity (स्वतस्त्व) means, The Pramāṇa is divided into *Kēvala Pramāṇa* and *Anu-pramāṇa*. The Kēvala-pramāṇa is right knowledge and Anu-pramāṇa is its instruments or causes: *Pratyaksha* (sense organs), *Anumāna* (Linga = हेतु = minor premises) and Āgama (word). Thus, to cover both the divisions, it is stated

प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः तज्जनितं विज्ञानं च प्रमाणं ।

Sense organs, minor premises and word and the knowledge produced by them are 'evidences'.

The प्रत्यक्ष is the unblemished sense-organs (निर्दोषेंद्रिय) contacted with their respective objects free from defects अतिदूरत्व, अतिसामीप्य, चाकचक्य etc. The defects of the sense-organs are jaundice, cataract etc. (काचकामलादि). The Anumāna is defined as निर्दोषोपपत्तिः। "The reason or हेतु free from its defects असिद्धि. व्यभिचार, बाध, सत्प्रतिपक्ष and विरोध. The unblemished word is the आगम, (निर्दोषः शब्दः). The defects of words are: intimating what is already known (ज्ञात ज्ञापकत्वं), lack of Expectancy (आकांक्षाविरहः) want of concordance योग्यता विरहः = प्रमाणबाधः and non-proximity सन्निध्यभावः = not being in close proximity.

Thus, the right knowledge (Kēvala-pramāṇa) and its instruments (अनुप्रमाण) are covered by the definition याथार्थ्यं = साक्षात् परंपरया वा यथावस्थितज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वं. "Comprehension of the object (of knowledge) *as it is* directly or indirectly". Here साक्षात् refers to ज्ञान i.e. Kēvala-pramāṇa and परंपरा to the sense organs, though both have direct contacts with the objects.

The distinction between केवलप्रमाण and अनुप्रमाण is explained lucidly by Shri Rāghavendratirtha in his commentary *Bhāvadīpa* on Pramāṇapaddhati as follows :—

ज्ञानविषय एव हि करणानां विषयः । न हि किमप्यविषयी कुर्वंत्येतानि तज्ज्ञानं जनयंति । नाऽप्यन्यविषयाणि । अतिप्रसंगात् । केवलं विषयस्य ज्ञेयतां ज्ञानोपाधितया । करणानि तु तज्जनकतया संपादयंतीत्येतावन्तं विशेषमाश्रित्य केवलानुप्रमाणभेदः समर्थितः ।

That is, a thing becomes an object of knowledge *directly* in *Kevalapramāṇa* whereas it becomes so through the sense-organs which produce the knowledge, in *Anupramāṇa*. But the 'objectness' of the thing is the same in both the cases.

Now the question arises. How to know that this knowledge is valid. Is it to be proved separately? This validity should be first produced in the knowledge and then it should be known as such. This is called उत्पत्तौ प्रामाण्यस्वतस्त्वं and ज्ञप्तौ प्रामाण्यस्वतस्त्वं respectively. When the knowledge is produced by the sense-organs in *Pratyaksha* (प्रत्यक्ष), by 'hētu' or Anumāna in अनुमान and by word or *śabda* in आगम, it is produced along with its validity. That is, its validity need not be proved by other evidences. This is उत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वं (ज्ञानजनकमात्राधीनजन्यत्वं –परिमळ).

Similarly, the knowledge of the first knowledge as true which is called by the *Naiyayikas* as अनुव्यवसाय (e.g. घटज्ञानवानहं) is self-valid. That is, its प्रामाण्य is known along with the knowledge that grasps it. This is known as ज्ञप्तौ प्रामाण्यस्वतस्त्व. This explanation holds good with regard to the knowledge that is produced by the अनुप्रमाण (जन्यज्ञान) and not to the eternal knowledge (नित्यज्ञान) of God Vishṇu and His consort Lakshmī (न चेदं नित्यज्ञानप्रामाण्येऽव्याप्तमिति वाच्यम् । तज्जनितं च ज्ञानप्रामान्यमिह विवक्षितमिति प्रागुक्ततया जन्यज्ञानप्रामाण्यस्यैवेह लक्ष्यत्वात् । —Parimaḷa P. 88.)

Similarly, the *Karaṇas* or the instruments of right knowledge have to be known as possessed of the capacity to produce right knowledge only from their capacity to produce the knowledge in general. Their knowledge—producing capacity is enough to charge them with the capacity to produce right knowledge only. This is known as करणानां प्रामाण्यस्य उत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वं. But, the knowledge of the करणप्रामाण्य i.e. the authenticity of the sources (ज्ञप्तौ प्रामाण्यस्वतस्त्वं). is not produced by the knowledge of the करण्s. For, the करण्s are known by the various means whereas their veracity in not known by them. The above points are briefly set forth in the Sudhā as follows :—

तत्र ज्ञानस्य याथार्थ्यलक्षणं प्रामाण्यं तस्य ज्ञानजनक (सामग्री) मात्राधीनजन्यत्वं स्वतस्त्वं । यथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वस्य अनुमानवेद्यत्वात् । Sudhā, P. 80.

See also यादुपत्य :– इन्द्रियाणामतींद्रियत्वेन अनुमानवेद्यत्वात् । लिंगशब्दयोस्तज्ज्ञानयोर्वा प्रत्यक्षवेद्यत्वादित्यर्थः । अनुमानवेद्यत्वादिति। कारणत्वस्य अन्वयव्यतिरेकगम्यत्वादिति भावः ।

If the self-validity of the knowledge in उत्पत्ति and ज्ञप्ति is not conceded, it will lead to an endless chain of arguments. (अनवस्था) which would leave the problem in doubt. (अनवस्थाऽन्यथा हि स्यात् । – अनुव्याख्यान ।) It is the साक्षिन् which receives or grasps the knowledge and decides its validity simultaneously. That will cut asunder the further endless queries. साक्षिन् is a powerful natural sense-organ with wonderful powers to grasp the knowledge, judge its authenticity and stamp it as right knowledge.

(ननु स्वतः प्रामाण्येऽपि कथं नानवस्था । इत्थं । साक्षी खलु वृत्तिज्ञान ग्राहकः । स एव च तत्प्रामाण्यं गृह्णातीति तस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं । स च स्वप्रकाशः स्वप्रामाण्यमपि गृह्णातीति तस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं । तस्य यथार्थत्व नियमान्नाहार्यं संशयविषयत्वमपीति) । —Sudhā, P, 81,

Thus, the Vedas and their knowledge are self-valid. This argu-

ment cannot be applied to the words of Buddha and Arhat. For, they are contrary to the contents of the Vedas.

(ननु यदि याथार्थ्यं उत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च स्वतः स्यात् । तर्हि बौद्धादिवाक्य जनितमपि ज्ञानं प्रमाणं स्यात् । अस्ति हि तत्र ज्ञानहेतुः । अन्यथा ज्ञानमपि न स्यात् । तथा प्रमाणतया ज्ञायेत । ज्ञानग्राहकसद्भावात् । अस्तु तदपि प्रमाणमिति चेत् । तस्य वेदविरोधित्वात् । वेदविरोधिनः प्रामाण्ये पुनर्वेद प्रामाण्यं न स्यात् । वस्तुनो द्वैरूप्यं चाऽऽपद्येतेति सर्वथा मीमांसानुपपत्तिरित्यत आह । अप्रामाण्यमिति । —Sudha. P. 81.)

It may be observed here that the इन्द्रिय (प्रत्यक्ष), अनुमान and आगम do not produce right knowledge *as a rule*, though they are a means to right knowledge, For, when they come under the influence of defects, the knowledge produced by them becomes vitiated and unreliable. The defects have a power to distort the normal course and produce quite a contrary result.

नाऽयं नियमो यज्ज्ञानकारणमिंद्रियं लिंगं शब्दो वा प्रामाण्यमेवो त्पादयतीति । किं नामेंद्रियादीनामौत्सर्गिकी शक्तिःप्रामाण्यजनने दोषारवादादप्रामाण्यमपि जनयत्येव । दोषाणां सहजशक्तिप्रतिबंधेन विपरीतकार्यजननसामग्रीनिवेशात् : तर्हि दोषाभावः प्रामाण्यस्य कारणमित्यायातमिति चेन्न । तथा सति उत्सर्गापवादयोः क्वाऽप्यभाव प्रसंगात् । तथा न ज्ञानग्राहकस्य साक्षिणोऽयं नियमः यत्प्रमाणतयैव गृण्हातीति । किं तु प्रवृत्त्यसामर्थ्यादिनाऽपवादकस्य सद्भावेऽप्रामाण्यमपि गृण्हात्येव । औत्सर्गिकत्वात्प्रमाणस्वतस्त्वंस्येति । —सुधा, P. 81.

The साक्षी (Sākshi) which sits in judgment over the knowledges, ratifies their validity so long as its function is not obstructed by the detracting factors the defects or दोषs. The un-authenticity or un-reliability of a knowledge is understood by the Sākshin, through its inherent power, as such a knowledge is produced under abnormal conditions of misunderstanding, deceitfulness or incapacity of the *Karaṇas*. instruments of knowledge. i.e., प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान and आगम. Since the अप्रामाण्य is due to extraneous causes (परतः), the words of Buddha and Arhat, are unreliable, being opposed to the Vedic teaching. It may be asked why then the Vedas themselves should not be unreliable and अप्रमाण? It is replied that the Vedas are अपौरुषेय and are not prone to the influences of human defects or ignorance, error or deceitfulness.

मिथ्याज्ञानप्रलंभादेस्तेन वेदविरोधि यत्
न मानमपि वेदानामंगीकार्या हि नित्यता ॥ —अनुव्या.

(अत्र नित्यताशब्देन अपौरुषेयता विवक्षिता ।
नित्यताया बौद्धागमेष्वपि सत्वात् । —सुधा, P. 81.)

Thus, the self-validity of the Vedas is established and the enquiry into Brahman is just and proper.

इति वेदप्रामाण्यसमर्थनम् ।

वेदापौरुषेयत्ववादः

What is Veda? How can it be an unwritten word? (ननु कोऽयं वेदः । किं च तस्यापौरुषेयत्वं । —Sudhā) This query should be answered properly without which the foregoing discussion would be meaningless

The Vedas are a group of letters (वर्णs) in a specific order unchanged from age to age and untampered by any human or unhuman agency. Their verbal order and sense are unchanged, unlike the order of the letters in the *Purāṇas*, which are written by God Vēdavyāsa. The God teaches the Vēdas first to his son four-faced Brahmā in accordance with the order that existed in them in the previous Yuga — thus going back to a beginningless time.

(क्रमविशेषविशिष्टवर्णाः वेदः । तस्य नियतैकप्रकारत्वमपौरुषेयत्वं । स्वतंत्रपुरुषपूर्वकत्वाभाव इति यावत् । Sudha, P. 81. वर्णानां नित्य सर्वगतानां स्वतः क्रमस्यायोगेन उच्चारणादि क्रियाधटितत्वेनैव वाच्यत्वात् । तस्य चाऽध्येतृपुरुषजन्यत्वादिति भावेन प्रश्नः । **किं च तस्या**

पौरुषेयत्वमिति ॥ नियतैकप्रकारत्वं प्रागुक्तदिशा नित्यभूतबौद्धागमादिष्वप्यस्तीत्य तो व्यनक्ति । **स्वतंत्रेति** । आधुनिकाध्यापकेन स्वबुद्धिस्थ पूर्वपूर्वदिवसीय क्रमानुसारेणोत्तरोत्तरदिवसेष्विवेश्वरेणापि स्वबुद्धिस्थ प्रवाहानादि पूर्व पूर्वकल्पीय क्रमानुसारेणैवोत्तरोत्तर कल्पेष्वपि वेदस्य उच्चरितत्वेन पुराणादिक्रमे इव वेदक्रमे स्वातंत्र्याभावात्स्वतंत्रपुरुष पूर्वकत्वाभाव इत्युक्तम् । —परिमळ, P. 90.)

The order of words and letters in the Veda is permanent and eternal. God repeats or recites them in the order etc. that existed in the previous *Yugas* and rested in his *Buddhi* (mind) which is intermittant and eternal.

Such a formidable piece of evidence as the Vedas, has to be admitted, as the source of knowledge i.e. authority, as otherwise, virtue, sin, heaven and hell etc., cannot be proved to exist. Without an undoubted evidence, how can a *Chārvāka* an atheist, be convinced of their existence. Neither *Pratyaksha* nor *Anumāna* and Paurusheya Āgama (human speech or even God's words) can know them. God is excluded because His existence has to be proved by the Vedas only. (वेदैप वेद्य.) The unhuman character (वेदापौरुषेयत्व) has been beautifully set forth in the Sudhā while commenting on the *Anuvyākhyāna* :

न हि धर्मादिसिद्धिः स्यान्नित्यवाक्यं विना क्वचित् ।
अविप्रलंभस्तज्ज्ञान तत्कृतत्वादयोऽपि च ।
कल्प्या गौरवदोषेण पुंवाक्यं ज्ञापकं न तत् ॥

—अ. व्या.

"अस्ति तावद्धर्माधर्मस्वर्गनरकादिकं सर्व वादि संप्रतिपन्नं । यस्तु तन्नांगीकरोति चार्वाकस्तं प्रत्युपपादयिष्यमाणत्वात् । तच्च प्रमाणोपेतं वस्तुत्वात् घटवत् । न हि विना प्रमाणेन धर्माधर्मादिसिद्धिविनिश्चयः सर्ववादिनां भवितुमर्हति । अतिप्रसंगात् । तदेवं सामान्यतः सिद्धं प्रमाणं न तावत्प्रत्यक्षं । तद्धि वाह्यं मानसं वा स्यात् । न तावद्वाह्यं । तस्य रूपादिमति द्रव्ये तत्समवेत गुणकर्मसामान्येष्वेव प्रवर्तमानत्वात् । नाऽपि मानसं । सुखादिवत् धर्मादावनुभवानुव्यवसायात् । अन्यथा सुखमनुभवामीतिवत् धर्ममनुभवामीति स्यात् । स्वर्गादीनां तु विप्रकृष्टत्वात् न प्रत्यक्षगोचरता । न च योगादिसिद्धानां प्रत्यक्षमस्मदादीद्रियार्थविषयमिति वाच्यं । तेन तेषां कथंचिद्धर्मादिसिद्धावपि अस्माकं तन्निश्चयोपायाभावात् । न ह्यन्यप्रत्यक्षेणान्यस्य निश्चयः अनुष्ठानं वा संभवति । नाऽप्यनुमानं । तत्प्रतिबद्धलिंगाभावात् । सामान्यतो दृष्टेन कथंचित्स्वरूपमात्रसिद्धावपि साधनफलसंबंधरूपस्तद्विशेषोऽनुष्ठानयोग्यो नानुमातुं शक्यः । न हीदृशयज्ञदानादिभिरुपजनितो धर्मः फलमीदृशं जनयत्तीत्यादयः सूक्ष्मतराः विशेषाः सर्ववादिभिरनुष्ठीयमाना. शक्यानुमानाः । वाक्यमपि न पौरुषेयं धर्मादिनिश्चयाय भवति । पुरुषाणामज्ञानसंशयविप्रलंभापटुकरणत्वस्य बहुलमुपलंभेन धर्माद्युपदेष्टर्याश्वासानुपपत्तेः । तदेवमपौरुषेय वाक्यं बिना धर्मादि निश्चयासंभवात्सामान्यसिद्धि परिशेषाश्यामपौरुषेयं किमपि वाक्यं धर्मादि प्रतिपादकं अस्तीति सर्ववादिभिरभ्युपेयमिति ।
—Sudhā, P. 81–82.

The extra sensuous objects like. धर्म, अधर्म cannot be known by *Pratyaksha* or *Anumāna*. Human word also is liable to err and cannot grasp them. So, the unhuman word i.e. the Vedas have to be admitted as a proof or evidence for these extra sensuous objects. Thus, by the general reasoning and the process of elimination, the un-human character (अपौरुषेयत्व) of the Vedas has been established.

The Buddhists and other similar opponents argue that the founder of their respective religions perceives and knows the extra-sensuous objects like Dharma etc. and no unhuman speech need be accepted. Buddha, it is replied, cannot be an आप्त. For the requisite characteristics of an *Āpta.* cannot be known or proved in him :

वक्तव्यार्थतत्वज्ञानं विप्रलंभाभावो विवक्षा करणपाटवं चेत्येतत्खलु आप्तत्वं नाम । न चैताः परचित्तवृत्तयोऽस्माकमध्यक्षाः । नाऽपि तथा अनुमानं प्रवर्तते । वाक्यं तु पौरुषेयमुक्तानुपपत्तिग्रस्तं । अपौरुषेयं तु

नांगीक्रियते । अतः केवलमविप्रलंभादयः क्वचित्पुंसि कल्प्या एव । न चाऽऽप्तत्व कल्पनामात्रेणास्य विवक्षितवाक्यस्य तत्प्रणीतत्वं सिद्धयति । अतः क्वचिद्वाक्ये तत्प्रणीतत्वमपि कल्प्यमेव । यस्मादेवं तत्तस्मात्कल्पना गौरवदोषेण पुरुषवाक्यं न धर्मादिनिश्चायकं । —सुधा, P. 82

This argument holds good about the founders of other religions such as *Ārhata*. The theist (Naiyāyika) who believes in the existence of God steps in and says that Īśvara knows *Dharma*, and *Adharma*. Where is the neoessity for the अपौरुषेरुवेद?

(स्यादेतदेवं यदि बुद्धादीन् पक्षीकृत्यानुमानं । ईश्वरवादिनं प्रति तु कथं । ईश्वरो हि तनुभवनादीनां कार्यत्वेन कर्ता सिध्यन् सर्वज्ञ एव सिद्धः । यथा चेश्वरपक्षीकारेणासर्वज्ञता साधनेऽपि नाऽऽश्रयासिद्धि- धर्मिग्राहकविरोधौ तथाऽऽचार्य एव शास्त्रयोनित्वसूत्रे वक्ष्यति । तदेव धर्मादिसिध्यन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्याऽपौरुषेयं वाक्यं किमपि सर्वैर्वादिमिरभ्युपे यमिति स्थितं । तच्चापौरुषेयं वाक्यं वेद एव । परिशेषात् । तदतिरि क्तानि हि कर्तृप्रसिद्धमंति । —सुधा, P 83.

An Āpta-Vākya (words of an Āpta) is reliable only if it conforms to the Vedic teachings and so ultimately the Vedas alone, which are well known as "unwritten" (अकर्तृक) are competent to explain and deal with the extra-sensuous objects. Since the *Varṇas* ((letters) comprising the Vedas are *Nitya*, the Vedas are Nitya or अपौरुषेय. This point is fully elucidated in the *Tatva-Nirṇaya* (and Tīkā) and Tarka-Tāṇdava, I. *Parichhēda*. If, as *Chārvāka* holds, Dharma and Adharma are not admitted, there will be chaos and disorder leading to mutual destruction. So, the authority of the Vedas must be admitted by all the thinkers, as self. evident

(तदेवं अपौरुषेयत्वाद्वेदस्य कर्तृदोषमूलत्वाभावेन स्वत एव प्रामाण्यमिति सिद्धम् । —Sudha, P. 85.

CHAPTER 11

शक्तिवादः

SENSE-YIELDING CAPACITY (continued).

Previously, an objection was raised that since a word could not be contacted with its sense, it cannot be a denoter of the sense or object (बोधक). How can the Vedas a group of words be considered as *Pramāṇa* and *Svataḥ - Pramāṇa* in as much as they cannot produce any sense ?

यद्यपि जिज्ञासा सूत्रावतारिकायां वेदापौरुषेयत्वे किं च शब्दस्यैव प्रामाण्यं दुर्घटं अर्थसंस्पर्शशून्यत्वात् । वाक्यार्थप्रत्यायन प्रकारानिरूपणा- दित्यादि चोद्यमुक्तं तद्विवृण्वन् शक्ति श्चेत्येतदवतारयति । ननु तथाऽपी त्यादिना । —परिमळ, P. 91.

The Veda is stated to be an authentic evidence. What is the sense of the Vedas? Is it the sense of the words or of the sentences comprised by them, that is authentic ? To understand the sense of words, the contact between the word and its sense which is व्युत्पत्ति (व्युत्पत्तेर्वाच्यवाचकभावे संबंध ज्ञानरूपत्वात् ।) must first be known. In the preliminary process only, the antecedent (पदार्थ) is known. न तावत्पदार्थेषु । तेषां प्रागवग- तत्वात् । —*Sudhā*. Where then is the necessity of the Vedas? There will be a defect of ज्ञातज्ञापकत्व = teaching what is already known. Further it cannot be an evidence for वाक्यार्थ.

(नाऽपि वाक्यार्थे प्रमाणं । तद्बोधजननोपायाभावात् ।)

How to know the Vākyārtha without the knowledge of the words comprising the sentence. Further, the constituents of the *Padas* Viz., प्रकृति + प्रत्यय + संबंध should be known to have the knowledge of the Padas Thus, the sense of the sentence depends upon the knowledge of these constituents which cannot

be known. Thus, the Vedas cannot be regarded as the instruments of correct knowledge i. e. Pramāṇa.

अतो अनियतनिमित्तकत्वादौत्प्रेक्षिक एव वाक्यार्थबोध इत्यप्रामाण्यं वेदस्येत्यतः आह । शक्तिश्चेति ।

शक्तिश्चैवान्विते स्वार्थे शब्दानामनुभूयते ।
अतोऽन्विताभिधायित्वं गौरवं कल्पनेऽन्यथा ।
न चाऽशक्त्याभिधायित्वं प्रवृत्तिश्च द्विधान्यथा ॥

Shri Jayatīrtha explains the problem thus—

'अयमर्थः । वृद्धव्यवहारादिना हि शब्दशक्त्यवधारणं । न च पदार्थ स्वरूपमात्रे व्यवहारादिकं युज्यते । किं तु पदार्थांतरान्विते । अतो व्यवहारादिना शब्दशक्तिमवधारयताऽर्थांतरान्वित एव स्वार्थोऽनुभूयते इत्यंगीकरणीयं । यद्यपि एकस्मिन् प्रयोगे गौरानयनान्विता प्रतीयते अपरस्मिन् बंधान्वितोऽन्यस्मिश्च दर्शनान्वितः इति पदार्थांतर तदन्वय व्यभिचारः । तथाप्य व्यभिचारिणि योग्येतरान्विते स्वार्थे शक्तिग्रहणमुपपद्यते एव । न हि विशेषाणां व्यभिचारेण त्यागे सामान्यस्याव्यभिचारिणो निर्निबंधनस्त्यागो युज्यते । यत एवं व्युत्पत्ति सममेऽन्विते एव स्वार्थे शब्दानां शक्तिरनुभूयते अतोऽन्वितस्वार्थाभिधायित्वं शब्दानामभ्युपेयं । शक्तिग्रहणानुरोधित्वादभिधानस्य । यदा च पदैरेव अन्वितस्वार्थं प्रतिपादनं तदा वाक्यार्थ एवावबुद्ध इति कथं तद्बोधस्य निर्निबंधनता । गुणप्रधानभावेनान्योन्यान्विताः पदार्थाः वा तदन्वयो वा वाक्यार्थ इति प्रामाणिकैरंगीकृतत्वात् । इति । अथ पदानामित्यनभिधाय शब्दानामिति वदता प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोरप्यन्विताभिधान सामर्थ्यं सूचितम् । —*Sudhā*, P. 86.

The words have the power of yielding a meaning after being construed with other relevent words. (अतोन्विताभिधायित्वं शब्दानामभ्युपेयम् ।) The sense of the sentence is accordingly grasped on the same principle of योग्येतरान्वितस्वार्थ बोधकत्व.

अभिनव सामान्यान्विताभिधानवाद

Here, the auther examines the other views about शक्ति (Sense-yielding capacity) and finally concludes that the inherent power of the word lies in being construed with the adjacent relevent words (अन्विते शक्तिः). When a word is understood only in relation to other relevent words, the specific use of the other words *again* in the sentence becomes redundant. How to explain this difficulty ? It may be noted that the use of the word शब्दानां instead of पदानां in the Kārikā above, indicates that the stem (प्रकृति) and termination (प्रत्यय) are also expressive of relation with the contiguous members, in addition to their own meaning.

1. Some writers think that one word which is the first or principal member in a sentence has a capacity to bear the relationship (अन्वय) with other words which are used to provide the प्रतियोगिन्'s or antecedents and have no independent function to perform, in the sentence.

केचिदाहुरेकमेव पदमन्विताभिधायि इतराणि तु पदानि तत्प्रतियोगि संनिधापनमात्रे एव व्याप्रियंते । तच्च प्रथमं वा प्रधानं वेति । तन्निरासार्थं शब्दानामिति बहुवचनं । =सुधा, P. 86.

This is disproved by the use of the word शब्दानां in the plural to indicate that all the words in the sentence have the power of relative meaning. For, what is first word in a sentence may change its place if the same is uttered differently. If the words change their places in this way, it means that all the words have the capacity to be constructed with their adjacent words.

(तथा च प्रथमं पदमिति वदना सर्वाण्यपि अन्विताभिधायान्यंगीकृतानीति किमत्र वक्तव्यम् । *Ibid*, P. 86.

2. Others hold that every word bears a specific relationship with the adjacent word. (विशेषान्वये एव शक्तिः पदानां) and not a general relationship सामान्यान्विताभिधान.) This is also disproved

by the use of the general term अन्विताभिधा(ि)त्व in the text. (ये तु विशेषान्वये एव शक्तिः पदाना मित्थास्थिप्सत तन्मतनिरासाया- न्वित इति सामान्येनोक्तम् ।) —*Ibid*, P. 86.

The विशेषान्विताभिधानवाद is open to the defect of mutual dependence (अन्योन्याश्रय) and redundancy of other words in a sentence. This point is clarified in the sequel in the भक्तिवाद, while commenting on उभयव्यपदेशात्त्व हिकुंडलवत् ।

कर्तृशब्देह्यभिहिते धर्मसामान्यवेदनात् ।
विशेष धर्ममग्विच्छन् किमित्येव हि पृच्छति ॥
गुणक्रियादिधर्माणां विशेषे कथिते पुनः ।
निराकांक्षो भवेद्यस्माच्छब्दा अन्वितवाचकाः ॥ —अ. व्या.

In the example 'Bring the cow' (गामानय), the cow is understood to mean the specific object 'cow' with the action of bringing, so, the use of the word 'Bring' (आनय) *again* is superfluous. Again 'bring' is understood to mean the action of specific bringing in relation to 'cow'. So, the word 'cow' is superfluous. Further, the sense of 'Bring' depends upon the sense of 'cow' and that of 'cow' on the sense of 'Bring' This is mutual interdependence. The attempt to remove this defect is futile. The word reminds one of the sense according to the dictum 'एकसंबंधि ज्ञानयपरसंबंधि स्मारकम्'. Then, the above procedure in producing the sense may be adopted. But this is not acceptable since it amounts to the theory of अनन्विताभिधानवाद i. e. producing the sense unrelated to and independent of other words.

(यथा चेदमनन्विताभिधायि तथा पदांतरमपि स्यादिति दत्तांजलि रन्विताभिधानवादः । —*Ibid*, 86.)

The words are used in ordinary wordly transactions in relation to other words only and not exclusively. Still, the explanation of the sentence according to specific relationship (विशेषान्वय). cannot be deemed as satisfactory. So, the words should be

understood in their general relationshtp with other words and when the other words are used in the sentence, their specific meaning becomes clear and unambiguous. For examle, in गामानय ('Bring the cow') the cow is understood in relation to the verb आनय (bring) = आनयननिरूपित कर्मत्वाश्रयः गौः. Here आनयननिरूपित कर्मत्व is possible in several objects. This uncertainty is cleared by the use of the word. गाम् = cow.

'वयं तु ब्रूमः । स्यादिदं विशेषान्विताभिधानवादिनां दूषणं । सामान्यान्विताभिधानवादे तु नायं दोषः । प्रत्येकं पदान्याकांक्षित सन्निहित योग्येतरान्वित स्वार्थाभिधानसमर्थानि न पदांतरमपेक्षंते इति नैतरेतराश्रयत्वं । विशेषानन्वय प्रतिपत्यर्थं च पदांतर समभिव्याहारोपयोगः । अत एव सामान्यान्विताभिधानवादे वाक्यार्थे विशेषाऽप्रतिलंभ इति निरस्तं । पदांतरसमभिव्याहाराद्विशेष प्रतिपत्युपपत्तेः । —*Ibid*, P. 87.

Those who admit विशेषान्विताभिधानवाद cannot get at the right meaning of the words, as the particular context cannot be understood, in as much as the antecedents (प्रतियोगिन्'s) and their contacts (अन्वय) are innumerable. So, they are bound to admit the general contact in the first instance and on the strength of the vicinity of the words in the text, assign them particular meanings. But, this vicinity, it may be noted, cannot dispense with the capacity of general contact. For, it can, at the best, help to produce the particular sense from the general sense.

(संगतिग्रहणसमये सामान्यान्विताभिधान शक्तेर्गृहीतत्वात् । पदांतरसमभिव्याहारोकैहि सामान्यस्य विशेषपर्यवसाने एव हेतुर्न पुनरविद्यमान शक्त्याधाने इति । —*Sudhā*, P. 87.)

It cannot create a new power in the words. Thus, it may be concluded that the सामान्यान्विताऽभिधान combined with the vicinity of other words (पदांतर समभित्याहार) will bring about the desired sense of the sentence and not the mere सामान्यान्वित's or विशेषान्वित्s by themselves as the former gives a general and not a particular meaning and the latter is impossible of understanding

the specific sense as explained above. This theory is called the अभिनवसामान्यान्विताभिधानवाद. This is briefly set forth in the कर्तृशब्देह्य भिहिते etc. quoted above. See Śrī Jayatīrtha's remark in the प्रमाणपद्धति—

'प्रत्येकं सामान्यान्वितो योग्यान्वितस्वार्थाभिधानशक्तीनि पदानि पदांतरसन्निधानाहित शक्त्यंतराणि विशेषतोऽप्यन्वितान् स्वार्थानभिदधति ।

It should be interpreted to mean that the vicinity of other words is only a सहकारिकारण in producing the sense.

('पदांतरसन्निधानमेव आहितशक्त्यंतरं लब्धसहकार्यकरं येषामिति पद्धतिवाक्यस्य अर्थकथनेन विरोधपरिहारस्य तर्कतांडवे द्वितीयपरिच्छेदे अन्विताभिधान बाधकोद्धारग्रंथे कृतत्वात् ।' —परिमळ, P. 92.)

अन्विते शक्तिः

CHAPTER 12

स्फोटनिरासः Etc.

The Āchārya refutes other explanations of the textual interpretations namely :—

1) स्फोटवादः
2) स्मर्यमाणवर्णमालावादः
3) वाक्यांतवर्णवादः
4) पदसमूह प्रयोगात् वाक्यार्थानुमानवादः
and 5) अभिहितान्वयवादः

and condemns them as involving defects like गौरवदोष (गौरवं कल्पनेऽन्यथा). The Vaiyākaraṇas posit that the sense of a sentence is obtained from the indivisible property called स्फोट (basic unit that manifests itself) which manifests itself from the *Padas* (words) or *Vākya* (sentence). Since, this स्फोट is अखंड, there is no order of sequence in its body. The *Vākya* (sentence) is made up of *Padas* (words) and the Padas (words) are composed of वर्ण's (letters) which are *Nitya* (eternal) and all-pervading. (सर्वगत). Even otherwise, they cannot be combined to produce a sense. The earlier *Varṇa* vanishes when the next *Varṇa* is pronounced. So, *Sphōta* is to be accepted

(ननु कथं स्फोटस्य अप्रामाणिकत्वं । पदार्थं वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपत्यन्यथाऽनुपपत्या पदवाक्यस्फोटयोः प्रतिपन्नत्वात् । —P. 88.)

It is, further, stated that for a sentence to produce a sense, there should be a combination of the constituent वर्णs in words in the order of earlier and later, which as stated above is not at all possible.

(तदा क्रमो न स्यात् । पौर्यापर्य लक्षणः क्रमो हि प्रतीत्यंगं । स च देशतः कालतो वा वर्णेषु सर्वगतेषु नित्येषु न संभवति । बुद्धिक्रमस्तु वाच्यः । स चैकस्मृतिसमारूढानां वर्णानां नास्तीति अर्थप्रत्ययानुपपत्तिः । —*Sudhā*, P. 88.)

Since the *Varṇas* are *Nitya* and *Sarvagata,* (all-pervading) how can they produce any meaning without coming into contact in some sequence of earlier and later position physically or mentally. If there is no order of sequence, or succession in the *Varṇas*, the words सरः = रसः नवं = वनं, राजा = जारा, नदी = दीन etc. should have to be treated as homonymous and identical tn meaning. So, the sense cannot be derived from the letters, words, and sentences but from some indivisible power which manifests itself and which is called स्फोट.

(अतो वर्णेभ्यः अनुपपद्यमानः अर्थप्रत्ययः तदतिरिक्तं स्फोटमवस्थापयति । स च स्वरूपग्राहकेण प्रमाणेन अर्थप्रत्यायनशक्तिमान् अखण्ड एवावगत इति कथं कल्पनागौरवं । - *Sudhā*, P. 88.

This argument of the Vaiyākarṇas is not reasonable. How cau स्फोट be proved? Is it produced from the *Varṇas*, *Padas*, or *Vākyas*? But स्फोट is नित्य and cannot be produced. So, स्फोट is unwarranted to explain the production of sense, which, as already discussed, can be derived from the theory अभिनव सामान्यान्विताभिधानशक्ति (अत एव अर्थापत्तिरपि परास्ता वेदितव्या : अन्यथोपपत्तेरुक्तत्वात् । —*Ibid,*) of the words in a sentence. The experience of the sequence of letters in mind precludes the possibility of identity of meaning of words in reversed position as वन–, नव etc. Thus, the assumption of an extra power of स्फोट is open to the defect of गौरवदोष.

Similarly, the theory of अभिहितान्वयवाद also is defective since it assumes the existence of mutual relationship between the senses of words—and not between the words, which is contrary to experience.

2. Others hold that the series of letters in a word which are remembered (स्मर्यमाण वर्णमाला) produce the sense of a sentence. The *Varṇas* and the *words* formed by them have been shown to combine in a particular order (अन्विताभिधान) to yield a meaning, and to suppose again the series of *Varṇas* as causing the sense to appear, involves a defect of गौरव. Further, how can the numerous letters in a sentence be remembered to yield a sense at the end?

(सति तु मुख्योपाये न प्रयासगौरव कल्पना युक्तेति । —सुधा. P. 88.)

3. A third group of thinkers posit that the last letter of a sentence produces the meaning of the entire sentence. This is also untenable. The previous letters would be redundant. If they serve the production of their memory at the time of uttering the last letter, how can this memory of unconnected letters produce the meaning at all? This संबंधस्मरण is the अन्विताभिधान as stated above.

(स्मृतिस्था वर्णाः पदत्वेनानुसंहिताः वाक्यार्थमवगमयंतीत्येव वक्तव्यं । तदिदमुक्तं गौरवं कल्पनेऽन्यथा । —P. 89.)

4. A fourth school thinks that the use of the words in a sentence is intended to convey the contacts between the words, and with this background one uses the group of words which through the knowledge of the contact yield the meaning of the sentence. This also involves extra thinking (गौरव) namely, both the words and their contacts are taken to yield the sense, while the contact alone as explained above, can produce the meaning.

Lastiy, the theory of अभिहितान्वयवाद propounded by some thinkers according to which the words in a sentence convey their original meaning by अभिधाशक्ति first and then by their contextual position and expectancy (आकांक्षादिवशात्) are combined together to yield the meaning of the sentence.

(अभिहितान्वयवादिनो वदंति । पदाभिहिताः पदार्थाः एव आकांक्षादिवशादन्योन्यान्वयं बोधयंति । इति । इदमप्यनुपपन्नं ।

is defective since the senses of the words are taken to combine together to yield a sense and not the words (तेरपि पदार्थानामन्वय बोधकत्वं क्वाप्यनुपलब्धं तावत्कल्पनीयं ।) whicb is against experience.

The adversary explains his position by quoting the common experience illustrated in understanding a particular object as 'white horse' by its form, sound, the kicking of hoofs which are the senses of words and not words themselves.

पश्यतः श्वेतिमारूपं हेषाशब्दं च श्रृण्वतः ।
खुरनिष्पेषशब्दं च श्वेतोऽश्वो धावतीति धीः ॥

इत्युक्तन्यायेन अस्त्येव पदार्थानामन्वयबोधकत्वमितिचेन्न ।

This is a wrong argument, The sense of the sentence is got by अनुमान or अर्थापत्ति and not by the senses of words. This involves the extra thinking (गौरव) namely the Padas (words) should have the power of yielding their senses and also the power of conveying the contact among the senses. The अन्विताभिधान वादिन्s on the other hand explain the sense of a sentence by supposing only *one power* due to आकांक्षा, योग्यता and सन्निधि

(आकांक्षित सन्निहित योग्यान्विताभिधान शक्तेरेकस्या एव पदांतर समभिव्याहारबलेन विशेषपर्यवसानस्योक्तत्वात् । –........पदानामेव पदार्थ प्रतिपादनावांतरव्यापाराणामन्वयप्रतिपादकत्वांगीकारात् । —Sudhā, P. 89.)

Here a query is raised : Has a word the power to convey the contact also, besides its sense ? It cannot be denied, it is replied. How can a sense be produced without the contact ?

(न च तत्राशक्तं तदभिधत्ते इति संभवति । —Sudha. P. 89.)

It is concluded that the words alone as stated above, convey the import of the sentence. Hence, the Vedas are the unchallenged evidence tc prove the existence of God and so the enquiry into His nature is quite appropriate.

तस्मात्पदैरेव वाक्यार्थप्रत्यय संभवात् युक्तं वेदप्रामाण्यमित्यतो युक्ता ब्रह्मजिज्ञासेति सिद्धम् । —Sudha, P. 90.)

Thus, the word अतः is explained to furnish the reasons for starting an enquiry into the nature of Brahman.

(एवं तावद्ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्यत्वोपयुक्तं युक्तिजातं अतः शब्दार्थत्वेन व्याख्यातं । —Sudhā)

The reasons are beautifully summarised in the *Parimala* as follows :—

1) मोक्षजनक प्रसादहेतु ज्ञानोत्पादकत्व–
2) बंधसत्यत्व–
3) वेदादि शब्दगत सिद्धार्थपरत्व–
4) प्रामाण्य–
5) अन्विताभिधायित्व रूपयुक्तिजातमित्यर्थः ।

—परिमळ, P. 94.

CHAPTER 10

OTHER VIEWS ABOUT अथ, अत: *AND* ब्रह्मन् *ARE REFUTED AND SIDDHANTA CONFIRMED*

The attempt of the वृत्तिकार to explain अथ and अत: as meaning the same thing is shown to be faulty as it involves a repetition of ideas. To avoid this difficulty some writers have supposed अथात: as one word which is not called for, since they can bc treated as two words अथ and अत: with two different significant senses,

(अत एव पुनरुक्तिभयात् अथात: इत्येकमेव पदं येऽभ्युपगतवंत: तेऽपि निरस्ता भवंति । अर्थभेदसंभवेऽप्रसिद्ध कल्पनानुपपत्तेः । -Sudha, P. 90)

Śri Rāmānuja's objection to the Siddāntin's interpretation of अत: is as follows :— The authenticity of the Vedas etc has been proved in the पूर्वमीमांसा of Jaimini and to state the same thing again in the first sūtra of *Brahma-Mīmāṁsa Śāstra* involves repetition. The interpretations of अत: as meaning सिद्धार्थबोधकत्वात् is not correct since there is no purpose served by the Siddāntin, whereas the Vedas are intent on teaching *Kārya* (*Vidhi* = action) which is purposeful and this is treated in the Sūtra 'तत्तु समन्वयात्'

(अत एव पुनरुक्तिभयादथात इत्येकमेब पदं येऽभ्युपगतवंत: तेऽपि निरस्ताभवंति। अर्थभेदसंभवे अप्रसिद्ध कल्पनानुपपत्तेः ।—Sudha, P. 90)

This is wrong. The conclusions of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā are dependent on the *Yuktis* or arguments (reasons) of the Brahmamīmsā as stated in the Purāṇas.

शब्दजातस्य सर्वस्य यत्प्रमाणश्च निर्णय: ।

The Āchārya fully explains this remark in the beginning of the वियत्पाद and in the opening section of the fourth Pāda of

the second Adhyāya. The Sūtra अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनि: । points to the same conclusion. The Sūtra न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् । etc. explains the वेदप्रामाण्य (authenticity of the Vedas) which is suggested in the word अत: of the first sūtra. Further, the Sūtra तत्तुसमन्वयात् । has no bearing on the *Kārya - Siddhārtha Vāda* at all. It proves that the property of creation etc. belongs to Brahman (Vishṇu) only and to no other god like Rudra, Sūrya etc.

A further query is raised here. The word अत: is derived from the stem एतत् with the ablative termination, तसिल्. The pronoun एतत् should refer to the topic just previously introduced, The meanings assigned by the Siddhāntin are not mentioned before. This objection is answered by stating that all the topics suggested in the word अत: are introduced in the Brahma-Tarka—written by Bhagavān Nārāyaṇa whose *Avatāra* is Śrī Vedavyāsa author of the *Brahmasūtras*.

(यस्मादेतत्सर्वं प्रमेयं ब्रह्मतर्काभिधे तर्कशास्त्रे विस्तरादुक्तं । तस्मादत्र मीमांसोपक्रमे अत इति संक्षेपेण सूचितमित्यनेन शंकाद्वयमपि परास्तम् । ब्रह्मतर्कोक्तत्वेन तत्कृतत्वादत: शब्देन परामर्शो युज्यते । तथैव विस्तरेणोक्तत्वादत्र संक्षेपकरणं चोपपद्यते इति । —Sudha, P. 90.)

That Brahma-Tarka is a separate work auxiliary to Brahma-Mīmāṁsā Śāstra is proved in the sequel by the Āchārya in the Kārikā of the *Anuvyākhyāna* :—

एवत्सर्वं तर्कशास्त्रे ब्रह्मतर्के हि विस्तरात् ।
उक्तं विद्यापृथक्त्वात्तु संक्षेपेणात्र सूचितम् ।
... ...
अतस्तदर्थं संक्षेपादत इत्यभ्यसूचयत् ॥

Thus, the meanings of the two words in the Sūtra namely अथ and अत: have been established in the foregoing discussion. Now, the meaning of the word ब्रह्मन् in the compound word ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा is discussed and shown to be *Vishṇu* in two ways :—

1) The last two sūtras of the Devī-Mīmāṁsā just preceeding the *Brahma-Mīmāṁsā Śāstra* are स विष्णुराह हि । तं ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते तं ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते । introduce Brahman as Vishṇu and the first Sūtra in the present work immediately follows them and deals with Brahman, obviously the same as the Brahman mentioned just before. This shows that Brahman means Vishṇu. 2) The same conclusion is arrived at by the etymology of the two words ब्रह्मन् and विष्णु (Vishnu), नारायण (Nārāyaṇa). Brahman means 'full of auspicious qualities' (बृहंतोह्यस्मिन् गुणाः।). *Nārāyaṇa* also means the same thing.

ततो नारा इति पदेन दोषविरुद्धाः गुणाः प्रोक्ताः इत्यर्थः । तद्वान् नारायण इत्यनेन नाराणामयनमिति विग्रहं सूचयति । अत्र गुणविशेषानुक्तेः सर्वगुणपरिपूर्णत्वं नारायणशब्दार्थ इत्युक्तं भवति ।

The word Brahman is used in the sense of Vishṇu in the Śruti.

तदेव ब्रह्म परमं कवीनां इत्यस्यां श्रुतौ ब्रह्मशब्दस्य विष्णौ स्पष्टतया मुख्यतया सिद्धत्वाच्च सौत्रो ब्रह्मशब्दः विष्णुपर इति ज्ञायते इत्यर्थः । .... ब्रह्मशब्दश्च विष्णावेव मुख्यः । तदेव ब्रह्मेति श्रुतेः ।

—Sudhā, P. 93.

Thus, the first Sūtra ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ which is an introduction to the whole *Brahma-Mīmāṁsa Śāstra* furnishes the requisite four fold necessaries (अनुबंध चतुष्टय) to justify the starting of a new work and gives five fold reasons for beginning the enquiry into the nature of Brahman. It shows that Brahman is, on the authority of the Vedas and etymology, identical with Vishṇu or Nārāyaṇa who is the Highest and the Supreme God, Lord and Creator of the Universe - composed of the Jīva and Jaḍa,

तदेवमधिकारिविषयप्रयोजनाभिसंबंधवत्वाद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येत्यारंभणीयमिदं शास्त्रमिति सिद्धम् ।

Some writers interpret ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा as जीवात्मनो ब्रह्मत्वजिज्ञासा = an enquiry into Jīva as identical with Brahman. But, this is

not the import of the Sūtra as pointed out in the foregoing discussion.

It is thus concluded that the enquiry into Brahman the Highest and Supreme God Vishṇu as distinguished from the Jīva etc, is the subject matter of the Brahma Mīmāṁsa Śāstra.

श्रीमन्न्यायसुधायां जिज्ञासाधिकरणे समालोचिताः विषयाः ।

विषयः

१, मंगलश्लोकाः ।
२. परापर विद्याविचारः ।
३. सूत्रप्रामाण्य विचारः । सूत्रव्याकर्तव्यत्वसमर्थनम् ।
४. मंगलवादः ।
५. ॐकारवादः ।

उपोद्घातः समाप्तः ।

६. ब्रह्ममीमांसा शास्त्रारंभणीयत्वप्रयोजकानुबंध चतुष्टय-समर्थनम् ।
7. (शांकर) अध्यासभाष्यस्य असंगतिनिरूपणं ।
8. कथालक्षणं – कथकवादः ।
9. सत्तात्रैविध्यभंगः ।
10. सदसद्विलक्षणत्व–अनिर्वचनीयत्वभंगः ।
11. पंचाख्यातिवादः ।
12. मायावादिरीत्या भ्रमविवेचनम् ।
13. वियदादिप्रपंचस्य अनिर्वचनीयत्व निरासः
14. परमते अज्ञानासंभवः ।
15. अज्ञानसिद्धि पूर्वपक्षः ।

(ततश्च ज्ञानेन समानाश्रय विषयं भावरूपमज्ञानं सिद्धम् ।)

16. सिद्धांतः ।

(पूर्वोक्तं सर्वं ज्ञानाभाव विषयतयोपपन्नमिति सिद्धांतयति । अत्रोच्यते इत्यादिना–अतो नोक्त प्रमाणं भावरूपाज्ञानसिद्धिः ।

[किं च न वयं भावरूपा ज्ञानस्य पारपंथिनः ।किनाम परपक्षे तन्न संभवतीति ब्रूमः ।

स्वभावाज्ञानवादस्य निर्दोषत्वान्न तद्भवेत् ।]

17. बन्धमिथ्यात्ववर्णनस्य प्रपंचनम् ।

परकृतापव्याख्याननिरासः ।

18. अतः शब्दं (i) ॐकारवाच्याद्ब्रह्मणः प्रसादात्

(ii) बन्धस्य सत्यत्वात्, इति द्वेधा व्याख्याय विषय परतयाऽपि व्याख्याति **कार्यताचेत्यादिना।**

कार्यतावादः

19. वेदस्य ब्रह्मनिष्ठत्व समर्थनम् ।

20. वेदप्रामाण्य समर्थनम् ।

21. प्रामाण्यस्वतस्त्व विचारः । उत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च वेदस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं ।

22. वेदापौरुषेयत्वं । वेदस्वरूपनिरूपणं । वर्णनित्यत्ववादः ।

23. अभिनव-सामान्यान्विताभिधानवादः ।

24. स्फोटनिरासः । अभिहितान्वयनिरासः ।

25. ब्रह्मतर्कस्य मीमांसांगत्वसमर्थनम् ।

॥ श्रीकृष्णार्पणमस्तु ॥

PART TWO

JANMADHIKARANAM

" *ŌM JANM-AD-YASYA YATAH ŌM* "

In the first *Adhikaraṇa* (ॐ अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॐ ॥) it was established that the enquiry into the nature of Brahman whose existence is proved by the self-evident Vedas, would lead to eternal unmixed happiness through his grace and that Brahman is full of auspicious qualities. This गुणपूर्णत्व of Brahman is proved in the subsequent *Sūtras* beginning with *Janmādyasya Yataḥ* which furnishes the possible reasons (संभावक युक्ति) for world creation etc. Jijñāsā or enquiry into the nature of Brahman comprises the knowledge of his nature, (स्वरूप) means to attain Him (साधन) and fruit to be obtained by His *Prasāda* (फल). In this process, Brahman is the principal subject (प्रधान) and all else centres round Him and is subsidiary (उपलक्षण). *Brahma-jijñāsā* would be complete only when the principal subject including the subsidiary appendages are enquired into and studied. So, the first two *Adhyāyas* are devoted to the study of the nature of Brahman and the next two to the study of *Sādhana* and *Phala* respectively.

(प्रधानेन अप्रधानोपलक्षणस्य अंगीकृतत्वात् . . . ब्रह्मणश्च स्वप्रधानत्वादभ्यर्हितत्वेन तत्स्वरूपजिज्ञासैव प्रथमप्राप्ता । Sudhā, P. 99)

The order of succession of *Janmādisūtra* etc., and the 3rd and 4th Adhyāyas is explained on the ground of आकांक्षा (expectancy) also.

ब्रह्मज्ञानाय विचारः कर्तव्य इत्युक्ते केन साधनेन कस्मै फलाय इत्याकांक्षायाः साधनफल विचारं विनाऽनिवृत्तेरित्यर्थः । साधनफलयोरित्युक्त्या तयोः पौर्वापर्यात्तद्विचारपरयो रुत्तरयोरध्याययोरपि पौर्वापर्ये बीजं सूचितम् । —परिमळः

To satisfy the queries arising out of ब्रह्मज्ञान the knowledge of साधन and फल follows in naturol succession.

To the objection that in कर्मणि षष्ठीसमास (*Tatpurusha* compound) i.e. ब्रह्मणो जिज्ञासा = ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा, ब्रह्मन् would be a subsidiary object as *Rājan* in *Rājapurusha* (राज्ञः पुरुषः = राजपुरुषः) is, it is replied that, in sense Brahman is principal though in verbal usage it holds a subsidinry position in the compound.

(शब्दादुपसर्जनतया प्रकृतत्वेऽपि अर्थतः प्राधान्यादित्यर्थः । —Parimaḷa P. 99.)

All right, let Brahman be the principal object of enquiry. But his characteristic of गुणपूर्णत्व is inconceivable (अप्रसिद्ध) as also the quality of creation of the world etc. by him, as no example possessing these qualities is known to exist. This, however, is not a sound objection. For the God Vishṇu (Brahman) is not amenable to perception (प्रत्यक्ष) or inference (अनुमान) but is grasped by the Vedas only (unwritten speech) and the Vedas like बृहंतोह्यस्मिन् गुणाः । describe Brahman as full of auspicious qualities. Similarly, the creation of *Mahat-Tatva* etc., implies the existence of a creator just as that of a pot, its maker (potter = कुलाल), having the requisite knowledge of all the material and efficient causes of the Universe. Thus, the second Sūtra जन्माद्यस्य यतः । explains the property of गुणपूर्णत्व of Brahman mentioned in the first Sūtra

(जन्माद्यस्येति सूत्रेण गुणसर्वस्वसिद्धये । ब्रह्मणो लक्षणं प्रोक्तं शास्त्रमूलं यतस्ततः ॥ —अ-व्याख्यान)

In the *Bhāgavata*, the concommittance व्याप्ति between कर्तुत्व and सगुणत्व is stated in कर्तुत्वात्सगुणं ब्रह्म··· (अविनाभावित्वात् —Sudhā). So the creator of the world is non else than गुणपूर्णब्रह्म and not निर्विशेष ब्रह्म as held by the Advaitins. The Vedas alone are competent to describe Brahman the creator (तत्कारणत्वस्य शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्यत्वादिति भावः । —परिमळ). They are to wit :—

अतः समुद्रगं विश्वप्रसूतेः कारणं तु यत् ।
सूक्तोपनिषदाद्युक्तं जन्माद्यस्येति लक्ष्यते ॥

The अंभृणीसूक्त (मम योनिरप्स्वंतः समुद्रे), the *Riks* सप्तार्धगर्भाः etc. and the वामनसूक्त are cited as evidences to prove the characteristic of सृष्ट्याद्यष्टकर्तुत्व of Brahman

सृष्टिः स्थितिश्च संहारो नियतिर्ज्ञानमावृतिः ।
बंधमोक्षावपि ह्यासु श्रुतिषूक्ता हरेः सदा ॥

creation, protection, destruction, control, knowledge, concealment, bondage, release are attributed to Śrī Hari in the Śrutis. Each of these is enough to provide a distinctive characteristic of Brahman. The other qualities are, however not redundant. For they are intended to eliminate the possible alternatives of Brahmā (Four faced), Rudra etc. as the meaning of Brahman of the first Sūtra. Or. they serve to indicate the unchallenged supremacy of God Vishṇu (= Brahman). The qualities scattered in different texts are colleeted here as they are to be meditated upon by *Mumukshu* (an aspirant for release).

जिज्ञास्य ब्रह्मणो हि सर्वव्यावृत्तये लक्षणमत्रोच्यते । न चैकमेव सर्वत्र जिज्ञासा विधायक श्रुतिषु लक्षणं श्रूयते । किंतु आसु जिज्ञासा विधात्रीषु श्रुतिषु क्वचित्सृष्टिः क्वचित्स्थितिरिति अष्टकं जिज्ञास्याद्धरेः विश्वस्योक्तमित्यनेक लक्षणोक्त्युपयोगः । —*Sudhā*. एतच्चोपलक्षणं । आद्यपद्यव्याख्यानोक्तदिशा विभवार्था अनेक लक्षणोक्तिरित्यपि ज्ञेयम् । —परिमळ)

Thus, the verse सृष्टिरक्षा etc. is explained in three different ways :- (1) To ward off other possibilities of ब्रह्मा, रुद्र, etc. (2) To facilitate meditation of the Mumukshus by collecting the qualities together from different texts and (3) To indicate the supremacy and grandeur of Brahma (विभवात् —Sudhā.) True, this explanation, as an *Āgama*, however, would mar the very purpose of the Sūtras which are designed to remove doubts and misapprehensions by providing the *Yuktis* or reasons free from flaws.

(तथात्वे न्यायेन वेदार्थविषयक संशयविपर्यय निरासपूर्वं तन्निर्णयरूपो पकाराजनकत्वेन आगमवद् बोधकत्वापत्त्या वेदेतिकर्तव्यतारूप न्याय सूत्रत्वभंग इत्यतो योजनांतरमाह । अथवेति । —परिमळ, P. 100)

In the Sruti तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्मेति, who is this ब्रह्मन्? Vishṇu is inconceivable and जीव is the only proper alternative. Though he is known by all in self-cognition = अहंप्रत्यय, the distinction between the self and the body is not grasped and instead of supposing an unknown object like Brahman (Vishṇu), it is easy to take him to be the individual soul. This argument is, however, set at rest by furnishing the specific attributes of Brahman in the verse सृष्टिरक्षा etc. which cannot be claimed by the Jīva under any circumstance. The apparent sense of ब्रह्मन् as जीव is, thus, eliminated. In some Sruti texts, these qualities are attributed to Brahman (Four faced = हिरण्यगर्भ) etc But these terms ब्रह्मा, रुद्र etc. primarily mean Vishṇu only and not *vice versa.*

It is further argued that the texts like जनितोऽत विष्णोः । ascribing birth etc. to Vishṇu which is obviously a defect in the Supreme Cause Brahman, should be understood so as to suit the greatness of Vishṇu as meaning manifestation.

यं नामानि विशंत्यद्धा यो देवानामितिह्यपि ।
श्रुतेर्नामानि सर्वाणि विष्णोरेव यतस्ततः ॥
अतो न मुख्यतो नाम तदन्यस्य हि कस्यचित् ॥
गुणाः श्रुता इति ह्यस्मान्न दोषोऽर्थः श्रुतेर्भवेत् ॥
प्रीत्या मोक्षपरत्वाच्च तात्पर्यं नैव दूषणे ।

All names Brahma, Rudra etc. denote Brahman – Vishṇu only as proclaimed in the *Sruti* यो देवानां नामधा एक एव । etc. So, no other deity can claim to have that exclusive right. The release from bondage is obtained through devotion to and grace of Vishṇu. How can any failing or defect be conceived in Him? The apparent defects like birth etc. should be interpreted to

harmonise with His unchallenged God-hood. In fact, this is explicit in the passage as stated in the Sudha, P. 97.

गुणाः श्रुताः सुविरुद्धाश्च देवे संत्यश्रुता अपि नैवात्र शंका ।
चिंत्या अचिंत्याश्च तथैव दोषाः श्रुताश्च नाऽज्ञैर्हि तथा प्रतीताः ॥

इत्यस्माद्वाक्याद्विष्णोर्जन्मादिदोषो जनितोत विष्णोरित्यादिश्रुतेः न भवेद्यस्मान्नासंभवीदं लक्षणं । इदमुक्तं भवति । बाच्यार्थावगमे हि व्याख्यानं मुख्यकारणं । यथाहुः । व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिरिति । तथापि यदीयं व्याख्येयं तदीयं चे द्व्याख्यानं तदा सुतरां ततोऽर्थावगतिः । तत्र गुणाः श्रुताः इति श्रुतिरेव सर्वश्रुतीर्व्याख्याति । सर्वाः श्रुतयः विष्णोरनंतानलौकिकान् गुणानेव वर्णयंति । न कुत्रापि दोषान् । दोषवाद प्रतीतिस्तु शब्दशक्तितात्पर्याऽपरिज्ञाननिमित्तैवेति । एवं श्रुत्यैव सर्वासु श्रुतिषु व्याख्यातासु कथं तद्विरुद्धदोषपरतया व्याख्यानं युज्यते । तस्माद्विष्णुरिति यजमानस्य यज्ञस्य वा नाम । तौ सोमाद्भवत. इति सोमो-जनितोत विष्णोरित्युच्यते इत्यादि व्याख्येयमिति । —सुधा, P. 98.)

Further, as stated above, the release from bondage is effected by the love of God and not by hatred.

सर्वेषामपि वाक्यानां महातात्पर्यमत्र हि ।
तद्विरोधे न मानत्वं फलं मुक्तिर्हि वाक्यतः ॥

It may be argued that the import of the Vedas depends not upon ones likes and dislikes but upon the sense of words comprising them. The obvious sense derived from the instruments of knowledge should not be abandoned. No, we should pause and analyse the function of the instruments. In perception and inference the materials alone and not the intention of the person using them are responsible in producing the knowledge. But, the case is different with the word which yields a sense in conformity with the intention of the person using it.

(विषयोऽयमुपन्यासः । प्रत्यक्षानुमाने हि प्रयोजनोद्देशेन न प्रवृत्ते । किंतु स्वहेतूपनिपातमात्रादेवाऽर्थं बोधयतः । वाक्यं तु श्रोतृपुरुषोद्देशेनैव

प्रवृत्तं तदनुगुणमेव विषयं प्रतिपादयेत् । उद्दिष्टपुरुषार्थ विरोधिनि तु विषये प्रवर्तमानं कथं प्रमाणं स्यात् । —Sudha, P. 98.

The Vedas are intent on teaching the remedies for the release from bondage. How can the hatred of god bring about the release which God Vishṇu being pleased with devotion confers upon the devotee? True, says the opponent, the intention of a person plays an important part in yeilding a sense. But this does not hold good in the care of the Vedas which are *Apauru-sheya* unwritten by any person—man or God and are not moulded with intention. It is replied that every sentence whether human or unhuman should have some object or प्रयोजन as otherwise it cannot command any attention of the listener.

(मैवं । प्रयोजनानुद्देशिनोऽनुपादेयत्वप्रसंगात् । यथा पुरुषाभावेऽप्यर्थं प्रतिपादयति । तथा प्रयोजनोद्देशोऽपि कथं न स्यात् । —Sudha, P. 98)

Here न मानत्वं of the text is interpreted as अनुपादेयत्वं in the Sudha. This is explained in *Parimala* as

'एतेन न मानत्वमित्यस्य अनुपादेयत्वमित्यर्थ उक्तो भवति ।—*Parimala*, P. 102). ननु प्रयोजनोद्देशस्येदं मे भूयादित्येवंरूपेच्छाविशेषत्वात् कथमपौरुषेये वेदे तदुद्देशितेत्यत आह यथेति ॥ यथा स्वतंत्रपुरुषाभावे शब्दगतया सहजशक्त्याऽर्थप्रतिपादनं तथा तत्प्रमितिशेषत्वरूप यत्परमतात्पर्यं तद्विषयत्वमेव तदुद्देशित्वं नेच्छाघरितमिति भावः । —परिमळ, P. 102.

The definition of प्रमाण does not countenance the existence of fruit. The opponent argues that the प्रामाण्य (authenticity) depends upon the existence of cause only

(ननु याथार्थ्यं प्रामाण्यं न फलवत्वं । सत्यं । तस्यैव याथार्थ्यस्य विषय विशेषावधारणोपायत्वेन फलस्यानुसरणात् । —Sudha, P. 98.)

True it is replied. Just as a word is invested with a natural power to convey a sense without reference to the person who uses or utters it, so also, a sentence has its import to convey

which leads to correct knowledge and this is called प्रयोजनोद्देश, not depending upon the wish of the speaker. Here परमतात्पर्य means प्रमितिशेषत्व i.e. a conveying capacity or cause of right knowledge = प्रमित्यंगत्व in which the desire of person has no part to play. The Sruti itself states that its main function is to teach the remedy to get rid of worldy miseries (तेषां दुःखप्रहाणाय श्रुतिरेषा प्रवर्तते ।). But in determining the specific object of knowledge (in प्रामाण्य = याथार्थ्य = यथावस्थित ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्व) the specific fruit has to be taken into account. If a sentence were to convey two senses, the fruit decides the specific sense intended and in the प्रयोजनाधिकरण, the point is made clear by stating that the Srutis teach remedies for *Mōksha* through the grace of God Vishṇu,

मोक्षार्थाः श्रुतयो यस्मात्स च तस्य प्रसादतः ।
उन्निनीषति वाक्याच्च लोकदृष्टानुसारतः ॥
इच्छानिमित्तको यस्मात्तदभावे कुतः श्रुतिः ।
महातात्पर्यरहिता प्रमाणत्व गमिष्यति ॥
याथार्थ्यमेव मानत्वंमपि वाक्यं प्रयोजकम् ।
मानत्वमेति तत्रापि यत्संपूर्णप्रयोजनम् ॥

—अ. व्या. II, 1, 9.

Hence, the Sruti is acceptable as it has an object of teacing the remedies to happiness. It need not be inferred by a sylloligm like वेदः प्रयोजनोद्देशिप्रवृत्तिमान् उपादेयवाक्यात्वात् संमतवत्. The purport of the Vedas does not depend upon the *Anumāna*. For, the Sruti itself gives the fruit of knowledge as emancipation (फलं मुक्तिर्हि वाक्यतः ।) Here मानत्वं is taken to mean प्रमाणत्वं. मानत्वमित्यस्य प्रामाण्यमित्येवार्थमुपेत्याऽऽह ॥ किंचेति ॥ —परिमळ, P. 102)

If Moksha is not the प्रयोजन of the *Sruti*, then the Srutis तेषां दुःखप्रहाणाय श्रुतिरेषा प्रवर्तते …… यस्य प्रसादात्परमार्तिरूपात् …… मुच्यते संसारात् । etc would be meaningless like the sentence 'sprinkle with fire', due to lack of concordance

(तथा च अग्निना सिञ्चेदितिवत् योग्यताविरहात् अप्रामाण्यमपरिहार्यं । —सुधा, P. 98). See also श्रीनिवासतीर्थीय :— मोक्षोद्देशेन वेदप्रवृत्तेः, वेदो मोक्षोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तिमान् तदितरानिच्छूपादेयत्वात् । इत्यनुमानसिद्धत्वं यद्युच्यते तर्हि अनुमानापेक्षया श्रुतेः प्रबलत्वेन जनितोत विष्णोरित्यादि श्रुतिविरोधेन तत्प्रीतिद्वारा मोक्षोद्देशित्वं न स्यात् । नत्वेबमुच्यते । किं नाम । यस्य प्रसादात्, तेषां दुःखप्रहाणायैति श्रुत्या स्वयमेवोच्यते । इ-यर्थ, । तथाचेति । मोक्षरूप प्रयोजनोद्देशाभावे इत्यर्थः । योग्यतेति । तेषां दुःखप्रहाणाय । यस्य प्रसादादित्यादि श्रुतीनां बाधितार्थकत्वात् अप्रामाण्यमित्यर्थः । —श्री· ती. I, 1, P. 67).

The Śruti which attributes defects of birth etc. to Vishṇu being more powerful than अनुमान, would vitiate the अनुमान; So. it is stated that the Śruti itself declares the purport to be Moksha etc. Any statement that contradicts the Śruti is obviously untrustworthy. If the puport of the *Śruti* is sought to be proved by अनुमान then the Śruti जनितोत विष्णोः which attributes defects of birth to Vishṇu, being more powerful than अनुमान, would vitiate the अनुमान. So, it is stated that the Śruti itself declares the purport to be Mōksha. (तेषां दुःखप्रहणाय etc.). Any statement that contradicts the Śruti is obviously untrustworthy (तद्विरोधे न मानत्वं).

It may be argued that the heaven and the other covetable fruits may be the object of the Śrutis, instead of Mōksha. But it is replied that the words get contacted with their highest sense which leads to ultimate objective as stated in the प्रयोजनाधिकरण viz. मानत्वमेति तत्राऽपि यत्संपूर्णं प्रयोजनं । Here संपूर्णप्रयोजन is Mōksha, not स्वर्गादि.

Thus far, it was argued that the Śruti हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्तताग्रे etc. and जनितोत विष्णोः । would render the definition of Vishṇu as सृष्ट्याद्यष्टकतृत्व and गुणपूर्णत्व vitiated by अतिव्याप्ति and असंभव respectively — and that both the objections were removed in the preceding discussion. The objection of अव्याप्ति is out of question since the लक्ष्य i. e. विष्णु is one (undivided whole) (लक्ष्यस्यैकत्वादिति भावः । —परिमळ). Now it is posed that the *Purāṇas* glorifying Śiva, Sūrya etc. as the creator and Vishṇu as their servant dispel the thesis of गुणपूर्णत्व and कर्तृत्व of Vishṇu. It may be noted that the remark that Vishṇu is described as subservient to Śiva, Sūrya etc., in the Purāṇas is baseless. For, it is conclusively proved after full discussion in the आनंदमयाधिकरण, तदनन्यत्वाधिकरण, सांख्यनय and पत्युर्नय— that Vishṇu is the Supreme God.

न पुराणादिमानत्वं विरुद्धार्थे श्रुतेर्भवेत् ।
दर्शनांतरमूलत्वात् मोहार्थं चाऽऽज्ञया हरेः ॥ —अ. व्या.

मोहार्थमिति । दर्शनांतराणि कृतानीति शेषः । —सुधा, P. 99.

It is, further, replied that the Purāṇas like Śaiva, Pāśupata etc. are not authentic as they are contradicted by the Śrutis. For, it is definitely stated that the Śaiva *Purāṇas* were written by Dadhīchi and others specifically to mislead the *Tāmasa* souls under the command of God Vishṇu. Hence, they are not authentic.

तदुक्तं ।: कुत्सितानि च मिश्राणि रुद्रो विष्णुप्रचोदित. ।
चकार शास्त्राणि विभुः ऋषयस्तत्प्रचोदिताः ॥
दधीच्याद्याः पुराणानि तच्छास्त्रसमये न तु ॥ इति ॥

Jaimini also states विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानं । that the Smṛiti becomes unreliable if it is opposed by the Śruti. If there is no opposition, it may be acceptable as प्रमाण, by presuming a corresponding Śruti as its source.

(पौरुषेयतया शंकितदोषस्य अपौरुषेयवाक्यविरोधे अप्रमाण्यस्य न्याय्यत्वात् । —सुधा, P. 98.

If Rudra etc. are the creators of the Universe, then the names of Vishṇu who is described as creator etc. would be synonyms of Rudra which is against the *Śruti* 'यो देवानां नामधा एक एव । So. the Purāṇas like Pādmpurāṇa which attribute the

names of Vishṇu to Śiva are obviously misleading and unreliable. Further, Rudra and other gods are known to be deficient and faulty whereas Vishṇu as the name points out, is free from all defects.

न सर्वनामताऽन्येषां श्रुतावुक्ता हि कुत्रचित् ।
अदोषवचनाच्चैव नियमेन हरेः श्रुतौ ।। —अ. व्या.

(एवशब्दो हरेरेवेति संबध्यते । —सुधा, P. 99)

That Vishṇu alone is defect-free is explained in the *Kārikā*.

अज्ञानं पारतल्यं च प्रलयेऽभाव एव च ।
अशक्तिश्चोदिताऽन्येषां सर्वेषामपि च श्रुतौ ।। —अ. व्या.

Ignorance, dependance upon others, non-existence in Pralaya (Deluge, ineapacity, these defects are ascribed to other gods (like Śiva, Sūryn etc.).

Tc establish one's thesis firmly the theories contradicting it sbould be removed as untenable, The Māyāvādin interprets the Sūtra " जन्माद्यस्य यतः " as providing an indirect (exclusive) defini-tion of ब्रह्मन् (तटस्थ लक्षण) and not inclusive or direct definition. (स्वरूपलक्षस). The Āchārya affirms that the *creation* etc. mentioned in the second Sūtra is the inclnsive and direct definition of ब्रह्मन् only (स्वलक्षण).

जन्माद्यस्येति तेनैतद्विष्णोरेव स्वलक्षणम् ।
अस्योद्भवादि हेतुत्वं साक्षादेव स्वलक्षणम् ।। —अ. व्या.
कृष्णध्यान च्छलेनैव स्वयं भागवतेऽब्रवीत् ।। —अ. व्या.

In the Bhāgavata composed by Śri Vēdavyāsa who is an *Avatāra* of Vishṇu, it is unambiguously stated that Brahman is the cause of creation, protection, destruction etc. of the Universe,

यत्तत्परं ज्योतिरनन्यमद्वयं स्वसंस्थया नित्यनिरस्तकल्मषम् ।
ब्रह्माख्यमस्योद्भवनादि हेतुभिः स्वलक्षणैः लक्षितभावनिर्वृतम् ।।

Since Kṛishṇa is described as meditating upon God in the above verse, like a house-holder, in his morning prayer, there

is no doubt that Bādarāyaṇa the author of the Sūtras being the *avatāra* of Vishṇu = Kṛishṇa wholly concurs with it. Here the (स्वलक्षण स्वरूपांतर्गत लक्षण) and not तटस्थ लक्षण is given as अस्योद्भवादिहेतुत्व which is identical with जन्माद्यस्य यतः of the second Sūtra.

(तस्मात्सूत्रकारस्यैवायमभिप्रायो यज्जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपांतर्गतमेव लक्षणमिति । —Sudhā, P. 100).

Hence the interpretation of the definition as तटस्थलक्षण directly contradicts the statement of the Bhāgavata as स्वलक्षण.

What is तटस्थलक्षण? It can be explained in three ways:—

(१) नचैवं । किंतु तटस्थमेव । त्रैविध्यमत्र त्र संभवति । 1) मायाविशिष्टं ब्रह्म कारणमिति वा । 2) मायाशक्तिमत्कारणमिति वा । 3) जगत्कारणं तु मायैव तदाश्रयत्वात् ब्रह्म कारणमिति वा । सर्वथा जगत्कारणं तु बाह्यमेव । न साक्षात्स्वरूपांतर्गत मिति । तदेतदनुपपन्नमिति भावेनोक्तं स्वलक्षणमिति । स्वरूपांतर्गतमेवेदं ब्रह्मणो जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वं न मायावाद्युक्तरीत्या तटस्थमित्यर्थः । —सुधा, P. 99.

What is the function of a लक्षण? It must be admitted that the लक्षण (definition) should distinguish the लक्ष्य = object to be defined, from dissimiliar things and even in similar things from other substances

(लक्षणं हि सजातीय विजातीय व्यवच्छेदार्थं भवति । यथाह । समानासमान जातीय व्यवच्छेदो वा लक्षणार्थं इति । —Sudhā, P. 99.)

In the present case, the जन्मादि कर्तृत्व should distinguish Brahman from similar aod dissimilar objects i. e. from the Jīvas and *Jaḍas* (inanimate things). The Sūtra इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादि दोषप्रसक्तिः (If जीव is identical with Brahman, why does he not do good to himself and avoid evil thins always?) definitely points out that the जीव (and जड also) is warded off by this लक्षण as admitted by the Advaitin himself.

"यथाऽऽह । सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्ति विहायान्यतः । परपरि कल्पितात् प्रधानाद्रेचेतनाच्चेतनादपि परिच्छिन्न (ज्ञान) क्रियाशक्तेः संसारिणो हिरण्य

गर्भादुत्पत्यादि न संभावयितुमपि शक्यते इति । तथाऽपि न्यायेनोपपादयितु **मिदमुक्तमिति** । —सुधा, P. 102

इदमुक्तमिति । न हि जन्मादि हेतुत्वमित्यादिक मुक्तमित्यर्थः ।
—परिमळ)

Then, how can Brahman who is different from Jīva be described as निर्गुण and निर्विशेष (quality - less and property - less)? This automatically discards identity between Jīva and Brahman?

अतो जीवैक्यमपि स निराचक्रे जगद्गुरुः ।
नहि जन्मादि हेतुत्वं जीवस्य जगतो भवेत् ॥
हिताकियादिदोषं च वक्ष्यत्येव स्वयं प्रभुः ।
निर्गुणत्वं च तेनैव निषिद्धं प्रभुणा स्वयम् ॥ —अ. व्या.

Thus, it is shown by sound logic that according to the confessions of the Advaitin, the defining Sūtra (लक्षणसूत्र = जन्माद्यस्य यतः) is unwarranted. (इतोऽपि मायावादिनां न लक्षण सूत्रारंभः संभवतीत्याह "**निर्गुणत्वं** चेति । —Sudhā, P. 100.)

It may be observed that the author of Bhāgavata gives as stated above the definition जन्मादिकर्तृत्व as the inclusive characteristic (स्वलक्षण = स्वरूपांतर्गतलक्षण) of Brahman and so the view of the Pūrvapakshin considering it as तटस्थलक्षण is not tenable.

The Pūrvapakshin quibles to interpret the word स्वलक्षण as सु + अलक्षण or स्वस्य लक्षण and states that it does not debar the view of तटस्थलक्षण. Further, he holds that thls does not conflict with the निर्गुणत्व, जीवब्रह्मैक्य and निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman. The Sūtra **जन्माद्यस्य यतः** should be understood by *lakshṇa*. In यत्र घोषः सा गंगा = where the village is, there is Gañgā, here गंगा is understood as गंगातीर (= bank of the river Gañgā) by लक्षणा, to mean यत्तीरे) Similarly in जन्माद्यस्त यतः (तद्ब्रह्म), यतः may mean यदधिष्ठितमाया तद्ब्रह्म (the receptacle of Māyā, the creator of the world) or यतः may mean Māyā and तत् by लक्षणा, तदाश्रय. No, it is replied. The

कर्तृत्व according to तटस्थ लक्षण is the property of Māyā and Māyā is the attribute of Brahman.

(ब्रह्माश्रितमायागतमेव न ब्रह्मगतमित्यर्थः । Parimala, P. 103) – नहि यतोऽस्य जन्मादि सा माया तदश्रयो ब्रह्मेति निर्देशः स्यात् । —Sudhā, P. 100). How can it be the लक्षण of Brahman? The Advaitin clarifies his position thus: The तटस्थ लक्षण is not a direct definition, but is an उपलक्षण as in काकोवलक्षितं गृहं । in which the perching of काक (crow) is not a part of the house but only indicator, Even then, like काक (crow) which distinguishes the house from other houses, the जन्मादिकर्तृत्व distinguishes Brahman from जीव. Otherwise, the definition would be purposeless. The Advaitin admits that the जीव who is toiling and experiencing the miseries of this world is no doubt distinguished but not the substractum of consciousness (चेतन्यधातुः) which is devoid of all properties and qualities. The substratum of consciousness the basis on which the whole world of miseries is super imposed is Brahman, The world is only विवर्त = Illusion

(न च सत्यस्य प्रपंचस्य कारणभूतायाः सत्याया मायायाः आश्रयो ब्रह्मेति सूत्रार्थो येन ब्रह्मणः सविशेषत्वं स्यात् । किंतु यदवष्टंभो विश्वो विवर्तः प्रपंचः तद्ब्रह्मेति सूत्रार्थः । सति चैवं सूत्रार्थे कथं जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वं ब्रह्मणो निर्गुणत्वे च विरुध्यते इति । —सुधा, P. 101.)

Thus, the Advaitin introduces the idea of विवर्त as a compromise between निर्गुणत्व and सगुणत्व of Brahman, This is refuted as lacking the support of प्रमाण (authorities), लक्षणा should be resorted to when the normal primary sense is incompatable. There is no incompatability of primary sense of सगुणत्व in the present case. (मुख्यार्थासंभवे हि लक्षणाश्रयणं दृष्टं । –सुधा, P. 108.) The creativeness (जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्व) of Brahman is not obstructed (negeted) by प्रत्यक्ष (Perception). For, it is not amenable to perception. The inference ब्रह्म न कर्तृ निष्क्रियत्वात् does not

obstruct the कर्तृत्व since it is directly opposed in the Śruti यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायंते etc, which is more powerful. Nor the Āgama निष्कलं निष्क्रियं would conflict with the जगत्कर्तृत्व (कारणत्व). For, it does not deny agency to Brahman but states as observed in the Tātparya of the Bhāgavata X Skandha 'अकर्मा अक्लिष्टकारित्वात्' that Brahman creates the world without any fatigue i. e. with ease like sport. The Advaitin resorts to अर्थापत्ति to prove the definition 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः । as तटस्थलक्षण. He says that the identity between ब्रह्मन् aud जीव is necessary and cannot be denied. If स्वलक्षण is admitted, the identity cannot be maintained. So, it must be तटस्थलक्षण only.

(जीवब्रह्मणोरेकत्वं तावदावश्यकं । न च जगज्जन्मादि कारणत्वस्य स्वलक्षणत्वे नत्संभवति । अतोऽन्यथाऽनुपपत्त्या मायागतमेवेदं लक्षणं । जन्माद्यस्य यतः तद्ब्रह्मेति लक्षणयोच्यते इति कथ्यते । Sudha, P. 10)

To this, the Āchārya replies :—

भेदेनैव तु मुख्यार्थ संभवे लक्षणा। कुतः ।
कथं नित्यगुणस्यास्य स्यादैक्यं गुणहानतः ॥ —अ. व्या.

We should either preserve the difference between जीव and ब्रह्मन् by retaining the primary sense of the word or sacrifice the primary sense and resort to लक्षणा to retain the imaginary identity. We prefer to reject the unauthentic identity which prompts to abandon the primary sense of difference.

(न हि अप्रामाणिकपरिरक्षणाय वाक्यानां जघन्यवृत्तिराश्रीयमाणा क्वचिदुपलब्धा । इति । तदिदमुक्तं भेदेनैवेति । —P. 101.

The Advaitin's main evidence for identity of जीव with ब्रह्मन् is the Text तत्वमसि etc. This by the criteria of उपक्रमोपसंहार etc., is proved to yield a meaning of difference only and not identity. तत् stands for परमात्मा who is full of endless auspicious qualities introduced in the previous context सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्. त्वं is the जीव with limited powers and capacities. Here, we should pause and analyse. Is identity tauget here keeping in-tact the mutually conflicting attributes of the primary sense of तत् (ब्रह्मन्) and त्वं (जीव) or removing the eonflict by ignoring the contradictions? The identity of two different categories cannot under any circumstance, be endorsed. If the former, the sentence would not yield any sense at all like the जरद्गवादि वाक्य In the second alternative, shoud we adopt लक्षणा for धर्मी i. e. तत् and त्वं or for धर्म i. e. सामानाधिकरण्य i. e. एक विभक्तिकत्व (standing in appositin with the nominative case ?

The primary sense of एकविभक्तिकत्व (same termination) may yield the sense of identity, but the secondary sense गौणार्थ (सदृशपर) will retain the primary sense of the धर्मी i. e. तत् and त्वं according to the dictum of त्यजेदेकं कुलस्यार्थे that is to preserve the integrity of the family a smaller loss is permissible, so, धर्म can be sacrified to preserve the Dharmā (धर्मी), Further, the mutually contradicting attributes of परमात्मा and जीव can never be ignored as stated in the first *Adhikaraṇa* "सत्यत्वात्तेन दुःखादेः" (अ. व्या) etc., and so they cannot be abandoned. The Advaitin's device of explaining the identity by जहदजहल्लक्षणा (leaving and accepting a part in the whole) is not acceptable. We have instances like सिंहो देवदत्तः (Devadatta is a lion) where the primary meaning of सिंह (lion) and देवदत्त (man) is retained and only the सामानाधिकरण्य is taken to be गौण i.e. सादृश्यपर (comparative ness) i e. देवदत्त is *like* सिंह in strength etc. Further, the contradictions are not temporary or effaceable as in सोऽयं देवदत्तः where that-ness and this-ness are changeable.

(कथं नित्यगुणस्यास्य स्यादैक्यं गुणहानतः । — अ. व्या.)

It should be noted here that सामानाधिकरण्य in तत्वमसि is गौण and not मुख्य. The primary (मुख्य) सामानाधिकरण्य would lead to identity in all aspects, where as the गौण one though not opposed to identity, in *some* aspects would retain the difference. This is explained in the *Chandrikā* under the पृथगुपदेशाधिकरण । See also

सिंहो देवदत्त इत्यादिवत् सामानाधिकरण्यमात्रं गौणमुपादाय जीव ब्रह्मणोर्भेदेनैवांगीकृतत्वेन पदद्वयस्य मुख्यार्थसंभवे जहदजहल्लक्षणा कुत आश्रयणीयेति । in Sudhā, P. 101.

The criteria of उपक्रमोपसंहार etc. also support the sense of difference between जीव and ब्रह्मन् and not identity as shown in *Tatva-Nirṇaya* and other works of the Āchārya. It is established in अत्त्राधिकरण in the next seetion (i. e. लिंगपाद) that the attributes of ब्रह्मन् viz. ज्ञान, क्रिया etc. are eternal and not changeable.

ज्ञानं नित्यं क्रिया नित्या बलं शक्तिः परात्मनः ।
नित्यानंदोऽव्ययः पूर्णो भगवान् विष्णुरच्युतः ॥ –अ. व्या. I, ii, 11

Similarly, the defficiencies of जीव also are eternal as stated in the Mahā Vishṇu Purāṇa :—

अल्पशक्ति रसार्वज्ञत्वं पारतंत्र्यमपूर्णता ।
उपजीवकत्वं जीवत्वं ईशत्वं तद्विपर्ययः ॥
स्वाभाविकं तयो रेतन्नान्यथा तु कथंचन ॥

Quoted in the गीतातात्पर्य, II Adhyāya.

The Advaitin is at a loss to defend his position. He doggedly puts forth that जीव is identical with निर्गुणब्रह्मन्. Here he is asked to define what निर्गुण is. He cannot be the same as सगुण ब्रह्मन्. If he is different from सगुण, he will remain different for ever. There will be no hope of कैवल्य for सगुणब्रह्मन्. To this, he replies, the गुण's or qualities are superimposed upon निर्गुण and are unreal as blueness in the sky. This flow of superimposition or illusion is endless. So. ब्रह्मन् is described as *always* full of attributes.

(आरोपप्रवाहस्य चानादि नित्यतया सदा सगुणत्वं च नानिष्टं । तथा च मिथ्याभूतविरोध्याकारपरित्यागेन ऐक्योपदेशोऽपि नाऽनुपपन्नः । —सुधा, P. 102).

Then, he is asked to explain what मिथ्यागुण means. मिथ्या means असत् or अनिर्वाच्य. The former is not admitted by him and अनिर्वाच्य is refuted in the जिज्ञासासूत्र above. So, मिथ्यागुण should mean गुणराहित्य = absence or want of all qualities. A query is posed here. निर्गुणत्व or गुणराहित्य is admitted by the *Vaiśeshikas* in गुण, कर्म, सामान्य, विशेष and समवाय. So निर्गुण is easy of explanation. This unintelligent query is set at rest by stating that in the present context, the निर्गुणत्व of Brahman cannot be proved. गुण means धर्म (property) and even the five categories गुण, कर्म etc. are proved to poseess the धर्मs, in the refutation of the गुणs of *Naiyāyikas* in the Samayapāda of thc 2nd Adhyāya below. The Śruti साक्षी चेतां केवलो निर्गुणश्च definitely shows that ब्रह्मन् has the qualities साक्षित्व, चेतस्त्व etc. So, निर्गुण does not mean निर्धर्म but devoid of प्राकृतगुण (materialistic qualities). If inspite of this conclusive explanation, the opponent persisits in thinking that Brahman is निर्गुण, then he is asked to please himself by clinging to निर्गुणत्व, अशुभत्व or आसुरत्व by identifying himself with निर्गुण ब्रह्मन्. The Advaitin's thesis that Brahman is निर्गुण and as its corollary, he is निष्क्रिय and निर्धर्म, is thus exploded as यिर्गुणत्व itself is not sustainable.

निर्गुणत्वं तदा च स्यादासुरत्वं न चान्यथा । अ. व्या.

Then, he says that the प्रपंचकर्तृत्व of Brahman is inconceivable since Brahman is निरुपाधिक and the कर्तृत्व depends upon the उपाधि (प्रपंच) which is unreal, This objection is removed by stating that कर्तृत्व, गुणपूर्णत्व etc. are inherent and not extranceous attributes of Brahman. They are not औपाधिक or aecidental.

(अतोऽनंतगुणं ब्रह्मेत्यत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूप विशेषणत्वोपगमेन तन्मात्रत्वांगीकारेण निराकरिष्यते इति भावः । —परिमळ, 104).

The Advaitin seeks clarification from the Siddhāntin whether the लक्षण i. e. जगत्कर्तृत्व and गुणपूर्णत्व of Brahman, is different from or identical with the लक्ष्यब्रह्मन् or both. If different, how can two different substances like *Meru* and *Mandara* mounts be related or brought together as लक्षण and लक्ष्य. The constant and

intimate relationship between the two cannot be made out. If they are not different, then, the multiplicity of the लक्षणs (definitions) would lead to the muliplicity of the लक्ष्य i. e. Brahman which cannot be admitted by both of us. The Śruti एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म reduces the लक्षण, into one or the different लक्षणs recorded in यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायते, येन जातानि जीवंति etc. would be meaningless repetitions. The last alternative is self-contradictory. Since the स्वरूपलक्षण cannot be explained as stated above, the Advaitin leads the Siddhanti to admit तटस्थलक्षण as the only alternative.

(अतोऽशक्यनिरूपणत्वान्नेदं ब्रह्मस्वरूपांतर्गतं लक्षणं । किंतु तटस्थमेव । Sudhā, P. 102). This तटस्थलक्षण does not conflict with the अद्वितीयत्व of Brahman

(न च तटस्थेन तेन ब्रह्मणोऽद्वितीयत्वभंगः । यद्रजतमित्यभात् सा शुक्तिरितिवत् मिथ्याभूतेनापि प्रपंचकारणत्वेनोपलक्षणयोयात् । इति । —सुधा, P. 102). यज्जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्वेन प्रतीतं त-द्ब्रह्मेत्येवं रूपेण मिथ्याभूतकारणत्वेनोपलक्षणसंभवादित्यर्थः । —परिमळ).

लक्ष्यलक्षणयो भेदोऽभेदो वा यदिबोभयं ।
इतिपृष्टे तदैक्यस्य गतिरेव न विद्यते ॥ —अ. व्या.

These incoherent objections are met be the Āchārya by driving the oppenent to accept विशेष a special trait in identical objects to facilitate normal transactions in the world, as otherwise even the identity between ब्रह्मन् and जीव cannot be conceived by the Advaitin.

(यद्येवं पृष्ट्वा लक्षणं दूषयसि, तदा ऐक्यस्य गतिः निरूपणप्रकारो न विद्यते । —Sudhā, P. 100).

The Advaitin admits two sets of Śrutis as authentic :— 1) Identity texts like तत्वमसि etc. and 2) Descriptive texts like सत्यंज्ञानमनंतं ब्रह्म etc. Both are explicable so as to refer to ब्रह्मन् characterised by inherent distinctive trait. (विशेष) The Śruti

तत् त्वं असि conveys, the Identity (ऐक्य). Is this identity different from the impersonal consciousness (तत् त्वं पदलक्षित चेतन्य) or the same? or both? If the ऐक्य is identical with चेतन्य, it will be self-luminous like चैतन्य and it need not be taught by the Śruti (कुतः स्वरूपस्य स्वप्रकाशत्वेन नित्यसिद्धत्वात् । तन्मात्रत्वाच्यैक्यस्य । - सुधा. P. 103). So, the Śruti तत्वमसि would be meaningless. If it is added that (अवेद्यत्वे सति अपरोक्षव्यवहारहेतुत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं) 'self luminous' means that which is not known but is capable of direct expression by words, it is replied lhat the self luminous-ness is incompatible with the "unknowableness" and so this modified definition is self-contradictory. To justify the function of the Śāstra, it is stated by the Advaitin that the Śāstra removes the misconception about 'ब्रह्मन्' as being different from जीव (भेद भ्रम) and doe not directly treat about Brahman. This is fallacious as the self luminous ऐक्य (identity) can not allow itself to be misconceived. If the ऐक्य is not manifest. then the चैतन्य which is identical with ऐक्य would remain concealed. Avidyā or Ignorance cannot envelope चैतन्य in parts also as the latter is अखंड = one solid whole. If impossible and improbable things can be adjusted by अविद्या then why not attribute it to जड (an inanimate object)? This, the Ādvaitin does not do.

Even if it is granted that the identity is known from the Śāstra, the word तत् (Tat) would convey the identity (ऐक्य) with *Chaitanya* (Conseiousness) and the remaining words त्वं असि (Tvam, asi) would be redundant. *Tvam* (Thou) *asi* (art), it may be argued, are required to remove the misconception of difference (भेदग्रह). But, when Identity is understood by *Tat*, there can be no room for misconception at all.

(तत्पदेन ऐक्यस्य प्रतिपादितत्वात् ऐक्यप्रतिपत्तौ च भेदभ्रमस्य निरस्तत्वात् । अन्यथा कदाऽप्यनिवृत्ति प्रसंगात् । Sudhā, P. 103).

Similarly, in the example सोऽयं देवदत्तः. "This Devadatta is

that person " the same objeetion of redundancy of अयं देवदत्त: (this Dēvadatta) can be advanced as the word तत् 'that' in स: conveys the sense of Dēvadatta and his identity (ऐक्य). To remove these apparent incongruities, विशेष (= distinctive trait in identical objēcts) has to be admitted. Thus, the identity conveyed by the sentence तत्त्वमसि 'That Those Art' cannot be the same as the substratun of consciousness (उपलक्षित चेतन्य). It cannot be different from it as well. For, it will be against the stand of *monism* (जपसिद्धांत).

भेदे मिथ्यात्वतो भेदसत्यत्वं स्याद्बलादपि ।
भेदाभेदौ यदि तदा स्यादेव ह्यनवस्थितिः ॥ —अ. व्या.

ऐक्य (Identity) and चैतन्य (consciousness) would both be real entities ऐक्यस्वरूपाद्भेदेऽङ्गीक्रियमाणे अपसिद्धांतः स्यात् । —Sudhā, P. 103), which is against the Advaitin's Siddhānta. According to the Advaitin, all else than Brahman is unreal. So, the identity (ऐक्य) being different from Brahman would be unreal. If the identity is false, tbe difference would necessarily be real. Further, the *unreal Identity* cannot be the object of the Śāstras, Otherwise the śāstra teaching a false thing would be unreliable aud unacceptable to the learned peaple

(अन्यथा तत्वमस्यादिशास्त्रस्य अतत्वावेदकत्वं स्यात् ।
—Sudhā P. 103.)

Here बलादपि means through व्याप्ति or concommittance viz., between two opposite things, if one is inadmissible, the other should be accepted.

(परस्परविरोधे तु न प्रकारांतरतःस्थितिः । (Sudhā) (परस्पर विरुद्धयोरन्यतरस्थितिं विना प्रकारांतरेण स्थितिः नेत्यर्थः । तथा च विरुद्धयोरन्यतरस्य मिथ्यात्वेऽन्यतरस्य सत्यत्वं स्यादेवेति भावः । —परिमळ) This is unpalatable to the Advaitin.

In the third alternative viz, that the जीव is different as well as identical with Brahman, it is aked whether भेदाभेदौ

(difference and identity) are identical with, different from, Brahman or both? If identical. the *Chaitanya* would be double natured (भेदाभेद) or भेदाभेद would be single (like Chaitanya). If different or both, an endless regress of thinking (अनवस्था) cannot be escaped. The difference (भेद) between Brahman and भेदाभेद is either different, identical or both, with Brahman. The endless chain of suppositions would vitiate the main proposition. Thus the alternative of भेदाभेद cannot be maintained, as it cannot produce the knowledge of Brahman (चेतन्य) but obstructs it. In the composite knowledge चेतन्य.देक्यं भिन्नाभिन्नं (identity) is both different and identical with (चेतन्य), the knowledge of विशेष्य and विशेषण are dependent on each other. Ultimately no knowledge is produced विशेषणप्रप्रतीतिमंतरेण विशिष्ट प्रत्ययानुपपत्त्या ज्ञप्तिप्रतिबंधकत्वात् । —P. 104).

(चैतन्यादैक्यं भिन्नभिन्नामिति विशिष्टप्रतीतिर्हि विशेषणत्वेन भेदाभेद भानमपेक्षते । विशेषणत्वेन भेदाभेदभानं च भेदाभेदरूपविशेषणस्य विशेष्यभूतैक्यस्य च भेदस्य वा भेदाभेदस्य वा भानाभावेऽनुपपन्नं । तद्भानमपि विशेषणत्वेन तज्ज्ञानं विना नेत्येवमुत्तरोत्तर भेदादिभानं विना पूर्वपूर्वभेदादिभानं न युक्तमिति ज्ञप्तिप्रतिबंधकत्वादोषएवैत्यर्थः । —परिमळ, P. 105.)

Thus, the identity (ऐक्य) cannot be proved to be different from consciousness (चेतन्य). The Advaitin tries to explain the भेदाभेद or अभेद of ऐक्य with चैतन्य without the flaw of अनवस्था by supposing that भेदाभेद or अभेद are self-luminous and need not antiticipate other series of भेदाभेद etc. which would lead to endless regress. That means they are both निर्वाहक and निर्वाह्य = they are both subject and object of conveyance (निर्वहण). Thus, we need not wait for other भेदाभेदs between चेतन्य and ऐक्य. Here again, the subject and object the action (निर्वहण) nppear. Are they different from ऐक्य or noi? If not; they would be synony-

mous which is absurd. If different, endless regress cannot be avoided.

Thus, all the explanations of the Advaitin to interpret the great sentences (महावाक्य) like तत्वमसि having failed, the Dvaitin offers a flawless remedy to tackle the problem by invoking the help of *Viśēsh* = a distinctive trait in identical objects. It is also pointed out that even in the interpretation of sub-clauses (अवांतरवाक्य) like सत्यं ज्ञानमनंतं ब्रह्म the same vicious circle of arguments like अनवस्था etc. is unavoidable.

(एवं विशेषाऽनभ्युपगमे महावाक्यार्थानुपपत्तिमभिधाय अवांतर-वाक्येऽपि तामतिदिशति । सत्येति । —Sudha).

स्वनिर्वाहकता चेत्स्याद्वाह्यं वाहकमित्यपि ।
पर्यायो भेदवान्वास्यादनवस्थाभयत्र च ॥
सत्यज्ञानादिकेऽप्येवं **न व्यावृत्त्या प्रयोजनम् ।**
व्यावृत्तस्याविशेषत्वे तदखंड च खण्डितम् ।
निर्विशेषत्वमेतेन मूकोऽहमितिवद्भवेत् ॥

The Advaitin states that सत्यत्व, ज्ञानत्व, अनंतत्व etc. are not positive attributes of ब्रह्मन् which by the alternate queries of भिन्न, अभिन्न and भिन्नाभिन्न would end in the fallacy of अनवस्था, पर्याय etc. as pointed out in the Mahāvākya तत्वमसि above. But they purport to convey the sense of warding off असत्यत्व etc. superimposed on Brahman = चेतन्य, by लक्षणा (secondary meaning).

(न च वाच्यं सत्यपदेन लक्षितस्यैव ज्ञानपदेन लक्षणायां वैयर्थ्यं। अधिक लक्षणायां च नाऽखंडार्थतासिद्धिरिति । लक्ष्यार्थभेदाभावेऽपि आरोपितासत्यत्वादिव्यावृत्त्यर्थत्वेन पदांतराणां सप्रयोजनत्वात् । अत एव न शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यम् । स्वप्रकाशेऽपि आरोपिताकारव्यावृत्यर्थत्वेन शास्त्रस्य प्रयोजनवत्वात् इति चेन्न । किं ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वेन असत्यत्वादि-व्यावृत्ति बोधः प्रयोजनमुच्यते किं वा स्वतंत्र एव व्यावृत्ति बोधः । आद्ये दोषमाह **न व्यावृत्त्येति ।** —Sudha, P. 104.

Here the Advaitin is asked to clarify his statement. Is असत्यत्व व्यावृत्ति = Warding off from unrealness, an adjective to Brahman or not. If a negative thing is conceded as an attribute of Chaitanya, why not concede the same to positive objects like सत्यत्व, ज्ञानत्व etc.

(अभावविशेषांगीकारे भावविशेषैः किमपराद्धम् । —सुधा)

Further, असत्यत्वव्यावृत्ति (removal of unrealness) cannot be the purpose of the *Sāstra* as it (व्यावृत्ति) is not coveted by the *Mumakshu* (seeker after bliss). He desires to know Brahman and his positive attributes or qualities. व्यावृत्ति or negation of unrealness is not his quality. Brahman is the object of negation according to the Advaitin. Since he (Brahman) is devoid of all traits (निर्विशेष), how can व्यावृत्ति be conceived as an attribute of Brahman? When the bank (तीर) is not denoted by the word river (नदी) there is no sense in trying to negative, that the bank is not 'river'

(न हि तीरे नदीत्वमनभिदधतो नदीपदस्य अनदीत्वव्यावृत्तिः प्रयोजनं भवति । —सुधा).

The imposition of opposite property on a thing is impossible when the thing is self-luminous and devoid of property.

Thus, the great sentence तत्वमसि etc. and the dependent clauses (अवांतरवाक्य) both cannot yield a proper sense without the intervention of a distinctive trait (विशेष) if it is assumed that ब्रह्मन् is निर्विशेष (void of all properties). It follows that Brahman is not निर्विशेष (i. e. अखंड) = निर्विशेषत्वमेतेन मूकोऽहमितिवद्भवेत् । While describing ब्रह्मन् as निर्विशेष you attribute विशेषाभाव, itself a special attribute, to Brahman. It is as good as a dumb person uttering 'I am dumb' ... a case of self contradiction. The fore-going discussion proves that a distinctive trait in identical objects has to be admitted not only by the Advaitin but by all the thinkers of different Schools of Philosophy :—

अभिन्नेऽपि विशेषोऽयं बलादापतितिह्यतः ।
विशेषतद्वतोश्चैव स्वनिर्वाहकता भवेत् ॥
भेदहीने त्वपर्याय शब्दांतर नियामकः ।
विशेषो नाम कथितः सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥

The Sudhā sums up the discussion in the following words :—

इदमुक्तं भवति । महावाक्य प्रतिपाद्यं च सत्यत्वादिकं ब्रह्मणा परस्परं चाभिन्नमेव । 'एकधैवानुद्रष्टव्य' मित्याद्यैकरसत्वप्रतिपादकश्रुतेः । न चोक्तदोषः । यतो भेदहीनेऽपि वस्तुनि अस्तिकश्चिव्द्यक्तिविशेषः येन प्रकाशमानमपि न प्रकाशते इति युज्यते । स च विशेषोऽनयैवार्थापत्त्याऽवगम्यते इत्येव त्वया वक्तव्यमिति । —Sudhā.

Even in things which are identical, this special trait (विशेष) conceals the self illumined properties and facilitates their expression as in the Mahāvākya तत्वमसि and subordinate clauses (अवातरवाक्य) सत्यंज्ञानमनंतम्, without exposing them to the defect of futility or वैयर्थ्य. The *Viśēshas* are unlike *Bhēda* and *bhēdābhēda*, innumerable and abide in every substance and are identical with the substances in which they abide. They are not open to *Anavasthā* (endless regress) as they are self-expressive. So, in the cases where the properties and substances (receptcales) are identical, the expression of difference in worldly transactions is due to this inherent trait of *Veśēsha* only. The Advaitin is thus drivin to admit *Viśēsha* in proving the identity of Jīva with ब्रह्मन्. The identity is conveyed by the Śruti एकमेव etc. The difference is noticed in the following experiences. Though चेतन्म is self-luminous, ऐक्य which is identical with it is not experienced. The luminition of self does not remove Ignorance or अविद्या whereas ऐक्यज्ञान removes it. The consciousness is one whereas the सत्यत्व, ज्ञानत्व, अनंतत्व etc. are many – these and similar experiences are traceable to the idea of difference only ;— The two apparent contradictions are silenced by admitting विशेष

which is responsible for the notion of difference in identical objects.

एतदुक्तं भवति । जीवब्रह्मैक्यादीनां एकधैवेत्यादि श्रुत्या चैतन्यस्वरूपत्वमात्रं प्रतीयते । चैतन्ये स्वप्रकाशतया सिद्धेऽप्यसिद्धिः अपर्यायशब्दवेद्यत्वं । चैतन्य प्रकाशस्य नाविद्या निवर्तकत्वं अद्वैतज्ञानस्य तन्निवर्तकत्वं इत्यर्थक्रियाविशेषाः चैतन्यमेकं सत्यत्वादीन्यनेकानि इति संख्यावैलक्षण्यमित्यादि भेदकार्याणि चावगम्यंते । एतदुभयान्यथानुपपत्त्या भेदरहितेऽपि चैतन्ये भेदप्रतिनिधिस्तत्कार्यकारी कश्चिदतिशयोऽस्तीति कल्प्यते । गत्यंतराभावात् । तथा चार्थापत्त्या स्वरूपग्राहिण्या भेदकार्यं निर्वाहक एव चा सौ सिद्ध इति किं तत्र प्रमाणांतरान्वेषणेनेति । अनेनैव विशेषस्य लक्षणं चोक्तं भवति । भेदहीनेऽप्यनुपचरित भेदव्यवहारनिमित्तं विशेष इति । —Sudhā, P. 106,

विशेषास्तेऽप्यनंताश्च परस्परविशेषिणः ।
स्वनिर्वाहकतायुक्ताः संति वस्तुष्वशेषतः ॥ —अ. व्या.

Whiteness is inseparable and is identical with the cloth though it is different from cloth (for redness may be associated with it) and whiteness and cloth are not synonymous and their functions are not interchangeable. To reconcile this incongruity the distinctive trait of *Viśēsha* should be conceded in all substances by all thinkers, not only the Māyāvādins but those who hold the world as real.

(न केवलं ब्रह्मणि मायावादिना विशेषोंऽगीकरणीयः । किं नाय प्रपंच सत्यत्ववादिभिरपि अशेषद्रव्येषु विशेषोंऽगीकर्तव्यः । तदेतदभेदभेदकार्मप्रतीत्योरन्यथानुपपत्त्या निर्भेदेऽपि पटेऽस्ति कश्चिदतिशयो भेदप्रतिनिधियंद्वशादिदं सर्वं समंजसं स्यादित्येव कल्पनीयम् । स चातिशयोऽभिन्नेऽपि विशेषकत्वाद्विशेष इति गीयते । एवमन्यत्रापि द्रव्ये विशेषः प्रतिपत्तव्यः । Sudhā, P. 106).

These *Vieśhas* though mutually distictive are eaeh identical with the other as with the substance, duc to their special

inherent capacity. (स्वनिर्वाहकतायुक्ताः । अ. व्या. See विशेषतद्वतोश्च above. पूर्वं द्रव्येण विशेषस्याभेदचिंता । इदानीं तु परस्परमिति स्फुटोऽर्थभेदः । Sudhā, P. 107). The विशेष is proved by *Arthāpatti* as stated above, though it is the object of perception. See

येन प्रत्यक्षसिद्धेन व्यवहारोऽखिलो भवेत्
भावाभावविभागेन यं विना न कथं चन ॥

एतादृशे विशेषेऽस्मिन् को द्वेषो वादिनां भवेत् ॥

—अ. व्या. वैशेषिकाधिकरण

This विशेष can not be dispensed with in lieu of भेदाभेद. For, the latter lands us into अनवस्था as pointed out above.

ननुभेदाभेदांगीकारेणानुपपत्तेः शमनात् किं विशेषेणेति चेन्न । परस्पर विरुद्धयोर्भेदाभेदयोरेकत्रावस्थान घटनायामपि विशेषस्यांगी करणीयत्वात् । प्रतीतत्वात्को विरोधः इति चेत् । सत्यं । प्रतीतिरपि कथमुपपन्नेति चिंतायां वस्तुस्वभावातिशयस्यानुसरणीयत्वात् । भेदाभेदा वस्था परिहारार्थमपि विशेषांगीकारावश्यकत्वस्योक्तत्वादिति । —Sudhā, P. 106,

See भेदाभेदौ यदि तदा स्यादेवह्यनवस्थितिरित्यादाविति भावः । —परिमळ)

अतोऽनंतगुणं ब्रह्म निर्भेदमपि भण्यते ।
एवं धर्मानिति श्रुत्या तदभेदोऽप्युदीर्यते ॥ —अ. व्या.

The objection that multiplicity of definitions (लक्षण) creates muliplicity or division in the indivisible solid *Brahma* or the oneness of Brahman would reduce all the (लक्षण) to a single entity, is silenced by the reply that many-ness and singleness in Brahman are reconciled by the peculiar trait of *Viśēsha* and they are not mutually conficiting.

यदत्रोक्तं अनेक लक्षणाभिन्नस्यानैकत्व प्रसंगो लक्षणानां वा अनेकत्वानुपपत्तिरिति । तस्योत्तरं । निर्भेदमपि अतो विशेषात् गुणानामनंतत्वं ब्रह्मणश्चैकत्वं अनंतगुणा अस्येति गुणगुण्यादि भावो ब्रह्म च गुणाश्चेत्युपुनरुक्तभवनं च युज्यते इति । —Sudhā, P. 107.

The chief characteristic of ब्रह्मन् is possession of endless auspicious qualities (गुणपूर्णत्वं) and the 'creation of the Universe' mentioned in the second *Sūtra* is only to justify and explain it (i. e. गुणपूर्णत्व).

अत्र जगज्जन्मादि कारणत्वमिति वक्तव्येऽनंतगुणमिति वचनं इदं सूत्रं अनंतगुणवत्वमेव ब्रह्मणो लक्षणमभिप्रेत्य तत्साधनाय जगज्जन्मादिकारणत्व लक्षणं प्रतिपादयितुमिदं सूत्रमिति सूचयितुम् । Sudhā, P. 107.

That there is absolutely no difference between ब्रह्मन् and his properties, is established in the *S'ruti* itself एवं धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यन् etc. The identity between His nature and properties being authentic, the verbal difference in describing ब्रह्मन् is accounted for by the peculiar trait of Viśēsha

(प्रमितमेतन्निर्भेदमेव ब्रह्म विशेषवशादेव नानाव्यवहारालंबनमिति । —सुधा, P. 107). The Advaitin holds that Brahman is both efficient and material cause of the world and not efficient only. This is disproved in the प्रकृत्यधिकरण on the ground that Brahman would then be subjet to transformation like मृत् (earth) into घट (Pot) which is against his नित्यत्व (eternality) = अविकारित्व,

III. ŚĀSTRA - YŌNITVĀDHIKARAṆAM

The conclusions of the previous *Adhikaraṇas* that the characteristic of Brahman viz. *Ananta guṇa pūrṇatva* and *shrishṭi kartṛitva* (अनंतगुणपूर्णत्व and जगज्जन्मादिकर्तृत्व) are questioned as being exposed to *Ativyāpti* as they can be applied to Śiva and Hiraṇyagarbha, as well as to the insentient Pradhāna of the Sāṁkhyas, on the evidence of Paśu-Pata- Āgama and Anumāna inferēnce only, respectively. There are two kinds of Āgamas of Śiva— (1) First is authentic, (2) the authenticity of the second has to be proved.

The following sylloligms are posed by the Pūrvapakshin ;—

(अयमर्थः। द्विविधो हि शिवप्रणीत आगमः। कश्चित्प्रत्यक्षयोग्यं संपदादिफलमुद्दिश्य साधनानि विदधत् । अपरस्तु स्वर्गापवर्गाद्य प्रत्यक्ष फलानि विदधानः शिवस्य जगज्जन्मादि कारणत्व - सर्वज्ञत्व - सर्वशक्तित्व-सत्यसंकल्पत्वाद्यशेषगुणपूर्णत्वं निरवद्यत्वं च प्रतिपादयति । तत्राऽद्यस्ताव त्प्रमाणं। तदुक्तसाधनानुष्ठाने सति प्रत्यक्षत एव फलदर्शनात्। तदयं प्रयोगः। विमतः आगमः प्रमाणं सफलप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् चरक सुश्रुतादिवत् । P. 108).

As the results correctly follow the injuctions in the Āgama, the Āgama is authentic and its author Śiva must necessarily be an Āpta (reliable). But there are certain other Āgamas of Śiva which do not yield the results promiscd there in. Their authenticity is also proved as they are the words of Śiva who is Āpta.

विप्रनिपन्नः=आगमः प्रमाणं शिववाक्यत्वात् । संप्रतिपन्नवत् ।

Thus, the Śaiva Āgamas which are authentic teach that Śiva is the creator etc. of the world.

(तदेवमनुमितप्रामाण्येन शैवागमेन शिवस्य जगज्जन्मादि कारणत्व-स्याभिधानान्नेदं लक्षणं विष्णोरुपपद्यते इति शैवाः।)

Similarly the votaries of Hiraṇyagarbha and other deities put forth their claims and deny Vishṇu the quality of creation etc. of the World.

Inference also proves the same thing, says the *Tarkika*, Earth, Sea etc. are creations (कार्य) and they must have some creator (सकर्तृक). The world is held and protected by one who is endowed with activity. It is destroyed by one who is active. Creation, protection and destruction imply the existence of the creator protector and destroyer, The three *anumanas* are respectivety :

1) क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत् ।

2) विवादाध्यासितं कर्म (आद्यकालीन परमाणुकर्मेत्यर्थः –परिमळ) प्रयत्नाधारजं कर्मत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवत् ।

3) विप्रतिपन्ने पृथिव्युदके प्रयत्नवता धृते गुरुत्वे सति अपातित्वात् ।

4) क्षित्यादिकं प्रयत्नवद्विनाश्यं विनाश्यत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवत् । इत्यादिभिरनुमानैः विश्वोदयस्थिति लयकर्तरि सामान्यतः सिद्धेऽस्मदादीनां तदसंभवाद्भगवांश्छिव एव परिशेषाज्जग-जन्मादि कर्ता सिध्यति , –सुधा P. 108.

Such a person can be Śiva only by सामान्य-परिशेष न्याय as all others including ourselves are incapable of this acheivement. The inconceivable variety of creation points to the subtlety and fullness of the intellect of the creator (सर्वज्ञत्व) and that is Śiva only. The same arguments are transposed to the other deities also

(एवमागमादनुमानाच्चान्येषां जगज्जन्मादि कारणत्वे प्राप्ते प्रतिविहितं सूत्रकृता। आगमादनुमानतो वा अन्ये जगत्कारणत्वेन न कल्पनीयाः। कुतः शास्त्रयोनित्वात् । –Sudhā, 108.)

The Āchārya controverts the arguments of the Śaivas and states that the Āgamas and Anumānas advanced to prove the जगत्कर्तृत्व etc, of Śiva are fallacious.

शैवाद्यागमसंप्राप्तदृष्टग्रेन फलेन तु ।
तद्वाक्योपमयाऽन्यच्च प्रमाणत्वेऽनुमीयते ॥
ईशवाक्यत्वत इति चेत्तद्गव्यभिचारिणा ।
अप्रामाण्यानुमा न स्यान्न पृथक्चानुमेश्वरे ॥

The results of the injuctions of the Saiva Āgama are not true as held out in them. So they are not authentic and their author Siva is not reliable. The previous अनुमान्स are opposed and disproved by the following अनुमान्स

'एतदुक्तंभवति । यदि प्रत्यक्षसंवादेन दृष्टार्थानां शिवादिवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यमनुमाय तदृष्टांतेन अदृष्टार्थानामपि शिवादिवाक्यत्वेन हेतुना प्रामाण्यमनुमीयते । तर्हि दृष्टार्थेष्वेव वाक्येषु यत्प्रत्यक्षत एव फलव्यभिचारवद्दृश्यते तस्य विमतं अप्रमाणं असमर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्वात् विप्रलंभकवाक्यवत् इत्यप्रामाण्यमनुमाय तदृष्टांतेन शिवादि वाक्यत्वादि हेतुनैव अदृष्टार्थानामपि बिमतान्यप्रमाणानि शिववाक्यत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवत् इत्यनुमातुं शक्यवे एव । न हि दृष्टार्थं सर्वमेव वाक्यं समर्थ प्रवृत्तिजनकं । विफल प्रवृत्तिजनकस्यापि बहुलमुपलंभात् । सुधा, P. 109

The Siva-Vākya which does not correspond with the result is proved to be incongruous and unanthentic. On the analogy, the other portion of the Saiva Āgama which teaches unpercivable results (अदृष्ट) is likewise unauthentic.

It may be noted that variance (disparity - विसंवाद) of results can best be attributed to some deficiency in the doer or doing when the authenticity of the words is established on incontrovertible evidence.

(प्रामाण्ये हि सुदृढनिरूढे व्यभिचारस्य कर्त्रादिवैगुण्ये कारणं कल्पनीयं । फलाव्यभिचारेणैव प्रामाण्यं परिकल्पयतः स्फुटमितरेतराश्रयत्वम् । तदेवं शैवाद्यागप प्रामाण्यस्याशक्यसाधनत्वान्न तेन जगत्कर्ता सिध्यतीति । *Ibid.*)

These arguments hold good in the cases of Hiranya-Garbha and others also.

The creative.ness of Siva cannot be proved by the above mentioned *Anumānas* (inferences) of the Advaitin

(उक्तानुमानैः कार्यत्वाद्यनुमानैरित्यर्थः । —परिमळ,)

The Pūrvapakshin is asked to state whether the *anumāna* is supported by the *Sāstra* or is independent. The Sāstras

(ऋग्यजुः सामाथर्वाश्च भारतं पञ्चरात्रकं । मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्याभिधीयते । —म. ता. नि.)

proclim that Vishnu and none else is the creator etc. of the world. This is explained fully in the समन्वयसूत्र below—

(शास्त्रस्य भगवदेकनिष्ठतायाः समन्वयसूत्रे वक्ष्यमाणत्वात्
—Sudha P. 109).

The independent (unsupported by Sruti) inference cannot function on God (Īśvara). The Sylloligm क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत् is incapable of proving the existence of God. For what is सकर्तृकत्व ? Does it mean one who has percieved and knows all the materials required to produce a thing (earth etc.) or mere agency. The former lacks in the example घट (साध्यवैकल्यम्) as the potter is not expected to (does not) know all the materials including virtue and sin (meril and demerit)

(नहि कुलालादिर्घटादिकारणानि धर्माधर्मादीनि साक्षात्कुरुते)

Similarly, कार्यत्य the minor premises also cannot be explained to exist in the *Paksha* (क्षित्यंकुरादिक) Is it to be proved because it is existent after being nonexistent (अभूत्वाभावित्व). Both are the same (साध्याविशिष्ट), so the difficuly is not solved. Further, a portion of the *Paksha* (like काल, आकाश etc.) is not अभूत्वाभावि. So the minor premises (हेतु) is partially nonexistant in the *Paksha* (भागासिद्ध). Nor, can It (कर्तृत्व) be explained by सावयवत्व, प्रदेशवत्व, संयोगि विभागि सजातीय द्रव्यांतरवत्व-तदारब्धत्व etc. All these are vitiated by व्यभिचार, व्यर्थविशेणत्व and असिद्धि. The other अनुमान्स (कर्मत्व, गुणत्वे सति पातित्व, विनाश्यत्व) are also

ineffective being exposed to व्यभिचार, सिद्धसाधनता, संदिग्धासिद्धता respectively. The inferences quoted by उदयन (Udayana) to prove the विश्वकर्तृत्व of God are also fallacious as shown in *Tarkatāṇḍava*. Further contrary inferences (सत्प्रतिपक्ष) like क्षित्यादिकं बिकर्तृकं अनुपलभ्यमान कर्तृत्वात् गगनवत् may be advanced to prove the opposite of it.

Independent inferences are, thus, incapable of proving the existence of God.

Thus, the independent inferences (स्वतंत्रानुमानानि) advanced by the Pūrvapakshin to prove Śiva as the creator of the world, were dispelled as fallacious. Now the eliminative inferences (परिशेषानुमान) are also proved to be defective in the same manner as above. It is asked whether the परिशेषानुमान is independent of Śāstra or supported by it. The Śāstras assign all agency to Bhagavān Vishṇu only. The inference unsupported by the Śāstras cannot prove Śiva as the creator of the World.

पुंस्त्वहेतुबलादेव पूर्वोक्तेनैव वर्त्मना ।
शास्त्रयोनित्वमेतेन कारणस्य बलाद्भवेत् ॥

We have shown above that the inferences purporting to prove the authenticity of the Śaiva Āgamas were contradicted by other contrary inferences thus nullifying the former; similarly. the eliminative inferences are refuted by the following contradictory syllolygms ;—

शिवः न जगत्कारणं पुंस्त्वात् देवदत्तवत् ।

The minor premises is violated in Brahman. Says the Purvapakshin; since the opponent rests on Anumāna, and does not recognise *Śāstra* as Pramāṇa, the production etc. of the world cannot be ascribed to Brahman. So there is no (व्यभिचार) (disparity) to the अनुमान. In the *Pariśēshānunnāna* (परिशेषानुमान) the major premises, says the Pūrvapakshin, is proved only directly by the process of elimination and the above inference will not act as a contradiction to it directly. It is replied that

the contradiction in sense whether direct or indirect serves to nullify the previous *Inference*. Otherwise such contradictions will not have to be treated as defects of अनुमान. The contradiction in sense is elucidated, clearly in the Śrinivāstirthya Commentary as follows :—

घटः पटो न भवतीत्युक्ते घटे पटप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकं घटत्वं नास्तीत्यर्थ लाभेन अन्योन्याभावस्य अत्यंताभावव्याप्यतया शिवो न जगत्कारणमिति शिवे जगत्कारणप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावे साधिते सति शिवे प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकीभूतं जगत्कारणत्वं नास्तीत्यर्थलाभेन जगत्कारणत्वं शिव निष्ठमित्येतद्विरुद्धार्थं साधकत्वेन आर्थिक प्रतिपक्षत्वमस्येति ध्येयम् ।
—श्रीनिवासतीर्थीय. P. 70.

There is no evidence or purpose in holding that धर्मी or पक्ष should be the same in the original and its opposite inferences (तत्कथमयमस्य प्रतिपक्ष इति चेन्न । विरुद्धार्थ साधनमात्रेण प्रतिपक्ष संभवात् । प्रयोगतोऽप्येक धर्मिनिष्ठतायाः प्रमाणप्रयोजन शून्यत्वात् । अन्यथा एवं विधार्थिक प्रतिपक्षाणां अन्यत्रानंतर्भावेनादूषणत्व प्रसंगात् ।
– Sudhā, P. 110.)

The contradiction cannot be denied. Thus the Āgama and Anumāna cannot probe into the realm of God Vishṇu. Only the Śāstras are competent to describe Him as stated in the Śruti,

'नावेदविन्मनुतेदं बृहंतं । नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनेया । नैद्रियाणि नानुमानं वेदाह्येवैनं वेदयंति । etc.

The view of the *Naiyāyikas* that omniscience of God can be proved by the inference in syllologyms like Earth sprouts etc. must have a creator as they are productions क्षित्यंकुरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत् । where agency (कर्तृत्व) implies knowledge of the materials of production, is controverted by the contrary syllolygms ईश्वरः किंचिज्ज्ञः पुंस्त्वात् देवदत्तवत् ।

वनकृत्वादि रूपेण पक्षभूतस्य चेशितुः ।
किंचिज्ज्ञत्वं हि पुंस्त्वेन शक्यं साधयितुं सुखम् । —अ. व्या.

Here, the forest should have a creator (producer), but he cannot be assumed to be omniscient.

वृक्षकृन्नाखिलं वृक्षं वेत्ति पुंस्त्वाद्धि चैत्रवत् ।
इत्याद्यनुमया स्पर्धिनानुमानं परेशितुः ।
शक्तं विज्ञापने चातिप्रसंगोऽनुमयेदृशा ॥

The producer of the forest does not know all and knows only a little like a producer of pot. So, inference cannot grasp the powers and properties of God who is known only from the Vedas. Anumanas unsupported by the Sāstras are ineffective in the investigation of Brahman, and would lead to absurd conclusions.

(अनेनैव न्यायेन सर्वत्र प्रतिपक्षसंभवात् सत्यसंकल्पत्वा—शरीरत्व नित्यज्ञानेच्छाप्रयत्नत्व दुःखादिराहित्यादिकमपि नानुमानेन साधयितुं शक्यमित्याशयवानाह ॥ इत्यादीति ॥ .... अथासमानयोगक्षेमं चेश्वरानुमानजातमित्याह । चातिप्रसंग इति ॥ —Sudhā, P. 111.)

The absurdities (अतिप्रसंग) are enumerated in the following Kārikā :—

वस्तुत्वात्तुरगः शृंगी पुष्पवत्खं सुतैर्युता ।
चित्रिणी च रसः षष्टोरसत्वात्सोत्तरो भवेत् ॥

A horse is horned because it is a substance (like cow), the sky is flowery, for it is a substance, a sterile woman (चित्रिणी) has sons because she is a woman. रस (pathos) has a successor to the Sixth (Seventh) being a रस (pathos). Independent inferences would lead to such impossible conclusions which cannot be acceptable to anybody.

(ईश्वरानुमानस्य प्रमाणतायां तेषामपि प्रामाण्यं स्यादिति शेषः । Sudhā, P. 111).

It is argued by the Pūrvapakshin that if inference is not accepted, the very function of the scientific investigation of the Brahma Mīmāṁsā Śāstra would be cut short and frustrated. To this, it is replied :

उपक्रमादि लिंगेभ्यो नान्या स्यादनुमानतः । —अ. व्या.

True, but we do not reject inference totally, provided it is aided by the Āgama. उपक्रम (beginning) उपसंहार (conclusion) and other criteria of interpretation which are none else than forms of inferences are pressed into service in interpreting the Vedas to get the knowledge of *Brahman*, if these criteria are supporated by the *Āgama* (i. e. अपौरुषेयवेद = unhuman or unwritten speech which is free from flaws) the *anumānas* would be admissible as instruments of correct knowledge about God etc., *Yukti* or reason (*anumāna*) is accepted as Pramāṇa only when it is supported by the Śāstra as stated in the *Karma-Nirṇaya*.

(कर्मनिर्णयें युक्तिश्चेत्यादिग्रंथे कर्तृत्वादौ कार्यत्वादीनां अनुमानानामंगीकारादाह । आगमानुगृहीतेति । - परिमळ, P. 109. आगमानुग्रहीतानुमानोपलक्षणमेतत् । आगमानुग्रहे हि सर्वाण्येतान्यनुमानान्येव । पक्षधर्मतादीनामंगानां अपौरुषेयतया स्वतः प्रमाणेन शास्त्रेण सिद्धेः । प्रतिपक्षादीनां तद्विरोधेन बाधादिति संक्षेपः । —Sudhā, P. 111.)

The Advaitin interprets the Sūtra शास्त्रयोनित्वात् । differently. He states that the omniscience of Ged indicated in the previous Sūtra is exemplified by the statement that he is the author of *Śāstra* (शास्त्रस्य योनिः). This is not correct, *Śāstra* is only a portion of the world of which God is stated to be the creator, in the previous Sūtra. How can it help clarify the point. It cannot be argued that to reject the claim of the Sāṁkhyas for Pradhāna (Matter) as creator, omniscience is advanced as the property of the creator in this *Sūtra*. For the Pradhan being *Jaḍa* inanimate; cannot be credited with knowledge; but the Sāṁkhya who does not recognlse ब्रह्मन् as creator cannot be expected to credit him with the authorship of the Vedas. Further, the *Īkshatyadhikaraṇa* where the creator is distinguished from Pradhāna by *Īkshaṇa* (knowledge) would be redundant

(तत्रापि ईक्षणरूपहेतुना प्रधानकारणत्व निरासादितिभावः ।
—परिमळ.)

It is not correct that a non-author of a thing is unable to know it. A non-maker of a pot i.e. a weaver *can know* the pot. What does the authorship of Vēda mean? Is it merely repeating the existing Vēda or composing the sentences with the knowledge of their component parts. The former does not invest the repeater with knowledge and the latter reduces the God as an ignorant human being. If it is explained that due to the capacity of investigation of ब्रह्मन् (विज्ञानशक्ति). ब्रह्मन् is misconceived as Śāstra, (Śāstra is superimposed on Brahman)

(तस्यैव विज्ञानशक्ति विवर्तत्वाच्छास्त्रस्येति चेन्न । वियदादीनामपि प्रकाशशक्ति प्रसंगात् । —सुधा, P. 112)

then like Śāstra, the sky etc. which are the transformations (विवर्त) of Brahman's intellectual capacity (ब्रह्मविज्ञानशक्ति) should have to be accepted as the source of knowledge which is against experience. Further, the capacity of enveloping a thing in Ignorance (अविद्या) will have to be attributed to the receptacle (अधिष्ठान) ब्रह्म (अविद्यायाश्चैतन्ये आरोपितत्वात् ।) and be considered as *real*. It is incongruous to suppose the capacity of the superimposed thing in the receptacle. For, the Vedas which are superimposed upon Brahman are *means* to knowledge whereas the receptacle *Brahman* is the *agent*. So, the relevency of the interpretation of the Advaitin in the present context cannot be established. The point is made clear in the *Parimaḷa* as follows:—

ब्रह्मणो या विज्ञानशक्तिः तयैव ब्रह्म शास्त्रत्वेन भ्रमविषयत्वमापद्यते इति शास्त्रस्य ब्रह्मविज्ञानशक्तिविवर्तत्वं अत आरोप्ये वेदे विज्ञान जनकत्वात् अधिष्ठानेऽपि ब्रह्मणि विज्ञानशक्तिः सत्यभूतोपेयेति सार्वज्ञ सिद्धिरितिभावः । वियदादेरपि शास्त्रस्येव विज्ञानशक्ति विवर्तत्वस्य वाच्यत्वात् शास्त्रस्येव तस्याप्यर्थज्ञानजनकत्वं स्यादित्याह ।

वियदादीनामपीति । आरोप्यगताशक्तिरधिष्ठाने अवश्यमंगीकार्येत्यत्र दोषांतरमाह ॥ अविद्यादीति । -- परिमळ, P. 109.

Further, the capacity of superimposed thing is not found in its receptacle

(आरोपित वेदस्य ज्ञानजननशक्तित्वेऽपि अधिष्ठाने विज्ञानशक्तिर्नास्ति । येन सार्वज्ञ्यसिद्धिः स्यादिति भावेनाह । **कुत्रचिदिति ।** —परिमळ, P. 110. कुत्रचेदमुपलब्धंमारोप्यगता शक्तिरारोप्याधिष्ठाने वास्तवीति । —सुधा, —भुजंगगतभयजनकत्व शक्तेः रज्जावभावादिति भावः । श्री. तो.

Thus, the interpretation of the Sūtra by the Advaitin is ncorrect and cannot be maintained at all.

IV. SAMANVAĀDHIKARAṆAM

॥ ॐ तत्तु समन्वयात् ॐ ॥

Yes, says the Pūrvapakshin, we admit that the efficient cause of the World is known from the *Sāstras* only. But this characteristic of creation, protection and destruction of the world is attributed to Hiraṇyagarbha, Hara and Pradhāna also in (some portions of the *Sāstras*.

एको रुद्रो न द्वितीयोऽवतस्थे । हिरण्यगर्भः समवर्तताग्रे । प्रधानादिदमाविरासीत् । जीवाद्भवंति भूतानि ।

So, the definition is अतिव्यापक. Śiva, Hiraṇyagarbha etc. are not the names of Vishṇu though the direction of the Śruti "all names denote Him only," (नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशंति ।) points to it. For, the sense of words is determined by etymology and intention of the author (शक्ति तात्पर्य). Though they may convey the sense of Vishṇu by etymology (शक्ति) the purport in favour of Vishṇu is not made known. Hence the conclusion of the previous Sūtra is vitiated. To this, Vēdavyāsa the author of the Sūtras asserts that the entire Śāstra primarily refers to Vishṇu only by the tests of sense yielding criteria (उपक्रमोपसंहारौ etc) Neither the superficial meaning nor the gloss of the Commentator at his will will yield the correct sense of the Śāstra.

(वेदगतोपक्रमाद्यननुगुणं यत्पशुपत्यादि रूपव्याख्यातृणां पाशुपतादि ग्रंथरूपवचनं तत् (व्याख्यातृ वचनं) इत्यर्थः । —परिमळ, P. 110)

न शास्त्र तात्पर्यगतौ आपातप्रतीतिर्वा व्याख्यातृ वचनं वा लिंगं । किंतु उपक्रमादय एव । तेषामव्यभिचारित्वत् । प्रतीतिव्याख्यानयोस्तु व्यभिचारित्वात् । यत्रापि प्रतीतिव्याख्याने न व्यभिचारतः तत्रापि उपक्रमाद्यनुसंधानपूर्वकत्वेनैव न तु स्वतः । अतः उपजीव्यत्वादुपक्रमादीनामेव तात्पर्यलिंगत्वमिति । तदिदमाह । त एवेति ॥ -सुधा, P. 112.)

त एवान्वयनामानस्तैः सम्यक् प्रविचारिते ।
मुख्यार्थो भगवान् विष्णुः सर्वशास्त्रस्य नाऽपरः ॥ —अ. व्या:

They (उपक्रमादयः) are called अन्वय 'binders of word with the sense inviolably' whereas the first imprression (आपातप्रतीति) or the baseless commentary (or both) detract the word from the required sense. The singular number अन्वयात् in तत्तुसमन्वयात् which represents the several criteria (उपक्रमादि), conveys the integrity or non-disparity of the sense yielded by them. The preposition सम् (properly) denotes that the criteria should be properly assessed as to their power so that the apparent sense derived by the superificial application of the tests may be rejected

(ननु च प्रतीति ध्याख्यानवदुपक्रमादीनामपि क्वचित्तात्पर्य व्यभिचार दर्शनात्कथं लिंगत्वमित्या शंका निरासाय सम्यक् प्रविचारिते इत्युक्तम् । Sudhā, P. 112.)

The proper assessment is explained in the Sudhā as consisting in the determination of their weakness or strength depending upon their yielding single or variant meanings etc., and in the rejection of the weaker sense in preference to the stronger one etc.

(उपक्रमादीनां श्रुत्यादीनां च सन्निकर्ष विप्रकर्षाभ्यां सावकाशत्वादिना च बलाबलनिश्चयपुरःसरं विरोधे बलवता दुर्बलबाधया **वाक्यार्थ विमर्शः सम्यक्प्रविचारणं** । तेन नोपक्रमादिमात्रं लिंगमुच्यते । येन व्यभिचारोद्भावनं संगच्छेत । किंतु सम्यक प्रविचार लक्षणावांतर व्यापारोपेता एवोपक्रमादयः । न च ते क्वचिद्व्यभिचरंतीत्युक्तं भवति । —Sudhā, P. 112.)

The procedure of test as narratcd in the Sudhā passage quoted above is explained fully in thc *Bhāshya* and *Tīkā* under the Sūtras तत्तुसमन्वयात् and शब्दादेव प्रमितः ।

(एतत्सूत्रे शब्दादेवेत्यत्र च श्रीमद्भाष्यस्य टीकायामुक्तरीत्येत्यर्थः । —Parimala, P. 111

सम् also means primariness and entirety, the word. *śāstra* should be detached from *Śāstrayōnita* of the previous Sūtra. तत् = ब्रह्म = God Vishṇu तु = *emphasis* that and no other, The Sūtra is construed in the Sudhā thus :—

अन्वयात् उपक्रमादि लिंगसमुदायात् । शास्त्रे सम्वक् प्रविचारिते सति, **सर्वशास्त्रस्य** भगवत्येव सम्यक् वचनवृत्या अन्वयात्, शक्ति-तात्पर्य लक्षण संबंधावगमात् तत् विष्णवाख्यं ब्रह्मैव जगज्जन्मादि कारणत्वेन शास्त्रयोनि न तु हरहिरण्यगर्भादयः इति । P. 113.

By the criteria of उपक्रम etc. and श्रुतिलिंग etc. the entire Śāstra being examined (एतदवगम्यते इति वाक्यशेषः —सुधा) thus is known :– By import and etymology, *primary sense* of the entire śāsra is Brahman (only) called Vishṇu as the cause of the generation of the whole world, and not Hara or Hiraṇyagarbha etc.

There is propriety in stating that Brahman is the object of the primary - not secondary (लक्षणा) sense as the primary sense of each word covers the basic quality or propety (प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ति = cause of verbal expression) of a thing denoted by it and the innumerable words of the endless Vēdas, the entire Śāstra would thus yield inumerable (अनंत) (कतिपयवाक्यैरनंतगुणा प्रतिपादनात् —Sudhā) qualities of Brahman. The secondary sense on the other hand ignores the primary meanings and to that extent thc qualities denoted by them will be limited.

(अनंतगुणपरिपूर्णत्वं हि प्रधान लक्षणं । तत्र च शास्त्रं प्रमाणी क्रियमाणं बचनवृत्या सर्वमेव च युक्तम् । लक्षणादिना बृत्तौ वाच्यार्थ गुणालाभात् । वाच्ये तद्गुणप्रसंगाच्च । —सुधा, **P.** 113.)

Now, a query is raised regarding the wording of the Sūtra. The Sūtra should be lcast lettered (अल्पाक्षर). So, the body of the Śūtra could be तु समन्वयात् and तत् could be drawn out from the second Sūtra जन्माद्यस्य यतः (तत्) by the process of frog-hopping (मण्डूकप्लुति॰याय) that is तत् hops from the second Sūtra

over to the fourth. It is replied that if तत् is not specifically inserted in the Sūtra, the construction of the word तु in the Sūtra would be difficult to explain 'तु' is intended to convey contrast i. e. to eliminate the possibilities of Hara etc, from the *Lakshaṇa* and emphasise it in तत् = Brahman. True, it can be construed with the तत् carried from the second Sūtra. But, the tendency is usually to be contrued with what is present and तु without तत् may possibly be taken with अन्वय which is present. But this is not wanted. It may be said that to avoid the superficial meaning and wrong commentary, it is economical to use the word तु with अन्वय. But the etymological sense itself of the word अन्वय used in the Sūtra debara the आपातप्रतीति etc. (superficial sense and commentary) and तु is not necessary for that purpose. Here again अन्वय is used to mean उपक्रमादि etc. only and will not debar the आपातप्रतीति etc. which is done by तु being contrued with अन्वय. But तु has to weed out Hara, Hiraṇyagarbha who are posed by the Pūrvapakshin as जगज्जन्मादि-कर्तृ (creator of the world etc). So, the main purpose of the Sūtra to remove the अतिव्याप्ति of the लक्षण is served by construeing तु with तत् only in the absence of which it is possibly taken with अन्वय as stated above.

The Advaitin explains सम् with अन्वय as conveying the sense of indivisible (अखण्ड) ब्रह्मन् by लक्षणा = secondary meaning. This is untenable since there is no अखण्ड ब्रह्मन् at all. The indivisibility of ब्रह्मन् is refuted above (तदखण्डं च खण्डितं) and in the ईक्षत्यधिकरण below.

V. ĪKSHATYADHIKARAṆA

।। ॐ ईक्षतेनाऽशब्दम् ।।

It was proved above that the entire Śāstra denotes Brahman only by the primary (etymological) sense. This is denied, as the Śrūti (यतो वाचो निवर्तंते । अशब्दमस्पर्श मित्यादि श्रुतेः) explicitly states that words cannot even approach Brahman and withdraw from him. He is beyond speech, beyond touch etc. The Smrlti शब्दो न यत्र पुरुकारकवान् (–भागवत) which definitely states that word with six *Kārakas* does not function on him (God), also points to the same conclusion. The primary sense of a word depends upon substance (द्रव्य), species (जाति), quality (गुण), and action (क्रिया). Brahman is none of these. So, the stand of primary sense of the Siddhantin is unsound. Further, we are not competent to know the sense of the inumerable Śāstras (अनंत) by the criteria of उपक्रम – etc. If a portion can be studied and known to refer to Brahman, the remaining portion may treat about other deities. This doubt hangs on to us and cannot lead to any decision. So the thesis of गुणपूर्णत्व and जगज्जन्मादिकर्तृत्व of Brahman made out in the foregoing Sūtras falls flat to the ground. This objection is set at rest by the Sūtrakara in this *Adhikaraṇa*. The first Sūtra is :—

(1) ॐ इक्षतेर्नाऽशब्दम् ॐ ॥

Īkshati (ईक्षति) in the Sūtra (तिपा धातुनिर्देशः) stands for the root ईक्ष्. Its meaning (= knowledge तदर्थोऽनेनोपलक्ष्यते) should be understood. How is *knowledge* related to *Brahman* in the present context? It is none else than 'object' ness of ब्रह्मन् i.e. ब्रह्मकर्मकं ईक्षणं. This does not provide the ground for stating that ब्रह्म is not अशब्द (is not beyond speech), as ब्रह्मकर्मकेक्षण, being व्याधिकरण cannot rest with Brahman (i.e. there will be no पक्षधर्मता). Hence, the reason ब्रह्मकर्मकेक्षणं, should be transposed as ईक्षणकर्मत्व

which is found in Branman. अशब्दं means अवाच्यं i. e. where words cannot function. ब्रह्म बाध्यं भवितुमर्हति न पुनरवाच्यं ईक्षणकर्मत्वात् घटवत्! ब्रह्मन्'s being the object of knowledge is proved by the Śrūtis 'स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्परात्पुरीशयं पुरुषमीक्षते । आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् etc. · He sees the Purusha lying in the body, different from Prakriti, one should see God in oneself (mind) i. e. mediate upon God' ete. In order to firmly establish वाच्यत्व (expressibleness) by refuting the opponent's view, the method of two negatives has been adopted in अशब्दं न (अवाच्यं न = वाच्यमेव). Here the Pūrvapakshin examines the sylloligm in some detail. He advances the अप्रयोजकत्वशंका (हेतुरस्तु साध्यं माऽस्तु) and sees no objeetion to stick to अवाच्यत्व; one need not say that if ब्रह्मन् is अवाच्य, he will not be ईक्षणविषय, (व्यापकाभावात् व्याप्यनिवृत्तिः) and without ब्रह्मेक्षण i.e. ब्रह्मज्ञान emancipation will not be possible. He replies वाच्यत्व is व्यापक and ईक्षणीयत्व is व्याप्य. He avers that ईक्षणीयत्व (being the object of knowledge from sense organs (प्रत्यक्ष), reason (अनुमान) and word (आगम) and their perversions (आभास) is on the other hand व्यापक (more widely spread) and वाच्यत्व which is limited to the primary sense-yielding capacity of the word only, is व्याप्य. The Siddhāntin affirms that the knowledge conducive to emanicipation is not the one described above by the Pūrvapakshin, but is derived from the Satras as Brahman is not amenable to Pratyaksha and Anumāna, So, only वाच्यत्व is व्यापक and ईक्षणीयत्व is व्याप्य and the अप्रयोजकत्वशंका cannot be advanced for the reason stated above. It is true that here व्यापकाभाव i. e. वाच्यत्वाभाव is not possible to state since all things are वाच्य. (वाच्यत्व is केवलान्वयि); still we can adopt here व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति i. e. यत्र ईक्षणीयत्वाभावाभावः (शब्दैकसमाधिगम्यत्व) तत्र वाच्यत्वं यथा धर्मादि. ईक्षणीयत्व has been explained to mean in the present context, शब्दैकगम्यत्व (being the object of speech only).

वाच्यत्वरूप साध्याभावस्य शब्दैकजन्यत्व विषयत्वरूपहेत्वभावेन सह व्याप्त्यभाव इत्यर्थः । सर्वस्यापि वस्तुनो वाच्यत्वेन साध्याभावस्य

क्वाप्यभावादितिभावः । यत्र शब्दैकसमधिगम्यत्वं तत्र बाच्यत्वं यथा-धर्मादीति दृष्टांत संभवात् व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति संभवादिति भावः । यत्र शब्दैकसमधिगम्यत्वं तत्र वाच्यत्वं यथाधर्मादीति दृष्टांतसंभवात् व्यतिरेकव्याप्ति संभवादित्युक्तं । – परिमळ, P. 112.

or a general concommittance such as

यद्यत्कारकाविषयः तत्तत्क्रियाऽविषयः यथा कुठाराद्यविषयो गगनं न छिदाविषयः । इति सामान्यव्याप्ति संभवाच्च । सुधा, P. 114

whatever is not graspad by the instruments, that is not the object of the result (क्रिया) of the instruments.

The अप्रयोगकत्व is advanced in two ways ;— (1) ईक्षणीयत्व —being the primary object of wider knowledge is व्यापक and (2) being the secondary object (लक्ष्य) of knowledge i. e. by लक्षणा. The first was removed by stating on the strength of the शास्त्रयोनित्व सूत्र etc. that Ikshanīyatva is व्याप्य only and means शब्दैकसमधिगम्यत्व and वाच्यत्व is व्यापक. The second will be removed as being unfounded and impossible,

नतावदित्यादिना ईक्षणीयत्व हेतोरप्रयोजकत्वं हि कारणांतर जन्यज्ञान विषयत्वनिमित्तं वृत्त्यंतर विषयत्व निमित्तं च । तत्राऽऽद्यं । शास्त्रयोनिसूत्रादि पर्यालोचनया सुपरिहरमिति स्वयं परिहृत्य द्वितीया प्रयोजकत्व चोद्यनिवर्तकतया मूलमवतारयति । ननु माभूदित्यादिना —परिमळ, P. 112).

ईक्षणीयत्वतो विष्णुः वाच्य एव न चाऽन्यथा ।
लक्ष्यत्वं क्वापि दृष्टं हि किं तदित्यनवस्थितिः ॥ —अ. व्या.

On the ground of *Ikshaṇīyatva* (being the object of knowledge), Brahman is proved to be the primary object of word (वाच्य) and the contrary (i.e. without वाच्यत्व = लक्ष्यत्व) is not possible to stand.

(वाच्यत्वस्य लक्ष्यत्वा व्यापकत्वात् कथं तदभावेन लक्ष्यत्वाभावापादनम् इत्यत आह। केन चिच्छब्देनेति । —परिमळ, P. 112).

तस्मादवाच्यत्वे ब्रह्मणो लक्ष्यत्वायोगःत् लक्षणयाऽपि नेक्षणीयत्वमिति शेषः । केन चिच्छब्देन वाच्यमेव हि तीरादिकं केन चिल्लक्ष्यं दृष्टमिति ।) —Sudhā, P. 114.

It is noticed that the secondary sense (लक्ष्य) is based on its being denoted primarily by a word. Thus in the तर्क. यदि वाच्यं न स्यात् तर्हि लक्ष्यं न स्यात्, the अप्रयोजकत्व शंका i. e. let it be अवाच्य. still let it be लक्ष्य वाच्यत्वाभावोऽस्तु लक्ष्यत्वाभावो मास्तु, is vltiated by the endless regress (अनवस्था). The endless regress ts very beautifully explained in the Sudhā :—

इदमुक्तं भवति । लाक्षणिको हि शब्दो न श्रुतमात्रोऽर्थांतरे धियमुपजनयति । तत्रागृहीतशक्तित्वात् । किंतु बाच्यार्थे बुद्धिमुत्पाद्य तदनुपपत्तिदर्शने सति । न तावताऽपि । वाच्यार्थानुपपत्ति दर्शनस्य तत्त्यागमात्रहेतुत्वात् । किं नाम अर्थांतरस्य स्वरूपतो वाच्यार्थसंबंधितया चावगतौ सत्याम् । गंगादिशब्देन हि स्वरूपतो गंगादिसंबंधितया च अवगतमेव तीरादिकं लक्ष्यं दृष्टम् । नाऽनवगतस्वरूपं कूर्मरोमादि । नाऽप्यन्यसंबंधितयाऽवगतं तीरादि । तथा च वैदिकशब्दलक्ष्यत्वे ब्रह्मणः प्रतीतिरंगीकरणीया । न च तीरादिवत् प्रत्यक्षादिना तस्य प्रतीतिः संभवति । ततो लाक्षणिक शब्दे प्रयुक्ते वाच्यार्थे ऽनुपपत्ति पश्यतो लक्ष्यार्थे किं तद्यदनेन लक्ष्यमिति जिज्ञासायां शब्द एव प्रयोक्तव्यः । तेनाऽपि चेन्न वाच्यं किंतु लक्ष्यमेव । तर्हि पुनः किं तदिति जिज्ञासाया अनिवृत्तत्वात् शब्दांतरमेव वाच्यं । तेनाऽपि चेल्लक्ष्यमेव पुनर्जिज्ञासैवेत्यपर्यवसानं स्यात् । पूर्वं पूर्वं लक्षणा सिद्धौ उत्तरोत्तर लक्षणाऽसिद्धेर्मूलक्षतिः । यदि केन चिच्छब्देन वाच्यं स्यात्तदा तदुक्तावुपरतजिज्ञासो लाक्षणिकार्थं प्रतीयात् । Sudhā, P. 114.

The gist of the above discussion may be compassed in the following words ;— A secondary word (गंगा in गंगायां घोषः) (Gangā in 'a village on the Gages') does not convey the sense of "Bank", for there is no natural contact (शक्ति) of the word with it. The primary sense of the word should first be grasped

and its incongruity in the context should be understood. Further, a sense which has a contact with the primary meaning should be selected. So, the *Bank* should first be known primarily (स्वरूपतः) by the word 'Bank' and should be connected with the primary sense of the secondary word the river Gaṅgā. Otherwise, if the Bank is denoted by a secondary word, that secondary word should have a secondary sense and the chain of suppositions will never end. So, the secondasy sense (Bank) should be denoted by some primary word i. e. तीर,

(केन चिच्छब्देन वाच्यमेव हि तीरादिकं केन चिल्लक्ष्यं दृष्टमिति ।
—सुधा·

Similarly, if ब्रह्मन् is लक्ष्य like तीर (Bank), he should be वाच्य by some word as तीर is by the word तीर.

All right; the same defect befalls on the Siddhāntin also. For, if Brahman is वाच्य, the contact between word and sense i.e. शक्ति) should first be known. Since Brahman who is an antecedent of the sense contact is known by the Upanishad only (words), the contact cannot be known except by other words, This leads to *add infinitum* अनवस्था·

(संबंधस्य द्विनिष्ठत्वेन संबंध ज्ञानस्य संबंधि ज्ञानाधीनत्वात् शब्दरूप संबंधिनः प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि ब्रह्मरूपसंबंधिनः औपनिषदत्वेन शब्देनैव पूर्वं तत्सिद्धे वाच्यत्वेन तत्राऽप्येवमित्यनवस्थेत्यर्थः । —परिमळ, P. 112.

This contingency is removed in the *Abhimāna - Naya*

शास्त्रोक्त वस्तुनश्चैव व्युत्पत्तिः शास्त्रलिंगतः । —अ व्या·
यौगिकानां शब्दानां वाक्यतुल्यतया पृथक् संगतिग्रहणानपेक्षत्वादित्यादि समाधानानां शास्त्रोक्त वस्तुनश्चैव व्युत्पत्तिः शास्त्रलिंगतः । इत्ये तव्द्याख्याप्रस्तावे वक्ष्यमाणत्वादिति भावः । —परिमळ, P. 112.

This point is discussed in the first *Adhikaraṇa* while explaining the meaning of *Brahma* which as a sentence (बृहंतो ह्यास्मिन् गुणाः) does not require the knowledge of contacts between constituent words as in श्रोतियश्छंदोऽधीते,

The Pūrvapakshin denies the necessity of वाच्यत्व for लक्ष्यत्व. For the varieties of sweetness of sugar-cane, milk, Jaggery etc. which are not denoted by any specific words

इक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां माधुर्यस्यांतरं महत् ।
भेदस्तथाऽपि नाऽऽख्यातुं सरस्वत्याऽपि शक्यते ॥

इति —सुधा, P. 115.

are obviously understood by the secondary process of लक्षणा. The Āchārya replies that it is an instance of glare ignorance of the objector to say that the varieties of sweetness are not expressed by words primarily. For, it is well-known from the Purāṇas,

विशदं क्षीरमाधुर्यं स्थिरमाज्यस्य तीक्ष्णकं ।
गुडस्य पनसादीनां निर्हारीत्यभिधीयते ॥ इति ॥

that these distinctions are recorded in the works of the respective sciences just as the varieties of tunes and rhymes are expressed and explained in the treatises on Music. To impute ignorance to the Goddess of speech (सरस्वती) is to court heinous sin and derogation against God. (ततश्चेक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां मितिवचनमात्मनो व्युत्पत्यभावख्यापनार्थं शारदानिंदया प्रत्यवायार्जनार्थं च ।)

The concommittance between वाच्यत्व and लक्ष्यत्व (यदि वाच्यं न स्यात् तर्हि लक्ष्यं न स्यात् ।) is further questioned by the Pūrvapakshin by quoting the example of नदी तीरे पंच फलानि संति uttered by a cheat. The sense of the sentence is always secondary not being derived from the primary meaning of the words comprising it, according to the authority,

वाक्यार्थो लक्ष्यमाणो हि सर्वत्रैवेति नः स्थितिः ।

For, the contact of sense with the sentence is not conceded. Hence its secondary sense is known directly without the medium of वाच्यार्थ (primary sense). So, ब्रह्मन् is the sense of the sentence and not of the words which would require the knowledge of contact between word and sense. He is therefore लक्ष्य and not वाच्य.

True, the Siddhāntin replies. But the meaning of वाक्यार्थ (sense of the sentence) is derived primarly from the word (वाक्यार्थ). Otherwise what is the primary sense of the word. (वाक्यार्थ)? The conceding to the view of the opponent that वाच्यार्थ is लक्ष्यार्थ of the words in lhe sentence is only in a spirit of compromise. For, it has been already established in the जिज्ञासाधिकरण that the sentence has a sense-yielding power by the mutual contact of the words in it by the process of अन्विताभिधान. न ह्यस्माभिः लक्षकेणैव शब्देन वाच्यत्वमाशास्यते । किं तु केन चिच्छब्देन वाच्यमे केन चिच्छब्देन लक्ष्यमिति भावः । Sudha, P. 115.

(शक्तिश्चैवान्विते स्वार्थे इत्यादिना । जिज्ञासाधिकरणे पदानामेव-पदार्थेऽन्वयरूपवाक्यार्थे च शक्तेः प्रतिपादितत्वादित्यर्थः। परिमळ, P. 112)

That ब्रह्मन् is the sense of the sentence is not acceptable since he is not a 'contact' or 'contacted', nor is he an indivisible whole as already established in the जन्मादिसूत्र above.

Thus, the अप्रयोजकत्व and व्यभिचार having been dispelled, the व्याप्ति (concommittance) between ईक्षणीयत्व and अवाच्यत्वाभाव i.e. वाच्यत्व is confirmed. This is stated in the Kārikā नाऽवाच्यं तेन किञ्चित्स्यात् ।

नाऽवाच्यं तेन किंचित्स्याद्यत इत्यादिकैर्वदन् ।
अवाच्यत्वं कथं ब्रूयात् मूकोऽहमितिवत्सुधीः ॥

Or नाऽवाच्यं तेन किंचित्स्यात् may be taken to provide another instance of absurdity if ब्रह्मन् is not वाच्य. viz.

यदि ब्रह्म अवाच्यं स्यात् तर्हि तस्य वस्तुत्वं न स्यात् ।

(अथवा ब्रह्मणोऽवाच्यत्वे तस्य वस्तुत्वमेव न स्यात् । यतोऽवाच्यं किंचिदपि नास्तीति प्रसंगांतरसूचनमिदं ॥ —सुधा, P. 115.)

Further, the Pūrvapakshin seeks to level the objection of प्रमाणबाध (कालात्ययापदिष्ट) to the inference ब्रह्म वाच्यं ईक्षणीयत्वात् । the वाच्यत्व (i. e. साध्य) is directly opposed to the Sruti यतो वाचो निवर्तंते अप्राप्य मनसा सह etc. This, however, is fallacious as the

Śruti does not purport to teach the अवाच्यत्व (absolute indescribability) of Brahman. येन, यतः in the Upanishad यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायंते येन जातानि etc. refer to Brahman. Having described ब्रह्मन् with these words, how can the Śruti teach in the same breath the indescribablity of Brahman at all? Otherwise, it will amount to contradiction in action like 'I am Dumb'. (मूकोऽहमितिवत् स्वक्रियाविरोधात् ।). If the words in the Upanishad cited above are taken as secondary (लक्षक) and the sense ब्रह्मन् as लक्ष्य, it is replied :—

येन लक्ष्यमिति प्रोक्तं लक्ष्यशब्देन सोऽवदत् ।
एकस्यापि हि शब्दस्य गौणार्थस्वीकृतौ सताम् ॥
महती जायते लज्जा यत्र तत्राखिला रवाः ।
अमुख्यार्था इति वदन् तस्य मार्गानुवर्तिनाम् ।
कथं न जायते लज्जा वक्तुं शाब्दत्वमात्मनः ॥ —अ. व्या.

We ask what does the word लक्ष्य mean? Is it the primary sense or secondary? In the former alternative, why deny the primary sense to all other words. In the latter, we ask again what that sense is, primary, or secondary. In this way, the series will not end and will lead to endless - regress - अनवस्था. If it is said that all the words denoting ब्रह्मन् are secondary, we say, this is an evasive reply. You should analyse how लक्षणा operates. Its function depends upon the incompatability of the primary sense and this scrutiny results in endless regress if a word has no primary sense as held by the Advaitin. Thus, the inference proving the describability of Brahman is free from flaws.

The Siddhāntin does not object to the operation of लक्षणा (Secondary Sense) at all. It will function only when the primary sense is unsuited and unacceptable. Otherwise, in instances like सिंहो देवदत्तः :— Devadatta is a lion, कुंण्डपायिनामयने मासमग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् where सिंह (lion) and अग्निहोत्र

(अग्निहोत्रमिव अग्निहोत्रमिति गौणमित्युक्तं पूर्वतन्त्रे । —परिमळ)

are used in the secondary sense would be meaningless. To introduce लक्षणा unnecessarily cannot be justified, (एवमेव = without any reason that is, when the primary sense is admissible). Even for one word the primary sense should not be abandoned. If the entire Vēda is held to denote (convey) secondary sense, it is highly objectionable. In the present case, the primary sense of the word ब्रह्मन् amply suits the text, declares the Āchārya.

The Advaitin is alert and puts forth an ingenous defence, There are two Brahmans: attributeless and attributeful.

(अत्राह । द्वे ब्रह्मणी । निर्गुणं सगुणं च । तत्र निर्गुणं नित्यशुद्ध-मुक्तस्वभावं परिपूर्णं । तदेव मायाशबलितत्वेन ऐश्वर्यादि धर्मवत्तया सगुणमुच्यते ।)

The former becomes associated with qualities or attributes under the influence of Māyā, सगुण ब्रह्मन् may be वाच्य amenable to description and not निर्गुण who is attributeless. So, the Śruti ascribes वाच्यत्व to सगुण ब्रह्म only. However, by लक्षणा, वाच्यत्व may be ascribed to Nirguṇa Brahman.

('तथापि सर्वे वेदाः यत्पदमामनंतीत्यादि श्रुतिबलात् वाच्यत्वं निर्गुणस्य सेत्स्यतीति : मायाशबले गृहीतसंगतयः सर्वे वेदाः लक्षणया यत्पदमामनंतीत्यर्थोपपत्तेः । —Sudhā, P. 116.)

This is refuted by the Sūtra-kāra :—

|| ॐ गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॐ ||

In the Śruti 'परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते' । "He sees the Purusha lying in the body who is higer than Para (Prakṛiti), the Purusha is obviously the conditioned God (सगुण ब्रह्मन्) since as stated above, निर्गुण (unconditioned) Brahma is beyond the reach of sense organs. निर्गुण is self luminous. (स्वप्रकाश) and cannot be snbjected to perception (ईक्षणविषयत्वं = प्रमेयत्वं)

This argument of the Advaitin is rendered fallacious since the object to be seen is described in the Śruti as आत्मा, ब्रह्मन्,

पुरुष etc. which mean 'full' 'perfect' and 'replete' with auspicious qualities. Such an object cannot be a conditioned Ātma. For the seer of Ātmā is vouchsafed emancipation and bliss in the Śrutis यस्यानुवित्तः प्रतिबुद्ध आत्मा, तरति शोकमात्मवित्. The conditioned Ātmā cannot confer emanicipation,

(न हि गौणात्म निष्ठस्य मोक्षः उपपद्यते । —Sudhā, P. 117.)

In the first Sūtra (in this *Adhikaraṇa*) the word आत्मा etc. is a clear indicator that the object of perception (पुरुषमीक्षते ।) is the perfect (गुणपूर्ण आत्मा) unconditioned Ātmā. By this the minor premises ईक्षणीयत्व in the above syllolygm is proved in Nirguṇa Brahman and there is no असिद्धि. The doubt that the indicator (ज्ञापक) etc., may refer to conditioned (सगुण ब्रह्मन्) is removed by the second Sūtra तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् । which states that the meditator upon आत्मा etc. obtains emancipation which precludes the possibility of सगुण ब्रह्मन्.

(अत्र प्रथमसूत्रे परात्परमित्यादि वाक्येषु, निर्गुण ज्ञापकोक्त्या हेतुसिद्धिः समर्थिता । ज्ञापकस्य च अन्यथा सिद्धिः समर्थिता । ज्ञापकस्य च अन्यथा सिद्धिरुत्तरसूत्रे परिहृतेत्येतावत्सूत्रद्वयतात्पर्यं स्फुटमवगम्यते । —सुधा, P. 117).

आत्मब्रह्मादय. शब्दाः साक्षात्पूर्णाभिधायिनः ।
जन्मादिकारणं ब्रह्म लक्षितं च यदा तदा ॥
वंध्यापुत्रोपमं मायाशबलं वाच्यमित्यपि ।
कल्पयित्वा विना मानं लक्ष्यं शुद्धं वदन् पदैः ॥
आत्मशब्दोदितस्यैव ज्ञानं मुक्तावसाधनं ।
आह श्रुतपरित्यागः स्याच्चास्याश्रुतकल्पना ॥
स्यात्सर्वत्र च यत्रैकमपि लोको जुगुप्सते ।
नियमेनोभयं स्याद्धि यस्य स्वपरयोर्मते ॥

Further, the Advaitin is exposed to the fault of abandoning the evidence on hand and imagining what is not authentic (श्रुतपरि-

त्यागः अश्रुतकल्पना). The Brahman who is characterised (soiled) by Māyā has been introduced without any ground as the object of the primary sense of the Vēdas and the unsullied Brahman all powerful, omniscient and full of auspicious qualities is supposed to be the लक्ष्य (secondary sense) of the Vēdas. Why should the relevant आत्मन् ब्रह्मन् of the Vēdas which are actually found in the Vedas be miscarried? and the conditioned Brahman who is not denoted by any word in the Veda be hugged on without evidence? This is as good as the son of a sterile woman – absolutely non-existent. We (the Siddhāntins) on the other hand, hold that the Brahman introduced in जिज्ञासासूत्र is the creator etc. of the world and is not लक्ष्य as supposed by the Advaitin. This is clear from the Sūtra ॐ गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ॐ. The same Ātmā (Brahma) is the conferrer of Mōksha as stated in the second Sūtra (तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात्) The Advaitin is made to admit that he is trading on imaginary things. For this arbitrary act of his he deserves to be consigned to the regions of eternal darkness being decorated with inconceivable ornaments. This miserable plight no thinker would welcome :

वस्त्रहीनमलंकारं घृतहीनं तु भोजनम् ।
भावहीनं तु संलापं न प्रशंसंति पण्डिताः ॥

In fact. the Śruti decries the person who miscarries the Vēdas and denies the self existent prowess to God extolled in the Śruti in the following words :—

अलंकृतः सदैवायं दुर्घटैरेव भूषणैः ।
अंधंतमो नित्यदुःखं तस्य स्याद्वसनद्वयम् ॥

अनंदा नाम ते लोकाः अंधेन तमसा वृताः ।
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छंति येऽविद्वांसोबुधो जनाः ॥

असुर्या नाम ते लोकाः अंधेन तमसा वृताः ।
तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छंति ये के चात्महनो जनाः ॥

इत्यादि श्रुतयो मानं शतशोऽत्र समंततः ॥ —अ. व्या.

This is the fate of those who discard and deny the very existence of the Great God who is the primary sense of the Śāstras (आत्महनो वेदवाच्यपरमात्मत्यागिनः । —Sudhā.)

|| ॐ हेयत्वावचनाच्च ॐ ||

The word आत्मा is found as an epithet of the object of seeing in the Śruti आत्मन्येवात्मानं पश्येत् ॥ The Advaitin always interprets it as applicable to conditioned Brahman (गौणपर). This is not correct. For, the Śruti teaches that He alone should be known setting aside all other deities.

हेयत्वावचनाच्चैव नाऽऽत्मा गौणः श्रुतौ श्रुतः ।
तमेवैकं जानथाऽन्या वाचो मुंचथ चेति ह ॥
उक्त आत्मा कथं गौणो हेयपक्षे ह्यसौ श्रुतः ।
परिवारतया ग्राह्या अपि हेयाः प्रधानतः ॥ —अ. व्या.

If आत्मन् means invariably conditioned Brahma, (सगुण ब्रह्मन्) then it should mean गौण आत्मा in श्रुतिs like तमेवैकं जानथ आत्मानं अन्यावाचो विमुंचथ । अमृतस्यैष सेतुः । which is impossible to accept since other deities than आत्मा are deprecated and आत्मा is described as the bestower of *Mōksha*. Other decties are recommended for meditation as subsidiary to the Supreme God Vishṇu and not as principal.

Thus, the आत्मा the object of meditation (पश्येत्) is proved to be *Nirguṇa* and not सगुणब्रह्मन् of the Advaitin. This is supported by the Sūtra :—

|| ॐ स्वाप्ययात् ॐ ||

पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते ।
इति स्वस्यैव पूर्णस्य पूर्णोऽप्यय उदाहृतः ॥
कथं मायाव्यवच्छिन्नः पूर्णो मुख्यतया भवेत् ॥

In the final dissolution of the world (प्रलय), the entity which remains full-blown and perfect always is described as

concealing itself in its own self. The conditioned Brahman cannot be regarded as perfect and as entering its own self, as according to the Advaitin, *Nirguṇa Brahman* is the substratum of Saguṇa. So, the ultimate goal to be reached is *Nirguṇa* Brahman who is introduced as full of auspicious qualities in the जिज्ञासा and जन्मादिसूत्र.

This conclussion is supported by the Śruti ;—

॥ ॐ श्रुतत्वाच्च ॐ ॥

श्रुतत्वाच्च वाच्य इत्यतो निर्गुणस्य वाच्यत्वसिद्धिरिति । —सुधा.

सगुणस्य स्वाप्ययानुपपत्तिस्तावद्भाष्ये एवोक्ता । पूर्णत्वानुपपत्तिमाहा कथमिति । व्याघातादिति भाव. ॥

Here the Acharya has omitted to comment on the Sūtra गतिसामान्यात् in order to maintain the continuity of the context viz. of वाच्यत्व,

(प्रकरण शुध्द्या व्याचिख्यासुस्त दुल्लंघितवान् । —सुधा.)

The Sūtra गतसामान्यात् on the other hand, proves the homogenity of the *Śāstras*. It will be explained in the उपासनापाद (III, 3) below :

(प्रकरणशुद्ध्येति । = वाच्यत्व प्रकरणमविच्छेदेन व्याचिख्यासुरित्यर्थः । पाठक्रममनुसृत्य गति सूत्रव्याख्याने वाच्यता समर्थन प्रकरणं विच्छिद्येतेति भावः । —परिमळ. P. 114.)

The Sūtrakāra (Vēdavyāsa) inserted the Sūtra गतिसायान्यात् in the middle only to indicate that he intended to explain the meaning of the word सम् in समन्वयात् as कार्त्स्न्यं (totality = entire Śāstras and मुख्यार्थ primariness of meaning) at one stretch.

(सूत्रकारस्यापि प्रकरण सौकर्यस्यैतदेव प्रयोजनं । यदाक्षेपद्वयसमाधानस्य पूर्वसूत्रस्थ संशब्दार्थ समर्थनमेकमेव प्रयोजनमिति सूचनम् । तेन चाऽऽवृत्या संशब्दस्यानेकार्थता ज्ञापनं । अन्यथैकेनार्थेन चरितार्थस्यार्थांतरं न ज्ञायेत । तथा च न लक्षणद्वयस्य शास्त्रीयता स्यादिति ।–सुधा, P. 118.

॥ तथाचेति ॥ गुणपूर्णत्व जगत्कारणत्व लक्षणस्य चेत्यर्थः । —परिमळ.

पदं च निर्गुण इति कथं गौणं वदिष्यति ।
गुणाभावोपलक्ष्यं चेत्पदं तदपि वाचकम् ॥
अतोऽनवस्थितिमुख सर्वदोषमहास्पदम् ।
कथमेतन्मतं सद्भिराद्रियेत विचक्षणैः ॥ —अ. व्या.

In the *Śruti* एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतांतरस्थः । केवलो निर्गुणश्च । ...... the God is described by the word निर्गुण. So, he cannot be सगुण.

(निर्गुण इति च पदं कथं गौणं वदिष्यति । व्याहतत्वात् । अतो न सगुणोऽत्र श्रुत इति । —सुधा, P. 118),

The Advaitin explains that the word निर्गुण conveys the sense of निर्गुण by लक्षणा i. e. गुणाभावोपलक्षितं ब्रह्म. Here we ask, what then is the primary sense of the word ब्रह्मन् since लक्षणा depends upon अभिधा (सर्वशब्द वाचस्य लक्षणाऽयुक्तेः । —त. प्र.) Ultimately, it is established that *Nirguṇa Brahman* is the primary sense of the *Śāstras*. The stand of the Advaitin that Brahman is लक्ष्य (secondary) lacks evidence and should be discarded.

The Āchārya now refutes the interpretation of the Sūtras in the Īkshatyadhikaraṇa offered by the Advaitin :

न च सांख्यनिराकृत्यै सूत्राण्येतान्यचीक्लृपत् ।
भगवान्न ह्य शब्दत्वं प्रधानेंगीकरोत्यसौ ॥ —अ, व्या.

Śri Śaṅkarāchārya interprets this *Adhikaraṇa* as intended to refute the *Pradhāna* or Prakriti as the cause of the world as held by the *Sāṅkhyas*. Not so, says the Siddhāntin. The cause of the world is credited with knowledge, whereas the *Pradhāna* being inanimate cannot think and act.

(इत्येवं सांख्य निराकरणायैतानि सूत्राणि भगवान् सूत्रकारश्चकारेति यन्मायावादिनो वदंति तन्नेत्यर्थः । सुधा. —P. 119.

The *Sāṁkhyas* argue to establish their thesis as follows :— सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत् etc. of the Upanishad speaks of सत् as the creator of the world and सत् is one endowed with knowledge and action (ज्ञानक्रियाशक्ती). But Brahman is devoid of these qualities which are some how (गौणवृत्या) possible in प्रधान, This is refuted by Sankara as absurd. For, प्रधान (Primordial Matter) being inanimate cannot be credited with knowledge and action

(न चा चेतनस्य प्रधानस्येक्षितृत्वं संभवति । —Sudha, P. 119),

This action of seeing cannot be secondary (गौण). The text अनन जीवेनाऽऽत्मना shows that the nature of the creator is of Jiva who is *Chētana* (Sentient) which is not possible in *Achētana Prakṛiti*. Since *Pradhāna* is most powerful, it may be styled as identical with *Achetana*. The meditator on the creator gets liberation from bondage. The insentient *Prakṛiti* cannot grant emancipation. Yes, by the अरुंधतीनक्षत्रन्याय *Pradhāna* can be described as liberator being close to *Purusha* who liberates, This is not possible to accept, since all else than सत् is enjoined for msditation. Nowhere is अचेतन प्रधान stated to be the creator of the world. So, *Pradhāna* cannot be the meaning of सत्. In the Sruti. It is clearly stated that सर्वज्ञ चेतन is the creator स कारणं कारणाधिपाधिपः Īśvara can be assigned, though unchanging, the power of knowledge and action like the sun who is unchanging but is shining with all embracing light.

The Advaitin's interpretation is not correct as the Sūtrakārā does not regard the *Prakṛiti* of the Sāṁkhyas as अशब्द. For he assertts in the last pāda

(न शब्दबाच्यतैवास्य प्रधानस्य निषिध्यते । —I, iv, 3),

that *Pradhāna* is not discarded in the Vēdas. Nor does *Sāṁkhya* state that *Pradhāna* is not treated in the Vedas. Further, Pradhāna can be eliminated by the reason of *Īkshapa* (knowledge) only and there is no propriety in giving the additional reason अशब्दत्व.

(किं चेक्षणेनैव नेति प्रतिज्ञार्थ सिद्धाव शब्दं हि तदिति मध्ये हेत्वंतरकल्पनं व्यर्थम् । —Sudha, 120.)

So, अशब्दत्व is not explicabe in *Pradhāna* and so is असिद्ध in the syllolygm प्रधानं जगत्कारणं अशब्दत्वात् । What is अशब्दत्व ? An असत् (non-existent something) also may be अशब्द. But प्रधान is not असत्, as otherwise, the reason ईक्षति (ईक्षणविषयत्व) would be a misfit to explain its non-existent character (आद्ये तदुपपादनायेक्षतेरुपन्यासोऽनुपपन्नः । —Sudha, P. 120.) The Advaitin has to admit ईक्षितृत्व (seeing) in Brahman as secondary (गौण): Then why question it for *Pradhāna* in the Sūtra गौणश्चेत् etc. Further, why is a new argument advanced (आत्मशब्दात्), if the knowledge (ईक्षण) is secondary and is unobjectionable? The meditator on it gets emancipation (तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ।). Here, Mōksha is identity according to the Advaitin. Is it *identity with* Pradhāna or identity of जीव (Jiva) with Brahman. The first is incongruous as the knowledge of difference between Prakṛiti and Purusha is quite essential for Mōksha. That the second is impossible, we have proved below. To the objection of the *Sānkhya* that *Ātman* is गौण (secondary on the ground of its supreme power like king) a suitable reply was necessary. Instead, हेयत्वावचन (all else is discarded whereas आत्मन् is not) is put forth which is no reply at all. To say that Brahman is the object of all knowledge, (गतिसामान्यात्) is redundant with ईक्षतेर्नाऽशब्दम् ।

Thus, the propriety of the Sūtras cannot be maintained by the Advaitin, if they are referred to the refutation of the *Sāṁkhyas*. Even otherwise, the present context is to establish the वाच्यत्व of Brahman and not the dispelling of the *Sāmkhyas*.

(तथाऽपि प्रकृतसंगति पर्यालोचनयाऽत्र वाच्यत्वसमर्थनमेवोपपन्नं न सांख्यनिराकरणमित्याह ।)

समन्वये प्रतिज्ञाते शब्दगोचरतैव हि ।
प्रथमप्रतिपाद्या स्यात्तदभावे कुतोऽन्वयः ॥
कथं च लक्षणावादी ब्रूयाद् ब्रह्मसमन्वयम् ।
योऽसौ शब्दस्य मुख्यार्थस्तत्रैव स्यात्समन्वयः ॥ — अ. व्या.

It is true that according to the proposition तत्तु समन्वयात् the Pradhāna of the *Sāmkhyas* should be disposed off (eliminated) and the Vedic import in Brahman should be established, but, priority should be assigned to the proving of समन्वय in Brahman, for which, the functioning of word on Brahman should be treated first. And then lt should be examined whether Brahman is the creator etc. or the Pradhāna. So, the refutation of Pradhāna as the cause of the Universe has only a secondary importance and should come next. It is argued that without शब्दसमन्वय ; the entire Vedas being the primary denoter of Brahman. we can discuss about the Sāmkhyas, for the Vedas convey the Brahman by Lakshanā only. This is disproved by the use of the word समन्वय and not simple अन्वय. This shows that primary sense and not लक्षणा or indirect sense is intended to be conveyed by the author. The word समन्वय means,

(—समीचीनो अन्वयः समन्वयः । स च शब्दस्य वाक्यार्थ एव घटते । तत्रैव साक्षाच्छक्तिमत्त्वात् । लक्ष्यार्थे तु वाच्यार्थद्वारेण अन्वयो न समीचीनः । अतः समन्वयशब्दं प्रयुंजानेन सूत्रकृता बाच्यवाचकभाव एव प्रतिज्ञात इति ज्ञायते । स च अवाच्यत्व शंकानिरासमंतरेण सर्वथाऽप्यसंभावितःस्यादिति वाच्यत्व समर्थनमेव प्राथमिकमिति । —Sudhā, P. 121.)

the primary sense only. If the two functions वाच्यत्व (अभिधा) and लक्ष्यत्व (लक्षणा) were to operate in a word independently the primary sense by अभिधा is preferred. But in all cases, लक्षणा depends upon शक्ति (primary sense) only, and the latter i. e. लक्षणा has no independent existence. The Pūrvapakshin tries to interpret सम् in समन्वय as indicating लक्षणा and not शक्ति as

stated by us above. For, the words cannot operate on निर्गुणब्रह्मन्, whereas the verbal transaction presupposes the association of द्रव्य, गुण, क्रिया and जाति which cannot be related to Nirguṇa Brahman. In conveying Nirguṇa, the function of लक्षणा only should be resorted to.

(अतो ज्ञायते लक्षणाऽऽश्रिता सूत्रकृतेति । —Sudhā. P. 121)

This explanation of the Advaitin is fallacious. Who is the object of enquiry to whom the creation of the world is ascribed *Nirgnṇa* or *Saguṇa*?

जन्मादिकारणे साक्षादाह देवः समन्वयं ।
उक्तं तदेव जिज्ञास्यं क्वाऽवकाशोऽत्र निर्गुणे ॥ —अ. व्या.

It cannot be *Nirguṇa*. The author introduces *Brahman* in the first Sūtra as the object of enquiry and its characteristics are detailed in the second. The entire *Śāstra* is cited as an authority for this thesis in the third (शास्त्रयोनित्वात्). Then, the concord of the Śāstra in Brahman is proposed in the समन्वयसूत्र 'तत्तुसमन्वयात्' । So, there is no room or scope for introducing the imaginary *Nirguṇa Brahman* in this scheme of the Sūtras. The ब्रह्मन् of the first Sūtra is defined in the second and there can be no division of meaning as निर्गुण in the first Sūtra and सगुण in the second.

(जन्मादिसूत्रे जन्मादिकारणत्वेन लिलक्षयिषितमेव जिज्ञास्यमुक्तं । न हि अन्यज्जिज्ञास्यतया प्रतिज्ञायाऽन्यस्य लक्षणमुच्यते । अनुपयोगात् । Sudhā, P. 121.

कथं चाऽसंभवस्तस्य मुख्यार्थस्य निराकृतौ ।
मानेन केन विज्ञेयमवाच्याज्ञेय निर्गुणम् ॥ —अ. व्या.

Who is the object of समन्वय of the Vēdas? It cannot be निर्गुणब्रह्मन् as stated above. The word तत् in तत्तु समन्वयात् refers to सगुणब्रह्मन् only. The Advaitin poses 'सगुणस्य प्रकृतत्वेऽपि तत्परामर्शाऽसंभवेन जहदजहल्लक्षणया निर्गुणपरामर्शोऽभिप्रेयते ।

The reference to सगुण is impossible. This is explained in the Sudhā—

'तस्यानुक्रांतावां त्रिसूत्र्यां प्रकृतस्य मुख्यार्थस्य वाच्यस्य समन्वय विषयतया त्यागे असंभव: कथं न कथंचिदित्यर्थ: । अतो निर्गुणे समन्वयस्य अप्रतिज्ञातत्वात् न लक्षणाश्रयणमत्र युक्तम् । किंतु प्रथमप्राप्तया मुख्यवृत्त्यैवेति तदर्थ एब संशब्दोऽपीति' । —Sudhā. P. 121,

Here त्यागे is the निराकृतौ of the कारिका of अ. व्या. and refers to निर्गुण as निर्गुणस्य त्यागे. If निर्गुण is referred to by तत् in तत्तुसमन्वयात्, it must be by लक्षणा only. But लक्षणा cannot function on निर्गुणब्रह्मन् who is not known by any Pramāṇa and is अवाच्य,

मानेन केन विज्ञेय मवाच्याज्ञेय निर्गुणम् ।
अमेयं चेन्न शास्त्रस्य तत्र वृत्ति: कथं चन ॥

Since लक्षणा depends on शक्ति (अवाच्यस्य लक्षणाऽयुक्ते: । त. प्र.) and since निर्गुण is not the object of any knowledge, the attempt to explain the concord of Vedic words (समन्वय) in him would be vain and purposeless

(निर्गुणं ब्रह्म अमेयं चे दंगीकृतं । तर्हि अमेयत्वात्तत्र शास्त्रस्य कथं चन लक्षणयाऽपि वृत्तिर्न संभवतीति समन्वयसूत्रं व्यर्थमेव प्राप्तं । —सुधा, P. 121.)

If तीर is not known in its own form (स्वरूपत:) and in contact with the river Gaṅgā, the word Gaṅga cannot convey the sense of तीर by लक्षणा. Now निर्गुणब्रह्म who is लक्ष्य is not known at all, by any instrument of knowledge. So, it cannor be लक्ष्य at all. It is very finely stated in Sudhā.

(लाक्षणिकोऽपि हि शब्दो लक्ष्यप्रमोत्पादाय प्रयुज्यते । अन्यथा प्रयोजनांतराभावेन वैयर्थ्यप्रसंगात् । तथा च प्रमेये हेतुफलयोरसंभवात्कथं लक्षणासंभव. । —Sudhā, P. 121.)

The secondary word (लक्षक = गंगा) has a definite purpose namely of conveying the correct knowledge of लक्ष्य i. e. तीर (bank).

For doing this, the contact between the primary and secondary senses should be known previously to produce the result viz. the correct knowledge of तीर (bank). See the clarification in *Parimala* :—

'लक्ष्यवस्तुन: स्वरूपेण मुख्यार्थ संबंधित्वेन चोपस्थितिरूपहेतो: लक्ष्यार्थप्रमितिरूपफलस्य चासंभवादित्यर्थ: । —परिमळ, P. 115.

That the secondary word (लाक्षणिक शब्द) need not produce the correct knowledge of the लक्ष्य but can serve the purpose of negativing the contrary possibilitles is not tenable and has already been refuted

(ननु लाक्षणिका: शब्दा: लक्ष्यप्रमामनुत्पादयंतोऽपि विपरीताकारव्यावर्तनेनैव प्रयोजनवंतो भविष्यंतीति । न । निराकृतत्वात् । -सुधा, P. 121 निराकृतत्वात् । सत्यज्ञानादिकेऽप्येवं न व्यावृत्त्या प्रयोजन मित्यादिना जन्मादिसूत्रे इति भाव: । —परिमळ, P. 116).

तस्माच्छास्त्रेण जिज्ञास्यमस्मदीयं गुणार्णवं ।
वासुदेवाख्यमद्वंद्वं परं ब्रह्माखिलोत्तमम् ॥ —अ. व्या.

For the reasons stated above, an enquiry should be made into the nature of God Vāsudēva Highest of all. full of auspicious qualities who is सगुण not the सगुण of the **Advaitin who is** swayed by Māyā and is proved absolutely अप्रामाणिक (unreal).

बिज्ञेयवाच्य लक्ष्यत्वपूर्वाशेष विशेषत: ।
निर्गतं मनसो वाचो यदि तत्स्यादगोचरं ॥

अस्तु तन्मावदेद्वादी न चाऽस्मच्छास्त्रगं तु तत् ।
अवाच्यं वाच्यमित्युक्त्वा किमित्युन्मत्तवन्मृषा ॥

अस्मच्छास्त्रस्य चौर्याय यतते स्वोक्तिदूषक: ॥ —अ. व्या.

The Āchārya strikes a final blow against the निर्गुणब्रह्मन् of the **Advaitin**. It is not provable by any Pramāṇa and is

inconceivable. It is non-existent like the horn of a hare. It is not denoted by word by शक्ति or लक्षणा. So, it is not the object of words. It has no form nor attributes, and cannot be percieved, nor can it be inferred for want of any contact with लिंग minor premises. With all this, if it is argued that *Nirguṇa Brahman* is self luminous then, please yourself, but it cannot be the object of the Sāstras. His explanation of स्वप्रकाशत्व as प्रकाशांतरव्यावृत्ति would be irksome to himself as according to him Brahman is लक्ष्य and at the same time is stated to be the object of Sāstras. His statements are full of self contradictions and are unsupported by Pramāṇas.

जन्मादिकारणं यत्तत्साक्षान्नारायणाभिधं ।
वदंति श्रुतयो ब्रह्म शास्त्रं चैव तदर्थत: ॥

प्रवृत्तमस्त्ववाच्यं ते नैवं ब्रूया: कथं चन ।
सर्वशब्दैरवाच्यं तदुक्त्वा तद्विषयं पुन: ।
शास्त्रं वदंतमुन्मत्तं कथं लोको न वारयेत् ॥

मा वदो मा विजानीहि त्यजास्मच्छास्त्रचोरताम् ।
वयं त्वां श्रुतियुक्तिभ्यां बध्वाऽस्मच्छास्त्रमंजसा ॥

विचारयाम: श्रुतिभिर्युक्तिभिश्चैव सादरं ।
अद्भुतत्वादवाच्यं तदतर्क्यमियमेव च ।
अनंतगुणपूर्णत्वादि त्यूदे पैंगिनां श्रुति: ॥

अवाच्यमिति लोकोऽपि वक्त्याश्चर्यतमं भुवि ॥ ५ ॥

As a last resort, the Advaitin still clings to his defence and states that the Sruti treats about *Nirguṇa* and its means of interpretation the *Sūtras* must have the same object. Otherwise there will be disparity between कारण = means of knowledge and इतिकर्तव्यता (methods). Otherwise, the Sūtras would be unauthentic. This is unsound. The Srutis यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायंते etc. directly teach the agency of All the Powerful God Nārāyaṇa in creating the world, and that is the subject of treatment of the

जन्मादिसूत्र. The God Nārāyaṇa = Brahman who is full of auspicious qualities is thus established as the primary sense of the Vedas and not Siva or Hiraṇya-Garbha. The concord of the Vedas in the All pervading God Vishṇu is fully borne out by all evidences discussed in the forgoing thesis.

(तदेवं ब्रह्मणो वाच्यत्वाद्गतिसामान्याच्च युक्तं समन्वय सूत्रमिति सिद्धं ।)

End of the First five Adhikaraṇas in *Nyāya-Sudhā* and Anuvyākhyāna.

॥ ॐ ॥

EPILOGUE

The fore-going analytical survey of the *Pañchādhikaraṇī* (the first five Adhikaraṇas in the first Pada of the first Adhyāya) epitomises the import of the Vedānta Sūtras in general with a volley of arguments advanced by Śrī Jayatīrtha in *Nyāyasudhā* in support of the Dvaita Siddhānta of Śri, Madhvāchārya, derived from the study of Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. The *Anuvyākhyāna* of the Āchārya, as stated in the introduction, is designed to examine the other systems of thought with the critical apparatus of accredited code of evidence namely Pratyaksha, Anumāna and Āgama and to show how all the previous theorists have missed the central teaching of the Vēdas which Śrī. Kṛishṇa has explained to Arjuna in the following verses of the Bhagavadgītā—

द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च ।
क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि कूटस्थोऽक्षर उच्यते ॥

उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः ।
यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य बिभर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ॥

यस्मात्क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥

यो मामेवमसंमूढो जानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् ।
स सर्वबिद्भजति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥

"There are two Purushas in the world *Kshara* and *Akshara*. All the Beings are *Kshara* and unperishable Prakriti is *Akshara*. Different from these two is *Uttama Purusha* called *Purushottama* who pervades all the three worlds and supports them. Since I am far higher than *Kshara* and superior to *Akshara*, I am therefore, known as Purashottama. He who considers me as *Purushottama* is verily the All-knower and wlli get shelter in me in all ways",

The Mahābhārata which comprises the Bhagavadgītā is an authentic exposition of the Vedic teachings as stated in the Bhāgavata—

भारतव्यपदेशेन ह्याम्न.यार्थः प्रदर्शितः ।

—Bhāgavata I, 1.

The well-known dictum इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृंहयेत् । (The Vedas should be explained with the help of *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa*) is accepted by all the Vēdāntic Teachers in India. And the *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* have attained the sta us of the Vedas: ' इतिहासपुराणः पंचमो वेदानां वेदः ' i.e. they are regarded as the fifth Veda. In the Bhāshya on Bhagavadgītā and its commentary the Prameya-Dipikā of Sri. Jayathīrtha, the Mahābhārata has been regarded as a more powerful and better authority than the Vedas as it clarifies many problems which are not directly touched by them. Thus, the Bhārata, Bhāgavata, the Vēdas and the Brahmasūtras are unanimous in teaching the supremacy of Vishṇu = Kṛishṇa, the reality of the world, the gradation among the souls (Bhūtas) and the unchallenged greatness of God Vishṇu who is the Lord of *Prakṛiti* i. e. Lakshmi. This, exactly, is the teaching of the Dvaita Siddhānta of Śri, Madhvāchārya. This conclusion drawn from the general survey of the philosophic literature is borne out by the technical sastric evidences of Pratyaksha, Anumāna and Āgama-Paurushēya and Apaurushēya which are free from all blemishes.

From atheism to theism, one has to pass through several stages of thinking, They are represented by *Charvāka*, *Bauddha*, *Ārhata*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Vaiśēshika*, *Tārkika* and *Mīmāmsaka*. These theorists have been denounced as defective by Śhri Bādarāyaṇācharya who is an *Avatāra* of God Nārāyaṇa and by all the Vedic and Āgamic thinkers in India who have commented on his works. Among the Vedic teachers. Śri. Śaṅkara, Śrt. Rāmānuja and Śrī. Madhva are the foremost and the Āgamic thinkers are two-fold (1) of Pāñcharātra and of Sātvata Āgamas which are based on **the Vedas** and (2) Śaiva Āgamas which **are written by Śiva or Paśupati.** The former are accepted as

authority as they are based on the Vēdas. But the latter are condemned and refued as they have the defects of human authorship. It may be noted that the Pāñcharātra and Sātvata Āgamas are Vaishṇava and teach the supremacy of Vishṇu-Kṛishṇa while the latter are Śaiva.

Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya who was the immediate suecessor of the early Buddhist teachers who preached nihilism (शून्यवाद) idealism (विज्ञानवाद), momentariness (क्षणिककाद) etc., was greatly influenced, by their philosophy though he refuted their system tooth and nail. An impartial thinker— a third person can easily detect the defects in Śaṅkara's philosophy and notice the structural similarity in both the systems. Mere verbal change in terminology does not constitute any difference in essentials. So, his Philosophy is declared to be a concealed Buddhism by Sri. Rāmānujāchārya and Śri. Madhvāchārya.

The Advaita-vāda is thus nothing more than the Buddhist *Śvnyavada*. It is an unbearable tragedy in Philosophy that the theistic realism of Bādarāyaṇa should be metamorphised into nihilism under the pressure of the over-riding Buddhist impact by such a giant thinker as Sri. Śaṅkarāchārya, who himself in his turn denounced Buddhism with vehement attacks. A careful perusal of the Bhāshya of Sri. Śaṅkarāchārya on the Brahmasūtras, Gītā and Upanishads reveals the incongruity and self contradictions obviously due to the author's dilema to reconcile the theistic realism of the Brahmasūtras which he belived in, with the theory of illusion and identity of Brahman with Ātma (Soul-Jīva) which are the figment of his imagination. Sri. Śaṇkara struggled hard to fit this philosophy with Advaita while interpreting the Brahmasūtras. But he has betrayed himself in several places by imposing unwarranted meanings which militate against the context and the general tenor of the text. Usually he understands the Sutras as couveying difference (Bhēda) between God and Soul and reality of the world. But at the end he adds an irrelevant note that this interpretation of difference is not the import of Sutras but the sense of difference vanishes soon after the rise of the God vision, by which the

soul becomes one with God (Brahma). He and his commentators openly have said that the Sūtras teach only *Bhēda* and not *Abhēda* except one or two like ' भोक्त्रापत्तेः ' ' मायामात्रं ' which only apparently seem to convey the sense of unreality of the universe due to Māyā. Here, in मायामात्रं तु कार्त्स्न्येन अनभिव्यक्त स्वरूपत्वात् । it is pointed out that Māyā does not mean illusion but God's inscrutable power and prakṛiti = Samskāra (वासना = impression) which are real.

All philosophical inquiry (ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा) is intended to yield knowledge which leads to emancipation and unmixed bliss (जिज्ञासोत्थ ज्ञानजात्तत्प्रसादादेव मुच्यते । –अ. व्या.) An imaginary or false something can not function and bring about any result like the son of a sterile woman or horn of a hare. Why waste energy and the thinking faculty if their outcome is nothing real and effective.

We have to note here that theorists who have written on philosophy have failed to evolve a sound and harmonious *Siddhānta* (teaching) from the Vedas and auxiliary lores which are the only means of knowledge in the realm of extra-sensuous objects like God, heaven, hell, *Dharma* and *Adharma* etc. The apparent contradictions, repetitions, unfrutfullness of Vedic injunctions etc. which are commonly observed in them due to lack of adequate approach have lead them to disbelieve their validity. The Chārvāka, Buddhist, Ārhata (Jain) etc. have flouted the Vedas as invalid and unreliable. The Mīmaṁsakas Vaiśēshikas, Sāṁkhyas etc. who accept the Vedic authority as reliable evidence have missed their real import in the midst of verbal and exterior hair-splitting analytical dissective investigations. Śri Bādarāyaṇa or Vedavyāsa was the real Vedantist who caught the central teachings of the Vedas and preached them to the world through Brahmasūtras, Itihāsa and Purāṇa which aim at dissolving the riddle of knotty and enigmatic problems and apparent contradictions in the Vedas. On the contrary, the over-riding Buddhist influence as stated above, was so powerful that it overwhelmed the greatest Vedantins like

Śri Śaṅkarāchārya. who while condemning it, himself fell a prey to it. His inner urge to establish theism through *Brahma-vāda* in philosophy led to the theory of illusion or unreality of the world in the wake of the Buddhist thinkers.

By this uncooked and half-hearted approach to the philosophy, he did great injustice to the Vedas which are dedicated to the preaching of Divine knowledge of God Vishṇu, Reality of His creation, philosophy of love and a means to salvation from the misery of birth and death in Saṁsāra (अदुःखमितरत्सर्वं जीवा एव तु दुःखिनः । तेषां दुःखप्रहाणाय श्रुतिरेषा प्रवर्तते । Though he professed to be a staunch follower of the Vedas, he was driven to think that the BrahmaKāṇḍa i. e. the Upanishads and even there the Five Great Sentences (पंचमहावाक्यs) like तत्वमसि, अहंब्रह्मास्मि, योऽसौ सोऽहं, नेह नानास्ति किंचन, परेऽव्यये सर्वे एकीभवंति । are the only reliable evidence in the vast mass of Vedic literature. Even these Five Great Sentences being other than Brahman which is the only real entity, had to be denounced as Myth or False. But how can a false word function as a means of knowledge? How can daily transcations be explained if the whole drama is unreal. To escape from such incongrucus anamoly. he most ingenously invented without basis – three kinds of realities – transactional (व्यावहारिक). Cognitional (प्रातीतिक or प्रातिभासिक) and Ultimate (पारमार्थिक) of which the first two are phases of unreality and the last is the only absolute reality i. e. Brahman. To establish this novel theory, he had to append a note called *Adhyāsābhāshya* to his commentary (Bhāshya) on the Brahmasūtras, which is irrelavent and unwarranted. This theory of Māyā, or Adhyāsa, played a havoc in philosophical investigation. This absolved him from all logical blemishes and testimonial lapses under the garb of All – Saviour Māyā. In the realm of false-hood all – good or bad – have an unfettered role to play. This lead to logical impotency and consequent chaos in the philosophical integrity of investigation. Hence, we notice that the greatest commentators of Śrī Śaṅkarāchārya have no fidelity and loyalty to their own Master-Teacher (Guru) and

have set themselves free to think and write without any curb on their vagaries and whims. They are found to refute the voteries of their own Advaita system mutually. The authors of Bhāmatī, Vivaraṇa, Vārtika, and Chitsukha, Ānanda Bodha, Bharatitīrtha etc. indulge in cock-fight among themselves advancing mutually antagonistic arguments. This created a defection in the fold. Some writers advocate the theory of *One Jīva* (एकजीववाद) and others many Jīvas (बहुजीववाद): some hold चित् as the receptacle of Ajñāna (चिदाश्रितं अज्ञानं) (ignorance or neisense) while others take जीव (soal) as its repository. दृष्टि-सृष्टिवाद, अज्ञानवाद, अजातवाद, जगदुपादानवाद, विवर्तवाद (doubts about the material cause of the universe) — all these various theories have outstayed the orginal Advaita of Sri Śaṅkarāchārya. This uncontrolled play of Māyā – Avidyā imagined by the founder of Advaita to explain his theory of निर्गुणब्रह्मवाद has cut asunder the binding cords of the structure of composite harmonious thought-pattern of philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa and introduced unbridled disjointed freaks of logic in the form of several theories noted above. This mutual destruction (सुन्दोपसुन्दन्याय) resulted in the collapse of the main edifice of Advaita.

To this list of Sundōpasundas' Cock-fights (सुन्दोपसुन्द) may be added the name of the author of *Advaita Tatva Sudhā*, M. M. Ananta Kṛishṇaśāstri who in his frenzy of attacking the formidable adversary Nyāyasudhā has cut his own throat by wrong interpretation of Dvaita Siddhānta, by self contradictions and by lapse of logical integrity and fair play. We notice here a few glaring blunders of the Śāstri as specimen of his intellectual imbecility and notorcity of disquisitional lapses.

In Advaita Tatva Sudhā the author has noted some topics in which the Dvaitins and Advaitin's are said to concur and differ. Here he has betrayed his utter ignorance of the tenets of Dvaita-vāda and misrepresented his own system (Advaita), by wrong statements. For example, the points of concurrence noted by him do not prove his thesis :

(1) वेदनित्यत्वं : The Vādas are, according to the Advaitins, unreal as they are part of the जगत् (world) which is unreal. *Mithyā* or unreal is defined as त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि which never exists in past, present and future. How can this be regarded as *nitya* = त्रैकालिकनिषेधाप्रतियोगि ? In this respect, there can be no agreement between Dvaita and Advaita. In fact, according to the alternative explanation of the Sūtra शास्त्रयोनित्वात्, as शास्त्रस्य योनि: by Śankara, the creation of the Vedas is attributed to Brahman = God. But, the Dvaitins consider the Vedas as *Apourshēya* not written by any author, and remain eternally unaltered in form and sense. They do not regard them as unreal or created by God

(2) It is stated in the A. T. Sudhā (page 97) that the Śruti declaring Brahma and world as real etc., is valid only until they are sublated by the corrective knowledge = Bādha, as the error of silver in shell is removed by the rise of Bādha-Jñāna (this is shell or this is not silver) (अद्वैतसिद्धांते हि ब्रह्मसत्यत्वश्रुतिः प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वश्रुतेः तत्रत्यशादिकं किंयहुना इदं रजतमित्यादिज्ञानमपि यावद्बाधं प्रमाणं । This is not the stand of the Dvaitins who hold that *Prāmāṇya* (reality) is not short-lived. The error endures as real until sublation or corrective knowledge rises. But this notion of reality Brahma is only = प्रामाण्यभ्रम, according to the Dvaitins.

The extra-sensuons inanimate objects are stated to be only inferrable whereas *Dharma* and *Adharma* which are also inanimate and अतींद्रिय are held to be knowable by Āgama (p. 110) only. This is an instance of the authors self contradiction. The author's observations about ॐकार, अनिर्वचनीयत्व are also contrary to the views of the Advaitins and misrepresent the opinians of the Dvaitins on the subject.

As I have stated above, there is no unanimity of thought among the writers on the Advaita, simply because the system itself is defective and the learned Advaita scholars with keen intellect and searching accumen try to justify and defend the weak system with blind loyalty to the great Teacher Śaṅkarā

chārya with new arguments which are opposed to the very foundatfons of "Advaita". I reserve the full treatment of this point (refutation of the system and of the stand of M. M. Ananta Krishṇa Sastri) to a later occasion after the full treatment of the *Nyāyasudhā* is completed.

The Vedic philosophy of Bādarāyaṇa was thus sidetracked and miscarried by the Advaitins under the garb of Vedantin. The same is the case with the Oriental scholars who have appeared in the field recently. The modern Oriental scholars who first came upon and contacted the Advaita scholars in India when they started to aquaint themselves with the different branches of Indian literature, were greatly influenced by that thonght pattern but in course of time, finding the self contradictions and unsoundness of the system began to criticise it as defective and untenable. But being partly politically motivated and partly unable to understand the hidden meanings of Indian philosophy, they invented a new line of approach called the "Historical Method", and the "evolution of thought," according to which, they denounced as invalid and unreliable, the Vedast Purāṇas. Smriti. etc. which, tney say, were composed at different periods by different authors to suit the exegencies of their own time. Though they may probably be treated as authoritive for the time being, they can not hold their ground as absolute authority for all times. This they tried to prove by the new methods of linguisties, philology, pré-historic archaeology, anthropology and other social sciences. The Vedas are said to be not competent to propound a systematic philosophy. Further, according to these scholars they are mere histōrical documents of a very early age tracing the movements of the nomadic Aryans and their domestic life. In this way, the modern approach of the Orientalists has cut at the very root of the otherwise unchallenge able composite evidence of the Vedas and the subsidiary lore and left the inquisitive scholar in the wildernesss with his eyes of introspection covered and blinded. The Advaitin's also invented many unproveable units, viz. Māyā, Avidyā, Ābhāsa, Anirvachaṇīya, three grades of existences (सत्तात्रैविध्य; प्रातिभासिक,

व्यवहारिक and पारमार्थिक etc) to steer clear of the evidential and logical deficiencies which are impediments in building up a cogent system of thought. Like the modern scholars the Advaitins also disbelieve the Vēdas as authority and unbridled logic and pro-conceptions have given rise to self contradictions and disparities in their theory. This offers no solace to the scholars, and stvdents of Vedānta.

The most cogent and logical handling of the extra-sensuous objects like Dharma, Adharma etc. and the raising of a harmoious mansion of Vedic phiiosophy to lead and guide the aspirant soul with proper instructions, to the gates of eternal happiness has been accomplished by Śrī Madhvāchārya who teaches the Supremacy of the compassionate Loving God Vishṇu with a big retinue of gods Vāyu, Rudra, Indra, etc. and their conserts to carry out His mendates and the noble mission of giving a proper lead to the groping souls for eternal happiness. The Ṭīkas of Śrī Jayatīrtha have presented the Āchārya's mission in unequivocal and clear language in recognition of which he is called *Ṭīkāchārya.* His Nyāya sudhā a lucid gloss on the *Anuunvyakhyāna* of Śri Madhvāchārya is the *Magna Chārta* of the Dvaita Siddhanta. The Pañchādhikarani published here summarieses the principles of Madhva Siddhānts for the use of the students of Indian philosophy.

The remaining paart of the *Nyāyasudhā* will be similarly presented in book-form where all criticisms on the Dvaita-system particularly on the Nyāyasudhā will be considered and answared.

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NYAYA-SUDHA OF SRI JAYATIRTHA

A COMMENTARY ON THE ANUVYAKHYANA OF
SHRI MADHVACHARYA

PANCHADHIKARANI

(An Analyticai Study)

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Mahamahimopadhyaya, Vidyaratna, Vidyabhushana,
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